Polish-Georgian

Historians’ Commission

Collected Works

Volume IV

Edited by

David Kolbaia

Reviewers

Prof. Paata Surguladze, Irakli Abashidze

Main Scientific Editorial board of the Georgian Encyclopedia, Georgia

Prof. Jan Szumski, IPN, Warsaw, Poland

Cover

Sylwia Szafrańska

Proofreading

David Kolbaia

Index

David Kolbaia

Typesetting

Marcin Koc

On the Cover: President of Poland Ignacy Mościcki during Sea Day celebrations in Gdynia aboard the warship ORP ‘Mewa’, welcomed by the ship’s commander Lt. Viktor Lomidze

Photo: National Digital Archives

On the Back Cover: Sergo Kuruliszwili, Warsaw, 1923

Photo from the David Kolbaia’s collection

Copyright © by Institute of National Remembrance – Commission of the Prosecution

of Crimes against the Polish Nation, 2023

Copyright © by David Kolbaia, Polish-Georgian Historians’ Commission, 2023

ISBN 978-83-8376-017-9 (epub)

ISBN 978-83-8376-018-6 (mobi)

Please visit us at

www.ipn.gov.pl

www.ksiegarniaipn.pl

Sergo Kurulishvili 1894–1925 (pseudonym ‘Typhoon’)

Poet and Journalist, Chairman of the ‘Georgian-Polish Club’, 1920

DISINTEGRATION OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND THE FORMS OF TRANSITION TOWARDS NATION-SATETS

by Wojciech Materski

The February Revolution ushered in a new situation for numerous nations that had comprised parts of the Russian Empire – a state which lived up to its moniker, the Prison of the Nations, due to its long-standing policy of conquest.[1] The structures of power of the days of old based on Governorates-General – an amalgamation of civil and military administration characteristic of Russia – which were used to keep the nations in check by effectively blurring ethnic and territorial distinctions, began to collapse and disintegrate.[2] The peripheries of the Empire began to exert an ever-increasing pressure on the central authorities to resolve the issue of the nations and to satisfy the ambitions of regional elites. The demands for federalisation of the state and distribution of power to the peripheries grew louder and louder as time passed. At a certain point, this movement engulfed virtually the entire state; however, the extent of the demands never went beyond calls for autonomy or self-government, with the notable exception of Polish lands.

This process also took place in Transcaucasia, and the overarching tendency to expand the region’ s self-government, which was characteristic of the movement, was reinforced by the Provisional Government’s policy toward it. This is because the cabinet of Prince Georgy Lvov determined that in the case of territories such as Transcaucasia and Turkestan, trying to effectively organise and supervise the local administration would be an exercise in futility. Thus, the governor made the decision to grant them autonomy and cede much of the central government’s authority to the local authorities. In March, a local administrative body – the Special Transcaucasian Committee (OZAKOM), which was also referred to as the Transcaucasian Provisional Government – was established. A similar solution was applied in Turkestan, where the bulk of local administration tasks were taken over by the Turkestan National Committee, which – just like the OZAKOM – was comprised of local deputies to the Fourth State Duma. Both these institutions theoretically had full control over their respective territories, with the exception of the legislative branch, which was reserved for the central authorities. They were treated as a temporary solution, which would remain in place for the duration of the war – they were not seen as a way to provide full autonomy for good.

The first weeks of the Provisional Government’s rule saw information coming in from almost all national regions about spontaneously emerging self-governing autonomous institutions. In early March, an Executive Committee was formed in Kyiv, bringing together Ukrainian politicians and local government activists, followed shortly thereafter by the Central Council, which clearly had national inclinations. The Belarusian National Committee, which was established at the same time in Minsk, was an initiative pursued mainly by Polish landowners; however, the Council of Belarusian Parties and Organisations, which was formed three months later, gave rise to autonomy-oriented activities in the spirit of the self-determination of the nation. During a meeting in Wolmar, which took place in late March, local government activists and Latvian politicians called on the authorities to create a separate Governorate to rule over all Latvian lands and elected a temporary Governorate Council to implement the project. The Estonians went even further, raising a demand for autonomy for the Estonian Governorate within the Empire in early March. It was accepted by the central authorities, who have appointed a commissioner of autonomy – the mayor of Tallinn.

The demands for autonomy, as well as the increase of the role of local elites in the system of power, were seen everywhere – even in remote regions of Siberia, where local activists from Yakutia, Buryatia, Khakas, Kyrgyzstan and Altai attempted to undermine the zemstvo system, which was imposed upon them by the central authorities.[3] National – or local – self-identification was dominant, but there was also a strong strand of religious self-identification. Partly under the influence of external propaganda, the Empire’s Muslims began to make political demands, which mainly boiled down to a federal state system, which was supposedly the best way to protect the interests of Muslim citizens. The First All-Russian Muslim Congress, which took place in Moscow in May 1917 to promote these ideas, was far more moderate than the one taking place in Baku at the same time, which saw a strong representation of Turkish-inspired Turanist sentiment, which was potentially dangerous for the state.[4]

The circumstances in which the autonomy and independence projects were forged by the respective nations and the various peoples of the Empire, as well as their subsequent attempts at making them a reality, were subject to changes caused by the dynamics of war. The role of politicians was to recognise these changing circumstances as well as to undertake appropriate actions without exposing society to the possibility of retaliation while fostering the right attitudes towards the alternative ushered in by the Russian Revolution – the national program or the class program.

The situation of the nations and nationalities of the crumbling Empire varied. Some were forced to declare their support for one of the sides of the growing political confrontation, while others initially avoided this outcome. Smaller nations, usually located on the outskirts of the Empire, mostly wanted to keep out of the conflict and to form local government bodies, which would enable them to successfully implement their survival policies until the final clarification of the political situation in Russia. The larger nations, which resided on the western borderlands of the Empire occupied by the central states, started to openly proclaim programmes that would put them on the road to independence while trying to implement their assumptions using the various forms of autonomy which were available to them despite being under occupation. The occupying powers fostered these ambitions while trying to channel them into an anti-Russian military campaign without making any further political commitments or concessions. This reserve was somewhat hard to maintain, given the pressure of the national communities, which led to the emergence of a variety of solutions, such as the Regency Council in Poland as well as the idea of installing a Hohenzollern monarch on the Lithuanian throne

The stance concerning the dynamically changing situation within the empire, as well as the social and political forms of reaction to these changes, resulted not only from the geographic location or the area inhabited by a particular nation or people. Their varying levels were as much due to the level of national self-consciousness, closely related to the historicity of the nation in question, its previous experience of statehood or struggle for national liberation – in particular in the 19th century – as well as the maturity and size of its national elite and their ability to win over the support of other nations. Another particularly important factor was the potential of a given nation, which directly determined the purpose and rationale of taking the risk of a political confrontation that would inevitably lead to a military campaign against one of the leading forces in the Russian civil war. This sum of factors was hardly exhaustive for each nation which stepped forward with demands for autonomy or with even more far-reaching propositions. The decisive role in this regard was played by the powers controlling – or seeking to control – a given region following the collapse of the Empire, which often resulted in disputes between them. In the case of the Empire’ s southern borderlands (Transcaucasia, the Southern Front), this dispute went on between Germany and Turkey, and in the context of the Entente, it was also led by Great Britain, France, the United States, and even Italy.

The tumultuous events of the two 1917 revolutions opened up an opportunity for a number of peoples of the Empire to claim independence. Undoubtedly, large nations – such as the Poles and Ukrainians – had an easier time pursuing these demands, as they were attractive as allies in the ongoing war due to their sizeable potential. In exchange for promises of support for their autonomy or even independence projects, these nations were able to effectively engage in the final phase of the war and field the ranks of much-needed recruits. That is why the authorities expressed rather significant tolerance for the newly emerging autonomous institutions, such as the Ukrainian Central Council, which had established an autonomous government expressing a relatively far-reaching demand for the country’s complete autonomy within the Russian Empire (June–July 1917). Following the dismantling of the All Russian Constituent Assembly by the Bolsheviks, the newly formed body made the decision to proclaim full independence in the form of the Ukrainian People’s Republic on 22 January 1918), which was ultimately recognised by the Bolsheviks in the Treaty of Brest following a brief attempt at an armed intervention.

Poland and Finland, which had a special status within the Empire, began their journey towards their respective national emancipation processes from a different starting point. The Grand Duchy of Finland, linked to Russia by a personal union, had a full autonomy. The Kingdom of Poland, which had lost its autonomy in 1874, had a much deeper integration with the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, in both cases there was a strong sense of separateness, and both Finland and Poland had their own autonomous institutions. Thanks to these institutions, after the Bolshevik revolution in the Russian Empire, Finland has declared itself as a sovereign kingdom on 6 December 1917. The ensuing war was ultimately won by the forces supporting the country’ s independence, although their situation remained unstable and precarious for a long time.

On the other hand, the process of institutionalisation of Polish autonomy, followed by building the foundations of quasi-independence, took place under the control of the armies of the Central Powers occupying the territory of the Kingdom of Poland. The Act of 5 November 1916 – a proclamation by the Austrian and German Governor-Generals announcing the restoration of Poland as a monarchy – was the foundation of Polish independence. Based on its provisions, the Provisional Council of State was established and started its operations in January 1917, with the Regency Council ruling in the king’ s stead created in October of that year. In November 1917, the Regency Council appointed the first government, giving rise to a system of government that lasted until the end of the war. Even though it was dependent on the occupying powers, it had the basic features of an independent statehood.

The Baltic States region, also referred to as the Pribaltica – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – was similar to Transcaucasia in terms of territory and population; however, its situation was different, since it was predominantly influenced by Germany – a factor, which emerged much later in Transcaucasia.

With the approval of the occupying German authorities, a conference of Lithuanian independence activists appointed the Council of Lithuania, better known as Taryba, in September 1917. In cooperation with the Germans, the aim of the Taryba was to prepare the country for independence, as well as provisionally reduce the annoyances of the occupation regime, while preparing the infrastructure for future statehood. On 16 February 1918 the Taryba proclaimed independence – the declaration was mostly a formality, since it did little to change the situation when it came to Lithuania’ s subordination to German authorities.

During the period in question, clear autonomy initiatives were not seen in Latvia, although the Latvian community in Petrograd made certain preparations to follow this pursuit. In the autumn of 1917, the Latvian Provisional National Council was established in the city, proclaiming the idea of the country’s independence. However, the new body lacked the ability to take any action aimed at organisation. In March 1918. The Baltic Germans decided, following the approval of Ober-Ost, to establish the Duchy of Courland and Semigallia, which was shortly-lived and lasted only several months.[5]

In Estonia, activities aimed at the country’ s emancipation were much more prominent. As mentioned above, Estonia was the first national territory to gain autonomy in the spring of 1917. Constant pressure on the authorities to expand its scope resulted in further successes – the establishment of an autonomous parliament in July 1917, the creation of the national army, the introduction of Estonian as an official language, and the nationalisation of the University of Tartu. The autonomous Estonian government, established in October, was overthrown by the Bolsheviks. Following the incursion of German troops into the republic, the Estonian Council of Seniors had declared the country’ s independence on 24 February 1918. Germany, however, did not recognise the newly-formed state and responded by introducing a military administration.

The Belarusian emancipation movement had found itself in a relatively precarious situation, mostly due to its relatively weak political elites whose experience could hardly be compared with those of Georgia, Ukraine or Poland. After the February Revolution, the process of establishing Councils of Delegates, which was characteristic of the Empire, spread to the Belarusian lands. The emerging political parties were mostly in favour of autonomy within the framework of the federated Russian state, followed by the Bolshevik state after the November coup. The attempt to include the national factor – the First All-Belarusian Congress of December 1917 – in the process of gaining autonomy was immediately dashed by the Bolsheviks, who imposed the Soviet regime in Belarus – first in the form of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic in Smolensk, followed by the so-called Litbel. After the resumption of the German offensive, which forced the Bolsheviks to escape from Minsk, the Committee elected at the First All-Belarusian Congress of December resurfaced, and – following the approval of the German military authorities – proclaimed the establishment of the Belarusian Democratic Republic and established an administrative body – the People’s Secretariat. The Committee has renamed itself the BDR Council, which – after recruiting regional representatives – proclaimed the independence of Belarus on 25 March in agreement with the Germans.

Of the small nations of the crumbling Empire, the greatest drive for independence was seen among the Crimean Tatars, who proclaimed an independent Crimean People’s Republic during a Tatar congress in Bakhchysarai in November 1917, established a Constituent Council (Kurultai) and formed a government (Directorate). This independence was short-lived – after a brutal pacification, the Bolsheviks proclaimed the creation of the Taurida Soviet Socialist Republic[6] on 21 March 1918.

The processes of gaining autonomy among the nations of Central Asia and the Far East (Turkestan, Khiva, Bukhara, Far Eastern Republic) were highly similar, but, with many unique factors. Most importantly, the Turkestan National Committee, which was subordinate to the Provisional Government, was overthrown in September by Russian colonists, who proclaimed the rule of the Tashkent Council in the region. This situation lasted until the Bolsheviks seized the city in November 1917. In contrast, the khanates of Bukhara, Khiva and Kokanda announced their autonomy only to have it be quickly quelled by the Bolsheviks, especially in the case of the latter.[7]

The experienced politicians of the Transcaucasia kept a keen eye on the developments taking place across 1917 in an attempt to try to avoid mistakes that could bring conflicts taking place across all of Russia to the region. The main ones stemmed from dual systems of power – the simultaneous functioning of administrative structures and councils of delegates. What is more, the Transcaucasian OZAKOM, while being important as an institutional precedent, did not lived up to expectations that it would counterbalance the network of councils, which gained an undisputed leading role in the region.

In contrast to many other regions, in particular Petrograd and Moscow, the Transcaucasian councils managed to impose and maintain a course of gradual democratic reform. The councils’ highest executive body, the National Centre, which had been active since June 1917, formulated no demands concerning the nation, maintaining a position of convening a democratically elected All-Russian Constituent Assembly as the optimal solution to the issues of the future of the Empire and Transcaucasia as a part of it. Over time, to streamline administration amid a deepening sense of national separateness among Georgians, Azerbaijanis and Armenians, the decision was made to establish three national councils subordinate to the Centre in November 1917. It was a functional solution, albeit with certain features of an autonomy.

The key turning point in the processes of gaining autonomy was the Bolshevik coup of November 1917. The ensuing civil war changed the context in which autonomous and national movements operated within the Empire. The previously dominant model of a democratic federation and Russia being the leading state has lost its raison d’être. It quickly became apparent that there was a clear and present danger of the surrounding nations being overwhelmed by the Bolshevik revolution – a significant part of their societies could see that future as a far more attractive prospect than building a national bourgeois-democratic state. This so-called class factor, which was particularly pronounced in Finland, Estonia and Latvia, decomposed national elites, facilitated the spread of revolutionary sentiment, and destabilised weak local power structures. Its role in Transcaucasia was small, but it should not be overlooked.

The new Bolshevik authorities controlled only a certain part of the territory of the former Empire. What is more, it was constrained by the slogan of the right of nations to self-determination, promoted during the tumultuous year of 1917, which the Bolsheviks found very difficult to abolish.[8] On the other hand, the military authorities of the counter-revolutionary White Guards, responsible for the administration in the regions controlled by them, highlighted the local national and ethnic features, since it helped with attracting local volunteers to enlist for the war effort; however, they failed to entertain any demands beyond the framework of the general project of a one and indivisible Russia.

Given the sudden and unexpected polarisation of the situation and the new circumstances in the aftermath of November 1917, Transcaucasia did not recognise the coup d’état and did not side with the Soviet authorities. This decision was not an attempt to proclaim independence – it was merely an expression of rejection of lawlessness. Amid the disintegration of the central government, administration in the region was temporarily taken over by the Public Security Committee, an ad hoc institution designed to oversee the region until the Constituent Council would be put in place.

Immediately after the results of the Constituent Assembly elections were announced, the region’ s winning parties – the Georgian Mensheviks, Armenian Dashnaktsutyun and Azerbaijani Mussavatists – established the Transcaucasian Commissariat, a body with the powers of a local government. The decision was purely pragmatic. It established a provisional framework for regional administration, pending the convening of the Constituent Assembly and its decision regarding the new political system. Like the earlier Public Security Committee, it was not an attempt at gaining independence from Russia, or even at establishing an autonomy – the goal was to maintain order in what seemed to be at the time a short transitional period.

These actions of the political elites of the Transcaucasia lost its raison d’ etre after the Bolsheviks dismantled the Constituent Assembly. The hopes for a democratic transition in Russia, mandated by the decisions of the Constituent Assembly, were dashed. At the same time, there was no institution of power with which the political elites of Transcaucasia could coordinate their local government programme.

Transcaucasia’s relatively small population, coupled with the immediate proximity to the disorganised yet still dangerous Southern Front, led the region’s politicians to be cautious; however, in the aftermath of the collapse of the democratic Russia programme, it was impossible to continue this policy. The region has been forced to choose its political representation and introduce an independent system of government. This was the genesis of the emergence of the Transcaucasian Seim – a transitional institution between the remnants of the Russian Empire threatened by the Bolsheviks and the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic. This decision was forced by the circumstances that exposed Transcaucasia to a brutal response from both sides of the Russian civil war, yet at that time, the elites, thinking in terms of patriotism and freedom, saw no alternative to that outcome.

Transcaucasia’s path to independence was thus hardly dynamic in comparison to the fate of other parts of the former Empire, not to say calculated. The direction and pace of change was determined by sober political deliberation, the maturity of the political class, and understanding the danger posed by the powerful forces clashing in a world war, followed by a civil war in the smaller nations. The political will of the population was secondary, although it too had an impact on the course of events.

Looking from the comparative point of view on the situation of Transcaucasia in early 1918 allows us to better understand the circumstances of the emergence of the Transcaucasian Seim, as well as the self-determination of Transcaucasia as a subject of international relations, a political entity independent of Russia. The choice of a political path made by Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis at the time – admittedly forced by external circumstances, namely the Treaty of Brest and the Turkish threat – was firmly based on earlier efforts to expand the region’s self-governance. This way of achieving independence through joint political representation of the three main nationalities inhabiting the region was highly unusual in the circumstances of the former Russian Empire, and stood in contrast to the experience of other nations. It can be compared at best with Lithuanian-Belarusian cooperation, but only at a later time, after the breakdown of Polish federation plans.[9]

In the case of the other nations, one of the key factors was the local military potential of the armed forces of the Central Powers, which were the conditions for the formation of autonomous institutions in Polish and Ukrainian lands. The Ober-Ost command moderated the political behaviour of the societies of the Baltic republics and Belarus, although one would be hard-pressed to overlook the impact of the Bolshevik propaganda, which was attractive for the so-called basic masses of the nations, coming from the nearby Petrograd and Smolensk.

The fear of the national political elites of the Bolshevik propaganda taking hold was palpable at the time. The establishment of homogeneous nation states was thus seen as an effective way to counter the internationalisation of the Russian Revolution, as well as to block internal and external propaganda regarding social classes, in addition to the realisation of the natural drive of societies for self-determination. The German authorities were quick to recognise this situation, supporting emancipation efforts of the nations, as well as condoning and even encouraging the formation of national quasi-state institutions, albeit to a limited extent. The Baltic republics and Ukraine followed this path, while Belarus made an attempt at doing so.

The fears of the Bolshevik revolution gaining further ground remained particularly low over the course of the process of establishing the Polish state, since its political elites saw the dependence of their autonomous structures on the patronage of the Central Powers as a much greater danger and focused primarily on loosening these ties.

To fully appreciate the formula of the Transcaucasian Seim as an important institution on the path of the three Transcaucasian republics to full independence, one needs to highlight one additional matter – the fact that at a certain point of the process, this joint representation was essential to maintain order internally, as well as to effectively negotiate with Turkey and Germany. Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis rose to the occasion, appointing this joint representation. This was a great testament to the maturity of their political elite. Although it lasted for only 35 days, without that attempt, reaching the stage of proclaiming the three national republics would have been much harder.

1. Document Concerning the De jure Recognition of Georgia.

Archive of the Central Archives of Modern Records (Archiwum Akt Nowych)

République Polonaise

Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres

J’ ai l’ honneur de porter á la connaissance de Votre Excelence que le chef de l’ Etat Polonais après avoir pris l’ avis du Conseil des Ministres, a décidé de reconnaitre définitivement la République Géorgienne come Etat independant et souverain.

Je suis fermement convaincu que par cet acte les relations de sincère amitiè et de bonne ententę existant heureusement antre la République Géorgienne et la République Polonaise ne feront désormais que se consolider et se reserrer.

Je saisis cette occasion pour Vous prier, Mon Prince, d’ agréer les assurances de ma haute considération.

Eustachy Sapieha

Minister des Affaires Etrsanceres

Varsovie, le 28 Janvier 1921

A Son Excellence

Monsieur le Prince Eristavi,

Ministre Plénipotentiaire at Envoyé Extraordnaire de la

République Géorgienne en Pologne.

2. Giorgi Sidamon Eristavi’ s letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Archive of the Central Archives of Modern Records (Archiwum Akt Nowych)

Envoyé Extraordnaire Ministre Plénipotentiaire

de la République Géorgienne en Pologne.

Mon Prince,

J’ ai l’ honeur d’ accuser récetion de la communication de Votre Excellence en date du 28 Janvier, au sujet de la decision prise par le Gouvernement Polonais de reconnaitre l’ independence de droit de la République Géorgienne.

Je me trouve tres heureux de povoir, au nom de mon Gouvernement, ainsi qu’ au nom du Peuple Géorgien, exprimer au Gouvernement de la Pologne, en la persone de Votre Excellence, la profonde reconnalissance pour les rapports sinceres et l’ appui moral accordes a ma patrie; ces sentimente qui ont trouve leur expression dans la decisions toujours de la part de la Pologne.

Do mon coté, je suis également fermemnt asuure, que grace a cet acte legitime et juste, les relations entre la République Polonaise et la Géorgie, deviendront deorais encore plus coriales et etroites.

Ja proite de cette occasion pour Vous prier, Mon Prince, d’ agreer les assurances de ma haute consideration.

Varsovie, le 31 Janvier, 1921

A Son Excellence

Monsieur le Prince Sapieha

Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres

[1] This term was probably used for the first time by the Marquis Astolphe de Custine (Letters from Russia, translated from French, Penguin Books, 1991). It was also often used by Aleksander Hercen.

[2] Basic administrative units of the state, according to the division introduced in 1775, which remained in effect until the Bolshevik coup. A Governorate-General encompassed several governorates and oblasts. In the final period of this division’ s existence, the Empire comprised eight Governorate-Generals, including the Caucasus Viceroyalty and the Vistula Land.

[3] Istoriya Rossii. XX vek. 1894–1939, ed. A. Zubow, Moscow 2009, p. 449.

[4] Cf. T. Świętochowski, Azerbejdżan i Rosja. Kolonializm, islam i narodowość w podzielonym kraju, Warsaw, 1998, pp. 77–82.

[5] Latvia decided to proclaim its independence only after the defeat of the Central Powers on 18 November 1918.

[6] This short-lived state existed for a month, and was disbanded with the help of the Ukrainian People’ s Republic troops. Thanks to German support, the Crimean People's Republic was reborn under the rule of the government of General Maciej Suleyman bey Sulkiewicz, and lasted until April 1919.

[7] In April 1918, the Bolsheviks proclaimed the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which was a part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, across the entire vast territory of the former Turkestan General-Governorate. Their authority over the territory was mostly theoretical at that time.

[8] Cf. W. Materski, ‘Przewrót listopadowy 1917 r. w Rosji a hasło bolszewików prawa narodów do samostanowienia’, Dzieje Najnowsze 4, 2017, pp. 7–28.

[9] Relocation of the BDR government of Prime Minister Vaclau Lastouski to Kaunas.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSCAUCASIAN DEMOCRATIC FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC AND ITS INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

by Paweł Olszewski

The Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic was established on 22 April 1918, and it existed as an independent state until 26 May 1918. Its creation meant a final separation of the South Caucasus from Russia and marked the beginning of the independence of the region, which would survive until the end of 1920/beginning of 1921. The short existence of the Transcaucasia republic was mainly influenced by the international situation in which this country found itself in late April and in May 1918, especially its relations with Turkey. The international position of the Transcaucasia federation was also associated with the policy of the Bolshevik Russia and the German Reich, and to a lesser extent with the policy of the Entente powers.

The main aim of the article is to present the origins of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic and its international position. These issues seem important because the establishment of the Transcaucasia republic started a short period of independence of the South Caucasus (Transcaucasia) from Russia. Moreover, the emerging international conditions that shaped the situation in the South Caucasus would also influence the existence of three independent South Caucasus republics between 1918 and 1920/1921.

The declaration of independence of the Transcaucasia republic might have come as a surprise to observers of the situation in the South Caucasus in the spring of 1918, especially since the leaders of Georgian Mensheviks, Armenian Dashnaks and Azerbaijani Musavatists, who dominated the political structures of the republic, had emphasized just a few weeks earlier the need for the Transcaucasia to remain within Russia. However, the very quick changes of the situation in the South Caucasus, also related to the violent political changes that were taking place in Russia, especially after the Bolshevik coup, favoured the final establishment of an independent Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic in April 1918. Earlier events had a particularly strong influence on the changes of the international situation in the South Caucasus region, so in order to better understand the international situation of the Transcaucasia republic, it is necessary to present the international situation in the South Caucasus after the 1917 October Revolution.

Before the beginning of November 1917, the geo-strategic situation of the South Caucasus was shaped by two important factors. The region was the immediate hinterland of the Russian-Turkish (Caucasian) front[1]. In addition, the South Caucasus played a very important role as an area where various types of raw materials, especially crude oil and manganese ores can be found[2]. Significant stocks of these were created in the Transcaucasia after the outbreak of World War I and were necessary for the economies of both the Entente and Central Powers.[3]

It was the Bolshevik coup the prompted the previously local authorities in Transcaucasia to refuse to recognize the new Bolshevik government in Moscow and established a new power centre at Tiflis (Tbilisi) on 27 November 1917: the Transcaucasian Commissariat under the leadership of the outstanding Georgian Menshevik Evgeni Gegechkori. Although the Transcaucasian Commissariat did not recognize the sovereignty of Vladimir I. Lenin’ s government, the members of the Commissariat, similar to representatives of other local authorities in the Transcaucasia, emphasized the wish and necessity to remain within the borders of Russia[4]. However, due to subsequent changes in the international situation of the Transcaucasia, this position was more and more difficult to maintain.

Under the influence of the Bolshevik government’ s populist moves, especially of the announcement of the ‘Decree on Land’ and the ‘Decree on Peace’, desertions intensified among Russian army soldiers on the Russian-Turkish front in Eastern Anatolia. The Turkish headquarters took advantage of this situation, when in mid-November 1917 its troops began to occupy the territories of Anatolia previously occupied by the Russian army.[5]

In addition to the Transcaucasian Commissariat, the National Councils of Georgia in Tiflis, Armenia in Yerevan and Azerbaijan in Ganja were established, and began to form local armed units to maintain order in the territories under their authority.[6] The establishment of the Transcaucasian Commissariat was supported by Russia’ s allies: the Entente powers, who did not recognize the government of V. I. Lenin. The military missions of Britain and France in the South Caucasus and the US consul in Tiflis established relations with the Transcaucasian Commissariat.[7]

The complicated situation on the Russian-Turkish front, caused by the growing desertions among Russian army soldiers and by the ceasefire signed in Brest on 15 December 1917 between representatives of the Soviet government and of the Central Powers, was another factor contributing to the independence of the South Caucasus from Russia. The armistice signed in Brest was also to apply to the Russian-Turkish front, event though the Bolshevik government had no control whatsoever over the Russian army troops there.

On 18 December 1917, the Russian commander of the Caucasian front, General Mikhail M. Przewalski, signed a separate armistice at Erzincan with the commander of the Turkish III Army, General Mehmed Vehib Pasha. Before signing the agreement, representatives of the Transcaucasian Commissariat declared that the armistice would constitute a prelude to a peace treaty that would be signed with Turkey by representatives of the Legislative Assembly on behalf of the whole of Russia.[8] However, in practice this turned out to be another step towards the emancipation of the Transcaucasia from Russia.

Suspending military operations on the Russian-Turkish front did not stop desertions of soldiers from Russian troops stationed in Anatolia. The visible weakening of the Russian military positions in Anatolia allowed Turkey to regain the territories of Turkish Anatolia occupied by the Russians in 1915–1916, as well as the lands lost by Turkey after the Russo-Turkish war in 1877–1878 and other areas of the South Caucasus. In turn, the occupation of Transcaucasia gave Turkey the possibility, at least potential, to expand into the North Caucasus, towards Persia and Central Asia, and made it possible to revive the Pan-Turkism project, which had been one of the reasons for Turkey’ s entry into the war. It proclaimed the need to unite under Ottoman rule the Azerbaijani people, who are close to the Turks in terms of language and ethnic origin, who lived in Azerbaijani lands in Russia and Iran, and the Turkish peoples from Central Asia.[9]

The weakness of the Russian army on the Caucasian front resulted in plans to create local Armenian, Georgian and Azerbaijani troops that would replace the deserting Russian troops in Anatolia and prevent further military expansion of Turkey towards the South Caucasus. Armenians took particularly active steps to create these formations, because they wanted to prevent Turkish troops from occupying the Russian Armenia. These actions also resulted from the fact that between 300,000 and 500,000 Turkish Armenians lived in the Russian Armenia and in other parts of the South Caucasus. They had survived the mass deportations of Armenian people carried out by Turkish authorities in 1915–1916 and sought refuge in the South Caucasus. Their presence fuelled the growth of anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim sentiments among Russian Armenians.[10]

Activists of the Armenian National Council formed the ethnic ‘Armenian Corps’ of 20,000 soldiers, which manned the former Russian-Turkish front line between Van and Erzincan as of the end of January 1918. The ethnic ‘Georgian Corps’ of 10,000 soldiers took control of the section of this front line between Erzincan and Trabzon (Trebizond). The forming of both these formations was approved and supported by the headquarters of the Russian Caucasian Front, which also provided these troops with armament and military equipment from Russian army stocks.[11] The Armenian-Georgian forces faced Turkish troops of about 50,000, the latter being better equipped and having better morale.[12]

Notably, the absence of Azerbaijani troops among the South Caucasian military forces that manned the Caucasian front was significant. It is true that the Azerbaijani National Council in Ganja also started to form its armed troops, but the Transcaucasian Commissariat did not deploy these to the former Russian-Turkish front, for fear that, in view of the growing pro-Turkish attitudes among the Azerbaijani, those troops might go to the Turkish side[13]. For the same reasons, the Russian army headquarters in the Caucasus also failed to agree to transfer weapons from the former tsarist army stocks to the Azerbaijani. For this reason, when the Azerbaijani political leaders formed their ethnic units, they had to disarm Russian troops by force, which resulted in armed combat between Azerbaijani and Russian forces and contributed to the growing animosity between the Azerbaijani and the Christians (Russians, Armenians).[14]

During the forming of the Armenian and Georgian ethnic armed formations in the South Caucasus, information spread about projects to assist in the forming of these units, formulated by representatives of Britain, France and the USA who were present in Tiflis. Already in mid-October 1917, the American Consul Willoughby F. Smith sent to the US Secretary of State a proposal that the Washington administration should support the emerging Armenian and Georgian troops, which were going to replace Russian troops on the Caucasian front.[15] Following the Bolshevik coup, when it turned out that the local authorities of the South Caucasus refused to recognize the sovereignty of V. I. Lenin’ s government, W. F. Smith renewed the proposals for this support by the American authorities. In his telegram to Secretary of State Robert F. Lansing of 9 November 1918, the American Consul proposed that the US authorities should earmark US$ 10 million for the forming of Armenian and Georgian troops.[16] He also proposed sending American railway engineers to the South Caucasus to help improve rail transport in the region. Moreover, he suggested the need to send a British armoured car unit and French military instructors to the Transcaucasia.[17] W. F. Smith repeated his proposals of financial support for the Transcaucasian Commissariat by the US administration in his subsequent dispatches sent to the US Secretary of State in November and December 1917.[18]

Department of State and the US Embassy in Petrograd opposed the proposals of W. F. Smith. A letter of R. F. Lansing, the Secretary of State, dated 26 November 1917, indicated that US government’ s financial support for the local authorities in the Transcaucasia would mean a US interference with Russia’ s internal affairs. Moreover, it could indicate that the Washington administration recognized the authorities in the South Caucasus. This, in turn, could give the impression that the US government supported the disintegration of Russia, its ally, into separate territorial units.[19]

The head of the French Military Mission in the South Caucasus, Lt. Col. Pierre August Chardigny, also took steps to support the forming Armenian and Georgian troops. In December 1917, the idea was put forward to send French officers as instructors, primarily to Armenian troops.[20] On 17 December 1917, the French Government decided to provide financial aid of 20 million roubles for the organization of the Armenian Armed Forces. It was decided that these funds would be transferred to the Russian Army HQ in the Caucasus, which would utilise these under the control of Lt. Col. P. A. Chardigny.[21] This decision was influenced by the pro-Armenian attitude of the French authorities, who were also aware of the need to counter the Turkish expansion towards the Transcaucasia.[22] However, putting the French financial assistance project into effect was prevented by the start of the Turkish offensive in the South Caucasus in mid-February 1918.

Representatives of the British military mission in the Caucasus under Gen. Offley Shore were particularly active as regards providing assistance to the forming Armenian and Georgian armed troops.[23] The project of involvement in military aid resulted from the fact that the Entente powers were aware of the strategic importance of the Transcaucasia and of the need that the South Caucasus military units oppose any possible military expansion of Turkey. Moreover, they appreciated the fact that the Transcaucasian Commissariat had not recognized the Bolshevik government. From the British authorities’ point of view, it was also important that the Transcaucasia troops could tie up some of the Turkish troops, so that the latter could not be redeployed to other parts of Turkey to fight against British forces. This was also indicated by the provisions of the Erzincan armistice, which mentioned that Turkey would not send its troops from the Caucasus to the Mesopotamian front.[24]

The strategic importance of the Transcaucasia and the hostility of its authorities towards the Bolshevik government led to the fact that during the British-French meeting in Paris on 23 December 1917, when the issue of Allied aid to anti-Bolshevik centres in Russia was discussed, it was decided to include the South Caucasus in the territories of Russia where the powers would support anti-Bolshevik centres. In the case of the Transcaucasia, this aid was to be provided by the British Government.[25]

The British and French analyzes of the situation in the South Caucasus that appeared in early January 1918, indicated the threat to the Allied interests due to the danger of Turkey taking control of the Transcaucasia. However, it was also believed that the expansion of Germany might form a greater threat to this region, as that country was particularly interested in obtaining the Azerbaijani oil and the Georgian manganese for its economy. It was indicated, among others, that nearly 40% of Georgian manganese production was exported to Germany before the war.[26]

During late 1917/early 1918, the internal situation, as well as the international position of the Transcaucasia was complicated by the somewhat dual power in the Azerbaijani part of the region. Apart from the Azerbaijani National Council in Ganja that cooperated with the Transcaucasian Commissariat, power in Baku was taken by the Council of Workers’ Delegates dominated by Armenian and Russian Bolsheviks, and this body recognized the sovereignty of V. I. Lenin’ s government.

The renewed offensive of the Turkish troops on the Caucasian front, undertaken on 12 February 1918, was another event that changed the international position of Transcaucasia. The Armenian and Georgian forces were unable to oppose the Turkish troops. Even before the start of the Turkish offensive, the British government considered the possibility of Baku being occupied by British troops under Gen. Lionel C. Dunsterville, which operated in Northern Persia. This was to prevent the city from being captured by the Turks. However, due to the weakness of Gen. L. C. Dunsterville’ s forces and the generally weak military standing of the British in Northern Persia, the plan of the British military intervention in Baku was not put into effect in the spring of 1918.[27]

The Turkish offensive in Anatolia, as well as the need to create a more stable government in the South Caucasus, which would enjoy the support of the local people, caused the political leaders of the Georgians, the Armenians and the Azerbaijani to form the Transcaucasia Seim chaired by the Georgian Menshevik Nikolaz Chkheidze. It consisted of delegates elected from this region to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly and representatives of the political parties that enjoyed the greatest influence in the region. The Transcaucasia Seim began its activity on 23 February 1918.[28] Although the Seim did not declare independence of the Transcaucasia from Russia, nor did it appoint a formal government, the factthat it was established was, from the perspective of the next few months, another step towards the separation of the Transcaucasia from the former Tsarist Empire.

Although the establishment of the Transcaucasia Seim was also an attempt at cooperation between the leaders of the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples, the idea of cooperation with Turkey began to gain more and more importance among Azerbaijani politicians in early 1918. The Georgian activists, on the other hand, began to consider the possibility of cooperation with Germany.

The pro-Turkish attitudes among the Azerbaijani leaders and people resulted from the strong ethnic and linguistic ties between them and the Turks. Moreover, Azerbaijani politicians had close contacts with the Young Turk activists that dated back to before World War I. The pro-Turkish attitudes, which had been strong among the Azerbaijani people in Russia at the start of the war, have during 1915–1916, when Russian troops were successful on the Caucasian front. Moreover, the rising prices of petroleum products connected with the increased demand of the Russian economy for crude oil and its products led to growing income of Azerbaijani oil entrepreneurs.[29]

However, the situation changed radically after the 1917 October Revolution. The internal chaos in Russia reduced the possibility of selling petroleum products on the Russian market. This caused a decline in oil production and an economic crisis, as other industries of the Russian Azerbaijan were closely related to the petroleum one, which played the most important role in the Azerbaijani economy. In addition, the situation of the oil industry in Baku was worsened by the Bolsheviks capturing the power in the city. Therefore, in early 1918, the idea of close cooperation with Turkey began to gain more and more supporters among Azerbaijani politicians, as it seemed the only alternative to the anarchistic Russia, which had no real force in early 1918 that would be capable of introducing internal stabilization in the former Tsarist Empire.

The Turkish Government also advocated establishing closer cooperation with Azerbaijani leaders in the Transcaucasia and undertook a growing pro-Turkish propaganda among the Azerbaijani and Muslim peoples in the Caucasus. For this reason a special ‘Caucasian Department’ was established in the Young Turk administration, headed by Hasan Rushem.[30]

On the other hand, the influence of supporters of the pro-German orientation was growing among Georgian politicians. This orientation had first appeared at the beginning of the war, when a relatively small group of Georgian nationalists advocated cooperation with Germany against Russia, as this could enable the Georgians to establish an independent state. Initially, due to the successes of Russian troops on the Caucasian front, the pro-German orientation did not gain much support among Georgian politicians. However, the Menshevik politicians who were politically dominant among the Georgian people, were not pro-Russian either, maintaining neutral attitudes.[31]

The situation changed during late 1917/early 1918, when the pro-German option started gaining more and more supporters among Georgian politicians. They saw the possibility of cooperation with Germany as a way of preventing Turkey’ s expansion in the South Caucasus.[32] Close contacts between Georgian and German social-democratic activists dating back to the time before World War I also supported the pro-German option among Georgian politicians.

On the other hand, the leaders of the Russian Armenians were still pro-Russian and pro-Western. This position was largely influenced by the pro-Armenian declarations of the Western powers. Moreover, the Armenian activists could not possibly adopt a pro-Turkish attitude due to the hostile attitude of the Armenian people towards Turkey and the Turks in connection with the deportations of Armenians in that country and the presence of several hundred thousand Armenian refugees from Turkey in the Transcaucasia. Neither could they adopt a pro-German position, because the German Reich was an ally of Turkey.

In addition to the Turkish offensive in Anatolia, the international situation in the South Caucasus was further complicated by the peace negotiations held in Brest-Litovsk between representatives of the Bolshevik government and those of the Central Powers. The Transcaucasian Commissariat rejected the invitation to participate in these negotiations that had been issued by representatives of the Central Powers, because accepting that proposal would have meant that they considered themselves representatives of territories independent from Russia and constituting an independent state.[33] Members of the Commissariat initially maintained that it was only a local centre of authority temporarily managing the lands that still formed an integral part of Russia.

However, the position of the Transcaucasian Commissariat changed when the Bolshevik delegation in Brest-Litovsk accepted the terms of peace imposed by representatives of the Central Powers. One of these was that V. I. Lenin’ s government agrees that the Soviet Russia gives up a part of the South Caucasus, territory acquired by Russia as a result of the victorious 1877–1878 war with Turkey.

Since of the Transcaucasia authorities wanted to avoid a situation where they had no influence on decisions that affected the future of the territories they ruled, and the Armenian-Georgian troops were unable to withstand the Turkish offensive, the chairman of the Transcaucasian Commissariat, E. Gegechkori, asked the Turkish Government to start peace negotiations.[34] Gen. M. Vehib Pasha, commanding the Turkish troops on the Caucasian front, agreed to this request on 23 February 1918, the day of the inauguration of the Transcaucasia Seim. The decision to negotiate peace with Turkey, which resulted, to a large extent, from the international situation in the Transcaucasia, was another step towards the establishment of an independent state.

The issues of peace negotiations with Turkey and of the political future of the region have become one of the most important elements of the discussion during subsequent sessions of the Transcaucasia Seim. After initial hesitations, the Georgian Mensheviks, led by Noe Zhordania, became supporters of the establishment of an independent republic in the South Caucasus. Leaders of the most important Azerbaijani party, ‘Musavat’ (‘Equality’) had a similar position.[35] On the other hand, political leaders of the Armenian ‘Dashnaktsutyun’ (‘Armenian Revolutionary Federation’) opposed the separation of Transcaucasia from Russia.[36]

On 1 March 1918, the Transcaucasia Seim made the final decision to start negotiations with the Turks, influenced by the position of the Musavat representative, Nasib Usubbeyov, who pointed out that Muslims would not fight against Turkey.[37] It was decided, among others, that during negotiations with the Turks, representatives of the Transcaucasia should insist on retaining the 1914 Russian-Turkish border. Moreover, under the influence of Armenian delegates, it was decided that the Transcaucasia delegation would request autonomy for the Turkish Armenia within the Turkish state. Despite the decision to start negotiations with Turkey, the Transcaucasia parliament initially avoided a clear declaration on the separation of the Transcaucasia from Russia.[38]

The position of the Transcaucasia Seim regarding negotiations with Turkey proved difficult to maintain when, on 3 March 1918, representatives of the Soviet Russia Government signed a peace treaty with representatives of the Central Powers in Brest-Litovsk. According to Article IV of the Brest Treaty, Russia withdrew from eastern Anatolia, and also resigned her authority over the Ardahan, Batumi and Kars districts, all those being parts of the Transcaucasia. The Bolsheviks also undertook not to interfere in political relations and the afiliation of these areas to a particular state. Their peoples were to define their state status in agreement with neighboring countries, and in particular with Turkey.[39]

The Russian-Turkish ‘Additional Agreement to the Treaty between Russia and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey’ signed on the same day in Brest-Litovsk was more important for the future of the south-western part of the South Caucasus. Under its provisions, Soviet Russia obliged to withdraw from the districts of Kars, Ardahan and Batumi, which were to be occupied by Turkish troops. The agreement clearly mentioned the restoration of the 1877 Russian-Turkish border. Moreover, Bolshevik Russia was only allowed to deploy one division on that border, while Turkey had no such restriction as it was still fighting a war.[40]

These agreements completely ignored the fact that Transcaucasia was not under Bolshevik control. Moreover, the consent of the Bolsheviks to the occupation of Batumi, Ardahan and Kars by the Turks also meant the consent of V. I. Lenin’ s government for further expansion of Turkey into other areas of the Transcaucasia, should all the military clauses of the Additional Agreement be put into effect.

The signing of the Brest Treaty, which significantly worsened the international position of Transcaucasia, had a significant impact on the commencement of the Turkey-Transcaucasia peace negotiations in Trabzon on 12 March 1918. On the day the conference commenced, Turkish troops occupied the strategically important fortress of Erzurum, defended by Armenian troops, which further weakened the already weak negotiating position of the Transcaucasia delegation during the talks in Trabzon. The Transcaucasia delegation was headed by Akaki Chkhenkeli, a Georgian Menshevik, while the Turkish side was represented by Vice Admiral Hüseyin Rauf Orbay, the Chief of Staff of the Turkish Navy.[41] In addition to the chairman, 10 other members of the Transcaucasia delegation, who represented the most important Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani political parties that made up the Transcaucasia Seim, also had the right to vote when the position of the delegation was defined during the negotiations with the Turks. Such a situation made it difficult to establish a common position of the members of the delegation during the negotiations with the Turks. The differences of opinion were especially visible in the case of the Armenian and Azerbaijani members of the Transcaucasia delegation.[42] On the other hand, the chairman of the five-person Turkish delegation had the decisive vote, so the position of that body during the Trabzon negotiations was uniform and consistent. [43]

Initially, Transcaucasia diplomats in Trabzon tried to push through the retaining of the 1914 Russian-Turkish border and the autonomy for the Turkish Armenia within the Ottoman State.[44] However, this position was rejected by the head of the Turkish delegation, who saw the Brest Treaty provisions as the basis for further negotiations. Moreover, Turkish diplomats agreed to conclude a peace treaty only with representatives of an independent Transcaucasia state, because the Turks wanted to consolidate their rights to Batumi, Kars and Ardahan.[45] These rights were not expressly confirmed in the light of the Brest Treaty, which referred to the principle of ‘self-determination of nations’, already popular at the time, but not yet firmly sanctioned in international law.

Georgian and Armenian members of the delegation initially rejected the Turkish proposal, because accepting it would have made it highly probable that Turkey would come to control the entire Transcaucasia in a short time. Moreover, representatives of the Armenians in particular were against handing over Kars to Turkey, as this meant a threat that the Russian Armenia would subordinated to Turkey along with the thousands of Armenian refugees from Turkey who resided there. The threat was real, as the Turkish authorities were already aiming at establishing a direct connection with the Russian Azerbaijan territory. Azerbaijani diplomats, on the other hand, suggested accepting the Turkish proposals.[46]

The particularly noticeable, growing antagonism between the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders and, above all, between the Armenian and Azerbaijani people of the South Caucasus resulted from the pro-Turkish attitude of the Azerbaijani, and more generally of the Muslim, people of the Transcaucasia during the developing Turkish offensive, which was not interrupted by the start of negotiations at Trabzon. As a result, at the beginning of the Trabzon negotiations, Turkish troops captured Erzurum on 12 March 1918, and crossed the former Russian-Turkish border at the end of March 1918, capturing Sarykamysh on 5 April 1918.[47]

The growing antagonisms between Armenian and Azerbaijani members of the Transcaucasia delegation in Trabzon resulted from the general deterioration of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations in the South Caucasus, which had already been bad earlier. The relations were further worsened by the events in Baku in late March/early April 1918, where Armenian-Azerbaijani armed fighting took place, in which about 3,000 Azerbaijanis were killed.[48] The fighting resulted in a consolidation of the Bolshevik power in Baku, who appointed the Council of People’ s Commissars in the city.[49]

The inability of the South Caucasus delegation to accept the Turkish demands presented at the Trabzon conference resulted in the interruption of the peace conference in that city. Moreover, the Transcaucasia Seim rejected the demand of the commander of the Turkish forces, Gen. M. Vehib Pasha, made on 12 April 1918, to hand over Batumi to Turkey. On 13 April 1918, the South Caucasian parliament decided to call off the Trabzon negotiations and declare war on Turkey.[50]

At the same time, as already mentioned, this war was actually being fought during the Trabzon peace conference, as Turkish troops were capturing subsequent areas of Batumi and Kars districts.[51] On 14 April 1918, the Ottoman forces captured Batumi, the most important Black Sea port in Transcaucasia.[52]

The strengthening of the Bolshevik position in Baku, and the military successes of the Turkish troops in Transcaucasia, resulted in growing numbers of supporters of cooperation with Turkey among Azerbaijan’ s political leaders. They hoped that Turkey, who had the largest military forces in the Transcaucasia, would help Azerbaijan gain sovereignty over Baku. The pro-Turkish attitude among Azerbaijani political leaders and people was also supported by the Turkish authorities, when their agents conducted pro-Turkish propaganda not just among the Azerbaijani but all Muslim people throughout the Caucasus.[53]

The worsening military position of the Transcaucasia led the Transcaucasia Seim to resume peace talks with Turkey. This was also a response to the proposal to resume negotiations issued on 22 April 1918 by the Turks, who were surprised by the significant Armenian resistance to the siege of the fortress of Kars by Ottoman troops. Turkey requested that their delegation should negotiate with a representation of an independent state, so to resume the negotiations the Transcaucasia Seim passed the establishment of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic on the same day, 22 April 1918. The republic was established primarily on the initiative of Georgian Mensheviks, supported by Azerbaijani delegates. The Armenian leaders in the Seim, on the other hand, agreed to this decision, realizing that the future of the Armenians in the Transcaucasia depended on their cooperation with the Georgians and Azerbaijans.[54]

Thus, the international position of the South Caucasus in connection with its relations with Turkey, and its impact on the situation in the region, were among the most important reasons for the establishment of the Transcaucasia republic. The provisional government of the republic was formed on 26 April 1918, under Akaki Chkhenkeli. He was a supporter of the independence of the Transcaucasia. Moreover, he believed that it was necessary to agree to the Turkish demands in order to end the Turkish-South Caucasian military conflict as soon as possible and to sign a peace treaty with that country.[55]

The day before, on 25 April 1918, the Turks captured the strategically important fortress of Kars. On 28 April 1918, Gen. M. Vehib Pasha notified the authorities in Tiflis about the recognition of the Transcaucasia republic by Turkey and proposed again the resumption of the Turkish-Transcaucasia peace negotiations.[56] The Transcaucasia government accepted this proposal, but the peace talks did not begin until 11 May 1918, in Batumi, because the Turkish government wanted to strengthen its position in the territories of the South Caucasus occupied by Turkish troops.[57]

Even before the Batumi conference started, pro-German attitudes had deepened among Georgian politicians and people. The view that Germany could be a counterweight to Turkish expansion in the Transcaucasia was voiced more and more often, also in Georgian press. Moreover, the German government, fearing an excessive strengthening of Turkey’ s military, political, and particularly economic position in the South Caucasus, made attempts to limit Turkey’ s expansion in the South Caucasus.[58] This was already noticeable during the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, when German diplomats tried to limit Turkish demands at the expense of the South Caucasus. On the other hand, the Reich, seeking to expand its influence in the South Caucasus that dated back to the period before World War I, was particularly interested in the mineral and natural resources of Transcaucasia, especially crude oil and manganese ore.[59]

The interest of the German authorities in the situation in the Transcaucasia was facilitated by the actions of V. I. Lenin’ s government, which issued a note to Berlin on 12 April 1918. In this, they demanded that the German government acts in order to stop the offensive of Turkish troops in the Transcaucasia and to end the persecution of civilian people in the Kars, Ardahan and Batumi districts by Turkish troops. The German authorities also tried to secure their influence in the South Caucasus by signing a secret agreement with Turkey on 27 April 1918, in Istanbul. This stipulated that Germany’ s zone of influence would include Georgia, while Armenia and Azerbaijan were to be in the Turkish zone of influence.[60] Germany’ s interest in the situation in Transcaucasia was also evidenced by the participation of a German delegation under Maj. Gen. Otto von Lossow in the conference in Batumi, which had the status of observers.[61]

Similar to the previous conference in Trabzon, a large Transcaucasia delegation, led by Akaki Chkhenkeli, a supporter of peace with Turkey, was sent to the peace conference in Batumi. Six of the delegates had an equal vote, which again made it significantly difficult to reach a common position of the whole delegation during the conference.[62]

The delegation of the Transcaucasia republic hoped that the negotiations would be based on the Turkish territorial demands as formulated in Trabzon and resulting from the provisions of the Brest Treaty. However, the new head of the Turkish delegation, Halil Bey, Turkey’ s Minister of Finance, rejected this position, stressing the significant change that had resulted from the Transcaucasia side breaking the Trabzon conference and resuming military operations on the Caucasian front. Therefore, the head of the Turkish delegation did not think the Transcaucasia delegates had the right to quote the political situation during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations or the Trabzon conference. Moreover, the new military and political situation in the South Caucasus gave the Turkish side the right to redefine the basis of the negotiations.[63]

The Turks expanded their territorial demands in the draft treaty they presented. In addition to the Batumi, Ardahan and Kars districts, which were already under the control of Turkish troops, Turkey’ s diplomats also demanded that the Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikhe municipalities, which were part of the former Tiflis governorate, should be handed over to Turkey. In addition, they demanded that the western part of the Yerevan Governorate, including the Araks River valley, which constituted about a third of the Russian Armenia, should also be handed over to Turkey. Finally, the Turks also demanded control of the railway line that connected Kars with Julfa on the Persian border.[64]

Meeting these demands would have meant Turkey’ s actual political control over the Transcaucasia, threatening Georgia’ s territorial integrity and subjecting Armenia to the Turkish authorities as a matter of fact. Implementation of the territorial demands of the Turks would have allowed them to obtain a connection with the Russian and Persian Azerbaijan areas, also creating a convenient military basis for the occupation of Baku and facilitating Turkish military operations against British troops in Persia. The realization of these goals would be possible thanks to the right to freely transport Turkish troops and war material over the South Caucasus railway lines, that was also demanded by Turkey.[65]

The Armenian and Georgian members of the Transcaucasia delegation were opposed to these demands, so attempts were made to delay the negotiations by bringing to the fore the issues related to the procedure for signing a future peace treaty. The Transcaucasia diplomats proposed that it should be concluded not only with Turkey, but also with its allies: Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Bulgaria. An agreement with all the Central Powers, and especially with Germany, could have meant that the Turks would be limited in making new demands on the republic, as they would have had to consult all new Turkish proposals regarding the South Caucasus with their allies, including the signatories of the planned treaty. However, this postulate was rejected by Halil Bey.[66]

The different positions of the two negotiating parties led to suspension of the Batumi peace talks, while Turkish troops resumed their offensive operations, capturing Alexandropol on 15 May 1918, and gaining a favourable position to attack Yerevan and Tiflis. The fear of breaking the conference altogether and further annexations of South Caucasus territories by Turkey prompted Gen. Otto von Lossow to put forward a proposal, on 19 May 1918, of a mediation by the German delegation in order to clarify the points of dispute between the Turkish and Transcaucasia delegations and to have the peace negotiations resumed. However, the proposal was rejected by the Turkish diplomats and by the Azerbaijani members of the Transcaucasia delegation, who voted to accept the Turkish demands.[67]

Despite the suspension of official Turkish-Transcaucasia negotiations, unofficial separate talks continued in Batumi between Georgian and Armenian members of the Transcaucasia delegation and representatives of the German Reich on establishing closer cooperation with Germany, as that country was interested in limiting Turkey’ s influence, particularly the economic one, in the Transcaucasia. The secret Georgian-German negotiations were very advanced and resulted, on 24 May 1918, in a final acceptance of details of the future Georgian-German agreement.[68] In addition, talks were held in Batumi between the Azerbaijani part of the Transcaucasia delegation and Turkey’ s representatives about Turkish assistance to Azerbaijan in regaining control of Baku.[69]

This was in line with Turkey’ s Transcaucasia policy, one of its main goals being to occupy Baku and its oil resources. This was evidenced by the establishment, in the second half of May 1918, of an armed force known as the Islamic Army, commanded by one of the leading Young Turk activists, Nuri Pasha. It numbered about 6,000 men of regular Turkish troops and about 12,000 Muslim volunteers and members of the Azerbaijani militia. Its main goal was to capture Baku. The Islamic Army was officially outside the control of the Turkish authorities, because the Ottoman government did not want to openly break the provisions of the Brest Treaty, which recognized the South-East Caucasus as part of the Soviet Russia, or to come into conflict with Germany, opposed to the occupation of Baku by the Turks.[70]

Georgian politicians realized that establishing close cooperation between Georgia and Germany could be received in a negative way by the Entente powers. That is why Noe Ramishvili, a representative of Georgian Mensheviks, during a meeting with US consul W. F. Smith on 25 May 1918, tried to convince the American diplomat that the Georgian-German agreement would not mean Georgia’ s support for the Central Powers, but that its aim would be to use the German-Turkish rivalry in the South Caucasus in the interests of Georgia and to prevent its dependence on Turkey.[71]

The inability to reach an agreement in Batumi led Halil Bey on 26 May 1918 to issue an ultimatum to the Transcaucasia delegation, in agreement with representatives of Azerbaijan. In it, he demanded the acceptance of Turkey’ s territorial demands, additionally extended to include the transfer of the Nakhichevan district to the Turkish government control. Should the Transcaucasia side did not accept the ultimatum within 72 hours, the Turks threatened to declare war on the Transcaucasia republic.[72] However, this ultimatum was not adopted by the authorities of the Transcaucasia republic because even before it was issued, the dissolution of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic was announced in Tiflis. On the same day, the Democratic Republic of Georgia was proclaimed, and on 28 May 1918, the independence of the Democratic Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan was proclaimed.[73] The Transcaucasia republic was dissolved because of too large differences of interests between the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples. These meant that the Transcaucasia republic was unable to fulfill one of the basic functions that lay at the basis of its establishment, that is to protect the peoples of Transcaucasia against Turkey’ s expansion.

To summarize the international situation of the Transcaucasia republic, it can be stated that the changes of the international situation of the South Caucasus at the end of 1917 and in early 1918 had a major impact on the establishment of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic. The seizure of power in Russia by the Bolsheviks was particularly important for the international situation in the South Caucasus, as it accelerated the collapse of the former Russian-Turkish front and enabled Turkey to expand towards the South Caucasus. The actions of the Bolshevik government were another factor that shaped the international position of the region: by signing the peace treaty in Brest with the Central Powers, they forced the Transcaucasia authorities to start peace negotiations with Turkey. Turkey’ s military and diplomatic activities turned out to be another important factor that influenced the international position of the South Caucasus, as these largely caused the establishment of an independent republic by the Transcaucasia authorities and contributed to its breakdown into three independent states.

Germany had a certain influence, especially as regards the end of the Transcaucasia federation, when they established direct cooperation with Georgia, fearing excessive dependence of the South Caucasus on Turkey. The Entente powers, primarily Britain and France, also attempted to play a role in shaping the situation in the Transcaucasia. However, the inability of these powers to provide direct military support to the Transcaucasia national troops in their resistance against the Turkish army, meant that the help of the Western powers had no practical significance, apart from moral one, and prompted independent Georgia to cooperate with Germany, and independent Azerbaijan to establish close contacts with Turkey.

It should also be pointed out that despite the attempts by representatives of the Entente powers to provide assistance to the Transcaucasia authorities in forming their national armed troops and the contacts with the Transcaucasian Commissariat and the Transcaucasia Seim, the Western powers continued to recognize this region as part of Russia, their ally. Therefore, the governments of Britain, France, USA and Italy did not recognize the independence of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic.

[1] Les Grandes Puissances, l’ Empire Ottoman et les Arméniens dans les Archives Françaises (1914–1918). Recueil de Documents, édité par A. Beylerian, Paris 1983, pp. 6–7; T. Wituch, Tureckie przemiany. Dzieje Turcji 1878–1923, Warszawa 1980, pp. 226–232.

[2] National Archives, Washington DC (College Park MD) (NA W), General Records of the Department of State. Record Group 59 (RG 59), Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Russia and Soviet Union, 1910–1929 M316 (M316), Roll 137, doc. 861.6363/4: From Embassy London to Secretary of State no. 9789 Annex: Memorandum D. Gambashidze, The Caucasian Petroleum Industry and Its Importance for Eastern Europe and Asia (Memorandum D. Gambashidze), 28.08.1918 London, pp. 8–10; National Republic of Georgia, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, Washington 1926, p. 68, pp. 145–148; M. Mądzik, Działalność społeczno-kulturalna i polityczna Polaków w Gruzji na przełomie XIX i XX wieku, Lublin 1987, p. 16; W. Materski, Georgia Rediviva. Republika Gruzińska w stosunkach międzynarodowych 1918–1921, Warszawa 1994, pp. 13–18; P. Olszewski, Polityka państw Ententy wobec Zakaukazia w latach 1918–1921, Piotrków Trybunalski 2001, pp. 11–14.

[3] Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris (MAE P), Série: Levant 1914–1918, Caucase–Kurdistan (Caucase–Kurdistan), vol. 3, de Chardingy à Paris, no. 100, 08.12.1918 Baku, p. 103; MAE P, Série: Europe 1918–1940, URSS (URSS) vol. 640, Agent d’ Information pour Bakou, Note sur les mesures à aprendre pour encourager et faciliter le commerce de France avec le Caucase …, 15.12.1918 Baku, pp. 22–31; ibid., vol. 656, Géorgie Commerce, télégramme de Chardigny à Paris – Guerre, no. 5, 25.12.1918, pp. 2–3.

[4] T. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan 1905–1920. The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community, Cambridge 1985, pp. 106–107; A. L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks. Power and Identity under Russian Rule, Stanford 1992, pp. 82–83; W. Materski, Georgia…, pp. 28–29.

[5] R. Pipes, Rewolucja Rosyjska, Warszawa 1994; pp. 394–396; S. McMeekin, Ekspres Berlin–Bagdad. Kajzer, islam i imperium osmańskie 1989–1918, Kraków 2020 (originally published as The Berlin–Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany’ s Bid for World Power, Cambridge, USA 2010), pp. 309–310.

[6] З. Аваловъ, Независимостъ Грузіи въ международной политикъ 1918–1921, New York 1982, p. 29; R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence 1918, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1967, pp. 111, 115; R. G. Suny, Nationalism and social class in the Russian revolution: The cases of Baku and Tiflis, [in:] Transcaucasia. Nationalism and social changes. Essays in the history of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, ed. by R. G. Suny, Michigan 1983, p. 255; A. L. Altstadt, op. cit., pp. 83–85; A. Furier, Droga Gruzji do niepodległości, Poznań 2000, pp. 90–91; W. Materski, Gruzja, Warszawa 2010, pp. 66–67.

[7] MAE P, Série: Guerre 1914–1918, Sous-Série: Turquie (Turquie), vol. 894, Arméniens du Caucase I (Arméniens I), télégramme du Consul de France à Tiflis au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, no. 68, 29.11.1917 Tiflis, pp. 24–25; ibidem, vol. 894, Arméniens I, télégramme du Consul de France à Tiflis au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, no. 68, 29.11.1917 Tiflis, pp. 26–27; Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1918 Russia (FRUS 1918 Russia),Washington 1932, vol. II, pp. 584–585.

[8] MAE P, Turquie, vol. 894, Arméniens I, télégramme Attaché Militaire à Ministre Guerre no. 1313–1314, 21.12.1917 Londres, p. 107; FRUS 1918 Russia, vol. II, pp. 594–595; З. Аваловъ, op.cit., p. 29; R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…, pp. 109–110.

[9] T. Świętochowski, Azerbejdżan i Rosja. Kolonializm, islam i narodowość w podzielonym kraju, Warszawa 1998, pp. 65–66.

[10] R.G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia. Volume I: The First Year, 1918–1919, Berkeley 1971, pp. 13–15; R. G. Suny, Looking toward Ararat, Armenia in Modern History, Bloomington and Indianapolis 1993, pp. 109–115, p. 125.

[11] Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Nantes (MAE N), Petrograd, vol. 54, télégramme de S. Pichon à J. Noulens no. 2366, 16.12.1917 Paris; Ministère de la Defence, Service Historique de l’ Armée de Terre, Château de Vincennes (AA), Série: 16N (16N), vol. 3184 no. 26 5bis, télégramme de gen. Lavergne Chef Mission Militaire Française en Russie à Premier no. 270, 29.03.1918 Moscou, p. 6; R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…, pp. 113–115; A. Ter Minassian, La République d’ Arménie 1918–1920, Bruxelles 1989, pp. 49–51.

[12] R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…, pp. 121–122.

[13] AA, 16N, vol. 3184 no. 26 6bis, Rapport du lieutenant-colonel Chardigny relativement à la situation du Caucase au 11 avril 1918, 11.04.1918 Tiflis, p. 3; FRUS 1918 Russia, vol. II, pp. 623–624.

[14] R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…, p. 115; A. L. Altstadt, op.cit., pp. 83–85.

[15] FRUS 1918 Russia, vol. II, pp. 578–580.

[16] FRUS 1918 Russia, vol. II, pp. 580–581.

[17] FRUS 1918 Russia, vol. II, pp. 578–580.

[18] FRUS 1918 Russia, vol. II, pp. 581–582.

[19] FRUS 1918 Russia, vol. II, p. 582, p. 590, pp. 600–601; R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…, p. 118.

[20] MAE N, Petrograd, vol. 54, télégramme de Noulens à Pichon, 20.12.1917 Petrograd, no. 1903.

[21] MAE P, Turquie, vol. 894, Arméniens I, Note Action des Allies au Caucase projet, 22.12.1917 Paris, pp. 108–110.

[22] MAE P, Turquie, vol. 894, Arméniens I, de Ministre des Affaires Étrangères au Ambassadeur français à Washington, 26.12.1917 Paris, no. 3944, pp. 138–139.

[23] MAE P, Turquie, vol. 894, Arméniens I, Note l’ Action des Allies au Caucase, 22.12.1917 Paris, p. 109; ibidem, de Ministre des Affaires Étrangères au Ambassadeur français à Washington, 26.12.1917 Paris, no. 3944, p. 138; National Parliamentary Library of Georgia (NPLG), Archival fond N6 (Akaki Ramishvili) (N6), vol. I: 1–50 (1917–19), doc. no. 4(5): Russia Committee – 40th Meeting. The Minute of the Procedings of a Meeting of the Russia Committee held at the Foreign Office on the 28th March,1918 London, p. 1.

[24] R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…, pp. 109–110.

[25] MAE P, Série: Guerre 1914–1818, vol. 1000, Notes of a Conference at the Quai d’ Orsay held at December 23, 1917, 23.12.1917 Paris, pp. 13–17; ibidem, URSS, vol. 224, Convention du 23 XII 1917 entre la France et l’ Anglettere au sujet de l’ action en Russie Méridionale, 23 XII 1917 Paris, p. 224; MAE N, Petrograd, vol. 10, de S. Pichon à J. Noulens no. 2431, 25 XII 1917 Paris; ibidem, de Paris à Petrograd no. 7660/3, 26 XII 1917; FRUS 1918 Russia, vol. I, pp. 330–331; ibidem, vol. II, pp. 596–600; Documents on British Foreign Policy. 1919–1939. First Series, London 1949, vol. III, pp. 369–370; Les Grandes…, p. 452.

[26] See an anonymous letter from the French Embassy in London of 25 December 1917 – MAE Nantes, Londres Ambassade 1914–1920, Série B, vol. 48, Lettre anonyme, 25.12.1917 Londres, pp. 9–10; ibidem, télégramme de Londres Amabassade à S. Pichon no. 19, 10.01.1918 Londres.

[27] MAE P, Guerre, Turquie, vol. 895, Arméniens du Caucasus II, de col. Fagalde à gen. Spiers, pour le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères (Direction Politique) no. 940, 23.02.1918, p. 46; ibidem, vol. 895, Arméniens du Caucase II (Arméniens II), télégramme de P. Cambon à S. Pichon no. 280 Situation au Caucase, 20.04.1918 Londres, pp. 273–274; ibidem, Caucase-Kurdistan, vol. 1, Note pour le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales, Paris 27.04.1918, p. 111; Les Grandes…, p. 502; G. A. Brinkley, The Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in a South Russia 1917–1921. A Study in Politics and Diplomacy of the Russian Civil War, Notre Dame 1966, pp. 61–62; D. Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace. The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of Modern Middle East, New York 2001, pp. 355–356; C. Kinvig, Krucjata Churchilla. Brytyjska inwazja na Rosję 1918–1920, Warszawa 2008 (originally published as Churchill’ s Crusade: The British Invasion of Russia 1918–1920, London 2006), pp. 30–31.

[28] Archiwum Akt Nowych, Komitet Narodowy Polski w Paryżu, ref. no. 24, p. 81; FRUS 1918 Russia, vol. II, p. 618; J. Kawtaradze, Gruzja w zarysie historycznym, Warszawa 1929, pp. 140–141; W. Materski, Georgia…, p. 38; A. Furier, op. cit., pp. 91–92.

[29] MAE P, Correspondance Politique et Commerciale 1897–1918 CPC. Nouvelle Série, Sous-Série: Russe, vol. 87, côte: Industrie 1912–1917, La situation de l’ industrie petrolifiens à Baku et au Caucase; 16.02.1918, p. 1, NA W, RG59, M316, Roll 137, doc. 861.6363/4: Memorandum D. Gambashidze, pp. 10–11; A. L. Altstadt, op.cit., pp. 75–76; T. Świętochowski, Azerbejdżan i Rosja…, p. 77.

[30] T. Swietochowski, Russian…, pp. 119–120.

[31] Г. В. Пипия, Германский империализм в Закавказе в 1910–1918, Москва 1978, pp. 36–37; R. G. Suny, Looking…, p. 179; W. Materski, Gruzja…, p. 52; P. Libera, Zarys historii ruchu prometejskiego, [in:] II Rzeczpospolita wobec ruchu prometejskiego, redakcja naukowa, wstęp, wybór i opracowanie P. Libera, ‘Wojskowe Teki Archiwalne’ Vol. 4, Warszawa 2013, p. 36.

[32] MAE P, Caucase-Kuridistan, vol. 1, télégramme de Jules Cambon à S. Pichon no. 30, Londres 25.04.1918, Annex: Note de Georgian Information Bureau, pp. 21–25; ibidem, Turquie, vol. 895, Arméniens II, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales Asie Oceanie. Note pour le Ministre Action allemande au Caucase, 26.04.1918 Paris, pp. 297–298; W. Materski, Georgia…, p. 31.

[33] NPLG, N6, vol. I: 1–50 (1917–19), doc. no. 3(7): Mémoire sur les rapports des Républiques Transcaucasienne et Géorgienne avec la Turquie et l’ Allemagne à propos de l’ effondrement du front russe (Mémoire), p. 1; З. Аваловъ, op. cit., p. 31.

[34] R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…, p. 124.

[35] Закавказскій Сеймъ. Стенографическій отчетъ. Сессія первая (Закавказскій Сеймъ). Засъданіе третье. Тифлисъ, 15-го февраля 1918 года, b. m. r. w., pp. 2–7, pp. 10–12; R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…, p. 127; W. Materski, Georgia…, p. 39; A. Furier, op. cit., pp. 90–91.

[36] Закавказскій Сеймъ. Засъданіе третье. Тифлисъ, 15-го февраля 1918 года, pp. 15–17; R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…; pp. 126–127; T. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan…, p. 111; W Materski, Georgia…, p. 37.

[37] Закавказскій Сеймъ. Засъданіе четвретое. Тифлисъ, 16-го февраля 1918 года, pp. 26–29; T. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan…, p. 121.

[38] Закавказскій Сеймъ. Засъданіе четвретое. Тифлисъ, 16-го февраля 1918 года, p. 35; MAE P, Turquie, vol. 895, Arméniens II, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales Asie Oceanie. Note pour le Ministre Action allemande au Caucase, 26.04.1918 Paris, pp. 298–299; T. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan…, p. 121; W. Materski, Georgia…, p. 38.

[39] NPLG, N6, vol. I: 1–50 (1917–19), doc. no. 10(4): Annexe II. Extraits des pourparles de Batoum du 11 au 26 mai 1918 (Annexe II), p. 18; Документы внешней политики СССР (DWP), vol. I, Москва 1957, p. 121; Les Grandes…., p. 516; P. Olszewski, op. cit., p. 29; S. McMeekin, op. cit., p. 318.

[40] DWP, vol. I, pp. 199–204; W. Materski, Georgia…, pp. 40–41.

[41] R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…, p. 134.

[42] Закавказскій Сеймъ. Засъданіе пятое. Тифлисъ, 17-го февраля 1918 года, pp. 1–2; MAE P, Guerre, Turquie, vol. 895, Arméniens du Caucase II, télégramme de Attache à Ministre Guerre no. 1478, 19.03.1918 Londres, p. 158; R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…, pp. 133–134; T. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan…, pp. 121–122.

[43] R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…, p. 134.

[44] NPLG, N6, vol. I: 1–50 (1917–19), doc. no. 6(7): Annexe I. Etraits des protocoles de la Conférence Turco-Transcaucasienne de Trébizonde (Annexe I), pp. 10–11.

[45] MAE P, vol. 895, Arméniens II, Note de l’ Ambassade de Russie, 02.04.1918 Paris, p. 190; ibidem, Note anonyme: Les Turcs et la Crimée, 15.04.1918 Paris, pp. 89–91; NPLG, N6, vol. I: 1–50 (1917–19), doc. no. 6(7): Annexe I, pp. 11–13; Закавказскій Сеймъ. Засъданіе двадцать второе. Тифлисъ, 9-го апръля 1918 года, pp. 57–64.

[46] NPLG, N6, vol. I: 1–50 (1917–19), doc. no. 6(7): Annexe I, p. 12; R.G. Hovannisian, The Republic…, pp. 23–25; T. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan…, pp. 122–123.

[47] AA, 16N, vol. 3184 no. 26 5bis, télégramme de gen. Lavergne Chef Mission Militaire Française en Russie à Premier no. 270, 29.03.1918 Moscou, p. 6; MAE P, Turquie, vol. 895, Arméniens II, de Lacomte à Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales, 13.04.1918 Teheran, p. 222; FRUS Russia 1918, vol. I, p. 496; З. Аваловъ, op.cit., pp. 32–33; R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…, p. 137; P. Olszewski, op. cit., p. 31.

[48] MAE P, Turquie, vol. 895, Arméniens II, de Lacomte à Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales, 13.04.1918 Teheran, p. 222;. F. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917–1921), New York 1951, pp. 70–71; R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…, p. 148; T. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan…, pp. 115–117; A. L. Altstadt, op.cit., pp. 86–87; pp. 442–454.

[49] F. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., pp. 73–77; R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…, pp. 148–149; T. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan…, pp.117–118; idem, Azerbejdżan i Rosja…., pp. 83–84; A. Adamczewski, op. cit., pp. 80–81; B. Patlewicz, Azerbejdżańska droga do pierwszej niepodległości, Szczecin 2016, pp.128–132.

[50] MAE P, Turquie, vol. 895, Arméniens II, du Consul de France à Tiflis au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, La Diète du Transcaucase à Tous les Peuples du Transcaucase, 13.04.1918 Tiflis, pp. 258–259; NPLG, N6, vol. I: 1–50 (1917–19), doc. no. 3(7): Mémoire, p. 2; ibidem, doc. no. 6(7): Annexe I, p. 13; Б. Кадищев, op. cit., p. 49; T. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan…, pp. 123–124; P.Olszewski, op. cit., p. 31.

[51] MAE P, Turquie, vol. 895, Arméniens II, note de Consul de France au Ministre de Affaires Étrangères no. 41, 25.04.1918 Tiflis, p. 283; ibidem, Caucase-Kurdistan, vol. 1, Note pour le Ministre de Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales, Paris 27.04.1918, pp. 106–107; R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…, p. 158.

[52] AA, 16N, vol. 3184 no. 26 6bis, Rapport du L.Colonel Chevalet Relativement à la situation du Caucase, 11.04.1918, pp.1–2; MAE P, Turquie, vol. 895, Arméniens II, de Lacomte à Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales, 13.04.1918 Teheran, p. 222; FRUS Russia 1918, vol. I, p. 496; З. Аваловъ, op.cit., p. 33; R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…, p. 137; P. Olszewski, op. cit., p. 31; D. Silakadze, The Armaments of the Forces and People’ s Guards of the First Republic of Georgia, Tbilisi 2017, pp. 29–31.

[53] T. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan…, pp. 119–120.

[54] Закавказскій Сеймъ. Засъданіе двадцать второе. Тифлисъ, 9-го апръля 1918 года, pp. 4–56; J. Kawtaradze, op.cit., p. 142; R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…, pp. 160–162; P. Olszewski, op. cit., pp. 31–32.

[55] R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…., p. 158; W. Materski, Gruzja…, p. 65.

[56] А. Б. Кадищев, Интервенция и гражданская война в Закавказье, Москва 1960, pp. 52–54; R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…, p. 172; W. Materski, Georgia…, p. 45.

[57] NPLG, N6, vol. I: 1–50 (1917–19), doc. no. 9(3): Annexe II, p. 14; P. Olszewski, op. cit., p. 32; B. Patlewicz, op. cit., pp. 133–134.

[58] D. Fromkin, op. cit., p. 354.

[59] T. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan…, pp. 126–127; W. Materski, Georgia…, p. 48.

[60] Г. В. Пипия, op. cit., p. 101; W. Materski, Georgia…, p. 44; P. Olszewski, op. cit., pp. 32–33.

[61] NPLG, N6, vol. I: 1–50 (1917–19), doc. no. 3(7): Mémoire, p. 3; З. Аваловъ, op. cit., p. 38; Г. В. Пипия, op. cit., p. 102; P. Olszewski, op. cit., pp. 32–33.

[62] F. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., pp. 109–109; W. Materski, Georgia…, p. 46.

[63] NPLG, N6, vol. I: 1–50 (1917–19), doc. no. 9(3): Annexe II, pp. 14–16; ibidem, doc. no. 10(4): Annexe II, pp. 18–19; R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…, pp. 173–174.

[64] NPLG, N6, vol. I: 1–50 (1917–19), doc. no. 9(3): Annexe II, p. 15, ibidem, doc. Nr 10(4), p. 17; З. Аваловъ, op. cit., p. 46; J. Kawtaradze, op.cit., p. 143; F. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., pp.109–112; R. G. Hovannisian, The Republic…, Vol. I, p. 28; W. Materski, Georgia…, p. 47; P. Olszewski, op. cit., pp. 32–33.

[65] NPLG, N6, vol. I: 1–50 (1917–19), doc. no. 10(4): Annexe II, p. 17; P. Olszewski, op. cit., p. 33.

[66] NPLG, N6, vol. I: 1–50 (1917–19), doc. no. 3(7): Mémoire, p. 3; ibidem, doc. no. 10(4): Annexe II, pp. 18–19; З. Аваловъ, op. cit., p. 45; R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…, pp. 173–174.

[67] NPLG, N6, vol. I: 1–50 (1917–19), doc. no. 10(4): Annexe II, pp. 19–20; T. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan…, p. 127 A. Ter Minassian, op. cit., pp. 67–68.

[68] З. Аваловъ, op. cit., pp. 59–60; F. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., pp. 119–120; R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…, pp. 183–184; W. Materski, Georgia…, p. 49; O. Janelidze, The Democratic Republic of Georgia, Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość 1, 2018, pp. 168–169.

[69] F. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. 114; R. G. Hovannisian, Armenia…, p. 181; T. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan…., p. 126.

[70] W. E. D. Allen, P. Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields. A History of the Wars in Turco-Caucasian Border 1821–1921, Cambridge 1953, pp. 250–252; T. Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan. A Borderland in Transition, New York 1995, pp. 70–71; D. Fromkin, op. cit., pp. 354–355; P. Adamczewski, Górski Karabach w polityce niepodległego Azerbejdżanu, Warszawa 2012, pp. 86–87.

[71] FRUS 1918 Russia, vol. II, pp. 632–633; Z. Awałow, op. cit., pp. 59–60.

[72] MAE P, URSS, vol. 833, dossier Géorgie, Rapport de P. A. Chardigny, 26.05.1918, p. 436; NPLG, N6, vol. I: 1–50 (1917–19), doc. no. 10(4): Annexe II, p. 20; Les Grandes…, p. 609; З. Аваловъ, op. cit., p. 61; А. Б. Кадищев, op. cit., p. 58.

[73] MAE P, URSS, vol. 833, dossier Géorgie, Rapport de P. A. Chardigny, 26.05.1918, p. 436, W. Materski, Gruzja…, pp. 66–67; T. Świętochowski, Azerbejdżan, Warszawa 2006, pp. 67–68; O. Janelidze, op. cit., p.168.

TRANSCAUCASIAN SEIM AND GEORGIAN POLITICAL SPECTRUM

by Otar Janelidze

The coup of October 1917 as a result of which the Bolsheviks took possession of the government in Russia, made the South Caucasus face new challenges as well. The title nations of the region and major political parties considered the incident as an adventure and separated from the soviet government. Instead of the weakened Special Transcaucasian Committee – OZAKOM, the new regional government – Transcaucasian Commissariat was established at Tbilisi on November 15, 1917 headed by the Social – Democrat Evgeni Gegechkori.[1]

In parallel with the Commissariat, the council of deputies for workers and soldiers of Tbilisi established after the victory of the revolution in February 1917 and the regional center of the deputies for the Transcaucasian workers, soldiers and peasants continued to exist. Both of these structures were headed by Noe Zhordania.

It was in these institutions where the idea arose to form a local temporary political government, which would lead the region before convening the Constituent Assembly of Russia. This proposal was first mentioned at the meeting of regional political parties, representatives of revolutionary organizations and institutions held in Tbilisi on November 11, 1917. The new temporary administrative body, as mentioned, was really established in Tbilisi on November 15, 1917 in the form of the Transcaucasian Commissariat.

The subsequent development of events showed that the Commissariat was not satisfactory enough and the issue of organizing the Transcaucasian self – government with a parliament in Tbilisi was on the agenda. It was Noe Zhordania’ s[2] idea to choose the name ‘Seim’[3] for the parliament which he mentioned at the sitting of the National Council of Georgia on November 20, 1917.

The issue of establishing the Transcaucasian Seim became even more vital after the Bolsheviks dispersed the Constituent Assembly gathered in Tauride Palace in Petrograd on January 6, 1918 and the expectation of establishing democracy in Russia ended. According to one contemporary, Zakaria Guruli, ‘the idea of convening Seim was originated when the Constituent Assembly was dispersed and there was no hope of restoring the entire Russian Revolutionary Front’.[4]

A certain plan was developed in the Transcaucasian Commissariat and revolutionary structures of the region according to which they had to create a local legislative branch from among the Caucasian deputies of the Russian Constituent Assembly ‘Transcaucasian Seim’ and the day of convening it was February 10 (23) 1918.

Under what circumstances was the Seim being established and what was the attitude of the political forces towards this institution in Georgia? Based on the initial sources I will try to report the reality of the previous century and respond to the question risen.

The time was highly dynamic and changeable. The world war continued and nobody knew what its outcome would be in the end. Events were developing at a kaleidoscopic pace. The external factor in general and the conjuncture caused by the course of the war sometimes resulted in new realities and had a significant influence on them.

Only contours of the collapse of the Russian Empire were outlined. In addition, the integration of the Transcaucasia itself was deprived of the internal strength which was caused by many factors. First of all the different direction of the political orientation of local dominant nations should be noted. There should also be mentioned the differences in social relationships, religions, cultures, traditions, goals and ideals of the population, which led to the absence of the ‘Caucasian self – consciousness’.[5] According to the Georgian publicist Geronti Kikodze, ‘The Federation of the Transcaucasia does not have any real grounds and political unity of the Transcaucasian nations would be a kind of mésalliance that would make all members equally unhappy... We are connected only by the factor that the compilers of popular geographical textbooks and old Russian bureaucrats have placed us into the same geographical and administrative unit but this factor will not overshadow deep cultural, racial and political resistances’.[6]

Indeed, such reality and the challenges of territorial separation could have become a precondition for confrontations and political, ethnical and religious conflicts more than for the unity.

What should the unity of the south Caucasian peoples rely on or what basis could it have other than the economic necessity? Would the centuries – old experience of coexistence in one empire act as a contributor to the consolidation? This and other similar questions with all seriousness were put before local politicians and required decided answers.

It should also be taken into account how the south Caucasia was seen from the outside and what place it took in the plans and projects of the belligerents. Territorial integrity, along with stability, gave the region attractiveness in the eye of powerful states and also increased its ‘international weight’. The supply of raw materials and energy resources, the natural wealth of the region in general and the local ‘boundless space’ for the industrial capital increased interest in it. Thus Seim was being formed in light of this situation as a temporary legislative branch of the Transcaucasia which was to function before the victory of democracy in Russia.

In the first decade of February 1918, with the agreement of the Transcaucasian Commissariat and revolutionary bodies of the region, was formed the Transcaucasian Seim which, in addition to local deputies of the Constituent Assembly of Russia, also included the representatives of the political parties of the region in proportion to the votes received in the elections of the Assembly. The number of Seim members consisted 111.[7] Georgian Social – Democrats got 32 mandates, Azerbaijan Musavat Party got 30 and Armenian Dashnaktsutyun got 27 mandates.[8] The National – Democratic and Socialist – Federalist parties of Georgia in Seim were represented by each deputy – Giorgi Gvazava and Giorgi Laskhishvili and from SR party Ivane Lortkipanidze got the mandate.[9] Nikoloz (Karlo) Chkheidze, a well – known Georgian Social – Democrat was elected as the chairman of Seim. The Transcaucasian Seim got down to work on February 10, 1918.

Seim was established on the basis of party and not on national principle but as soon as it began functioning, three unofficial national – Georgian, Muslim (Azerbaijan) and Armenian – sectors were formed in it.[10] All factions emphasized the necessity for the solidarity of the Transcaucasian democracy and inter – ethnicity for the perspective of the region but in practice each of them put the tendencies of its own nation ahead of the interests of the united Transcaucasia.

According to Georgian newspapers of that time, ‘New life of the old Caucasus began’ by establishing the Seim. The periodical press reported this fact but it was too difficult to determine how viable this new formation would work in a completely new and unusual environment.

Noe Zhordania explained the aims and importance of the Seim in the following way: The Transcaucasian Seim should solve three main issues: at first it must establish an authorized powerful government, conclude a permanent treaty with the Ottomans and take measures to suppress the anarchy.[11] Zhordania specified the earlier view in a declaration read out on behalf of the Social Democratic Party in the Seim as follows: if at first we believed that Seim would have a legislative function, now we should say that it must regulate all aspects of our social – political life and settle agricultural and national issues of the treaty. Noe Zhordania particularly distinguished the unity of the entire armed forces of the region and its subordination to the Seim or the legislative branch created by the Seim, but in his opinion, a permanent public militia was to be established instead of a regular army[12] (national units established at that time were subject to national councils).

Social – Democratic newspaper Ertoba considered the establishment of a powerful government as the primary goal of the Seim. The following priorities to be solved by the Seim were land and treaty related issues.[13]

Convening of the Seim was described by its creator Georgian Social – Democrats as ‘the most valuable achievement of the revolution’ and believed that the fate of revolution in the Transcaucasia was in reliable hands because according to them, the Seim chose the way[14] ‘to carry out the slogans of the great Russian revolution in life’.

The Georgian leaders of the Social – Democratic Party saw the formation of the district Seim of the Transcaucasia and the strengthening of its influence as part of the ‘Action Plan of Democracy’. Among the issues to be decided by the Seim, they gave priority to the following: 1. Treaty, 2. Land and 3. National issues. Subsequent tasks were finances and management – governance.[15]

The head of the Socialist – Federalist Party Giorgi Laskhishvili believed that ‘the present Seim is the roof of a poorly constructed building, it is temporary and artificially arranged to meet the urgent needs’. According to him, ‘the union of the Caucasian nations should not be managed from above but it should be built from the underneath: first the nations should have the right of self – determination, establish their national – territorial autonomies and then these autonomies should appoint Federal Seim and Government’. Despite this, the Federalists supported Seim as ‘a temporary, transitional combination which should execute some urgent tasks and then give way to the Federal Seim established by autonomous units.’[16]

The federalist newspaper Sakhalkho sakme noted that Georgian Social – Democrats considered the Transcaucasian Seim as the institution for ‘centralist experiments but centralism ruined Russia and the same fate awaits the Transcaucasia too’.[17] A well – known federalist publicist Archil Jajanashvili had the same opinion too, who wrote the following: ‘Social – Democrats fought for a long time to defend the entire revolutionary front of Russia but when the Bolsheviks broke that front, our Social – Democrats had to limit the field of activity. Today they are defending the revolutionary front of the Transcaucasia and created the Transcaucasian Seim for this purpose’.[18]

According to the federalists, Seim first had to decide on the issue of national – territorial separation of the Caucasian nations and after that they would immediately develop a resolution for convening the Constituent Assembly of Georgia and establish the Government of Georgia, which would take all power within the territory of Georgia. Seim had to take care of the following issues: to make a deserving treaty with the Ottomans for establishing a common, powerful and authoritative government and to carry out the agricultural reform.

The Transcaucasian Seim was not very much enjoyed in the Federalist Party. ‘Gathering the representatives of the Transcaucasian nations in one hall does not mean the integrity which can ensure the independence of the Transcaucasia and a brilliant future of the Transcaucasian democracy. Integrity must be based on the internal agreement of interests. If this does not happen, otherwise, the integrity will not be able to endure not only a strong political storm but even a simple breeze’, wrote the newspaper Sakhalkho sakme.[19]

The representatives of the Federalist Party have stated many times that Seim did not express the will of the Caucasian peoples and ‘present Seim would not cope with the current situation’, it was not relevant to the present spirit.[20] It is not real Seim, it is a temporary organization because Seim or a Federal Council of the Transcaucasia can only be established when separate nations convene Constituent Assemblies and form their own governments’.[21] Despite all of this, Georgian Federalists still considered the existence of Seim necessary and cooperated with it.

Prominent representatives of the National – Democratic Party, Vasil Tsereteli,[22] Geronti Kikodze,[23] Grigol Veshapeli, Shalva Amirejibi and others dedicated newspaper publications to the Transcaucasian Seim.

According to Vasil Tsereteli, the Transcaucasian Seim would not have real power and its authority would remain insignificant because ‘dissenter forces are more in the Transcaucasia than uniting forces. And as the once famous parliament of Frankfurt (convened on May 25, 1848) failed to gather and unite Germany, it is clear that the authority of the Transcaucasian Seim would be even more insignificant’. Vasil Tsereteli believed that National Councils would also block the power of Seim due to which ‘its existence as a government would be short.’ However, Seim could make negotiations about the treaty with the warring states and facilitate the separation of the state territories of the Transcaucasia. ‘If Seim did these two great deeds during the period of its short existence, the trace of its activity would permanently remain in history’,[24] – wrote Vasil Tsereteli.

The National – Democrats saw the Transcaucasian Seim as an artificially originated strange creature and called it ‘premature’ and did not believe in its existence. According to Shalva Karumadze, if the Transcaucasian Federation was created, it would be such a conglomerate that would soon break down,[25] therefore Georgia should have to look after itself more. It did not happen by chance that their newspaper Sakartvelo quoted the following: ‘Constituent Assembly of the Transcaucasia – Seim is being convened. Long Live the Constituent Assembly of Georgia!’ And several days later it added one more phrase: ‘Long Live the temporary government of Georgia!’[26] Of course it was the expression of the position.

According to the National – Democrats, Seim would neither make hopes come true, nor be able to destroy anarchy or complete the separation of borders among the nations. Despite this, they did not mind its creation and convening. They said that ‘Seim is a transitional step which brings us closer to our ideals... We support it so that the Mensheviks can completely exhaust the illusions which they have about the center’.[27]

In point of the view of the National – Democrat Giorgi Gvazava, Seim was to be considered[28] as an organization carrying the sovereign rights within the borders of the Transcaucasia in terms of international rights, which would determine the issues[29] such as treaty, nation and relations with the neighbors.

National – Democrats also pointed out that Seim was the only institution the need of which was based on both political and general situation of the Caucasus and its existence was ‘still tolerable’. However, the position of Social – Democrats was criticized according to which ‘the first – born children of the revolution’ and the structures (meaning councils and centers of different levels) ‘originated in the calamity of the revolution’ should have remained as the bodies for controlling and ‘watching’ the Seim, which would weaken the authority of the Seim.[30]

At the first meeting of the Seim, Giorgi Gvazava also asked a question: ‘Now as the legislative body of the region has been established, will the council of deputies for workers and soldiers be cancelled’? in response to which he got the dissatisfaction from the majority of the Socialists of Seim.[31] Georgian Social – Democrats believed that revolutionary organizations such as the district center of the councils of deputies for the Caucasian workers, soldiers and peasants should still remain ‘the support of the revolution’ on which Seim had to rely several times during its actions.[32] It should be noted that Noe Zhordania really tried that the mentioned district center including its resolutions support the Transcaucasian Seim.[33]

Georgian Socialist – Revolutionaries expected Seim to resolve the issue about the land first of all through its socialization. The next problem which they mentioned was the formation of the national – territorial Constituent Assemblies of the region and the issues about the treaty and government, however, at the same time they considered that the fight for the unity of the Russian Revolutionary Front, Constituent Assembly and the United Federal – Democratic Republic of Russia was necessary.[34]

The Bolshevik organizations in the South Caucasus have not participated in the formation of Seim even though the Transcaucasian Commissariat offered them participation in a new legislative body of the region.[35] The Bolsheviks called Seim a counter – revolutionary body and immediately declared its creation as a separation of the region from Soviet Russia.

The Caucasus Regional Committee of RSDLP (B) issued a special statement which said the following: Seim has no authority over the Transcaucasian peoples. It will be a continuation of the hopelessly discredited commissariat in the eyes of the population. Convening the Seim actually means distancing the Transcaucasia from Russia and creation of an independent state without people’ s will. And this is the fight against worker – peasant soviet government in the union of the counter – revolutionary bourgeoisie and landlords. The Bolshevik Party will do their best to expose the initiators of Seim who are deceiving people.[36]

In response, at the request of the Transcaucasian Commissariat, the representative of Soviet Russia in the region, the Special Commissar throughout the Caucasus Stepan Shaumian and several other members of the Caucasus Regional Committee of RSDLP (B) were arrested, the Bolshevik ‘Кавказский рабочий’[37] was banned and the newspapers ‘Brdzola’,[38] ‘Банвори крив’,[39] etc. were closed.

On the opening day of Seim, the Bolsheviks organized a crowded meeting in the Alexander Garden in Tbilisi. The protesters did not obey the demand of the police for disperse and called the crowd to overthrow the Transcaucasian Commissariat which was followed by a violent dispersal of the meeting. Several people[40] died which threw dust into the newly created Seim.[41]

The establishment of Seim had not been welcomed by the Armenian Dashnaktsutyun Party. The leaders of this political organization accused Georgian Social – Democrats of betraying the internationalism. Newspaper ‘Ashkhatavori’ reported the following: ‘The Menshevik Party sacrificed the international – Caucasian democracy to its Georgian national policy’. The newspaper hoped that Georgian Social – Democracy would give up ‘its traditional anti – Armenian and Muslim defense policies’ and work with the Dashnaktsutyun Party to form a powerful government to ‘save the revolution and democracy of the Caucasus’.[42]

Social – Democrats did not leave critical opinions unanswered which were stated against them and responded to the opponents directly: ‘If we follow the way of our National – Democrats and Federalists, the fight of nations will begin in the Transcaucasia and our region will be transformed into the field of a civil war’.[43] According to the chairman of Seim, Karlo Chkheidze, the Transcaucasian Seim is a valuable achievement of the revolution, which will contribute to the establishment of slogans of the great Russian revolution in practice.[44]

Georgian Social – Democrats did not exclude the fact that if the idea of the Constituent Assembly in Russia died due to the conditions created, chances were that Seim could be transformed into the Constituent Assembly of the region. As for convening Constituent Assemblies of individual nations, in their opinion, this would be possible only after the territory of each nation of the Transcaucasia was identified and separated.

The opinion of one of the sane observers, writer Grigol Robakidze is also interesting with regard to the current events. In his words, ‘the Transcaucasian Seim does not leave an impression of state power’. It was consisted of the absolute majority of the left – wing parties. ‘In modern era ‘Leftism’ is the same label of political hope’, but in the Seim where only the leftists dominate, ‘you doubt that such parliament should either be short – lived or completely random, opened according to various circumstances.’[45]

The political parties included in the Seim submitted declarations to the legislative body of the region on February 15, 1918 in which they clearly expressed the attitude of their political organizations towards the Seim and the challenges facing the south Caucasus.

Noe Zhordania identified the issues about the treaty, agriculture, workers and nationality as priority objectives of the Seim. And among the problems were mentioned the issues related to finances, armed forces and government of the country. He declared the principle of territorial and equality of nations to be the basis for the separation of local nations. As for the armed forces, according to Noe Zhordania, it should have been formed with a territorial principle instead of national units and directly subordinated to the Seim or the authorized body of the Seim.[46]

Noe Ramishvili (Social – Democratic Faction) specified the issues given in Noe Zhordania’ s speech more clearly which was as follows: liquidation of the war at the front of the Caucasus and restoration of peaceful, neighborly relations with the neighboring peoples; free transfer of land to peasants of all the Transcaucasian nations; establishment of an 8-hour working week and minimum of the wage throughout the region, provision of social insurance and labor protection; territorial separation, formation of national – territorial cantons by defending complete internal self – governance and rights of national minorities.[47]

To solve the financial problem, Noe Ramishvili set out the following: 1. establishment of a monopoly on consumer goods (bread, sugar, oil, etc.), 2. nationalization of some essential industries, 3. bringing credit institutions under the control of the State Bank and 4. revision of the Tax system and tariffs in accordance with the interests of indigent levels of the population.

Despite the formation of the Seim, Georgian SRS still supported the idea of a ‘common Russian front’. In addition, they openly supported Seim, which in their opinion was related to the solution of every issue caused by life. Ivane Lortkipanidze, the representative of the Socialist – Revolutionary Party also raised the issue of establishing a national – territorial parliament. He also identified the following objectives of the Seim, such as the solution of the agricultural issue through the socialization of land, imposing a minimum wage on industry on the basis of the control of state and trade unions, introducing state insurance, fight against unemployment, etc. The declaration of the SR also paid special attention to the issues related to treaty and government, required a democratic truce without indemnities and annexation and formation of one party – Public – Socialist government.[48]

Giorgi Laskhishvili introduced the Socialist – Federalist declaration to the members of the Seim, who described the formation of the Transcaucasian Seim as a celebration of the ideas of the Federalist Party. He said, ‘current Seim is the institution which was created due to the course of the revolution to resolve urgent issues. This is the result of the fact that the Transcaucasia moved away from the rest of Russia. The free peoples of the Transcaucasia must, through self – determination, establish national – territorial autonomies, which, only after that, will create a common government or the Union of Seim.

In Giorgi Laskhishvili’ s opinion, Seim, as a representative body of the revolutionary democracy of the Transcaucasia, has no authority to conclude any other treaty unless it is based on democratic principles.

The declaration of the Socialist – Federalist Party stated that delaying an agricultural reform was disastrous. As the objective of a great and true revolution, it must be solved in a radical way: private ownership of land must be abolished and become socialized.

The Federalist Party named the principle of national settlement with the insurance of the rights of the national minorities as the basis for the territorial separation of the region and added that the survey – referendum of population would be needed especially in the peripheries.[49]

Giorgi Gvazava, who spoke on behalf of the National – Democratic Party at the meeting of the Seim, poured cold water over those who still spoke about the democracy and the Constituent Assembly of Russia and trusted them. He noted that neither of them was a real power and it was better to say goodbye to dreams because trusting them prevented them from overcoming the challenges. It was necessary for the Transcaucasia to have moved away Bolshevik Russia before. We should only think about our survival and turn Seim, as a necessary institute, into a real powerful body. What concerns social and political issues, in Giorgi Gvazava’ s opinion, they should be transferred to the national councils of local peoples.[50]

The activity of the Seim coincided with a very difficult international situation for the region. On March 3, 1918, Soviet Russia signed a separate peace treaty with Germany in Brest – Litovsk according to which it ceded Batumi, Ardahan and Kars counties in the South Caucasus to the Ottoman Empire, the ally of Germany.[51] The Transcaucasian Seim did not recognize the terms of the Brest Peace Treaty, which was followed by the invasion of the Ottoman army into the region.

The Transcaucasian Seim and the Commissariat tried resolve the conflict through a diplomatic way. They agreed to the Ottoman initiative to hold peace talks between the Transcaucasia and the Ottomans and sent a delegation to Trabzon (Trebizond at that time) in March, 1918 led by Akaki Chkhenkeli. Seim was sure that the negotiation would lead to the final treaty as well.

Seim gave the following instruction to the delegation of the Transcaucasia sent for the negotiations: the Peace Treaty with the Ottomans was to be based on the borders of Russia – Ottoman Empire before the outbreak of the World War in 1914; the delegation was to seek the self – determination of Eastern Anatolia, in particular, to gain autonomy for the Ottoman Armenians within the Ottoman Empire.[52]

Possessing the military advantage, the Ottoman side paid no regard to this offer. They demanded the unconditional fulfillment of the Brest – Litovsk Treaty and declaration of the Transcaucasia as a sovereign state as the basis for the negotiations. While the delegations were exchanging memorandums and notes with each other, the Ottoman army was approaching Kars and Ardahan with successful military operations.[53] The negotiation was deadlocked. Seim convened its delegation in Tbilisi. The Ottomans issued a 48 hour ultimatum for the Transcaucasian authorities, urging them to reject the claims to the districts of Ardahan, Kars and Batumi.[54] At the same time, the Ottoman army was heading deep towards the Transcaucasia.

As the issue failed to be solved through negotiations with the Ottomans, on April 5, 1918, the Seim issued a manifesto to the nations of the Transcaucasia and called them to defend themselves with weapons. The ‘Manifesto’ of the Seim emphasized that the Transcaucasia had done everything to resolve the aggravated situation peacefully with the Ottomans but it turned out impossible. ‘The Ottomans are insisting their primary demands. Their goal is to move the Transcausia away from the outside world and enslave it. ...The Transcaucasian nations long for the treaty but these nations will not agree to buy the treaty at the expense of slavery and shame. Now we have to choose either a shameful treaty and slavery or war.

With the awareness of our great responsibility for the homeland and future generations, we have firmly chosen not to sign the shameful treaty. The negotiations about the treaty with the Ottomans were terminated. From now the disputes between us will be solved on the battlefield,’[55] – the document reads.

Although this appeal obtained[56] the support of Georgian and Armenian population and the Seim decided to start war against the enemy, self – defense became impossible. The Ottoman troops occupied Batumi and Ozurgeti, invaded into Samtskhe – Javakheti and also occupied a substantial part of Armenia.

The Seim had to act at the behest of the Ottomans: on April 9 (22), 1918, a decision was made about seceding the region from Russia and establishing a Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic.[57]

The issue of the independence of the Transcaucasia has been the subject of discussion in the Seim before. It was first raised by the representative of National – Democratic Party Giorgi Gvazava on February 13, 1918[58] as a response to the negotiation of Brest – Litovsk but he could not gain the support. Debates were also held on February 22. Noe Zhordania said: ‘when there is a choice between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, we choose Russia but if there is a choice between the Ottoman Empire and the Transcaucasia, we choose the independence of the Transcaucasia. ...When we are asked which one we prefer: destruction or separation, – of course I support separation’.[59] The independence of the region was also supported by several other factions (I. Semyonov expressed an opposite opinion on behalf of the Faction of People’ s Freedom) but the final decision had not been made at that time either. The following was recorded in the resolution of the Seim: ‘Having discussed the issue about the declaration of the Transcaucasian Independent Democratic Republic, the Seim considers it possible to solve the issue in a positive way. It instructs a special commission to process it in the shortest time and goes on to the next issue.’[60]

Georgian Social – Democrats were aware of the seriousness of the problem, pointing out that ‘the independence of the Transcaucasia naturally comes from the current situation and attitude of real forces’ and the establishment of an Independent Republic of the Transcaucasia is the only way[61] to avoid the threat coming from the Ottomans, but they do not hurry to make a decision. Their newspaper Ertoba wrote the following: ‘We can’ t cut ties with Russia at a blow, which is still our ally. We know that in current conditions Russia is not able to provide assistance to us but cutting ties with it will put us in the hands of the Ottomans. Therefore, if there is a choice between the Ottomans and Russia, we will choose the latter, we prefer to stay within the borders of Russia.’[62]

The situation created by April 1918 prompted the leaders of the Social – Democrats to make a different decision and therefore, they had to justify for their party members or supporters from a working class why it was necessary to move the Transcaucasia away from Russia. For example, Karlo Chkheidze interpreted that ‘independence is an essential step for democracy.’[63] And David Oniashvili, who submitted a resolution on the secession of Transcaucasia from Russia to the Seim on behalf of the faction, called the secession an ‘act of political necessity.’[64] Newspaper Ertoba in its editorial letter explained to the reader, ‘we do not think that the independence of the Transcaucasia is the ‘best medicine’, which will cure people’ s wounds and bring them into the Promised Land, but at present it is the only solution’. The editorial staff did not hide the fact that the chosen path would not be a bed of roses and many dangers were expected ahead.[65] That is why Karl Kautsky wrote the following: ‘Transcaucasia did not step aside at once, but gradually,’[66] and according to the Georgian publicist Joseph Imedashvili: the Transcaucasian Seim determined the independence of Transcaucasia after ‘many hesitations and dithering.’[67]

It is interesting that the leader of the Georgian Social – Democracy, Noe Zhordania refrained[68] from voting for the issue about the secession of Transcaucasia from Russia. In addition, the following is also known: after the self – liquidation of the Transcaucasian Seim, before the declaration of the state independence of Georgia, Noe Zhordania announced at the meeting of the National Council on May 26, 1918, that instead of the dead state, that is the Democratic Federative Republic of Transcaucasia, there will be created a new state union of the nations of the South Caucasus and this state will be the Confederation of the Caucasus. ‘This will establish the unity of the Transcaucasia and the strength of the nations living here’. According to Noe Zhordania, the path and ideal of the nations of the South Caucasus should be the formation of the confederate union. ‘This union will be the state body, the union of states, which, with a common effort, will stand against external enemies and defend itself. And only then can be accomplished what the Seim was not able to do.’[69] But when particularly asked what a separate Transcaucasian state was to be look like, the Georgian Social – Democrats, loyal to centralism, had supported the federation and explained their position on the current situation in more tactical and political than in principle terms.[70]

In the opinion of the Socialist – Federalists, the prerogative of a united state had to be foreign policy, armed forces, customs and finances and the remaining issues would be the competence of the local governments of the three republics – Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. One of the leaders of this party, Grigol Rtskhiladze says that their party would not support either a fully federal or fully confederate state structure, because for the reality of modern life is appropriate more the constitution with mixed elements of federation and confederation.[71] Generally, the federalist press supported the confederation more and pointed out that ‘the integral parts of the Transcaucasia should be given the maximum of rights.’[72]

National – Democratic Party demanded the immediate declaration of Georgia’ s state independence.[73] In their opinion, if the unity of the Transcaucasia was maintained, it had to be confederate. It should be noted that a similar view was also supported by the intelligentsia of Georgian society. For example, journal Teatri da tskhovreba (Theatre and Life) wrote: ‘When we create our own government of Georgia and the Democratic Republic of Georgia by our own efforts, then we will join the Union of the Transcaucasian Democratic Republic more openly and sincerely.’[74]

Nor the Committee for the Liberation of Georgia, which was formed in Europe with the help of Germany shortly after the outbreak of World War I, was against the Confederation of Transcaucasia. The Committee made every effort to free Georgia from the imperial yoke of Russia and establish it as a sovereign state, while it did not reject the idea of the Confederation of Transcaucasia based on the current situation. According to the members of the Committee, the constituent elements of the future confederation should first create the principles of their own political life, border their own territory and go through the process of self – organization and self – establishment. Only then, based on the common interests properly understood by each, a confederal kind of union[75] could be formed. Georgian Socialist – Revolutionaries[76] also shared the idea of the Transcaucasian Confederation.

At the joint meeting of the factions on May 3, 1918 the Azerbaijani deputies of the Seim raised the idea of the confederation of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus according to which the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan had to form[77] a single federal unit. It should be noted that Dagestan and part of the North Caucasus demanded unification in the Republic of Transcaucasia.[78] It can also be noted that General Von Lossow,[79] the head of the German delegation, who was attending the negotiations about the Ottoman – Transcaucasia in Batumi in May 1918, also considered the unification of the South and North Caucasus as a possible fact.

During the period of functioning of the Transcaucasian Seim and newly created Federal Republic, along with external difficulties there also emerged domestic difficulties, which were mainly due to the disorder of relations among the nations. The situation was especially aggravated by the tragic events in Yerevan and Yerevan Mazra in February 1918 and then in Baku in the month of March of the same year which were manifested in the massacre of Armenian – Tatars.[80] The Bolsheviks used the peasants’ dissatisfaction, caused by the unresolved agricultural issue, for their protests in the provinces of Tbilisi and Kutaisi. The incidents in the Ossetian – populated villages of Sokhumi district and Shida Kartli were of political nature, where the Bolsheviks sought to establish the Soviet Government. They demanded the secession of these regions from Georgia and their unification with Russia. Seim, with the participation of representatives of various factions, formed special investigation commissions and sent to the destinations to study the mentioned disturbances, but was unable to fully suppress the anarchy.

Although they agreed to coexist as one state for a certain period of time, the social – political forces of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan considered that Seim was a temporary union. The representatives of all three nations made provisions for the future in their national councils from the very beginning, they established constitutional commissions for separating the territories and determining the borders, and so on. On April 14, 1918 they also formed[81] a commission in the Seim to develop the constitution of the Republic of Transcaucasia, but the activity of the Seim had not lasted long.

The short existence of the Transcaucasian Seim and the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic, observation and analysis of its history allows us to conclude the following:

The Transcaucasian Seim, provided with the international conjuncture, was a hastily formed, unstable unity, which failed to endure time challenge. Seim failed to manage the integrative process of the region, failed to separate national borders, could not eliminate ethnic conflicts and could not bring the interests of the Transcaucasian nations together. Seim existed for only four incomplete months in quickly changeable and dynamic period. On May 26, 1918 it broke down in a civilized form and remained as a short stage on the path to the emergence of three new states – Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Despite this, the Transcaucasian Seim has gained some experience, leaving us a historical lesson which is necessary and essential for us to know in order to better understand the past and realize the present thoroughly and develop future relations.

The history of the Seim shows that the relations of the three dominant nations of the region reveal two levels of South Caucasian unity: 1. coexistence in one state – political unit and 2. cooperation. The latter one has no alternative either today or in the future, but as for the first one, – the form in which it existed from April 22, 1918 to May 26, 1918, – is unpromising.

Document

СОСТАВЬ СЕЙМА

№ 1 С.-дем. меньшевики.

1) Жордания Н. Н.,

2) Церетели И. Г.,

3) Чхеидзе Н. С.,

4) Гегечкори Е. П.,

5) Зурабовъ А. Г.,

6) Рамишвияи Н. С.,

7) Рамишвили И. И.,

8) Чхенкели А. И.,

9) Скобелевъ М. И.,

10) Джибладзе В.Г.,

11) Георгадзе Г. Т.,

12) Смирновъ М. Н.,

13) Бекзадянъ 1. Н.,

14) Ломтатидзе А. С.,

15) Теръ-Газарянъ Г. Г.,

16) Махарадже Г . Р.,

17) Арсенидзе Р. М.,

18) Бернштейьъ Э. А.,

19) Тевзая В. В.,

20) Джиблаазе С. В.,

21) Хомерики Н. Г.,

22) Эрадзе Г. П.,

23) Андрониковъ К. М.,

24) Ониашвили Д. Е.,

25) Пирумовъ С. Г.,

26) Анджапаридзе Г. К.,

27) Чихладзе Р. А.,

28) Гурджуа В. Г.,

29) Абашидзе Г.,

30) Гаглоевъ Г. А.,

31) Дадешкелиани Я.,

32) Ахметеловъ В. Г.,

К -Д № 2.

и) Семеновъ Ю. Ф.

С.-р. № 3.

1) Лункевичъ В. В.,

2) Атабеклнъ Л Н.,

3) Гoбечия Г. П.,

4) Саакянъ С. С.,

5) Лордкипанидзе И. Н.,

Дашнакцутюнъ № 4.

1) Зорянъ С. Г. (Ростомъ).,

2) Ованесовъ М.,

3) Оганджанянъ А. О.,

4) Амбарцумянъ К.,

5) Зпвриевъ Я. X.,

6) Шахатуни А. Т.,

7) Качазнуни О. И.,

8) Тигранов-ь С. Р.,

9) Газазянцъ К. А.,

10) Чилингарянг Ар.,

11) Грузинянъ-Врацянъ,

12) Хатисовъ С. Л.,

13) Налчаджянъ А.,

14) Дзамоевъ Г.,

15) Хатисовъ А. И.,

16) Хачатурянъ С. А.,

17) Карчикянъ X. О.,

18) Арутюнянь М.,

19) Яглжиянъ Г.,

20) Аманспюръ X.,

21) Чплохянъ Г.,

22) Саакянъ А. И.,

23) Левонянъ П.,

24) Теръ-Арутюнянъ Г.,

25) Кочарянцъ А. С.,

26) Мамдалянъ Г.,

27) Теръ-Геворкянь В.,

Груз. соц.-фйд. № 6.

1) Ласхишвили Г. М.,

Груз. нац -дем. № 7.

1) Гвазаеа Г. В.,

Муссаватъ № 10 и группа безитартийныхъ.

1) Джафаровъ М. Ю.,

2) Топчибашевъ А. М.,

3) Расулъ-Заде М. Э.,

4) Уссубековъ Н. б.,

5) Агаевъ Г. б.,

6) Султановъ X. б.,

7) Мамедбековъ Г. А. 2 ой,

8) Махмудовъ М.б.,

9) Гаидовъ-Миръ-Гидаявъ,

10) Кардатииевъ А.,

11) Рустомбековъ М.,

12) Хойский Ф X.,

13) Хасъ-Мамедовъ Х.,

14) Гаджинский М. Г. I-й.,

15) Меликъ-Еганивъ Д.,

16) Гиижм-бабабековъ М.,

17) Ахундъ-Заде Г. М.,

18) Ахиджановъ М.,

19) Меликъ Аслановъ X.,

20) Бебутовъ Л. б.,

21) Гаджинский М. б. 2-й,

22) Качарлинсксй Ф.,

23) Махмудбековъ А.,

24) Кабуловъ И.,

25) Векиловъ И. А.,

26) Шахтахтинский Г.,

27) Башировъ А.,

28) Векиловъ Р.,

29) Эфенди Раде Ю. Ф.,

30) Кара-Ага-Заде-Гамда-Эффенди.,

Гумметъ № 11.

1) Ахундовъ Д.,

2) Авиловъ И.,

З) Шейхъ-Уль-Исламовъ А.,

4) Агамалов С.,

Мус. соц блокъ № 12.

1) Гайдаровъ И.,

2) Кантемировъ А.,

3) Сафикюрдский А.,

4) Пепиновъ А.,

5) Ризаевъ В.,

6) Гаджинский Д. 3-й.,

7) Магерамовъ М.,

Мусульманство въ России (Иттихадъ Ислам) № 14.

1) Ганиевъ С. М.,

2) Мехтиевъ М. Я.,

3) Мамедбековъ Э. К. I-й.

Газ. ‘Кавказ’, 1918 г. 3 марта.

[1] Newspaper Sakartvelo, November 12, 14, 1917; Newspaper Ertoba, November 12–15, 1917.

[2] Н. Жорданиа, За два года. Доклады и речи. Тифлис 1919, p. 56; Newspaper Ertoba, January 23, 1918.

[3] Seim is the Polish name for the social – representative assembly. Such governmental institution existed in Poland, Lithuania, Finland and Hungary at different times. In Georgia the participants of the conspiracy of 1832 had an idea of establishing Seim.

[4] Leaders of Georgia. Volume XIII. Noe Zhordania. Chairman of the Government of the Republic of Georgia (June 24, 1918 – March 18, 1921), official documents, speeches and announcements, Tbilisi 2018, p. 257.

[5] M. Tsereteli, Georgia and World War, Tbilisi 2014, p. 97.

[6] Newspaper Sakartvelo, January 23, 1918.

[7] According to different publications, Seim consisted of 133 members. This number might also include the deceased deputies or the substitutes of the deputies who left the Seim on the basis of their own statement. Anyway, the periodic press published the surnames of the 111 members whose authority was recognized by the Mandate Commission. See: Кавказ 3, 1918.

[8] Закавказский Сейм: Стенографический отчет. Сессия первая, заседание седмое, Тифлис 1918, p. 6; Заседание тринадцатое, p. 5.

[9] Seim consisted of representatives of a total of 10 political forces, including the members of SR, Cadets and people’ s freedom parties, members of Azerbaijan political organizations 'Hummet' and 'Ittihad', as well as several non – party members.

[10] Протоколы заседаний мусульманских фракций Закавказского Сейма и Азербайджанского национального совета, Баку 2006, предисловие А. Пашаева.

[11] Newspaper Sakartvelo, January 23, 1918. A bit later Noe Zhordania considered it necessary to expand the competence of the Seim and to include all the areas of social and political life of the region in it.

[12] Закавказский Сейм: Стенографический отчет. Сессия первая, заседание третье, Тифлис, 1918, pp. 3, 7, 9–10.

[13] Newspaper Ertoba, January 23, 1918.

[14] Закавказский Сейм: Стенографический отчет. Сессия первая, заседание первое, Тифлис 1918, pp. 1–2. It is impossible not to recall the statement made by Akaki Chkhenkeli at the meeting in Petrograd in September 1917: ‘Georgia will be Tabriz of the Russian revolution’. V. Voitinsky, Georgian Democracy, p. 90. Ivane Lortkipanidze also paid attention to this phrase of Chkhenkeli when he introduced the declaration of the SR party to the Seim members. See: Закавказский Сейм: Стенографический отчет. Сессия первая, заседание третье, Тифлис 1918, p. 20.

[15] Newspaper Sakhalkho sakme, February 17, 1918.

[16] Ibidem.

[17] Ibidem.

[18] Ibidem.

[19] Newspaper Sakhalkho sakme, February 21, 1918.

[20] Newspaper Sakhalkho sakme, January 23, 24, 1918.

[21] Newspaper Ertoba, January 23, 1918.

[22] Newspaper Sakartvelo, January 20, 1918.

[23] Newspaper Sakartvelo, January 23, 1918.

[24] Newspaper Sakartvelo, January 20, 1918.

[25] Newspaper Sakartvelo, January 24, 25 January, 1918.

[26] National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, Foundation 1836, reference 1, Case 5, p. 136.

[27] Newspaper Sakartvelo, January 16, 20, 1918.

[28] Newspaper Sakartvelo, January 24, 1918.

[29] Newspaper Sakartvelo, February 16, 1918.

[30] Newspaper Sakhalkho sakme, February 18, 1918.

[31] Newspaper Sakartvelo, February 27, 1918.

[32] Закавказский Сейм: Стенографический отчет. Сессия первая, заседание второе, Тифлис 1918, p. 11.

[33] Newspaper Ertoba, January 23, 1918.

[34] Н. Жорданиа, За два года. Доклады и речи, Тифлис 1919, pp. 73–74.

[35] Закавказский Сейм: Стенографический отчет. Сессия первая, заседание третье, Тифлис 1918, pp. 20–21.

[36] А. Галоян, Создание и крах Закавказского сейма (февраль–май 1918 г.), p. 158. http://hpj.asj–oa.am/4491/1/1986–1(157).pdf

[37] Борьба за победу Советской власти в Грузии. Документы и материалы (1917–1921 гг.), Tbilisi 1958, p. 186–187.

[38] Russian language daily edition of Tbilisi and then the Caucasus Regional Committee of the RSDLP (B) 1917 – 1918 was published in Tbilisi, editors S. Krasnov and S. Kavtaradze.

[39] Mushis Brdzola (Worker’ s Fight) – Armenian language Bolshevik newspaper, published in 1917 – 1918. The editor was first Askanaz Mraviani, then Sarkis Khanoyan.

[40] According to the famous Georgian worker – revolutionary Arakela Okuashvili, the number of the dead was up to 18 people. See: A. Okuashvili, My Memories, Tbilisi 2018, p. 226.

[41] P. Kazemzade, Fight for the Transcaucasia. 1917 – 1921, Tbilisi 2016, p. 117.

[42] Newspaper Ertoba, January 30, 1918.

[43] Newspaper Ertoba, January 27, 1918.

[44] Закавказский Сейм: Стенографический отчет. Сессия первая, заседание первое, Тифлис, 1918, pp. 1–2.

[45] Newspaper Sakartvelo, February 21, 1918.

[46] Закавказский Сейм: Стенографический отчет. Сессия первая, заседание третье, Тифлис, 1918, pp. 6–9.

[47] Ibidem., pp. 48–49.

[48] Ibidem., pp. 18; 21–22.

[49] Закавказский Сейм: Стенографический отчет. Сессия первая, заседание третье, Тифлис, 1918, pp. 30–31.

[50] Закавказский Сейм: Стенографический отчет. Сессия первая, заседание второе, Тифлис, 1918, p. 11; Заседание третье, p. 39–44.

[51] Мирные переговоры в Брест–Литовске с 22/9 декабря 1917 г. по 3 марта (18 февраля) 1918 г. Т. 1. Пленарные заседания. Заседания политической комиссии. Москва 1920, p. 215.

[52] Трапезундская и Батумская мирные конференции. Февраль – Май 1918 года. Документы и материалы. Под ред. Ир. Якобашвили, Тbilisi 2018, p. 108.

[53] P. Kazimzade, Fight for the Transcaucasia. 1917 – 1921, Tbilisi 2016, p. 126.

[54] Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, Тифлис 1918, pp. 155–156; 138.

[55] Newspaper Ertoba, April 5, 1918.

[56] Muslim Azerbaijanians did not intend to have war with the Ottomans. Moreover, they hoped that the invasion of the Turks into the South Caucasia would lead to the liberation of Baku from the Bolsheviks. In the resolution of the Muslim Factions of the Seim, before the war with the Ottomans, there was noted that they would support other peoples of the Transcaucasia during that challenge and take all measures for the liquidation of the war. See: Протоколы заседаний мусульманских фракций Закавказского Сейма и Азербайджанского национального совета, Баку 2006, док. № 4.

[57] Zurab Avalishvili, a well – known Georgian lawyer and diplomat and a contemporary of the event, notes the following: ‘It can’ t be said that a formal withdrawal from the Russian Empire had occurred with a national passion. No, it was caused by practical need to sign the treaty’. See: Z. Avalishvili, Independence of Georgia in International Politics of 1918 – 1921, Tbilisi 1926, p. 49.

[58] Закавказский Сейм: Стенографический отчет. Сессия первая, заседание второе, Тифлис 1918, p. 12.

[59] Н. Жорданиа, За два года. Доклады и речи. Тифлис 1919, p. 76.

[60] Закавказский Сейм: Стенографический отчет. Сессия первая, заседание девятое, Тифлис 1918, pp. 14; 56; 58.

[61] Newspaper Ertoba, February 22, 1918.

[62] Newspaper Ertoba April 7, 1918.

[63] Newspaper Sakartvelo, May 3, 1918.

[64] Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, Тифлис 1919, pp. 202–203.

[65] Newspaper Ertoba, May 10, 1918.

[66] K. Kautsky, Georgia – A Social – Democratic Peasant Republic. Impressions and observations, Tbilisi 2018, p. 137.

[67] Journal Teatri da tskhovreba (Theatre and Life), 1918, no 7, May 5, p. 2–3.

[68] N. Zhordania, My Past, Tbilisi 1990, p. 88.

[69] May 26, 1918. Declaration of the Independence of Georgia, Tbilisi 1919, p. 7–8.

[70] Newspaper Ertoba, May 3, 1918.

[71] National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, Foundation 1836, Writing 1, Case 5, p. 107.

[72] Newspaper Sakhalkho sakme, May 9, 1918.

[73] Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, Тифлис 1919, pp. 229–233.

[74] Journal Teatri da tskhovreba (Theatre and Life), May 5 1918, no 7, pp. 2–3.

[75] G. Mamulia, G. Astamadze, Independence Committee of Georgia 1914 – 1918, Documents and Materials, Tbilisi 2019, pp. 592; 603.

[76] National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, Fond 1836, Writing 1, Case 5, p. 110.

[77] Протоколы заседаний мусульманских фракций Закавказского Сейма и Азербайджанского национального совета, Баку 2006, док. № 14; И. Багирова, Азербайджанское представительство в Закавказском Сейме и Федерации (февраль–май 1918 г.), p. 8. http://www.clio–caucasus.org/assets/files/Багирова–––Азербайджанское–представительство–в–Закавказском–Сейме–иФедерации–(февраль–май–1918–г.).pdf

[78] Н. Жорданиа, За два года. Доклады и речи. Тифлис, 1919, p. 90; Г. Аветисян, К вопросу о Кавказском доме и пантюркистских устремлениях. http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/etni–1/avetisyan.htm

[79] M. Bakhtadze, G. Mamulia, Materials from the history of the relations between Georgia and Northern Caucasus, Tbilisi 2005, p. 19.

[80] Azerbaijanian historian Z. Alizadeh blames the leaders of Baku Bolshevik Council and the leadership of the Transcaucasian Seim, along with the Dashnaktsutyun Party, for the Baku events. See: З. Ализаде, 'Азербайджанно–Армянские политические отношения в 1917–1918 годах', Кавказ и глобализация 2, вып. 2, 2008, p. 177.

[81] Newspaper Sakartvelo, May 1, 1918; М. Мацаберидзе, 'Разработка Конституции Закавказского Сейма и Национальный Совет Грузии,' Кавказ и глобализация 2, вып. 2, 2008, pp. 151–169; И. Багирова, 'Закавказский сейм: Несостоявшееся объединение центрального Кавказа', Кавказ и глобализация 2, вып. 2, 2008, p. 147.

SAINT GRIGOL PERADZE’ S THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS ON MONASTICISM

by David Kolbaia

Grigol Peradze, who is known in the academic world as Archimandrite Peradze, started his studies at the Philological Department of Tbilisi University. Professor Korneli Kekelidze, an outstanding specialist in Old Georgian literature and liturgy, helped him in obtaining consent to study abroad. The Board of the Catholicosate of Georgia, which was chaired by Patriarch Ambrose I, in 1921 sent Peradze to study in Berlin, where he was expected to receive a broad theological education. At the beginning, Peradze was polishing his German in Berlin to become a student at the Theology Department of the University of Berlin in May 1922. He studied theology and Oriental languages (Hebrew, Syrian, Arabic, Coptic, Armenian, and Greek). He also learnt Latin, German, English and French at that time. Additionally, he obviously was a fluent user of Russian, Old Church Slavonic and Georgian. He quickly mastered Polish after 1933. The degree of Doctor of Theology was conferred on Peradze to crown his studies at the University of Berlin. Doctor Johannes Lepsius recommended him to move to the University of Bonn, which Peradze did in April 1925. In Bonn, he studied the history of religion and improved his knowledge of Eastern languages with the assistance from Paul Kahle, Anton Baumstark, and especially Prof. Goussen, a brilliant German orientalist. At that time he translated the biography of George the Hagiorite into German, which he had compiled (as The Activity of George the Hagiorite), and added a critical introduction and footnotes to the work. He was awarded the distinction of Ph.D. in 1926 on the basis of his work Geschichte des georgischen Mönchtums von ihren Anfängen bis zum Jahre 1064. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der orientalischen Mönchtums, which was reviewed by Prof. Dr. Paul Kahle of the University of Bonn and Prof. Dr. Karl Holl of the University of Berlin. In that work the author analysed the lives of canonised Georgian monks, which led him to a number of conclusions essential for understanding the history of Georgian monasticism. Primarily, he believed that Georgians developed the eremitic form of their monasticism shortly after the conversion of Georgia to Christianity in the 4th century. Later, ca 550 AD, the country was visited by the “Thirteen Syrian Fathers,” who Peradze believed to have been the founders of monastic life. Their arrival stimulated the building of new monasteries and the development of monastic life. The Syrians came to Georgia due to persecutions in their own homeland and brought some elements of asceticism typical of Monophysitism. Their asceticism was characterised by a clear hostility towards their own bodies; they did not care for their food (they ate bread and vegetables and drank water), clothes (for example, they went barefoot) or homes (they lived in caves). They came to Georgia at a very important historical moment. In the 5th century, the Georgian Church became united with the Armenian Church against the supporters of the Council of Chalcedon and to withdraw from Monophysitism one century later, the leader of that move was Patriarch Kirion. When the Syrian monks came to Georgia, it was religiously neutral and did not take any stance on the Council of Chalcedon. The newcomers from Syria reinforced the Georgian Orthodoxy and organised a system of monasteries. Peradze made a number of comments on the impact the monasteries had made on the Georgian Church and Eastern Christianity as a whole. Georgian monasticism is not based on rules and statutes. The main factor was the personality of the father superior, who became a model to others. Each father superior had his own rule, which was later followed by his disciples. This gained a double meaning in Georgia, both negative and positive. As a consequence of the lack of ideas and statutory rules adequate internal relations between the Church and individual monasteries did not develop there. Unlike Oriental monasticism, Georgian monasticism did not serve the Church guided by its intrinsic need. Great saint monks accepted church positions and fulfilled tasks assigned to them only when they had been forced to, which was probably an effect of influence from Syrian and Coptic monasticisms. Peradze indicated the unexplored field, which was the influence of Coptic traditions on Christianity in Georgia. However, on the other hand, the spiritual nature and enthusiasm of monasticism were preserved in Georgia, owing to which monasteries could perform their religious and ecclesiastic tasks without the risk of excess of form and rules. Georgian monasticism brought the spirit of independence and restlessness to the Church. Peradze focused his attention on the pre-Byzantine Georgian liturgy and wrote several classical works on this subject. Traditions of Antioch and Jerusalem were adopted by the Church of Georgia because it had initially been dependent on Antioch. Jerusalem influenced the Georgian liturgy especially via the Georgian monasteries (including of the Holy Cross and the Saviour) and Georgian people living in Palestine. Georgian pre-Byzantine liturgical monuments prove that the Liturgy of James the Apostle (initially) and the Liturgy of Peter the Apostle (some time later) were celebrated in Georgia. The ordination prayers, which have been preserved until now, show some dependence on the traditions of Constitutiones Apostolorum and Testamentum Domini Nostri Jesu Christi. The canonical hours also prove a strong dependence on the Jerusalem tradition. Georgian troparia and idiomelons do not correspond to any known Greek text, which proves that they originate from Jerusalem. A large number of Matins canons include a second song, which is no longer practiced in the Byzantine tradition.

The tradition of celebrating some parts of services in front of a richly adorned cross standing in the middle of the church has been preserved in Georgia, which is a trace of the procession ad crucem at the Golgotha rock, described by Egeria. Some liturgical texts, the Greek originals of which had been lost, such as the stichera to be sung on 24 December and 5 January, and the Matins canon sung on Sunday before the Epiphany, written by Saint John of Damascus, have been preserved. The presence of the 24 troparia for Kyrie ekekraksa in the vespers is still an insoluble puzzle. The Byzantine Rite was adopted as a consequence of close relations with Byzantium at the turn of the 10th century mainly owing to the translation activity of Euthymius and George the Hagiorites on Mount Athos. However, traces of the pre-Byzantine tradition have been preserved in Georgia until the present day. Interesting data regarding this subject may be found in the German translation of the letter of St. Euthymius Mtatsmindeli answering the questions asked by Tevdore Sabatsmindeli, which was published by Peradze. The letter provides a description of relations inside the Church of Georgia in the 11th century. One of the questions concerns the Liturgy of James the Apostle and the Liturgy of Peter the Apostle. Euthymius believed that the Liturgies could be celebrated but the time of the union with Armenia had come to an end and thus all customs originating from the Armenian Church were wrong. However, references to Armenian literary achievements were made even in the 11th century, which is evident in the writings of George the Hagiorite. Euthymius was one of the first representatives of the Byzantine trend in the Georgian Church. The trend led to the liquidation of the Antioch and Jerusalem traditions in Georgia. Peradze also shed more light on aspects of the Georgian liturgy by publishing his French translation of the Georgian version of the Liturgy of Peter the Apostle.

Peradze published catalogues, for example of Georgian manuscripts in England, pilgrims’ reports on Georgian monasticism in the Holy Land (so-called notes on the book margins in the libraries of Palestine concerning Georgia), and first of all the catalogue of translations of Old Christian literary works into Georgian. Analysing the cult of St. George in Georgia and his links with paganism, Peradze argued with the thesis that the cult of St. George in Georgia was a continuation of the lunar cult, proved that the sun had been worshiped as the main deity in pagan Georgia.

Christianity was introduced in Georgia circa 325 in effect of missions from Cappadocia and Byzantium (Rufinus of Aquileia, Historia Ecclesiastica, Socrates, Gelasius of Cyzicus, and Theodoret of Cyrus). A great role was also played by St. Nino, whose life is one of the oldest monuments of Georgian literature. Christianity was developing very slowly at the beginning, and it was the establishment of monasteries and their pastoral service that accelerated the process. Monasteries, especially their scriptoria, played a great role. Georgian monks were theologians, philosophers and historians. Georgian monasteries fulfilled a very important function beyond their motherland, especially in Palestine as well as in and around Jerusalem (St. Sabbas Monastery near Jerusalem), where the Georgian Lectionary of Jerusalem among other works and liturgical books was written between the 5th and the 8th centuries, which along with the Armenian Lectionary is of key significance to the history of liturgy.

The Lectionary of Jerusalem was discovered by Prof. Kekelidze in two manuscripts in Svaneti. The liturgical ceremonies, pericopes, the calendar of saints and other data comply with the report given by Egeria in Peregrinatio ad loca sancta and with the Palestinian tradition. This document is a pre-Byzantine Georgian liturgical monument. Another important centre was Iviron, a Georgian monastery on Mount Athos, where a school for translators was operating. They translated works not only from Greek into Georgian but also Georgian into Greek. Saint Giorgi even composed poetry in Greek.

The establishment of the monastery of Iviron caused a new orientation in Georgian culture; Byzantium supplanted the influence of Jerusalem, Antioch and the Coptic Church. The Georgian version of the Book of Job, which was copied by Grigol Peradze on Mount Athos from a manuscript written in 978, is very similar to the Coptic version. The Bible, the liturgy, the ecclesiastic law and all other branches of theological knowledge in Georgia from the pre-Iviron epoch were revised. That reform, carried out by Georgians, fathers from the monastery of Iviron, had a major impact on Georgian culture.

Georgian monasteries existed in Constantinople and on the Black Mountain (Kastane monastery) near Antioch. Other important Georgian centres included Olympus in Bithynia, St. Catherine’ s Monastery on the Sinai Peninsula, and later Bachkovo in Bulgaria.

Initially, the Georgian Church was administered from Syria (Georgia was dependent on Antioch until 545) and from neighbouring Armenia. However, when Armenia had adopted Monophysitism, twelve (or, according to some sources, thirteen) new missionaries were sent from Syria to Georgia; their lives, recorded by various authors, were compiled and edited by Catholicos Arsen II (in the 9th century).

The newcomers from Syria reinforced the Georgian Orthodoxy and organised a system of monasteries: John of Zedazeni established the monastery in Mtskheta, David, the monastery in Gareja, Shio, the monastery Shio-Mgvime, Abibos became Bishop of Nekresi, and Ise, Bishop of Tsilkani. However, our knowledge of their lives is very limited. Their lives, written very early by their disciples, unfortunately were lost. Almost all of those, which have been preserved until now originate from the 12th century and are mostly legendary works written by monks on the basis of various sources. Finally, Catholicos Arsen II was recognised as their author because at that time he was the main opponent of the Armenians who held anti-Chalcedon views.

The founders of monastic life in Georgia are referred to in Georgian sources as “The Thirteen Syrian Fathers,” who came from Antioch to Georgia in the second half of the 5th century. Works describing the lives of some of them, albeit in the legendary form and of late origin (written in the 12th century), have been preserved. We have only reports on the lives of John (in the Chronicle by Sabinin), Ise the Bishop of Tsilkani, martyr Saint Abibos of Nekresi, Joseph the Bishop of Alaverdi, Shio of Mgvime, David of Gareja and Anton of Martqopi.

The number “thirteen” raises doubts from the very beginning. “John as the central figure and his twelve disciples are a clear reference to Christ and the twelve apostles. In fact, when one considers the names mentioned in the lives, the number of the fathers increases. The fact that the number of the names grows from thirteen to at least seventeen leads one to a presumption that in this case one deals with two separate lists of Georgian and Syrian fathers. It is quite probable that the Georgians were disciples of the Syrian fathers, and that tradition made them Syrians later.”

According to the Chronicle by Tedo Zhordania, the fathers came to Georgia between 541 and 557, when Armenian Monophysites were raging in Georgia, and the Georgian Church was severely endangered and needed help (the Chronicle by Tedo Zhordania described the situation until 550). Let us now leave aside this chronological aspect and return to the question whether the fathers were Monophysites. After all, the Georgian Church was officially Monophysite in the 6th century. At the end of the 5th century the Georgian Church joined the Armenian Church and condemned the Chalcedonian Church to reject Monophysitsim one hundred years later under the leadership of Patriarch Kirion. When the Syrian monks came to Georgia, the Georgian Church was neutral in the dogmatic disputes, and its attitude towards Chalcedon was neither hostile nor friendly.

Regarding the question why the Syrian fathers had come to Georgia, Kekelidze believed that they had been persecuted as Monophysites and sought shelter in Georgia because Monophysitism was flourishing there at that time. Moreover, they also wanted to reinforce the Georgian Monophysites.

We have just assumed that the fathers came to Georgia not in the 6th, but in the 5th century. However, Monophysites were not persecuted in Syria at that time, and the Georgian Church was not officially Monophysite yet. For this reason, the motive emphasised by Kekelidze must be disregarded. In the texts of the lives various motives for their arrival to Georgia are indicated: for example, by chance (which was the case of David of Gareja), moral motivation such as escape from worldly fame (John) and, finally, religious vocation in two forms, modest to accomplish a mission in the country (Joseph) and in another case elaborate and imaginatively presented (Shio). The case with the reception of the fathers was similar; according to all the lives, the fathers were received with great respect. However, according to the lives of David and John, their arrival in Georgia was unnoticed, and they were even unknown in Mtskheta. Different reasons could be given in their case: a desire to carry out a mission in a country, which has not been converted, and a desire to live in solitude and stay away from people. The two motivations make a good combination when one assumes that those deserted areas chosen by the monks were believed to be the most dangerous to the human soul because many demons lived there. The demons could be expelled through fast and prayer. Holy places, free from the devil and unclean spirit, were to be created in solitude and in the desert.

Our author also raised another problem to be solved: what was the nationality of the fathers? Were they Georgians or Syrians? I have already mentioned that Syrians were the leaders but their disciples could be Georgian. However, due to the lack of sources, such facts should be considered separately.

Kekelidze called into question the Syrian origin of the fathers and presented arguments to support his doubts. Then the fathers became Georgians. They lived in various Syrian monasteries. However, when the Monophysites started persecuting them, they escaped going home, to Georgia. Only David escaped to Jerusalem first. The author backed his theses with the following arguments: Why did the fathers go to Georgia if they were not Georgian? How could John all of a sudden speak Georgian if he was not Georgian? After their arrival in Georgia, they were familiar with Georgian customs and traditions, which would have been absolutely impossible in the case of a stranger. However, these arguments do not provide strong evidence because they fail, to a certain extent, to consider the hagiographic nature of the lives. The works were written by Georgians who lived at least seven centuries later than the fathers. Therefore, quite obviously, the authors automatically attributed contemporary Georgian characteristics to the fathers. The monastic life, as shown in the lives, did not differ much from the life in other Eastern monasteries.

Therefore, the author argues that it would not be an overstatement to assume that all the lives might also refer to, for example, Ethiopian or Coptic hermits, if one simply changed the names of the protagonists or the places. The following quotation from The life of St. Shio also fails to provide strong evidence. “When he visited John, he learnt Georgian in four years, however, he used Greek and Syrian for praying and singing the psalms, because he had learnt those languages also.” If Shio was Syrian, why would the author emphasise so strongly that he “learnt” his own native language? This convinced Kekelidze that Shio was a Georgian. In fact, this is very strange because the author used the word “learnt” in both cases, a word that would not have been used to refer to a native language. However, the same text provides good grounds for asking a counter question: If he was Georgian, why would he have to “learn” that language? The reference to the fact that he used Syrian and Greek for praying and singing the psalms proves that he was not Georgian. Why would he have to use a foreign language in Georgia?

Both languages (Greek and Syrian) were used in monasteries in Syria, and it is not so certain whether the “Syrian Fathers” learnt them after their arrival in Georgia, especially as they were unable in four years to master the difficult Georgian language to be able to preach freely using Georgian liturgical and other prayer books. It is also unclear whether at that time (mid 5th century) all religious texts were already written in Georgian.

Georgian monasticism in its hermitic form could not have been founded by the Syrian fathers because it had already existed in Georgia long before their arrival; the Syrian fathers were rather the founders of the cenobitic life, which is their great and enduring merit.

They were Syrian ascetics and came on a mission in the middle of the 5th century (the authors of the lives of the saints deemed that probable) to Georgia, which was a usual practice in monastic life at that time.

It is impossible to determine their exact number. The lives were probably written by their disciples on the basis of their own experiences. However, unfortunately, they were lost in that early form.

The lives, which we have today, all come from the 12th century. Most of them were written by monks on the basis of various sources to ensure general respect to their monasteries and local saints.

With time, the fathers were chronologically moved from the mid 5th century to the mid 6th century, and the credit for writing down their lives was given to Catholicos Arsen (855–882) because he had the reputation of being the main opponent of the anti-Chalcedon Armenians.

Peradze writes that Eastern monasticism is not generally based on rules and statutory regulations. The most important factor is the personality of the father superior, who becomes a model and whose example is followed as long as he lives. If he is a significant figure, the monastery flourishes and after his death everything either comes to a standstill or lingers on like a boundless plain without peaks. Each great father superior had his own rule (the rule of Saint Basil the Great and referring to Eastern orders as “Basilian” as opposed to Western orders is rather inaccurate). “This had a dual impact on Georgian monasticism; both positive and negative. As a consequence of its lack of understanding of social life and statutory forms (rules); monasticism, quite naturally, had little in common with the Church, whose activity was intrinsically linked with social issues. Unlike Western orders, Georgian monasticism never served the Church voluntarily. We often hear that the great saint monks were forced to accept church duties and perform specific tasks for the Church.” On the other hand, “monasticism preserved its pneumatic-enthusiastic character and thus indirectly contributed to the religious and ecclesiastic life, especially when there was risk of its disintegration as a result of adopting stricter forms. This way monasticism brought dynamism and restlessness to the areas where it had impact.”

The topic of Syrian, Palestinian and Byzantine influences constantly re-emerges in academic discussions. As Peradze marked, Syrian influence originated from Antioch, which was referred to in the language of the Georgian Church as a divine and holy city. St. Simeon the Younger (died in 596) played a great part. Georgians had monasteries on the Black Mountain, in Kalliopios and in Antioch itself. Eastern Georgia was clearly under their influence. Thus the influence on Samtskhe was exerted through St. Simeon. It is difficult to tell anything about St. Simeon as a person. Reports on this saint’ s life appeared as late as the turn of the second period in Georgian monasticism and had little in common with the original (for example, the lives of the thirteen Syrian fathers and of St. Seraphim). A more visible and stronger influence came from Palestine. Again, we have no information about its beginnings; we can only address this epoch when it was flourishing, through its representative St. Grigol of Khandzta (who died in 861). He did not submit totally to the Palestinian influence. Instead he was in the middle of a movement, which attempted to make a synthesis of influence from both Jerusalem and Byzantium. Similarly to St. Simeon in the Syrian period, in this epoch another great anchorite, St. Sabbas, played a prominent role in this epoch. Georgians lived in his monastery. The rule of his monastery was brought to Georgia, where monasteries and temples were built in his honour. The third influence came from Byzantium, which in the Georgian ecclesiastic language is referred to as a second Jerusalem. The best representatives of that period are St. Euphimios and Giorgi the Hagiorite. However, they were not uncritical and they did not take everything from Georgian monasticism; they chose what suited them and what seemed necessary to them. They were guided by their own choice in their activity.

At that time Georgian monasticism became universal. Georgian monasteries were located in all paces of influence (Syria, Palestine, Mount Athos and Constantinople); the monks replaced one another and tried to preserve their national character for the benefit of their common task. Despite those strong influences, Georgian monasticism was not enslaved; it maintained control of the situation and preserved its national character. This was very beneficial to the Georgian monasticism because this reflected the essence of the Georgian Church, and to other nations as well. Moreover, no one could take full power and control over people who simultaneously dealt with influences from three different sources. An additional difficulty resulted from the fact that the monks often travelled and did not reveal their places of stay.

Peradze presents a number of facts showing the internal nature of Georgian monasticism. It was characterised by special preference for anchoritic life. All prominent figures were anchorites. All those who were forced to live coenobitically suffered very much and were constantly looking for an opportunity to escape from that form of life and to live in peace and solitude. I am sure that in that grey, early period in Georgia, lived anchorites who have not been mentioned in historical records because there was little or nothing to mention. Even if they had some social or religious influence within their own circles, they did not contribute anything to the general cultural progress of the country. Monasticism became a cultural and historical power only when coenobitic life prevailed and was regulated to a certain extend by adopting the rules.

However, the rules played a minor role; they were not set for a long term and people did not have to adjust their lives to comply with them because they were temporary. Each abbot could introduce new rules, and all saints took the liberty to do that. Following the presentation of such facts, Peradze attempts to indicate the proper sense of the following conclusions.

“Hermitic life was the most favoured form of monasticism in Georgia. We do not know any representatives of early Georgian monasticism because they spent their entire lives in solitude.

In historical records, the type of anchorite monk, only a little secularised, with some interest and contacts with the world, has been preserved. The monks did not forget about their monastic life and its rules, but they knew that by doing so they considered human weakness.

This unnatural double location between the world and solitude had a very detrimental effect on the development of their personalities. On the one hand, the monks could not reach the highest and the most valued degrees in monastic hierarchy and could not develop their ability to create something original, valuable or mystically speculative. They did not remind people of such saints as St. Sabbas Athanasius of Mount Athos or Simeon, the new theologian. They took rather than gave, were more passive than active.

On the other hand, their passive approach to the world prevented them from developing positive activity. Even though they were asked to do so by the kings, they remained in the purely ethical and individual areas. They were unable to reform the Church structure to consist of a central authority and branches, to convert people to their founder Christ and the Gospel, to develop the concept of national identity among the people in the best meaning of the word, to create Georgian Christianity and thus reveal its historically conditioned way to the Georgian Church.”

In 1928, Peradze made a presentation entitled Zur vorbyzantinischen Liturgie Georgiens at the 5th German Orientalist Conference in Bonn, and later, in 1930, he gave a lecture under the title Die Probleme der georgischen Evangelium Übersetzung during the 6th German Orientalist Conference in Vienna. At that time, Peradze focused his attention on Georgian pre-Byzantine liturgy, which resulted in several classical works on the subject. Traditions of Antioch and Jerusalem were adopted by the Church of Georgia because it had initially been dependent on Antioch. Jerusalem influenced the Georgian liturgy especially via the Georgian monasteries (including of the Holy Cross and the Saviour) and Georgian people living in Palestine.

In 1931, Peradze took holy orders and was ordained a priest at the Greek cathedral in Paris. He established contacts with the Georgian community in Paris, was nominated its first parish priest and was one of the founders of the parish. In the same year, he started the publication of the academic annual named Jvari vazisa, of which he was the editor, at the Georgian parish. In 1933, Metropolitan Dionysius (Waledyński) invited him to Warsaw to work as an assistant professor of patrology and deputy director of the patristic studies seminar at the Centre of Orthodox Theology of the University of Warsaw. In January 1934, Father Peradze was conferred the title of archimandrite at the Greek Orthodox Saint Sophia Cathedral in London. He undertook a number of research trips: in 1935, he was staying in Romania, Greece (Mount Athos and Thessalonica) and Bulgaria. On Mount Athos, he managed to obtain 50 Georgian books and 13 manuscripts, including Apophtegmata Patrum, the works of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and apocryphal lives of the saints. He also found Greek versions of the reports on the martyrdom of the martyr saints Anthony, John and Eustachy of Vilnius. In the National Library in Sofia he found a Georgian text of the Typicon written by Grigol Bakuriani (11th century), a Georgian magnate and founder of the Bachkovo Monastery (in Georgian Petriconi). The monastery was established for Georgians, and its founder wrote its Typicon in Georgian, Greek and Armenian.

In 1936 Peradze took a trip to the Holy Land and Syria, from where he brought, among other works, Georgian palimpsests from the 6th and 7th centuries. He published his memories of that trip in Słowo magazine in 1938. That trip also resulted in a abundant collection of photographs and documents. Peradze continued his patristic research in December 1937 and January 1938 in Italy (Florence, Naples, Venice and Rome) studying the works of Dionysius Areopagite; in the Easter period in 1938 he was working at the National Library in Paris on Apology by Tatian; and in July and August in Austrian libraries (Gratz and Vienna), where he found the Georgian version of the work by St. George the Theologian Dialogue with St. Basil.

Summing up this survey (which is far from complete), I would like to admit that my presentation may have included some gaps and some of its parts may seem insufficient. However, my intention has been to make this presentation accessible to the broadest possible public and to be helpful to teachers and students.

Literature:

Paprocki, Henryk, “L’archimandrite Grigol Peradze (1899–1942)”, Revue des études géorgiennes et caucasiennes, 4 (1988), pp. 198–230.

Peradse, Gregor, “Die Anfänge des Mönchtums in Georgien”, Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, 46 (1927), 1, pp. 34–75.

Peradse, Gregor, “L’activité littéraire des moines géorgiens au monastère d’Iviron au mont Athos”, Revue d’Histoire Ecclésiastique, 23 (1927), No. 3, pp. 530–539.

Peradse, Gregor, “Über das georgischen Mönchtum“, Internationale kirchliche Zeitschrift, 34 (1926), Neue Folge 16, 3 (135), pp. 152–168.

Peradse, Gregor, “Skizzen zur Kulturgeschichte Georgiens. 1. Der Heilige Georg im Leben und in der Frömmigkeit des georgischen Volkes (ein religionsgeschichtlicher Versuch)”, Der Orient, 12 (1930), 2, pp. 45–52; 2. “Das Mönchtum in der orientalischen Kirche”, 3, pp. 85–89; 3. “Das Mönchtum in der georgischen Kirche”, 6, pp. 178–182.

St. Grigol Peradze, Collected Works, Vol. I, History of Monasticism in Georgia, Early History of the Georgian Church, ed. David Kolbaia, Warsaw 2012; Vol. II, About the Pre-Byzantine Georgien Liturgy, Patrologia, Poetry, Sermons, Warsaw 2014.

Św. Grzegorz Peradze, Dzieła zebrane, vol. I, O monastycyzmie gruzińskim, O liturgii gruzińskiej, ed. Henryk Paprocki, Warszawa 2010; vol. II, O patrologii, O historii Kościoła, Warszawa 2012; vol. III, Dzienniki, Kazania, Warszawa 2014; vol. IV, Die alt-christliche Literatur in der georgischen Überlieferung, Warszawa 2015.

POLISH – BOLSHEVIK WAR AND GEORGIAN SOCIETY. (ACCORDING TO THE MATERIALS OF THE GEORGIAN PRESS)

by Mikheil Bakhtadze

In the months of April – October, 1920, the ongoing military operations on the Polish – Soviet Russian front were quite actively reported by the Georgian press at that time. This clearly indicates to the fact that the Georgian society was interested in the peripeteias of the Polish – Bolshevik war.

It should be noted that this war significantly impacted on political and military events developed in the South Caucasus in May 1920. In particular, we mean the first attempt of Soviet Russia to occupy Georgia. The hard situation that Soviet Russia faced at that time, on the Western front helped Georgia defend its independence.[1]

Of course, when working on the materials of the press, several points must be taken into consideration: the political orientation of the newspaper (whether it is an official government newspaper or of a political party, or it is a periodical body of a group of the right or left direction, etc.), the situation in the country at that time (there is a military or political censorship if there is the freedom of speech) and others.

While studying the materials published in the Georgian press, we chose the period from late April through October 1920. The reason is simple. At the end of April active hostilities resumed when a new major attack of the Poles began, after which they occupied Kiev. On October 12 a temporary treaty was signed and the hostilities ceased.

Information about the war of the Polish – Soviet Russia was regularly published in various types of Georgian newspapers: in an official government body Sakartvelos respublika; in the party press: Ertoba (Georgian Social – Democratic Party), Sakartvelo (National Democratic Party), Sakhalkho sakme (Georgian Social – Federalist Revolutionary Party); even in such a specific newspaper as Sasoplo gazeti and others.

Before we start discussing the materials published in the Georgian press, we would like to look at one point which is also related to the Polish – Bolshevik war. It is interesting to note that the term ‘Polish Treaty’ emerged at the sitting of the Constituent Assembly of the Republic of Georgia held on June 25, 1920 when the issue of ratification of the treaty made with Soviet Azerbaijan on June 12 was being discussed. This term was used by Akaki Chkhenkeli when responding to the opposition party in his speech. Here is what he said, ‘Here we are told, for example, that we made a Menshevik Treaty and we used to make Menshevik Treaties before and they oppose this to the Polish Treaty.’[2] He pronounced these words when responding to Grigol Veshapeli when the latter said, ‘Our policy should have been not a policy of the loyalty to the Russian Treaty but such as Poland stands today: Victory and then Treaty!’[3] We can say that the term ‘Polish Treaty’ used by Akaki Chkhenkeli refers to the negotiations in light of the military success and the use of this advantage.

The materials about the war of the Polish – Soviet Russia published in the Georgian press can be provisionally divided in three types.

First type – short and dry information, which was mainly received from foreign news agencies and also reprinted from foreign newspapers almost unchanged. For example, on September 26 Soplis gazeti was saying the following: ‘Having defeated the resistance of the Bolsheviks, the Poles managed to move them aside and are heading to the source of the Seret. They occupied a number of places as well as the shores of the river Stokhid. The Poles continued to be persecuted in the Konin sector. The Bolsheviks brought new divisions into battle but in vain. The places which the Reds occupied, were returned back soon by the Poles with counterattacks during which the Bolsheviks were strongly defeated.’[4]

There were cases when information was not published fully. The reason for that was probably a technical problem. It was impossible to receive the full text by telegraph or to understand single words in the text. The names of individual paragraphs were often distorted. For example, newspaper Ertoba wrote the following on August 24: ‘Reports of Lyon. Polish attack. 1) Middle Bug. Main field of hostilities: Polish troops advancing from Ivangorod to the direction of Brest – Litovsk, reached the field of the middle Bug. The number of captives taken in the last days has reached 19,000. 2) On the Narew[5]: This time the hostilities take place in the middle triangle of the rivers Narew and Bug. The defeated Bolshevik army near Warsaw retreats through this region. Apparently the aim of the Polish army approaching Ostolenko is to cut off the centre for the Bolshevik army from the right wing. The Bolsheviks sent abundant forces to cut off the road between Warsaw and Danzig. These troops came across some of the Polish troops which had delayed at Poznan and Pomerania and detained the Bolshevik army on the line located between Poland and Prussia; the second army is heading (then the text is missing)…’.[6]

Reports received from Soviet Russia were often published, which were printed unchanged and it was narrated in the first person. Therefore, there were phrases such as: ‘We attacked’, ‘We were defeated’ and others. It should be noted that the word ‘We’ creates a bit awkward situation for the reader. However, perhaps this is our subjective perception today and the reader of that time did not have such an impression on it.

We have not paid attention to this kind of brief information this time. We have not even started to study and analyze them because they do not actually express the attitude of the Georgian society to the war. They contained dry facts only.

Second type – reports received from foreign news agencies and newspapers which were followed by few explanations or comments. These are exactly the comments that are interesting because they show the attitude to the ongoing war and the belligerents. For example, the information printed in the newspaper Sakartvelo was followed by such a comment – ‘the Polish bomb destroyed Red Attila near Warsaw sooner than that horrible thing would reign on the ruins of Warsaw, which was then carried out by Lenin’ s agents in Azerbaijan in a miniature form.’[7] The epithet ‘Red Attila’ quite clearly shows the position of the newspaper and its readers. However, it should be noted that there are very few cases where certain comments are enclosed to the reports with dry information.

Third type – articles of analytical type, which in addition to information, also contain the analysis and evaluation of events and facts. The position of the newspaper can be clearly seen in such articles as well, which should probably be considered as the position of a political party, group or part of the society who are behind this particular newspaper. These are exactly the articles which seem interesting to us. We hereby note that analytical articles printed in foreign magazines were very rarely published in the Georgian press. I will provide an example without any comment. In the newspaper Sakartvelo was published a small analytical article of the ‘French PTI Journal’ with the title – ‘Russia and Europe’.[8] Even such articles were not interesting for us because they did not express the position of the Georgian society.

Articles of analytical type were mainly published in two newspapers: Ertoba and Sakhalkho sakme. Both newspapers were the periodical body of the left – wing parties (Ertoba belonged to Social Democrats and Sakhalkho sakme to Socialist – Federalists) and this obviously influenced the nature and content of the articles printed in them. Eight articles were published in Ertoba and ten articles were published in Sakhalkho sakme.

One article was published in the newspaper Sakartvelo of the right – wing opposition party, the National – Democratic Party. Unlike left – wing parties, the newspaper of the National – Democratic Party clearly expressed its sympathy to Poland and regarded its war against the Bolsheviks as the fight for freedom and independence.

It should be noted that we have not found analytical articles in the official body of the government Sakartvelo respublika. There are probably several reasons for this. This four – page newspaper published all kinds of official information and it is possible that there was no space left in it for a longer article which would be dedicated to Polish – Bolshevik war. However, if needed, it would probably be possible to solve that ‘technical’ problem. The main reason might be the fact that after the Treaty made with Soviet Russia on May 7, 1920, the government was cautious and did not want to write anything about this war in its official newspaper.

At first we will discuss the articles published in the newspaper Ertoba Six articles out of the articles published in Ertoba do not have authors, thus they might be considered as an editorial article. The other two articles have authors but they obviously sign under a pseudonym: a ‘Gani’ and ‘B. Teklateli’.

The first article with the title ‘Poland and Russia’ was printed on May 22. By this time the advantage was on the side of the Poles, they had occupied Kiev and stopped the counterattack started by the Red Army.

The article emphasizes that Poland is more dangerous for Russia than all its former opponents. ‘If we do not take into consideration the Far East (to the direction of Vladivostok) on the one hand, where there are armed clashes between Japanese troops and Russian troops and on the other hand, the Crimean peninsula, where the so called ‘People’ s Forces’ are settled led by General Wrangel, today the major strong attack against the government of Moscow is carried out by the Polish government. It can be said that this new adversary is very dangerous for Soviet Russia, it is even more dangerous than all its former adversaries. This will be proved by the comparison between ‘the Dobrovoltsi’ and the Poles. After that the author of the article compares General Denikin’ s ‘Volunteer Army’ with the Polish Army and draws certain conclusions. According to the author, the weakness of Denikin’ s army was due to several reasons: his warriors had participated in the Civil War before and some of them ‘had changed the battle flag many times’, i.e. they moved from one side to the other. In addition, the ‘Volunteer Army’ used strict measures in Ukraine and thus made both the Ukrainian peasantry and the local national movement go against the army. Unlike Denikin’ s army, the Polish army is well organized. It has not gone through the civil war and in national point of view it is more united. In Ukraine it acts as an ally of the Petliura government. The Ukrainians see in him the force that will free them from the yoke of Moscow. The letter says that the Soviet government was giving propaganda in the back of the enemy troops while managing to bribe some of the leaders of the opponent army and they spent large amount of money on it. In Ukraine they cannot give propaganda, more exactly, they will not be able to achieve a result, nor will they able to bribe the Polish officers. The article also emphasizes that ‘according to newspapers this war is becoming national. Newspapers also printed Brusilov’ s letter… it appears that other democratic parties (Mensheviks, SSRs) are joining the Bolsheviks in this war’. Finally, the article concludes that ‘if the Polish invasion is quick and the Bolsheviks do not have time to mobilize all their forces, Moscow government can be defeated. We think that Poland cannot carry out fast operations. Ukrainian troops will not go towards Moscow with joy. The Bolsheviks will manage to mobilize forces and thus avoid danger. It is also possible that both parties should start peace talks. One thing is clear, when the Bolshevik radio is silent, there is undoubtedly hardship on the front.’[9]

The article in fact provides a correct analysis. Despite the neutral position, there seems to be some sympathy to the Poles and their ally Ukrainians.

The next article with the title ‘Invasion of Poland into Russia’ was printed on June 5. By this time Budyonny’s cavalry army, which had been moved away from the Caucasus front and transferred to the south – western front, was engaged in the war against the Poles. However, the Bolsheviks have not yet achieved any great success in battles.

The article raises an interesting question: Why is it that despite ‘the political collapse’ the Bolsheviks are still leading Russia for two years already? The author answers this question himself and thinks that all those who benefited from the Russian revolution and who will be in danger in case the old government returns, were united around the Bolsheviks. Another reason is that the intervention of foreign troops made the Bolsheviks become the defenders of their homeland, i.e. Russia. ‘The popularity of Bolshevism grew even more by the fatal, reckless, political move taken by the united counter – revolution to fight against it. It was the deployment of foreign troops in Russia. This event made Bolshevism fulfill the role of the defender of national freedom and turned it into the national standard – bearer of Russia.’ According to the author of the article, deployment of foreign troops in the territory of Russia was a mistake and Poland repeats the same mistake too. The article states the following: ‘We have many times called the government of Soviet Russia for its imperialist aspirations. It evidently proved this imperialism with its ‘Eastern policy’. But justice requires to acknowledge that the Soviet government made an extraordinary compromise to Poland with regard to both politically and territorially. Poland had no choice but to agree to the very favorable terms of the treaty on which Soviet Russia wanted to agree to’. As Poland did not agree to the terms of the treaty suggested by Moscow, it ‘revealed its true imperialist spirit’ by this action and decided to occupy those territories, which, neither ethnographically, nor historically, nor strategically, nor otherwise were considered to be part of Poland. With this invasion, Poland once again put the communist government in the role of the homeland rescuer.’[10]

Talking about the fact what caused the Bolsheviks to retain power will take us far. Everything is not as simple as the author of the article writes. However, one thing is certain that the Bolsheviks used the ‘Russian defense slogan’ quite well in the war against Poland. We can even recall the statements of General Brusilov and several other generals.[11] This propaganda had a result and many former generals and officers got involved in this war. It should be noted that the epithet ‘Imperialist’ first appears in relation to Poland. On May 7, 1920, the Democratic Republic of Georgia signed an agreement with Soviet Russia and the latter one recognized it as the Republic of Georgia. Therefore, it is possible that the periodical body of the governing party might have changed its own attitude to the Polish – Bolshevik war to some extent and this fact might explain the reference to ‘Polish Imperialism’ in the article. But given that the following articles also speak directly about Polish ‘Imperialism’, we think there is evidently a class approach. Georgian Social – Democrats or at least some of them considered the actions of Józef Piłsudski’ s government as a manifestation of imperialism in Ukraine and Belarus.

On July 15 was published a Gani’ s article with the title ‘On Russian Fronts’. By this time the situation had radically changed. The advantage was already on the side of the Red Army. Its units occupied Kiev, Babruysk, Minsk and the Poles retreated.

The article focuses on the fact that the war was on Russian territory before but it is now moving to the Polish territory. ‘On the Polish front the soviet troops occupied a number of cities and important strategic locations. Polish army retreated and apparently lost the ability to attack. If the war was carried out on Russian territory until now, today it is moving to the Polish territory and whole Poland is facing destruction from war’. It is emphasized that Poland did not agree to the Treaty at that time and ‘fascinated by Piłsudski’ s adventure’ it wanted more and thought that it would obtain more. As a result, it got something quite opposite, ‘before the war outbreak, Poland was not satisfied with its own territory and fascinated by Piłsudski’ s adventure and boasting, it seemed ridiculous to them to talk about the treaty and peaceful negotiations. The Polish Socialists were unable to make restrictions for Piłsudski and the adventure of the company. The country was engulfed in the war and it resulted in not only human victims but also economic and cultural destruction.’ Based on his class worldview, the author states that the Polish bourgeoisie will survive, it will shelter the bourgeoisie of the European ally and ‘and is burning not so much as Poland of the poor, Poland of the miserable’.[12]

The article clearly shows pessimism towards the future of Poland and it is not surprising either. Probably many people not only in Georgia thought so at that time.

The next article ‘Poland and Russia’ was printed on July 21. At this time, the Poles continue retreating, the Red Army also occupies Vilnius and is advancing. The situation of Poland is slowly getting critical.

The article begins with a discussion of Lord Curzon’ s proposal, who proposed both parties to cease the war. Then it reviews the domestic situation in Poland and says that Grabski’ s moderate direction has won. However, it also states that ‘today’ s moderates are yesterday’ s imperialists’.

The article is also interesting with regard to the fact that it discusses Polish – Bolshevik war for the first time in an international context. ‘If we look at the issue from an international point of view, it should be noted that the action of Poland was in contradiction with the latest policy of both the British and Italian governments towards Russia. Strengthening of Poland meant the extreme weakening of Germany. This weakening was not in the interest of Italy at all, which was closely connected with Germany economically and was the most benevolent ally with the Republic of Germany. As for England, it had recently begun reconciliation with Russia and there were such conditions which opposed its policy every month. Such obstacle was the beginning of a new war between Poland and Russia. It should be noted that if Poland had won, then England would have been on its side, but it did not happen so.’ The article discusses the issue of Ukraine separately. It states that ‘those who are familiar with the relationship of Poland – Ukraine, it is clear for them that Ukraine, freed by Poland was resembling Armenia, freed by the Ottoman troops.’ While the Poles were freeing Ukraine from communists, they had their support, but then happened such a thing which had happened many times in history, ‘the liberated people rebelled against the new patron’.[13]

Some of the views about Polish – Bolshevik war expressed in the articles published in the Georgian press in 1920 can surely be considered naive and primitive today. It was certainly caused by lack of information to some extent. Nevertheless, I think that these views are still interesting because they express the worldview and attitude of one part of the Georgian society towards this war. I believe that the above article discusses a bit naively the international context which existed around the Polish – Bolshevik war. The situation was much more complicated and many factors influenced it. However, several emphases are properly pointed out, for example, about the history of Polish – Ukrainian relations.

The newspaper Ertoba also dedicated its pages to the Polish – Bolshevik war on August 5. An article with the title ‘Situation of Poland’ was printed. By that time the Red Army occupied Brest as well and moved to the river Bug. Moscow established a temporary revolutionary committee of Poland, which had to take power after the entry of Soviet Russian troops into Warsaw. The situation of Poland was terrible and its independence was hanging by a thread.

At the beginning of the article is stated the military success of the Bolsheviks and the assumption that ‘nothing can stop the advance of Soviet Russia from now and we should wait for the news of the capture of Warsaw’. Then it talks about what led to a radical change in the situation on the front. In other words, a few months ago Poland succeeded more and more and ‘Poland was already facing the ideal of the past time – ‘Poland from the sea to the sea’ (from the Baltic sea to the Black sea)’. And now the Bolsheviks are at the outskirts of Warsaw. According to the author, ‘Poland was not strengthened by its own forces. Its strengthening was completely artificial: Its troops were arranged with the funds of other states, the outfits of these troops, food, everything they needed were provided by foreign states. The Polish government was a creature of foreign states and obediently fulfilled every wish of those states. Its influence on Polish people, its democracy was so insignificant that it did not hope to get any support in this regard. Such a situation could have continued until the unpopular government of Poland was by itself and its policy did not require the mobilization of the forces of the entire nation. But the tragedy of this kind of government lies in the fact that it could not be by itself and it was necessary and inevitable for it to pursue an aggressive policy. Poland (no doubt encouraged by its patron states) crossed the line on which it could raise any claims and began to occupy the places where Poland can in no way declare freedom. This is the very step which turned out to be fatal for Poland. That is the downside of its artificially created power’. It is fatal because winning a war is impossible unless the military force is reinforced by the united nation. In the author’ s opinion this is the reason why small nations manage to defeat a large number of the enemy during a defensive war. Poland did not have such national unity. ‘With its imperialist policy, the Polish government brought people to the point that they even did not have a desire to defend themselves. Polish democracy would not sympathize with the attack on a neighboring country because there was no moral truth on the side of the Polish government in the Polish – Russian war. From the very beginning, the war started on such grounds turned out to be so unpopular that Polish people could not show enough interest during the period when even the existence of Poland was in danger’.[14]

The statement expressed in the article that Warsaw is ruined, is completely clear considering the situation at that time. As for the reason for the defeat, there is some truth in it as well. In the first stage of the war while Poland was succeeding and military operations were being carried out in the territory of Ukraine and Belarus, the natural Polish society was less mobilized and motivated. Second stage was different from the first stage during which military operations had already moved to the territory of Poland.

In the middle of August the situation radically changed again. The Poles counterattacked and there occurred a ‘Miracle on the Vistula’. Right after that was published the next article ‘Russia – Poland’ in the newspaper Ertoba on August 25.

The article continues the statement expressed in the letter of August 5 related to defensive and offensive wars and national unity. At the beginning it states that ‘the battle around Warsaw was of international character initially. Whole Europe was interested in its outcomes. Imperialists were afraid of losing Warsaw. This was a sign of their neighborhood to the Bolsheviks and were celebrating the victory of the Polish army, which made Warsaw and European capitalists avoid that danger’. The author believes that after the defeat of Poland, Russia avoided ‘national threat and could even cease the war. However, ‘appetite came with eating’ and ‘great hopes and wishes were born in Moscow to transform Poland so that it could implement communist tendencies, i.e. in order to introduce communism in Europe’. Poland found itself in the role of the oppressed and it gathered all the strength to defend itself. ‘This time Poland was found in the role of the oppressed and we think that this event contributed to the defensive army of Warsaw to gain more energy and make the Red Army retreat’. The article clearly shows class attitude towards ongoing events. It notes that the introduction of communism in Europe with Moscow methods ‘is not required by the European working class either, they won’ t be able to use this treasure introduced by Soviet Russia in their complicated battle against capitalism… Europe is heading to socialism but this path does not go to the tips of the Russian red bayonet, it is prepared and matured in the very heart of the European proletariat. Backward Russia must not be turned into as its center and the main driving force. Its center must be settled in the heart of the developed country of European industry not by Bolshevik methods but by Marxist ones, by dictatorship established based on democracy and not by the domination of the minority. And this goal is opposed by Russia’ s armed Red Army’ s diametrical move towards Europe’. The article concludes that ‘the only way out of the Russian – Polish war is to make a treaty that would be related to the independence of Poland and non- interference in internal affairs of Russia. Poland itself has learned enough not to repeat the adventure towards Moscow. But we cannot say that European imperialists will give up their evil intentions, nor do we hope that Bolshevism will give up the way to introduce communism into Europe through weapons and these two extremes are the sign of only endless wars and battles until one of the sides is destroyed… We do not consider it impossible to make treaty with Poland even temporarily. But we do not hope to gain common peace.’[15]

Unlike the previous articles published in Ertoba, the above letter is the most ideologized. On the other hand, I think that the reasons for the victory of Poland are properly noted: mobilization of the Poles, devotion and foreign aid.

On September 2, newspaper Ertoba published B. Teklateli’ s letter with an interesting title ‘Girondins and Montagnards’ (because of Russian – Polish War)’. The advantage at his time was clearly on the side of the Poles and the Red Army continued to retreat.

The article begins by discussing the positions of the Girondins and Montagnards during the period of the revolution of France regarding the Revolutionary War. The author writes that Girondins supported the revolutionary war which France was carrying out with several European states and Robespierre was opposed to this war. The latter believed that all attention should have been devoted to solving domestic problems. Then the conversation refers to Soviet Russia and it is believed that ‘defenders of Robespierre’ s ideas are also in Moscow. However, we also know that individuals inspired with revolutionary phraseology follow the Girondins’ path. According to the latter ones, the mission of the Russian troops is to free the oppressed Polish people. It is completely natural when the Polish bourgeoisie dreams of conquering parts of Russia. It fully conforms to its class interest. But when the small Russian bourgeoisie is rushing to conquer new regions – this is not the outcome of a class interest. This is further explained by the desire to find prey which is caused by the déclassé condition’. There is also mentioned that the entry into a foreign country takes place only for the purpose of conquering it and not for its liberation. The authors writes that ‘Perhaps Lenin shared Robespierre’ s fate. Just as the latter one got involved in the ideology of Girondins, so the chairman of Moscow Sovnarkom was involved in a war of a conquering nature by Russian merchants’. Finally, there is provided a comparison between the French Revolutionary Army and the Red Army and it is concluded that ‘the French revolutionary army was politically and culturally higher than its opposing armed forces… As for the Russian army – the situation is worse in its case. The people of Western Europe stand at a much higher level in their overall development.’[16]

Of course we will not discuss the worldview and interrelation of Girondins and Montagnards, or Jacobins. We will just note that the author is right when he says that the goal of Soviet Russia was to conquer Poland. I hereby say that the author’ s opinion that Lenin is ‘involved’ and has to share the position of the supporters of the war is very naive (it is unknown what arguments the author relied on when expressing this point of view). Lenin himself was one of the creators of that war.

On October 16, the newspaper Ertoba printed a letter with a title ‘Treaty between Soviet Russia and Poland’. The first part of the article evaluates the Polish – Bolshevik war. ‘The borders established between Poland and the neighboring countries go beyond the ethnographic borders of Poland. Other conditions also make it clear that Treaty was necessary for Soviet Russia, no matter what compromise had been given for obtaining it. Under the terms of the Treaty, not a single word is mentioned about the interference in the domestic affairs of Poland. It seems that the Bolsheviks no longer remembered the demand for the introduction of the government of workers and peasants and the establishment of legions of workers in Poland, which they submitted to Poland several months ago at the time when the Red Army was moving towards Warsaw. It is the turn of Poland today. The terms of the Treaty suggest that Poland is willing to take advantage of the victory which its troops got in the war against the Red Army over the past two months. Immense expansion of the borders of Poland and stretching it from the river western Dvina to Dniester suggest that its leaders consider themselves as won. One way or another the Treaty has been launched.’ Finally, it is concluded the following, ‘we have always believed that the sooner there is peace in Russia and threat of counter – revolution disappears, the sooner ‘the communist’ incidents will end and the time for a complete liquidation or domestication of ‘communism’ will come’.

We do not consider talking about ‘ethnographic borders’ seriously. As regards to the conclusion, we think that it is quite naive.

Second part of the article no longer deals with the Polish – Bolshevik war. Here is a talk about future perspective. We would like to provide the entire part of it. ‘The press has mentioned fears many times that after the liquidation of the Western front, Soviet Russia will strengthen its military operations to the south and the east and it will reach the Transcaucasia as well. To be honest, the behavior of the local Bolsheviks, especially Turkophile – communists leading Azerbaijan gives the reason for such doubts. Despite this fact we do not think that Soviet Russian leaders will have such political short sight to support their comrades sitting in Azerbaijan and share their policy. In a short time it became very clear for them how difficult it is to conduct offensive war even against a small nation and even the smallest adventure can bring difficult political consequences. In addition, Soviet Russia will still have a long and difficult war with the domestic reaction, which built a very solid and dangerous nest in Crimea and the fight against it requires that a favorable spiritual situation should be created in other neighboring countries for Soviet Russia.’[17]

This ‘Prediction’ is very naive and evidently indicates to the author’ s uncertainty in the situation and to his ignorance of the goals and methods of the Soviet government. In fact, everything went exactly opposite the mentioned prediction. In just four months Soviet Russia started a war against the Democratic Republic of Georgia and conquered Georgia after a month of hostilities.

If we evaluate the content of the letters published in the newspaper Ertoba of the Social – Democratic Party in general, we can say that a class approach is clearly seen in them. Both sides are accused of having a desire to seize the territories of the other. In some cases we are dealing with either the absence of information or wrong analysis (possibly with both) and the wrong conclusions made as a result.

Ten articles were published in the Socialist – Federalists’ newspaper Sakhakho sakme which was about the Polish – Bolshevik war.

First article was published on June 3. By this time the advantage was still on the side of Poland. One part is dedicated to the Polish – Bolshevik war in an article, ‘Situation of Russia’ which was about Russia in general. The author writes that despite the success of the Poles and occupation of Kiev by them, the fate of war is still unclear, ‘Polish and Ukrainian armies made a big and dangerous front against it. Readers might have known for a long time that the adversary liberated Kiev from Soviet Russia. The issue of Odessa has been raised. The battle is getting fierce and the adversaries are trying their best to pull the scales of the war towards itself. It is difficult to say for sure which side will find out to be lucky, which side will win’. There is emphasizes the ‘national character’ of the war’, ‘the war is really of a national character. The Poles and the Ukrainians did not hide it from the beginning. The Ukrainians were clearly saying that they want to liberate Ukraine from a foreign power – Russia. Lenin and Trotsky always tried to hide that the actions of Soviet Russia are of national character and whatever they do, they do it for the idea of internationalism and communism. But the war against the Poles and the Ukrainians made the Soviet government reveal the national character of their actions and fight. In this regard, the call of Moscow government to all the former Russian officers is of great attention. The Bolsheviks are not only speaking on behalf of workers in this call, but also on behalf of the Russian people as well’. It is interesting to note that not only Poland but also Ukraine is also mentioned as an adversary of Soviet Russia. I think it is an important fact. The article is neutral, there is no direct and obvious sympathy for either Poland or Russia. If there is any support for anyone, it is for the Ukrainians. The desire of the Ukrainians to free themselves from Moscow’ s ruling is directly stated.[18]

Another brief report on the war was published on July 13. It is again a general article, ‘Situation of Russia’ in which is noted that unlike Georgian communists, the Moscow newspaper ‘Pravda’ ‘does not consider it an easy task to defeat the Poles’. It concludes briefly that ‘the Polish front is so serious, thoughtful and dangerous for the Bolshevik government.’ It is interesting that this little information makes the position of the Georgian Bolsheviks clear. As it seems they considered defeating Poland to be an easy and simple task.[19]

The first major serious analysis about the Polish – Bolshevik war was published on July 21. By that time the advantage was on the side of the Red Army. The title of the article is ‘Russia and Poland’. At the beginning of the letter is stated that after the defeat of Kolchak – Denikin, Poland became the most serious adversary of Soviet Russia. ‘That what the generals of the King could not manage to do, Poland executed it but this plan can also be considered as a failure. It has been a few months since a fierce and big war broke out between Poland and Russia. At the beginning Poland managed to put Soviet Russia in serious danger, it invaded into the center of Ukraine and was approaching the borders of Belarus from the north – west side. It is noted that at first the Bolsheviks were ready for peaceful negotiations. However, it is emphasized that only the ‘helpless condition’ of Soviet Russia and not any other reason made the Bolsheviks negotiate. As to why Warsaw rejected the peaceful process, the newspaper commented: ‘Treaty proposals of Moscow were rejected by Warsaw cabinet, which was obsessed with conquering desires on the one hand and on the other hand, carried out the plans that were worked out without it to weaken Soviet Russia. It is no secret for anyone that behind Poland stood the winner imperialist Entente, which was trying to liquidate Bolshevism in Russia with the help of Kolchak – Denikin at first and then by the rebel of Finland – Poland’. The article also states that ‘the invasion of Poland made entire Russia on feet. Danger of Poland united all the elements in favor of the Soviet Union that are or were hostile to the Bolsheviks. The war got a pure national character. In addition to the party forces, the whole national energy was mobilized, the whole Russian front was organized against Poland. While this war got such a public character in Russia, in Poland everything was on the contrary – the goals of the war were quite strange there. The hard working people of Poland were outside the preparations for the war because the plans for an attack were being made in Paris and London.’ The author of the article writes that both sides will come out of the war weakened and collapsed. Though one point is emphasized, ‘but Soviet Russia obtained a military and moral victory in this war. The idea that the liquidation of Bolshevism through slaughter, weapons, war and interference in domestic affairs is a waste of energy and that Bolshevism is not weakened with such methods but rather their ruling is prolonged, became true in this case as well.’ At the end of the article, a brief conclusion is made that if Soviet Russia is not involved in foreign wars, Bolshevism will gradually come to an end and a ‘third force’ will emerge in peaceful conditions, which will be truly democratic and take care of Russia’.[20]

This article, as well as the articles in the newspaper Ertoba talk about Entente which stands behind Poland and the fact that Entente greatly influenced the policy of Poland towards Russia. It is not mentioned that the defeat of Soviet Russia and the restoration of the independent state of Ukraine were vital for Poland. This was a very important moment for the independence and freedom of Poland.

While the successful attack of the Red Army was still going on and the Poles were retreating, a new article with the title ‘Allies and Poland’ was published in the newspaper Sakhalkho sakme on July 24. At the beginning of the article is stated that England offers Soviet Russia peace talks with Poland and Baron Wrangel. The author quite fairly points out that the victory of Russia would bring Polish workers and peasants as such ‘freedom’ as it did to Azerbaijan in late April 1920 and ‘Events of Ganja’[21] might develop in Poland too. It is stressed that ‘Return of Russia to Poland will be a great national disaster, which will definitely be followed by the destruction of all the wealth that this nation has created over the centuries’. Then it says the following: ‘We do not refer to the issue who was the cause of the war, who is to blame: Poland or Russia, but one thing should be noted. Some circles in Poland gave too much hope to its nation and fell into dreams. They could not measure their own strength, did not take into consideration that Poland risen from the dead needed a lot of creative work and it would not share the common joy of imperialists so quickly after one hundred and twenty years of slavery. Its mistake was that it believed the word of outside forces and started a war with their hope, which would not do any good to it in the end’. The same opinion is given as in the previous article according to which the Bolsheviks used the war with Poland for self agitation and also began talking about ‘Matushka Rossiya’. The author emphasizes that this time Poland is in trouble and needs to unite all its forces. ‘This united force of the newly liberated nation may overcome the danger and make the Bolsheviks speak in a minor tone. In any case, the Poles will need a lot of energy and struggle to improve the situation.’ The article also mentions that France is trying to help the Poles.[22]

The article properly identifies the threat against Poland in case of the victory of Russia.

The following article was published in the newspaper of the Socialist – Federalist Party on August 3. By that time the Red Army occupied Brest and crossed the rover Bug. Moscow set up a temporary revolutionary committee of Poland which had to take power after the entry into Warsaw. The title of the article is ‘Tragedy of Poland’. This is one of the largest articles published in the newspaper Sakhalkho sakme about the Polish – Bolshevik war. The article begins with a pessimistic view saying that it is doubtful whether Poland will be able to survive and whether it will be destroyed again as an independent state. It is stated that the Polish army is panicked and the Bolsheviks have paved the way to Warsaw. The author asks why Poland is defeating. ‘Poland whose national awareness was a role model for the oppressed people of Russia in old times.’ This is a very interesting assessment of Poland and the Poles. They really represent the role models for the nations like Georgians first of all, left in the Russian Empire fighting for freedom. There are many examples of this but I will not continue to talk about it here. The following statement is given in the newspaper as the reason for the defeat of Poland in the war against Soviet Russia: ‘the following should be taken into consideration here: Poland obtained national freedom by a declaration at the time when German army had entered there. Post factum, its independence was confirmed by conqueror Russia and the commander of its army Nikoloz Nikolozi’ s son granted ‘autonomy’ to the Polish people that did not even belong to Russia at that time. It was before the revolution, during the process of the world war. This greatly influenced on the domestic situation of Poland and management activities fell not into the hands of the true representatives of people but into the bourgeoisie. Democracy had been rejected in this management’. The role of the ‘imperialists’ in the incitement of Poland is still emphasized. ‘Poland followed the imperialists from the very beginning and turned into their weapon. Because of Danzig, Germany became its enemy, it conquered Ukraine by the order of Britain and with the help of the allies, it tried to cut off such parts of Russian territory that Russian people would never reconcile.’ Then the opinion is repeated again related to the use of war as propaganda by the Bolsheviks with Poland. One of the reasons for the defeat of the Poles is that ‘it could not oppose its democratic and national front with the united front of Russia… The Soviet army marching under the revolutionary slogan was met with an ideologically non – united and non pure democratic state.’ There is also mentioned that Germany might take advantage of the hard situation of Poland and rise claims on certain territories. However, at the end of the article there is still a small optimistic part that Poland may win and even if it loses it will be a defeat of the bourgeoisie and the democratic forces of Poland will never reconcile with the loss of freedom – ‘It is also possible that there might be a coup in Poland and battle against Russia may turn into a real national battle and the whole people will unite for the defense of the homeland. The old government failed to achieve such unity and maybe a new, more democratic and revolutionary one can do it. In any case, even if they conquer Warsaw, the communists will not be able to destroy the independence of Poland in the same way as they did in the case of Ukraine. Communists are weak to fight against true people’ s, democratic countries. As the communists say, ‘Paneis’ might lose but the democracy of Poland will never reconcile putting a foot on the neck such as national slavery for the second time and earlier or later it will surely get rid of it’.[23]

The class approach is still seen in the article and it is clear. We believe that it is the result of this approach based on which the article talks about the conquer of Ukraine by Poland. It is even a bit surprising considering that one of the previous articles published in the same newspaper talked about the freedom of Ukraine from Soviet Russia with the help of the Poles.

Two days later, on August 5, the next article appeared on the newspaper pages with a title ‘Bukharin’ s tendencies’. The article reviews an article about Nikoloz Bukharin printed in the newspaper ‘Pravda’ in Soviet Russia, in which was stated that the war of Soviet Russia with Poland is the aid of the Polish working class. The comment of the Georgian newspaper about this issue is brief but comprehensive: ‘According to Bukharin, there is no nation, there is only a class and currently the class of workers (or the dictatorship of the Bolsheviks?) is the ‘winner’ in Russia and therefore the workers of all the countries should assist Russia. Here is an example, says Bukharin, the Polish workers must provide direct assistance to the Red Army, use every effort to facilitate them to win. This is the opinion of one of the leaders of the Bolsheviks. Everything seems logical here. There does not exist any nation. There are only the Bolsheviks and there where they do not rule, the locals must ‘try their best to facilitate their victory.’ Yes, everything is logical here but in a pure Russian imperialist point of view. Fanatical mind can invent anything when it tries to justify devour and swallow of others. Perhaps the communists conquered Azerbaijan, North Caucasus and Ukraine in this point of view and now it is the turn of Poland. But those who acknowledge the existence of the nation and self – determination (and this is acknowledged by all true socialists), it is impossible not to be excited by Bukharin’ s imperialist chants and his desire to show black intentions in white.’[24]

Here everything is evaluated properly and no comment is needed.

In an article published on August 22 there is a talk about the negotiations on Treaty begun in Minsk and there is hope that the war might end. The author writes that the situation on the front will greatly influence the process of negotiations. ‘Diplomats of both sides will transfer to the paper what will be written and drawn on the battlefield with the blood of the soldiers and the grenades of cannons… The fact of holding peace talks gives hope that Russian – Polish war might end, but it is difficult to say this for sure in current life that is full of surprises. The hope that the war might end is more well – grounded because there has been a sudden change on the front recently to the detriment of the communists. Between two fighting sides, the one which is more irreconcilable and capricious turns out to be lucky in the battle. In this case, Moscow was intoxicated by its excellent victory on the Polish front, which is explained by the fact that it avoided negotiations with Poland… The victorious Red Army was going ahead and trying to dictate its terms to the opponent and at the same time further strengthen Soviet prestige in the eyes of Entente states. Everyone expected the conquer of Warsaw every day. But Warsaw has not fallen because of this expectation, on the contrary, according to the European sources the situation significantly changed and the danger of Warsaw should be considered over. We do not know yet whether these data are reliable or not, but the fact that Warsaw was not conquered makes us think it is true. If the story that the Poles are attacking and this attack is developing in favor of them is true, it is obvious that such a situation on the front will play an important role in the negotiations of Minsk and both sides will be eager to launch a treaty’. At the end of the article, it is stated that ‘while Moscow was repulsing an unfair attack of Poland and while Soviet Russia was defending itself, the moral advantage was on its side and this moral truth gave it military advantage too. But as soon as Soviet Russia crossed the borders of Poland and threatened the center of Poland, it became irreconcilable at the same time and due to this Moscow lost moral advantage and instead, transferred it to the opposite side that resulted in a strong patriotic feeling and unanimity in Poland. This will contribute to the establishment of a balance between the fighters, which in turn will lead to a peaceful end of the Minsk conference.’[25]

Talking about the ‘moral advantage’ of Soviet Russia in this war is wrong not only today but we think it is wrong from the point of view of that time as well. The reason should still be found in the class approach, that is, we must take into account the view of the newspaper of the left – wing ideology, the fact that Piłsudski is an imperialist and imperialists stand behind him and so on.

On August 25 an article with a title ‘Polish Attack’ was published. At the beginning of the article there is a talk about the latest achievements of the Poles and it is emphasized that this war must not be considered only in the context of two fighting states but we should keep in mind that ‘Russo – Polish war was not just a local issue – it connected every section, every string of a difficult instrument of the world politics. The noise of this battle was echoed in major political centers of Europe, significant issues about the east and west, Europe and Asia were intertwined around this front. The Russo – Polish war, with all its severity, has posed a problem of Russia before the authorities of European states. It was impossible to be postponed or avoided. Military force of Soviet Russia would knock on the door of Europe through Poland exactly from the painful and fateful side where the victorious allies expected the insulted giant – Germany. This circumstance made London cabinet speed up solving the cursed issue in order to keep its position safe from the Bolshevik situation. The victory of Soviet Russia on the Polish front opened fascinating images to Moscow Sovnarkom and with Warsaw it sought to tie the loop knot by which it intended to hang international imperialism. The more brilliant and powerful the advance of the Red Army on the front was, the louder, stronger and more dignified the Moscow’ s word was during the process of the negotiations with Entente and the position of the communists under the leadership of Trotsky and Bukharin were more asserted who were against any compromise and reconciliation in the relationship with the allies. At the same time, the situation of the Polish front allowed the chairman of the Russian – Ukrainian delegation in Minsk to present such harsh conditions to Poland.’ Then there is fear that Poland might lose the feeling of reality with new military achievements and prolong the war, ‘but there is fear that Poland can be so fascinated by this sudden and big victory that it might prolong the war itself. There are always the drops of poison in the victory which intoxicates and stupefies the winner and wrings its neck. Moscow was dizzy with the very ‘poison’ and made a mistake with Warsaw in military ecstasy. The same happened to Poland once when the brilliance of Moscow domes confused its legions.’ At the end of the article it is concluded that ‘the latest victory of Poland should be used to ensure that Minsk fulfills its peaceful mission by respecting the dignity of both sides.’[26]

The article shows quite well what the goal of Soviet Russia was in the war with Poland and that this goal went beyond conquering Warsaw. Warsaw was also the way to Germany and Central Europe.

An article printed on September 29 with a title ‘Minsk and Riga’ still talks about the progress of the negotiations on the treaty. It analyzes once more why and how the positions of the negotiators were changed by the ‘Miracle on the Vistula’, who does not remember the Minsk Peace Conference? Warsaw was going to fall, Piłsudski’ s army broken, weary and defeated was retreating. In Galicia there were battles near Lviv. The peaceful delegation of Poland in Minsk was surrounded by a blockade, unable to have a contact with its government. The head of the Russian – Ukrainian delegation B. Danishefsky dictated treaty terms proudly and fiercely. The terms were very severe… This time the roles significantly change… Now Minsk is just a historical memory… The tone and the position of the Russian delegation has changed too… These terms obviously show that Moscow is eager to make a treaty but not because it was fond of peace. No, not for that reason but the weakness of Moscow forces it to end the war as soon as possible’. Then the author writes, ‘Moscow is defeated in this case. Poland is in the role of a winner and it is exactly the same diplomatic game between a cat and a mouse as it was in Minsk unlike the fact that at that time communists showed the cat’ s claws and the Poles were covered with justice. And in Riga the communists wore a coat of innocence. Maybe in this way they will hide the wounds which deeply bother their body. And this wound is the frosty shade of the future winter waiting at the door of Russia. There is seen complete disorganization of the state, economic anarchy, pale shades of famine, frost, illness and in the south is the cursed Wrangel, Crimean front which is already transformed into a front of Ukraine and military action is moved to the region of Ekaterinoslav. These circumstances make Moscow go to compromise. But will this compromise save it from hardship? Will victorious Poland hear the weeping of Russia? Winners are said to be cruel. It will be revealed in a short time.’[27]

The author quite properly notes that the desire of Moscow to cease war and make a treaty is due to the hard situation and not to the sincere intention of the Bolsheviks, they just have no other choice. However, one phrase is interesting, which refers to the position of Poland about Minsk negotiations which says that ‘the Poles were covered with justice’. I think this phrase indicates that the sympathy of the newspaper was not entirely on the Polish side.

The last article ‘In imperialist slumber’ which is about Polish – Bolshevik war was published on October 20. The article states that the situation in Soviet Russia led to its failure from the very beginning: ‘Soviet Russia experienced the biggest defeat on the fields of Poland. Of course, this defeat was not only of a military nature, it was not the verdict of the blind fate of the war – the whole system of the domestic life of Russia, its chaotic situation, economic turmoil and state weakness were preparing the shackles of defeat for Russia in advance’. The author writes that in light of the war with Poland, the military operations of Kolchak and Denikin were only a ‘faint picture’. There is emphasized what the real aim of Soviet Russia was in this war – ‘By destroying Poland, Soviet Russia would reach the border of Europe and standing proudly on this border with a soviet flag in hand, the ‘Biblical David’ would sound the trumpet to the proletarian revolution of the world and with this sound it would wake up the proletariat of Europe exhausted with lethargy and throw a sparkle of social revolution to light a great bonfire in the flames of which the culture of modern Europe would burn and turn into ashes’. The main point of the article is that despite the defeat Moscow Bolsheviks are not going to change their militaristic intentions. They are just changing the direction of the attack. ‘Moscow does not stay in its shell. It has not fully woken up from the slumber of communist imperialism yet and still sails in the glorious waves of dreams of world domination. Embarrassed Moscow, on the brink of Europe, is heading to Anatolia and trying to deafen Europe by blowing the Bosphorus… What they failed to do in Europe by stamping on Poland, they want to carry it out from the borders of Asia by destroying Armenia. But if Bolshevism was not able to reach the working class of Europe in a shorter and more direct way, will it manage to reach them by crossing the plains of Asia, oceans and seas that is a longer and tangled way? Of course not. And again, just as the slogan to ‘Warsaw’ was failed, so will the second slogan towards ‘Asia’ be failed! And perhaps this last discourage might still pull Moscow out of the poisonous ravages of Imperialism. But they will also be completely ruined immediately within Russia’.[28]

The last prediction and optimistic disposition somewhat looks like the information written in the last letter on Polish – Bolshevik war printed in the social – democrat newspaper Ertoba. Their common interest is ungrounded optimism that defeated Russia will no longer be able to conquer neighboring countries or people. Unfortunately the reality was different and it is very pity that the newspapers of both left – wing parties (one of which was a ruling party) had such positions and created some illusion for their readers or supporters. And this was happening at the time when Red Russia had already invaded into the South Caucasus, conquered Azerbaijan and was evidently getting ready to conquer Armenia and Georgia too. Based on the given situation the ‘optimism’ of these newspapers was no longer a simple naivety but a misperception of reality.

The newspapers of both left – wing parties eventually concluded that after the defeat with Poland, they will start towards Asia (here is implied South Caucasia too) but they will be defeated there too. Unfortunately this prediction did not come true. Soviet Russia defeated on the Western front, really found time for the Caucasus and conquered Armenia first and then Georgia too.

The fact that Soviet Russia was not acceptable for both socialist parties is clearly seen in the articles. But their attitude towards Poland was almost similar. It was somewhat a class approach. It is also evident based on the terminology: imperialists, panies, militarists and so on. Both newspapers had similar positions regarding the fact that the government of Poland and Polish working class are different and the interests of the ruling parties do not correspond to the tendencies and desires of workers. I think that it was the class approach that led to the inappropriate assessments expressed in the newspapers in some cases which had a tendentious character.

The attitude of the right – wing opposition, the National – Democratic Party towards the Polish – Bolshevik war was completely different. They did not hide their sympathy to Poland and supported it. Of course, the newspaper of the National Democratic Party Sakartvelo published information about the war but we found only one article which was interesting and analytical. The reason for that was probably the fact that in the months of May – July 1920, the newspaper was not edited. When the edition was renewed, it was already the second half of August and the final stage of Polish – Bolshevik war was going on.

The article published in the newspaper Sakartvelo radically differs with its position from the articles published in the newspapers Ertoba and Sakhalkho sakme and therefore we provide the full text.

The article ‘Poland and Russia’ was published on August 25. ‘When the Bolshevik army was heading to Warsaw and part of the Polish army was sheltering in Prussia, many people were convinced that Poland as a state body, was finally coming to an end. Instead of independent Poland there was going to be declared ‘Soviet Poland’ by ‘Red’ Azerbaijan but happened what almost no one expected: Whole Poland stood on foot to defend Warsaw and maintain freedom and independence of national state. The extreme effort of the military force of the restored state broke the steel arc of the Red Army… According to the latest telegrams, Soviet armies began to retreat from Poland and at some points the latter one was given an image of panic. Important castles are returned to the Poles and thus a swift and deliberate counterattack will be replaced by the restoration of state borders of Poland in the nearest days. What does the Polish – Russian war look like? What is the goal of each of these states for which they fight against each other with such ruthless fierce and destroy the already poor country culturally and economically? Some capricious politicians would like to prove as if Poland was a blind weapon of Entente in this case, as if there was completely no reason for conflict between Russia and Poland. Poland is fighting Soviet Russia because it has an order from France. Is this true? One thing is clear that the sympathy of Europe is surely towards Poland. The victory of the Russian Bolsheviks in Poland would be an indication for the educated Europe that barbarism and uncultured methods of governing the state would approach Europe. Entente sees the Polish battle from this point of view. And the same opinion would probably prompt it to provide all assistance with the new state in the fight for life and death against the Red Army. Though Europe is interested in defeating the Bolsheviks, it is well aware that it will not be able to achieve this goal through Poland, devastated by the terrible world war… The same event took place on the borders of Poland what we see everywhere, where Velikaya Rossiya is geographically annexed to the nation or state which is distant from it. Was not the image given in the northern coasts of Georgia the same, where our army had to repel the invasion of Russians, regardless of who was our neighbor – Denikin’ s White Army or Trotsky’ s Red Army? Every social – political sector operating in Russia wanted (and still wants) to restore Russia in old state borders. Russia, as such, fights the marginalized regions away from it regardless of whether it has formally recognized their independent existence. This especially refers to communist Russia, which always gives advantage to the actual disposition and situation… The war of Russia with Poland is approximately of the same content. This is how we understand the great idea of the battle, the amazing turnaround of which is probably followed by many political effects. Poland avoided the biggest and most terrible crisis. Its statehood should be considered secured. The existence of the state is inviolable from now and this fact will cause a feeling of pleasure in liberated Georgia as well. The war between Russia and Poland must be over with a firm treaty for both sides and this is especially the duty of those sent to Minsk peace conference by both states’.[29]

The article shows very clearly what the aim of Soviet Russia was: to strengthen its influence in Eastern Europe and to establish marionette Soviet government in Warsaw. The parallel is also properly drawn with Soviet Azerbaijan, where Russia successfully implemented its plan. In addition, the opinion expressed in the article is absolutely true according to which both ‘the Reds’ and ‘the Whites’ were actually aiming to restore the Russian Empire. The article clearly shows the criticism of the opinion expressed in the press of the left – wing party which said as if Poland was fighting Russia under Entente’ s order. The article emphasizes that first of all Poland defends its independence and freedom and ‘its existence of the statehood is inviolable from now and this fact will also cause a feeling of pleasure in the liberated Georgia’.

In conclusion, we should note that the materials of the Georgian press confirm the great interest of the Georgian society in the Polish – Bolshevik war. There are obviously different assessments about the event by the left and right wing parties and their supporters, however, it must be mentioned that the Georgian society supported Poland in this war and welcomed the existence of Poland as an independent state.

[1] M. Bakhtadze, ‘An attempt of Establishing Soviet Power in Georgia in 1920 and the War between Poland and Bolsheviks’. in Polish – Georgian Historians’ Commission. Collected Works. Volume I. Warsaw 2019.

[2] Meeting minutes no. 27 of the Constituent Assembly, Tbilisi 1920, p. 24.

[3] Ibidem., p. 19.

[4] Newspaper Sasoplo gazeti 15, 26/IX 1920.

[5] It should probably be on Narva.

[6] Newspaper Ertoba 191, 24/VIII 1920.

[7] Newspaper Sakartvelo 110, 2/X 1920.

[8] Newspaper Sakartvelo 97, 11/IX 1920.

[9] Newspaper Ertoba 113, 22/V 1920.

[10] Newspaper Ertoba 124, 5/ VI 1920.

[11] ‘Возвание Ко всем бывшим офицерам, где бы они ни находились’ http://kuprin-lit.ru/kuprin/public/dva-vozzvaniya.htm

[12] Newspaper Ertoba 157, 15/VII 1920.

[13] Newspaper Ertoba 162, 21/ VII 1920.

[14] Newspaper Ertoba 175, 5/ VIII 1920.

[15] Newspaper Ertoba 192, 25 / VIII 1920.

[16] Newspaper Ertoba 199, 2/ IX 1920.

[17] Newspaper Ertoba 235, 16/ X 1920.

[18] Newspaper Sakhalkho sakme 840, 3/ VI 1920.

[19] Newspaper Sakhalkho sakme 873, 13/VII 1920.

[20] Newspaper Sakhalkho sakme 880, 21 /VII 1920.

[21] Referring to the anti soviet revolt begun in the city of Ganja in late May 1920, which the Soviet government suppressed by their usual cruelty.

[22] Newspaper Sakhalkho sakme 880, 21/ VII 1920.

[23] Newspaper Sakhalkho Sakme 89, 13/ VIII 1920.

[24] Newspaper Sakhalkho Sakme 89, 35/ VIII 1920.

[25] Newspaper Sakhalkho Sakme 90, 822/ VIII 1920.

[26] Newspaper Sakhalkho sakme 910, 25/ VIII 1920.

[27] Newspaper Sakhalkho sakme 938, 29/ IX 1920.

[28] Newspaper Sakhalkho sakme 956, 20/ X 1920.

[29] Newspaper Sakartvelo 83, 25/ VIII 1920.

THE STORY OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SENIOR GEORGIAN OFFICERS IN THE POLISH ARMY IN 1929

by Dimitri Silakadze

In the second half of 1929 a major conflict occurred between senior Georgian officers serving in the Polish Army which was a final act of a long time complicated relationship between General Alexandre Zakariadze and a group of 15 officers. Georgian political parties, which wanted to have their own influence on Georgian officers, along with personal incompatibility also contributed to the conflict, its formation and stimulation. We have obtained detailed information about the conflict in the materials of the investigation and decision carried out by the legitimate and emigrant government of Georgia which were kept in the Fonds of National Archives and Central Historical Archive of Georgia, in particular, in the personal Fonds of the politicians of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, Evgeni Gegechkori and Akaki Chkhenkeli. The documents preserved in these Fonds allow us to restore the details of this conflict.

After losing the independence of Georgia, the Georgian military – political elite first took refuge in Constantinople (present Istanbul). Politicians then moved to France and the military including most of the cadets was sheltered by Poland. The cadets graduated from the Polish military academies and continued their service in the Polish Army. There were also senior Georgian officers[1] who began working on the basis of contracts. Those people had held high military ranks first in the Russian and later in the Georgian armies. Georgians’ service in the Polish army began in 1922. The legitimate government of Georgia, which was based in Paris, first offered the last Commander-in-Chief of the Republic, General Giorgi Kvinitadze to supervise and coordinate those people, protect their rights and support them but after his refusal, General Alexandre Zakariadze,[2] the Chief of General Staff of the Republic of Georgia was appointed to the given position, who was awarded with the rank of General of Division in the Polish Army. However, soon the relationship between Zakariadze and other senior officers became tense and broke up. This relationship was getting worse from time to time. The attempt of Georgian political parties, who made the officers support them, played a big role in the deterioration of the relationship. The officers were more or less calm and despite periodic incidents were less likely to confront each other en masse. Everything changed on September 14, 1929 when 15 senior Georgian officers serving in the Polish Army, with the leadership of the Generals Alexandre Chkheidze, Alexandre Koniashvili and Ivane Bakradze, demanded the emigrant government of Georgia for the immediate dismissal of General Alexandre Zakariadze and his recalling from Poland. Otherwise they threatened that they would settle the matter themselves. They also demanded that Joseph Salakaia, the representative of Georgia in Poland who was considered to be Zakariadze’ s accomplice, should never interfere in the officers’ affairs without asking the government. The officers said that they had been enduring everything for seven years, asking members of the Polish government to get Zakariadze rid of them. They expected that he would behave correctly but in vain. According to them, the last step made by Zakariadze was the proof that he would never correct himself. They believed that Zakariadze did not care at all about the future welfare of the homeland and Georgian officers. Senior officers claimed that they had not made junior officers interfere in the case. The text of the statement was not signed by General Ivane Kazbegi and Colonel Alexandre Bagrationi and as for Major Valerian Tevzadze, he had not been asked to sign it because they had expelled[3] him from their circle.

With regard to the ‘last step’ the senior officers referred to their possible dismissal from the Polish Army which in their opinion was carried out by the tricks of General Zakariadze. Individually or collectively they also sent the letters which were against General Zakariadze to the members of the emigrant government: Evgeni Gegechkori, Konstantine Kandelaki, influential member of the Social Democratic Party and Ambassador to France Akaki Chkhenkeli, as well as the member of the National – Democratic Party Shalva Amirejibi and an influential Colonel, the hero of the anti – occupation uprising of Georgia in 1924 Kakutsa Cholokashvili.[4]

Joseph Salakaia had informed the Georgian government about the possible dismissal of senior Georgian officers from the Polish Army in August 1929 before the government received a collective letter from the officers. At the meeting held on August 24 it was decided to instruct Salakaia to provide additional information. Joseph Salakaia had to provide them with a complete list of those who were to be dismissed and what the reason for their dismissal was. They wanted to identify whether the reasons were related to the termination of the contract or any new law or other reasons except for the age and expiration of the contract. The government decided that after receiving a full response they would ask the Polish government to let the officers stay in military service but if it was impossible, then they would ask for their provision in some other way, such as their transfer to another job, customs, for instance. At the government meeting Evgeni Gegechkori proposed not to wait for the full information and start negotiations immediately with the Polish Embassy in Paris to clarify the issue, but his opinion was not shared by the members of the government and decided[5] to wait until the full information was received. In response to the government decree, on August 30 Joseph Salakaia informed Evgeni Gegechkori that nothing had been decided for sure yet, but according to the officials the dismissal referred to the sick and old aged officers as was the case with the Poles. The reason for dismissal was unknown to him. As for the contracts, the Poles always automatically extended the contracts for Georgian officers after the completion of half a year. In the letter Salakaia was saying that Generals Kazbegi (69 years old) and Bakradze (61 years old) asked them to apply to the Polish staff for their transfer to the reserve and receiving a pension. After that the Poles demanded Zakariadze and Salakaia for a full list of the officers and promised that the sick officers and those over the age of 40 would be provided but in what form was unknown and they were working on it. Salakaia added that nobody knew what would happen in the end. General Zakariadze and he tried their best to get the case be resolved in favor of the Georgian officers. They did this despite the fact that some part of the officers were against[6] him and Zakariadze.

Before sending the collective letter, General Zakariadze and Chkheidze exchanged several letters on the issue related to the dismissal of the officers. On August 15 Zakariadze wrote to General Bakradze, Chkheidze and Major Terjaszwili that according to the given situation, the general provisions applying to the Polish officers, would also apply to Georgian officers. He supposed that it would be carried out by the end of the year. If any of the Georgian officers would have to leave their job due to the age or health condition, they would receive satisfactory insurance but for this it was required to accept the subordination of Poland. This issue was to be resolved by a special bureau which would contact the officers itself. Only those who were already 40 years old or those who were ill would be financially insured, but financial insurance would not apply to the others. In addition, General notified them at that stage it had been difficult to issue subordination for every officer. General Chkheidze replied to his letter on September 10 and asked Zakariadze two questions. By whose initiative was all this happening, was it Polish staff or Georgian government? And at what stage was the issue of the young officers? Zakariadze replied to his letter in two days, on September 12 saying that the answer to these questions was in his previous letter but he also explained that everyone was well aware of the given situation. A number of senior officers had referred to him about their awkward situation. He had been approached by two senior officers with a request to raise the issue related to their dismissal from the army with material support. He added that the conjuncture of that time provided a good opportunity for such officers to be well insured. He could not demand the Polish government to do for the Georgians more than for the Poles. Regarding the issue of the citizenship, he explained that in his first letter it was quite clear that the issue was on the path of improvement and not of deterioration.[7]

General Chkheidze later clarified that according to Zakariadze’ s first letter he concluded that the Polish staff was dismissing them from their service and he was waiting for the case to proceed. But then he heard rumors that Zakariadze had demanded the Poles for their dismissal on behalf of the government. Therefore, he answered back to his letter with two questions but he could not understand anything from Zakariadze’ s confused answer. From the first letter Chkheidze understood that the staff would dismiss all over the age of 40 and as for the second letter, in his opinion Zakariadze was talking about the situation and request[8] of two officers in an unclear way. It was also followed by another rumor and the officers wrote the above mentioned collective letter.

On September 23, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Evgeni Gegechkori also received a letter from Joseph Salakaia who was requesting him an investigation on behalf of himself and Zakariadze. Salakaia was saying in his letter that he had rescued these officers from dismissal many times and the possible dismissal of the officers was neither of his initiative nor of Zakariadze.[9] At the meeting of the government of Georgia on October 4, 1929 it was decided that the Foreign Minister Evgeni Gegechkori who was in Warsaw would investigate the issue in detail.[10]

In October 1929 Evgeni Gegechkori began investigating the case. Gegechkori received separate letters and reports from Generals Alexandre Chkheidze, Alexandre Koniashvili, Zakaria Bakradze as well as from Colonel Nikoloz Kandelaki, Colonel Konstantine Kvikvidze, Colonel Nikoloz Vachnadze, Colonel Roman Gvelesiani, Major Vladimer Siamashvili, Major Bidzina Kutateladze. According to the officers, General Zakariadze and the representative of Georgia in Poland Joseph Salakaia had decided to get rid of them and had given a list of 22 officers to the General Staff of Poland. The list included the officers who would be discharged from the army and given a pension. These officers had also been accused of Russophilia and Monarchism and had decided to profane their name in the eyes of the Poles. The officers did not believe General Zakariadze’ s and Joseph Salakaia’ s explanation according to which the given issue did not only concern Georgian officers but also the Polish officers who had reached a certain age or were no longer able to serve due to the health condition. They also did not believe that the General Staff of Poland had asked Zakariadze to hand over the list of officers to them. The officers claimed that through their personal contacts with the Polish officers they had learned that General Staff of Poland had not demanded for such a thing and it was only the initiative of General Zakariadze and the representative of Georgia in Poland Joseph Salakaia. However, the senior officers had not confined themselves only to this issue, they complained to the government about all those issues which had been worrying them for years and did not consider it to be General Zakariadze’ s fault. On the whole, their total accusations against General Zakariadze can be formulated as follows.

In their opinion Zakariadze was trying to pursue a party policy and he was more like a representative of the Social – Democratic Party than of a government, which should equally have taken care of the condition of all Georgian officers. He would not prevent politicians especially the members of the Social – Democratic Party from conducting a party propaganda among Georgian officers. They believed that Zakariadze was trying to ruin senior officers’ reputation both before the Georgian and Polish government. He accused them of Russophilia and Monarchism because some Georgian officers did not speak Georgian or spoke it very poorly or some of them had Russian wives. According to them General Zakariadze was trying to turn the former cadets – the junior officers of the Polish army into his own spies. As an example of it they recall a feast in the city of Vilno (Vilnius, present capital of Lithuania) in 1923 where Zakariadze had invited four cadets to a restaurant, had fun and drunk with them and told them that he knew senior officers talked bad things about him and asked them to tell him everything freely what the senior officers had said. When the cadets did not answer him, he had told them that it was fine if they hesitated then but when they would go home they could write to him what the officers were saying about him. They also accused Zakariadze of not trying hard enough to gather Georgian officers being in Poland and be close to them. For seven years he seldom met them which consisted of incomplete number of officers. Zakariadze was accused of attempting conflict between senior and junior Georgian officers. The officers tried to participate themselves in the life of the Georgian colony in Poland through the membership of the Georgian Committee operating in Poland and included their representatives in the Committee but one year later at the meeting of the Georgian Committee Zakariadze and Salakaia announced that Georgian officers would be banned to work in the Committee by the order of the General Staff of Poland. According to the officers, it was exactly Zakariadze and Salakaia who did not want Georgian officers to be in the Georgian Committee and they made the General Staff of Poland make that decision. After that the officers tried to create a union of Georgian officers but the obstruction in this business was attributed to Zakariadze again. They described Zakariadze as an unprincipled, immoral, intriguing, chandler, timid, envious, weak and shy person, who could not properly raise the issue of Georgian officers in the General Staff of the Polish Army. Using several examples they recalled the moments when Zakariadze positively responded to the request of Georgian officers and cadets, he promised them he would fulfill it but later the officers found out through their personal contacts that Zakariadze had not even raised the given issue with the Poles. They said that he smiled at everyone, promised everything to everyone but in fact did not fulfill anything. If he looked at someone in a hostile way he would do everything against him. Disruption of the appointment of Colonel Kandelaki as Deputy Head of the Engineering Department was attributed to the envy of the General. In addition, the officers were suspicious about the competence of Zakariadze in the military. They said that his appointment as the Chief of General Staff of Georgia surprised them much at that time because they thought there were many Generals with more experience, deserving than him and Zakariadze’ s appointment to this position was unclear for them. Therefore, one of the reasons for the defeat in the Russian – Georgian war in 1921 was the disordered operation of the General Staff. They directly stated that Zakariadze was not an authority in the military and could not be considered an authority either in the Polish Army when he was their curator. General Bakradze said more and wrote that he already believed in old rumors according to which Zakariadze disdained he was Georgian during his service in the Russian Army and hid his knowledge of the Georgian language. The officers claimed that Zakariadze blamed them for ignoring and disrespecting the government of Georgia and it was the ‘wrong’ move from his side in the eyes of both the Poles and the Georgian government. The officers categorically denied this and added that although they were discussing about politics, more about the military policy of independent Georgia, talking about the mistakes, they also had some political sympathies as other citizens did but it did not mean that they were not loyal to the government or did not perform their duties honestly. They categorically denied Russophilia and Monarchism. They said that General Zakariadze had been trying before to have the unwanted officers for him dismissed from the Polish Army. For seven years Zakariadze’ s only initiative was to establish a Court of Honor of Georgian Officers the Charter of which was approved by the General Staff of Poland. However, they doubted the actual functioning of this court because the decisions made were not executed. In their opinion Zakariadze’ s policy led to the fact that there were only several senior officers who supported him. Because of all the above reasons, they demanded Zakariadze’ s dismissal and even his recall from Poland because if Zakariadze remained in Poland, he would misuse his influence against them and the Georgian welfare. According to the officers, they did not want Zakariadze’ s position, they just needed a capable and courageous leader who would not be ashamed of himself or the government.[11]

We have already got introduced to the accusations which senior officers had against Zakariadze and Salakaia. It is interesting what kind of answers General Zakariadze or even his supporter officers had to it.

According to the Colonel Bagrationi, Second Division of the General Staff of Poland asked General Zakariadze to make the Georgian officers fill in a special blank such as service description sheets and deliver them to the Second Division. After that Zakariadze was told at the Staff that the officers who were over 40 years old were at risk of dismissal. However, in such a case they would be provided properly. As Bagrationi said, Zakariadze was confused because he could not understand what this proper provision meant and he had told him that he would try that the same pension would be appointed to Georgian officers as the Poles have. General Zakariadze shared this information with him, Colonel Kvikvidze and General Kazbegi. Aftter that, as Bagrationi said, the rumors reached other officers too and they were very excited. Therefore, Kvikvidze, General Kazbegi and he were asked to notify Zakariadze to hold a general meeting of officers and tell them about the situation there. Zakariadze refused to fulfill that request because he did not know exactly how the issue would be solved and if any officer got interested in the issue, he would also respond in writing in the same way as he had told Bagrationi, Kvikvidze and Kazbegi. Zakariadze’ s refusal excited officers which was followed by a meeting of Joseph Salakaia and three Georgian officers in the street. These officers asked Salakaia whether the decision on their dismissal was true to which Salakaia had replied that it was almost decided and it was difficult for him to change anything. This was followed by an attempt from the officers to clarify the issue through personal sources during which they were told that the initiative belonged to the Georgian side. After that, according to Bagrationi, at the request of the officers Kvikvidze, Kazbegi and he met Zakariadze and Salakaia to hear their explanation. Zakariadze told them that the situation turned in favor of the Georgian officers and the issue of their dismissal from the army was suspended. Only the issue of retirement was being processed so that the officer in the army should know what to expect after the completion of the service. According to Bagrationi, despite this fact, the officers who confronted Zakariadze no longer believed in his and Salakaia’ s explanation and wrote a collective letter to the government of Georgia. Bagrationi did not sign the letter because he did not agree to the content of the letter. At the same time he considered that although General Zakariadze’ s actions were not completely acceptable due to a number of reasons, Bagration did not think that the General had malicious intent or insulted Georgian officers in any way. He also believed that writing such a collective letter was neither lawful nor moral.[12]

Evgeni Gegechkori also inquired Kote Imnadze, Secretary of the Georgian Committee in Poland. He said that he had information about the issue only in the form of rumors, but he negatively described the officers opposing Zakariadze and Salakaia. As for Zakariadze, in Imnadze’ s opinion, he had both positive and negative features. Negative side was the weakness of character and as for the positive side, in Imandze’ s opinion, he was the most trusted man in national affairs among all senior officers. He could not imagine that Zakariadze would betray for the national issue in any way but he could not say the same about some of his opponents.[13]

During this period General Zakariadze was asking for the testimonies of the ‘rebels’ in order to respond to them. He was also interested if the representative of the Ministry of Defense of Poland was involved in the investigation process. He considered that it was necessary because the nest of provocation should be destroyed once and for all and rescue the young officers from lewdness. He sent a letter to Joseph Salakaia for the purpose to deliver it to Evgeni Gegechkori which was written by Lieutenant Arkadi Skhirtladze to Zakariadze. It was clear in the letter that another officer (based on the other letter of Zakariadze, it was Lieutenant Kvaliashvili) was trying to influence him.[14] Skhirtladze was assured that on one side were the Socialists – Salakaia, Zakariadze, Ramishvili and many others and on another side were the true Georgian army – Kvinitadze, Cholokashvili, Chkheidze and all the youth except Nanuashvili and Makharadze. The officer was assuring Skhirtladze that Zakariadze had wanted to fire all of them from the Polish Army except for his favorites and he told the Poles that the Georgian government was demanding it and he told the Georgian government that the Poles were demanding to dismiss them. The government heard about it and sent Evgeni Gegechkori to clarify the case. The officer advised Skirtladze in a ‘friendly’ way to stand on the right side in order not to be found himself out in a bad situation because Salakaia and Zakariadze would be banished from Poland.[15]

After that General Zakariadze received some complaints written against him and he sent an extensive reply to Evgeni Gegechkori on October 30.

He argued that the presence of senior officers in the Polish Army had always been in question and despite many obstacles he always tried to resolve the issue in favor of the officers. Zakariadze accused opposition political forces, in particular, members of the National – Democratic Party and Georgian Generals and officers (Giorgi Kvinitadze, Spiridon Chavchavadze and Kakutsa Cholokashvili) in France being close to them of inciting Georgian officers to engage in anti – government propaganda so that they could be able to seize the entire emigration including the Georgian officers in Poland. At the same time Zakariadze added that the Poles were not satisfied with most of the senior Georgian officers. In his opinion it was caused by the fact that some officers did not know their native Georgian language and spoke Russian. Zakariadze denied the fact that they referred to those officers as Russophiles with the Poles. He insisted that he had not written a negative characterization about any of those officers because of this fact. On the contrary, when the Poles raised that issue with him, Zakariadze argued that after the liberation of Georgia these officers would be used throughout the Transcaucasia where their knowledge of Russian would be useful. Nevertheless, Zakariadze listed in his report facts that might have been the reason for these officers to suspect their Russophilia, Monarchism and in some cases their possible collaboration with the Bolsheviks. Simultaneously Zakariadze received information quite often from the Polish officers about immoral behavior of some senior Georgian officers. Regarding the accusation about the failure of the general meetings of Georgian officers, Zakariadze stated it with two arguments. First of all it was a request of the Poles that the activities of Georgian officers should be more conspiratorial because they did not want the Bolsheviks to hear that Georgian officers were working in an organized manner in the Polish Army. This would throw the Polish side into an awkward situation. The second reason was the ignorance of the Georgian language by some of the senior officers. Concerning winning the cadets over as his own spies, Zakariadze said that when he arrived in Vilno (Vilnius) in 1923 and met with the cadets, there was no confrontation between him and other officers. At that time there were no Georgian officers in Vilno except for 4 – 5 cadets and how those cadets could know what other officers thought about Zakariadze. Zakariadze denied the fact that he had invited the cadets to a restaurant, he wrote that he had met them at a table in a local Georgian family and in that situation it was impossible to win anyone over as a spy. Zakariadze wanted the members of the Georgian family who were at that table in Vilno to be inquired too. The General was furious at the doubts about his abilities and added that he had undergone considerable practical and theoretical training during the wars of Russo – Japanese and World War I, as well as at the General Staff Academy.

Zakariadze completely denied the initiative to expel senior Georgian officers from the Polish Army in 1929 and provide them with pension. He argued that it was the responsibility of the General Staff of Poland and he was trying the issue to be decided in favor of Georgian officers. General Zakariadze saw in this collective action of officers a kind of conspiracy not only against him as a person but also against the government. Zakariadze demanded that the government investigate the matter thoroughly, punish the offenders and report the incident well, so that this would be an example for young officers. An example that would show that the army was to be at the disposal of the government which should be chosen by the nation not by different groups or persons. Zakariadze requested Gegechkori to ask the Polish Ministry of Defense to investigate it and take measures. In his opinion the Poles would not refuse to it because such an example was also dangerous[16] for them in their army.

After that Evgeni Gegechkori proceeded the investigation of the case. The Head of the second division of the General Staff of Poland told him that it was them who demanded Zakariadze to hand over the list to them and there was no initiative started by Zakariadze.[17]

After the completion of the investigation, Gegechkori arrived in Paris and reported the investigation results to the government. The government discussed the case at the sitting on November 26 and decided to issue a resolution[18] at the next sitting.

On November 30, 1929 the Government made the following decision on the complaint of the Georgian officers of the Polish Army:

1. The situation of Georgian officers in the Polish Army was always unstable because they were recruited on the basis of a contract and for a specified period of time, so it was the duty of our representatives to provide certain conditions with our officers and if their dismissal from service would become necessary, this would be carried out smoothly and with proper support.

2. The case of dismissal of senior Georgian officers and their transfer to the retired reserve had been raised by the Military Staff of Poland in accordance with the laws there.

3. General Zakariadze, on his part, had thought in good faith that instead of leaving senior officers completely penniless, which was a threat at that time, appointing a pension for them would be the best way out of the situation given.

4. But our representatives had not delivered this information to the interested persons in due time and the latter ones had heard it from their own sources in a different way, so they could sincerely have thought that the initiative of this case belonged to our representatives.

5. The basis for such doubts had been prepared due to the abnormal relationship between General Zakariadze and senior officers by them who had agitated previously against General Zakariadze as well as the government and its representative mainly for political motives.

6. The collective appeal of 15 senior officers to the Chairperson and some members of the government demanding the resignation of their leader indicates to the fact that the atmosphere is poisoned in this circle and domestic discipline is extremely shaken. Such general speeches especially in our situation are very harmful for Georgia. Its justification, even if its authors had had enough evidence that their leader violated the law and committed disloyalty, is not allowed at all.

7. The Government is pleased to note that Georgian officers properly understood the main idea of their arrangement in the Polish Army and therefore the vast majority of Georgian officers showed adequate talent and diligence in the Polish Army and we hope that they will serve the homeland properly in the future.

8. Numerous misunderstandings, repeated violations of military discipline and loyalty to the legitimate government both individually and collectively by some officers were caused by the abnormal situation of their service. On the one hand they obeyed the Military Staff of Poland which had an administrative authority over them and on the other hand, they obeyed the government of Georgia which did not have such coercive authority and was therefore unable to maintain proper discipline and loyalty among Georgian soldiers.

Based on all these considerations, the government decided the following: a) Georgian officers in the Polish Army shall be transferred to the full command of the Polish staff, so that our representatives shall neither interfere in their service nor bear any responsibility.

1. Giving up the interference in the affairs of Georgian officers in the Polish service, we reserve the right to provide assistance especially to the senior officers when the agreement of their military training with the interests of the future army of Georgia so requires. In addition, the government reserves the right to protect Georgian officers as the citizens of Georgia.

2. General Zakariadze shall remain the trustee of the government and continue to perform the duties imposed by the government.

In respect of the above decision, the following shall be notified to the Polish government:

At the meeting on November 30, 1929 the National Government of Georgia reviewed the situation of Georgian officers serving in the Polish Army and decided the following: to express their deepest gratitude to the Government of Poland for the confidence and attention and for that it has taken into consideration the recommendation of our government to admit Georgian soldiers in the army and let them stay there.

We hope that Georgian military has fully justified both our hopes and the trust of the Military Staff of Poland and they deserved the attention from their leaders with their decent behavior within those seven years.

The Military Staff of Poland is now quite aware of the features of the service of Georgian officers and neither Staff nor officers need special recommendations from us any more.

Therefore, the government decides the following: please transfer the Georgian officers in the Polish Army to your command in whose service affairs our representation will not interfere. General Zakariadze shall remain in his post and continue to fulfill the assignments of the government. The government shall reserve the right to protect Georgian officers as the citizens of Georgia.[19]

Before the decision of the government was finally approved, on the same day it was also discussed at the general meeting of the government, Presidium of Constituent Assembly and the delegation of the Independence Committee of the Socialist Parties. At the beginning of the meeting, the Chairman of the government Noe Zhordania introduced the latest edition of the Government Decision to the audience. Evgeni Gegechkori spoke about the investigation conducted by him. He noted that the case consisted of two sides: a specific incident and a seven year history of Georgian officers in the Polish Army. The aim of the investigation was to determine who initiated the dismissal of senior officers – the Polish Staff or Zakariadze. Gegechkori determined that the initiative belonged to the Staff but the interested parties had heard about it even when the case was not still decided. This created a nervous atmosphere, the fear of dismissal spread to the officers and rumors were given a great way out. Therefore, the officers no longer believed in the truth. In his opinion, the situation generally was very strange. The officers were considered to be in the service of Poland and obeyed the Polish Staff while they also obeyed Zakariadze as a representative of the government who had no administrative authority over them. This double situation contributed to the misunderstanding. Therefore, it was necessary to free Zakariadze from this obligation and the army would subject only to the Polish Staff. Noe Zhordania said that Zakariadze’ s merit was great in arranging or caring for these officers. However, in his opinion it was better for them not to interfere in the officers’ affairs after their arrangement in the Polish service. They did it for the purpose to help them but unfortunately they did not appreciate it. According to him the government did not even have the right to interfere in the relations between them and the Polish Staff just as they did not interfere in the affairs of Georgian citizens employed in Citroen, Reno and other factories, for example. But they did this to enable the soldiers to expand their special military knowledge. Finally he added that the officers could not understand this and he had no other way left but to tell the Polish Staff the following: ‘these people are at your service and treat them with common rules. We do not interfere.’ Noe Ramishvili added that the officers should be perfectly taken care of, at least 2/3 of them would be useful for the common cause. He therefore said that the Decision had to emphasize the point that these officers would be involved in the common cause at relevant time and the government would continue to take care of them for this purpose. Akaki Chkhenkeli negatively assessed the role of General Zakariadze. In his opinion the General did not make any contribution to the arrangement of the officers, on the contrary he had further moved these officers away from the government. He asserted that Zakariadze took repressive measures even in that moment against two officers, therefore, despite Zakariadze’ s dismissal from his position, he would still continue repressions against the officers. Chkhenkeli called on the government that if they wanted to take advantage of the Georgian officers, they had to appoint someone else instead of Zakariadze such as General Kazbegi or any other civilian. Finally, the meeting recognized the Decision[20] of the government.

The Decision adopted on November 30 was approved on December 6 at the meeting of the government. The Decision was to be sent to General Zakariadze who was to declare the Decision as a guide for all officers. The Appeal drafted on the basis of the Decision was to be sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland and the copy of the Appeal was to be sent to General Zakariadze.[21] The Decision approved by the government was also unanimously approved on December 14 by the joint meeting of the government, Presidium of the Constituent Assembly and the delegation of the Independence Committee of the Socialist Parties.[22]

On the whole, the Decision was a kind of intermediary option and aimed to ease the heated confrontation among the circle of senior officers. Although neither General Zakariadze nor his opponent officers were excited about the given Decision but they silently accepted the government’ s Decision and declared their military obedience to it. The period of the ‘Treaty’ did not last long. From the second half of 1930, the disagreement between Georgian officers started again, the sides remained as it was and the conflict ‘became enriched’[23] with new episodes. But these are other stories and are outside the scope of the article.

[1] Category of officers above the rank of the Major.

[2] Central Historical Archive of Georgia. Fond 1861. Writing 3. Case 200, p. 69.

[3] Central Historical Archive of Georgia. Fond 1861. Writing 3. Case 206, pp. 1–2.

[4] Ibidem., p. 2; Central Historical Archive of Georgia. Fond 1831. Writing 2. Case 206, p. 5; Central Historical Archive of Georgia. Fond 1861. Writing 3. Case 205, pp. 33–35.

[5] Central Historical Archive of Georgia. Fond 1861. Writing 3. Case 199, p. 17.

[6] Central Historical Archive of Georgia. Fond 2121. Writing 1. Case 45, pp. 30–31.

[7] Central Historical Archive of Georgia. Fond 1861. Writing 3. Case 205, pp. 71–73.

[8] Central Historical Archive of Georgia. Fond 1861. Writing 3. Case 206, pp. 8–9.

[9] Central Historical Archive of Georgia. Fond 1861. Writing 3. Case 205, pp. 29–31.

[10] Central Historical Archive of Georgia. Fond 1861. Writing 3. Case 199, p. 18.

[11] Central Historical Archive of Georgia. Writing 3. Case 206, pp. 3–41, 55–58.

[12] Central Historical Archive of Georgia. Fond 1861. Writing 3. Case 206, pp. 51–54.

[13] Ibidem., pp. 47–50.

[14] Central Historical Archive of Georgia. Fond 1861. Writing 3. Case 205, p. 38.

[15] Ibidem., pp. 22–23.

[16] Central Historical Archive of Georgia. Fond 1861. Writing 3. Case 205, pp. 8–21.

[17] Central Historical Archive of Georgia. Fond 1861. Writing 3. Case 200, p. 68.

[18] Central Historical Archive of Georgia. Fond 1861. Writing 3. Case 199, p. 22.

[19] Central Historical Archive of Georgia. Fond 1861. Writing 3. Case 199, pp. 24–26.

[20] Central Historical Archive of Georgia. Fond 1861. Writing 3. Case 200, pp. 68–69.

[21] Central Historical Archive of Georgia. Fond 1861. Writing 3. Case 199, p. 27.

[22] Central Historical Archive of Georgia. Fond 1861. Writing 3. Case 200, p. 71.

[23] Redakcja naukowa, wstęp, wybór i opracowanie Paweł Libera, II Rzeczpospolita wobec ruchu prometejskogo, tom 4, Warszawa 2013, pp. 219–231.

GEORGIAN POLITICAL EMIGRATION TO POLAND AND THE ISSUE OF DE-OCCUPATION OF GEORGIA (20S – 30S OF THE XX CENTURY)

by Shorena Murusidze

During the occupation days of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, on March 17, 1921 in the coastal city Batumi was held the last meeting of the Constituent Assembly of the Legislative Branch of Georgia where they adopted a Decision pursuant to which the government of Georgia had to leave Georgia and continue fight for the independence in Europe. The government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, members of political parties, the military and some Georgians who did not share the Bolsheviks’ views left the country and emigrated. They established Georgian centers and organizations abroad. The restoration of the lost independence was the goal for which the Georgian emigrants fought.

The fight for de-occupation was led by the emigrated government of Georgia, headed by the Chairman Noe Zhordania, Ambassador of the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in France Akaki Chkhenkeli, Georgian political parties (Social-Democratic Party of Georgia, Socialist-Federalist Party of Georgia, National-Democratic Party) and political organizations established in Europe at different times.

The demand for the restoration of Georgia’ s sovereignty included solid legal grounds. Independence was de jure recognized by 21 countries in the world including Soviet Russia. The country had a legislative branch elected by general elections and a government. It also had a constitution. The government of Georgia, despite the attempt of the Bolsheviks, did not sign the capitulation.

The international situation was not favorable for the activities of Georgian political emigration in the 20s-30s of the XX century. The outcomes of the World War I were devastating for the European economy.

Searching for the way out of the given situation raised the issue of Soviet Russia due to the solution of which it would be possible to develop the European capital and to gain profit. More and more European politicians shared the view that raw materials and market of Russia were necessary for the economic restoration of Europe. It also became clear that defeating the Soviet Government in the nearest future was impossible. The Bolsheviks won in the civil war of Russia, Sovietized the neighboring states and gradually gathered strength.

The given situation prompted Great Britain and Italy to have a benevolent relationship with Soviet Russia. As early as in the second half of 1920 the Prime Minister of Great Britain Lloyd George started negotiations with the Soviet authorities to conclude a trade agreement which ended with the formation of a mutual agreement on March 16, 1921. Germany, rejected by the European states, radically changed its foreign policy course after the defeat in World War I. At first France showed interest in the Georgian issue and actively supported the demand for the restoration of Georgia’ s independence. On February 25, 1921, on the day of the occupation of the Independent Republic of Georgia, the French government accredited the Embassy of Georgia with all the rights and advantages. At the end of 1922 France without the consent of the allies occupied Ruhr district which was followed by a severe reaction from the governments of Great Britain and the United States of America. Foreign political situation of France complicated, it was found out in a diplomatic isolation and after that its government was obviously avoiding to raise the issue of Georgia in order not to aggravate the situation to the detriment of its country. At the same time a campaign for approaching Moscow began in France led by Prime Minister Edouard Herriot, which was followed by a diplomatic relation between France and the Soviet Union in 1924 and its de jure recognition.

The most favorable conditions for the activities of Georgian political emigration in the 20s and 30s of the XX century were in Poland. During this period, Poland was the only state that actually supported and assisted Georgian emigrants to fight for the de-occupation.

Political relations between Georgia and Poland date back to the period of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. On October 1, 1918, the Polish mission in the South Caucasus headed by Wacław Ostrowski began working in Tbilisi. He established the relationship with the government of Georgia and paved the way for future political and military cooperation.[1] After the de facto recognition of Georgia’ s independence in March, 1920, Poland sent a special mission to the South Caucasus under the leadership of Tytus Filipowicz, an associate of Józef Piłsudski and a member of his closest circle. On July 31 of the same year, the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia sent a diplomatic mission to Poland headed by Giorgi Sidamon-Eristavi.[2] Poland de jure recognized Georgia’ s independence on January 27, 1921. The Polish-Georgian military-political relations begun during the years of the independence of Georgia continued even after the occupation of Georgia.

Foreign policy interests of Poland included the formation of an alliance against the USSR by the representatives of emigrants from the countries occupied by Russia. In the years of 1918–1922 and 1926-1935 the de facto ruler of Poland Marshal Józef Piłsudski considered Soviet Russia as the main threat to the state. In his opinion, the leadership of the USSR would try to influence the area of the former Russian Empire in the future. To prevent this, he thought of creating a Federation consisted of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Belarus and Ukraine. The Federation would be closely connected with Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Turkey and the Caucasus states. In Warsaw it was believed that the restoration of the sovereignty of the Caucasus states and their liberation from Russia was possible by uniting the Caucasus and creating a confederation.[3]

In Autumn of 1924 the supporters of Marshal Józef Piłsudski began to pursue practical measures in the Foreign Ministry and General Staff of Poland to unite the Caucasian nations on a single platform in the Caucasus Confederation.[4] As a result of their activity the Committee for the Independence of the Caucasus was established in Constantinople in 1926. It included representatives of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and North Caucasus immigrants. The goal of the committee was to free the Caucasus from the Bolsheviks. In November 1926, the Committee for the Independence of the Caucasus began publishing a French language journal ‘Promethee’ in Paris. The publication of the journal contributed to the establishment of the Promethean Movement which was later joined by the emigrants[5] from other nations[6] conquered by the USSR.

In the same year in 1926 for the purpose of studying the history and culture of the East in Poland was established the Warsaw Institute of Eastern which helped Georgian emigrants to carry out educational, scientific and cultural programs. The Polish government took care of the education of young emigrants, in particular, their goal was to prepare the young generation of emigration for political activity. So, in 1929, in addition to the Warsaw Institute of Eastern was established Young Orientalists’ circle which was funded by the Foreign Ministry of Poland and the Military Staff of the Polish Army. Within the circle of Orientalists was created the Caucasus section. Poland received major part of Georgian military. They were first enrolled in military academies and then served in the Polish Army on the basis of a contract. The issue of the de-occupation of Georgia was fully supported by the Polish society.[7]

On June 25, 1932 a Non-Aggression Pact was signed between Poland and the USSR according to which Poland could no longer carry out such actions directed against the Soviet Union. After that the Polish government’ s support for the emigration of the Caucasus became secret.[8] The Chairman of the Democratic Republic of Georgia Noe Zhordania wrote in his secret letter sent to his representative Simon Mdivani in Warsaw about the Agreement signed between Poland and the USSR that Poland would not act against the state interests because of Georgia which was acceptable and clear for him.[9]

Prior to the conclusion of the Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact in 1932, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland cooperated with the Georgian emigration and after the signature of the Pact, the Second Bureau of the Polish General Staff cooperated with them. However, important decisions were still made by high rank officials of the Foreign Ministry.[10]

Although the Polish government and society had a favorable attitude towards Georgians, the number of Georgian emigrants in Poland was small. This was probably due to the economic crisis of Poland in the 20s of the XX century. The Founds of the National Archives of Georgia preserve the open letters of the representatives of the Georgian community in Poland to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia in emigration. They are unable to employ Georgians arrived in Poland due to hard economic situation, so they demanded to suspend the flow of refugees to Poland. Numerous requests of Georgians living in Poland are also preserved here. They apply for visas to move to another country due to unemployment and lack of income. Despite this, Andrzej Wożniak the researcher of the Georgian emigration in Poland writes the following: ‘In a numerical point of view Georgian emigrants belonged to a small group, but due to their independent nature they were quite active and had special, privileged positions, which cannot be explained either by numerical or economic role. This position was based on a similarity of the histories of more emotional, centuries – old friendship of Polish and Georgian people’[11]. In Poland Georgians lived in different cities and towns. Their major part was united around the Georgian Committee in Warsaw.

‘Georgian Committee in Poland’ was in charge of restoring Georgia’ s independence. The establishment of the committee was due to the difficult situation of Georgians in Poland and the need to protect their interests.

After the end of the World War I, Georgian prisoners of war fighting in the army of the Russian Empire found themselves in Poland. They could not return to their homeland because of the Russian Revolution and unstable situation in the East.[12] In order to help them, engineer and journalist Sergo Kuruliszwili,[13] who was well known in Poland, convened a meeting of Georgians and founded the ‘Georgian Committee in Poland’[14] on March 1, 1920. On May 28, 1920 Sergo Kuruliszwili wrote to the Georgian delegation at the Peace Treaty Conference in Paris: ‘Just imagine our situation: plenty of Georgians in need. Camps full of Georgian prisoners of war’.[15] After the establishment of the Mission of the Republic of Georgia in Warsaw, the Mission took over the functions of the Committee, that’ s why the Committee ceased to exist. However, the occupation of the Democratic Republic of Georgia and the activity started for the restoration of the sovereignty lost in emigration necessitated the restoration of the Georgian Committee in Poland. On November 6, 1921 the ‘Georgian Colony in Poland’[16] was restored and continued its activities.[17] The aim of the unity was to protect the interests of the Georgian subordinates in Poland and to help them; to publish journals, newspapers and brochures which would introduce the history and culture of Georgia to the Polish society. They also carried out propaganda activities for the restoration of Georgia’ s independence.[18]

The Georgian Committee received information from the Georgian Embassy in Paris on current issues, as well as periodicals which were then sent to the local press or institutions.[19] After the abolition of the Georgian Legation (Embassy) in France, the Georgian Committee of Poland received information about Georgia and the Caucasus from the press club established in Paris in 1931.[20]

The committee was chaired by: Sergo Kuruliszwili in 1921-1922, Joseph Salakaia in 1923-1933 and Kote Imnadze in 1934-1939. Alexandre Godzjaszwili, Rostom Kazbegi, Vasil Atabegishvili, Pavle Tumanishvili, Tite Berishvili and others were actively involved in the activities of the committee.

Sergo Kuruliszwili was not supported by the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in emigration, so during his chairmanship in 1921-1922, the activity of the committee with regard to Georgian state interests and assistance to Georgians was a private initiative of the leader and the members and not the policy implemented by official structures of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. The situation changed after the appointment of Joseph Salakaia as the chairman of the committee.

The Chairman of the Georgian Committee was at the same time the representative of the government of Georgia in emigration to Poland, who acted in agreement with the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in emigration. The Chairman of the Georgian Committee of Poland was in constant coordination with the Chairman of the Government Noe Zhordania, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Evgeni Gegechkori, the Ambassador Akaki Chkhenkeli, the Minister of Internal Affairs Noe Ramishvili, the Foreign Bureau of the Georgian Social-Democratic Party. The Founds of the National Archives of Georgia preserve the documents, which show that the Chairman of the Georgian Committee in Poland systematically sends reports and information to the members of the Georgian government in Paris and the Foreign Bureau of Social-Democratic Party about the activity of the committee, the situation of the Georgian Emigration, Internal and Foreign policy of Poland.[21] Major part of the documents are confidential and encrypted. The Chairman of the Georgian Committee of Poland received instructions from the Head of the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia and was accountable to him.[22]

The Georgian Emigration of Poland had not stopped contact with the Head of the government Noe Zhordania until the beginning of the Second World War. Noe Zhordania’ s Foundation preserves the diary dating back to 1939 which includes the records about the activity of each day. When looking through the diary, it is clear that till September 1, 1939, before the outbreak of the Second World War he still intensively received reports from Warsaw.[23]

In the first years of the occupation of Georgia, the members of the Georgian Committee tried to clarify the political interests of Poland and establish contacts with the official circles of Poland with the help of the Poles under the instructions of the Chairman of the emigrant government Noe Zhordania and the Ambassador Akaki Chkhenkeli. In the summer of 1923, at the request of Joseph Salakaia, Chairman of the Georgian Committee, Polish professor Studnicki who had uncompromising attitude to Russia and was sympathetic to Georgians, met with the Prime Minister of Poland Wincenty Witos and the former Foreign Minister of Poland, member of the Polish Sejm, Jan Dąbski. He introduced the Georgian issue to the Prime Minister and the deputy of the Sejm.[24] On August 9, 1923 Joseph Salakaia and Pavle Tumanishvili visited the Polish Ambassador to Finland, Tytus Filipowicz who was the head of the diplomatic mission of Poland during the independence of Georgia and they asked him for help.[25]

Georgian emigrants had an attempt to meet in person with Marshal of Poland Józef Piłsudski. On February 24, 1923 Joseph Salakaia informed Ambassador Akaki Chkhenkeli that his Polish friends had promised to help him meet with Marshal Piłsudski. This intention of the Chairman of the Georgian Committee had not been implemented.[26]

At the beginning of January in 1926, the 20th Congress of the Socialist Party of Poland was held in Warsaw attended by the delegates of the Georgian Social-Democratic Party Evgeni Gegechkori and Joseph Salakaia. They were met with great sympathy by the Polish socialists. Evgeni Gegechkori addressed the Congress and asked the Polish Social-Democrats to provide moral support to them in the issue related to the fight for Georgia’ s independence.[27]

The Polish government provided political and financial assistance to Georgian emigration. The Chairman of the Georgian Committee and its members met with the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland. Considering the situation in Poland, Salakaia informed the Chairman of the government Noe Zhordania and the Ambassador Akaki Chkhenkeli in Paris about the persons who had influence over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and asked them to send official letters to them. Minister of Internal Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Georgia Noe Ramishvili and Minister of Foreign Affairs Evgeni Gegechkori as well as Ambassador Akaki Chkhenkeli used to arrive in Poland which was organized by the Georgian Committee.

The Chairman of the Committee met with the members of the diplomatic corps accredited in Poland to introduce the issue of Georgia to them and invited them to the event for the celebration of the Independence Day. In a monthly report sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in emigration on June 3, 1930, Joseph Salakaia writes that he met the Japanese military attaché, the representative of the League of Nations and introduced the Georgian issue to him[28]. The Georgian evening held on January 6, 1934 in Warsaw was attended by not only the Poles but Ambassador of Estonia, First Secretary of the Embassy of Turkey and the representatives of the Embassy of Japan.[29]

As already mentioned, the correspondence between the Chairman of the Committee and the representatives of the emigrated government in Paris was often encrypted. When it refers to the meetings with the officials of Poland, name and surname are not mentioned. For example: it says ‘I met Number 2’, ‘Sch’ (this should be Minister Tadeusz Schaetzel), ‘I had a meeting with G.’

The latter, in my opinion, was Tadeusz Hołówko, the Polish public figure, deputy of the Sejm, supporter of the Promethean Movement and the head of the Eastern Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland. He was referred to as Gholowko by Georgian emigrants in the articles published in personal letters and periodicals.[30] Holowko fought for the liberation of the oppressed nations. He was assassinated on August 31, 1931. He had special friendly relations with Noe Ramishvili. During the trial, lawyer Stanisław Józef Szurlej linked the assassination of Tadeusz Hołówko, Noe Ramishvili (killed in 1930 in Paris) and Symon Petliura (killed in 1926 in Paris) the head of the Republic of Ukraine fighting for the independence of Ukraine in emigration because they fought for one goal[31].

In the years of 1918-1919 Georgian political emigration was assisted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Ambassador of Poland to Estonia, from 1931 it was assisted by the Vice President of the Supreme Council of Poland Leon Wasilewski,[32] writer and politician, member of the Sejm Wacław Sieroszewski and Chairman of the Eastern Institute, Senator Stanisław Siedlecki.[33]

Georgian emigrants not only sought to gain support and assistance in Poland for the issue about Georgia but they also tried to assist the Georgian political emigration in other countries. For this purpose, they met with the Ambassadors of Poland sent to different countries (when they arrived in Warsaw) and asked them to support the Georgian emigrants. When the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, who were well aware of the Georgian issue, were sent to the other country for the job, this fact was notified to Ambassador Akaki Chkhenkeli by Joseph Salakaia.[34]

It is also noteworthy to mention the letter sent from London on June 6, 1927 to Joseph Salakaia by Konstantine Gvarjaladze, the deputy of the Constituent Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. He is asking him to meet Frank Savery, Consul of Great Britain in Poland, who has ties to anti-Bolshevik organizations in England. As these organizations operate in secret, it is difficult to contact them, so he would like Frank Savery to send a diplomatic letter to London about the issue which will then help him establish contacts with anti-Bolshevik Organizations and gain their trust.[35] In this regard, it is important to note Joseph Salakaia’ s letter to Evgeni Gegechkori dated December 10, 1928. Salakaia notified him that although it was a difficult task, he managed to meet the Englishman about whom he wrote. The person turned out to be cautious but he was very interested in the Georgian issue. The meeting had lasted a long time and he had promised to provide information to his government.[36] We can assume that Joseph Salakaia implies Frank Savery when referring to the ‘Englishman’.

Domestic and foreign policy of Poland influenced the activity of Georgian emigrants. Georgian emigrants thoroughly watched the events in Poland, the ongoing personnel changes in the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs. They wrote analytical articles about the foreign policy and international situation of Poland on the basis of which they made predictions and tried to determine what the tactics of Georgian political emigration would be like in the given situation.

In April 1930, the emigrated Georgian government sent the member of the Constituent Assembly of Georgia, Simon Mdivani to Warsaw. He had received the following instruction from Noe Zhordania: ‘active relationship with the Polish Diplomatic Corps in order to provide necessary information and receive material assistance’.[37] He met with representatives of the Polish government as well as the individuals with whom he had relations during his stay in Istanbul.[38] He studied well the foreign reference points of Poland with regard to Russia and Turkey. Simon Mdivani wrote the following words in a report ‘We and the Poles’ sent on August 14, 1930 from Warsaw to the Chairman of the government Noe Zhordania: ‘the attitude towards us is old. I do not notice any change. Moral and material aid will continue as long as the current government is at the head of the Republic. I am not saying that time does not work against present emigrants. The duration of our emigration slows down their enthusiasm. The sympathies among the society are still great but material aid from the society should be considered exhausted. There was time when the society provided much material aid along with their sympathies but we could not use it properly at that time. Thus our condition here has strong roots, however, just as every plant suffers sometimes from great heat or constant rain, so our condition has its cloudy days and sometimes suffers badly from the storm. Who is guilty? In my opinion, both sides, especially we’.[39]

Members of the emigrated government and those acting by their mandates collaborated with the Promethean Movement. In 1928, the Prometheus Club[40] was founded in Warsaw which existed until 1939. Members of the Georgian community living in Poland were involved in its work. The activity of the club included publishing periodicals in different languages and political activities.[41] In February 1930, a conference of the Caucasus Independence Committee was held in Warsaw, attended by Evgeni Gegechkori and Joseph Salakaia. In March of the same year Joseph Salakaia was to be elected as a member of the board of the ‘Prometheus Club’. However, as the Second International was opposed to the cooperation with the ‘Prometheus’ organization of Georgian Social-Democrats, Joseph Salakaia refused to become the member of the board and nominated Simon Mdivani for the given position.

In 1930 was founded the Women’ s Division of the Prometheus Club.[42] Its chairman was B. Zavatskaia (Ukraine), deputy Barbare Bagrationi (Georgia), secretary B. Kazum-Beg (Azerbaijan), treasurer K. Bezruchko (Ukraine), hostess P. Khavzhoko (North Caoucasus Mountains). Their goal was to enter the international area through international women’ s organizations. On January 16, 1930 Zavatskaia, the head of the Women’ s Division of the Prometheus Club delivered a speech entitled ‘The role of women in the fight for the liberation of the home country’, in which she talked about the need for women’ s political activity. They called on all women in emigration to join them.[43]

Maro Shalikashvili, a member of the Women’ s Division of the Prometheus Club published an article in the newspaper Damoukidebeli sakartvelo in 1936 entitled ‘Women in the fight for Independence’ which is about the Polish women’ s fight for the independence of Poland and the role of Georgian mothers for the liberation of the homeland. She notes that the history of Polish women should be a model for every woman and according to history Georgian women had always fought for defending Georgia. The article ends with the words appealing to the emigrated Georgian women: ‘Let’ s work for the liberation of the homeland’.[44]

Georgian political emigration worked mainly in two directions for the de-occupation of Georgia. In addition to the cooperation with official structures and state officials, the Georgian issue, culture and history were also introduced to the society. Even in this respect, they had the best situation in Poland. In 1937 Captain Vasil Injia writes: ‘every Georgian living in Poland encounters authentic evidence that not only a circle or any group but the whole nation feels such sympathy for the Georgians’. The Georgian emigration to Poland organized various events to introduce the history and culture of Georgia to the public. They periodically published journals and newspapers,[45] books, printed articles in the Polish press, gave public lectures, celebrated the Independence Day of Georgia every year and at the beginning of January they held a Georgian Ball[46] which was attended by members of the Polish government, military officials of high rank, prominent public figures, representatives of political organizations and the press. In 1926 by the organization of the board of the Georgian Committee Wacław Sieroszewski, a well-known Polish writer and politician and a member of the Sejm gave lectures about Georgia in almost every major city in Poland. On December 3 and 11, 1937 the 750th Jubilee of famous Georgian poet Shota Rustaveli was celebrated in Warsaw.

Georgian contractors in the Polish army were not officially allowed to engage in political activity. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia adopted a resolution in 1925 based on which Georgian soldiers in Poland were banned to join the political organizations and engage in political activities.[47] Georgian soldiers took an active part in the life of Georgian emigrants to Poland. After the graduation from the military academy in Poland, the ‘Union of Junkers’ was established for the purpose to maintain connection between Georgian soldiers. Pursuant to the charter, the goals of the union were as follows: ‘1. To watch the events taking place in Georgia; 2. To watch the development of martial arts; 3. To study the territory of Georgia in a strategic point of view; 4. To process the wars lost and won by Georgia; 5. Great Georgian military leaders and lost and won wars experienced by them; 6. To assemble the scattered emigrants who are hostile against one another and unite them for the independence of Georgia’.[48] The members of the board of the ‘Union’ were Vano Nanuashvili, David Laghidze and Nikoloz Matikashvili. The Georgian ‘Union of Junkers’ published a journal ‘Mkhedari’ in Paris. They published articles in it, thus trying to develop the Georgian military and determine the future needs through studying and analyzing its past and present. The government of Poland did not recognize the ‘Union of Junkers’ and as one of the founders of the union, Nikoloz Matikashvili suggests, the reason for that was the fact that the Polish government did not want to aggravate the relations with Russia.[49] Alexandre Zakariadze, the military representative of the Georgian government in Poland wrote in his memoir ‘Democratic Republic of Georgia’ that the Bolsheviks were sending protest notes to the Poles because of the contact of Georgian contractors of the Polish army with Georgian political emigration or their activity around the issue of Georgia. Therefore, the representatives of the General Staff of Poland asked Alexandre Zakariadze to act as if he had forgotten the Georgian issue and Georgia itself.[50]

In conclusion, it should be noted that the activities of Georgian emigration in Poland in the years of 1921-1939 were manifested in maintaining the idea of Georgian sovereignty and in the fight for de-occupation. They met with the officials of Poland and those arriving in Poland from other countries, held cultural and educational events to introduce the history and culture of Georgia, printed books and magazines. The internal economic and political situation in Poland influenced the activities of Georgian political emigration, however, it did not cause any radical changes. The sympathy and assistance of the Polish government and the society towards Georgian emigration did not change.

[1] O. Janelidze, ‘Diplomatic Representation of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Poland’, [in:] Polish–Georgian Historians’ Commission. Collected Works, ed. D. Kolbaia, Volume I, 2019, p. 130.

[2] Ibidem., pp.133–134.

[3] Кавказская Конфедерация в официальных декларациях, тайной переписке и секретных документах движения ‘Прометей’: Сборник документов / Сост., пред., пер., прим. Г. Г. Мамулиа, Москва 2012, p. 6.

[4] Ibidem., p. 7.

[5] The Prometheus Organization included the following: Emigrants of Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, The Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus, Turkistan, Crimean and Volga Tatars, representatives of Kuban and Don Cossacks, peoples of Karelia and Ingria. Poland provided organizational and financial support for them. The relation of Poland with the Caucasus emigration and the history of Promethean Movement were thoroughly studied by the historians Pawel Libera and Giorgi Mamulia. See, 1) Кавказская Конфедерация в официальных декларациях, тайной переписке и секретных документах движения ‘Прометей’: Сборник документов / Сост., пред., пер., прим. Г. Г. Мамулиа, Москва 2012; 2) P. Libera, ‘The International of the Conquered – The Promethean Movement and Polish Authorities During 1926–1939’, History (Bulgarian Journal of Historical Education), Sofia 2018, volume 26, number 6; 3); P. Libera, ‘A forgotten Episode in the History of Polish–Finnish Relations: The Prometheus Club in Helsinki, 1932–1939’, [in:] Mannerheim and Polish–Finnish Political and Military Relations 1917–1946, ed. T. Siewierski, Warsaw 2018; 4) P. Libera, ‘Polish Authorities and the Attempt to Create the Caucasian Confederation (1917–1940)’, Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo–Wschodniej (3)

[6] P. Libera, ‘The International of the Conquered – The Promethean Movement and Polish Authorities During 1926–1939’, History (Bulgarian Journal of Historical Education), Sofia 2018, volume 26, number 6, p. 625.

[7] D. Kolbaia, Under Polish Wings: Georgian Emigration in Poland 1921–1939, Warsaw 2019, pp. 39–41.

[8] P. Libera, ‘The International of the Conquered’ – The Promethean Movement and Polish Authorities During 1926–1939’, History (Bulgarian Journal of Historical Education), Sofia 2018, volume 26, number 6, p. 626.

[9] National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, 2113/1/282/9.

[10] P. Libera, ‘A forgotten Episode in the History of Polish–Finnish Relations: The Prometheus Club in Helsinki, 1932–1939’, in Mannerheim and Polish–Finnish Political and Military Relations 1917–1946, ed. T. Siewierski, Warsaw 2018, p. 125.

[11] A. Woźniak, ‘Georgian emigration of Warsaw’, trans. D. Kolbaia, Kartuli emigratsia, vol. 2, Tbilisi 2014, p. 53.

[12] Ibidem., p. 38.

[13] Sergo Kurulishvili was one of the first who introduced the Georgian history and culture to the Polish society.

[14] National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, 1864/2/401/1v.; 2115/1/125/1.

[15] Ibidem., 1864/2/323/4.

[16] In addition to the Georgian Committee, on June 13, 1920 the Georgian–Polish club was founded by the initiative of Kurulishvili. His goal was to bring Georgians and Poles closer. Club members gave lectures and wrote papers about Georgia and Poland. They held Georgian–Polish evenings (National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, 1864/2/323/18). The activities of Georgian–Polish club ceased after the death of Sergo Kurulishvili in 1925 (TSU, Center–Library of the study of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. Democratic Republic of Georgia–222–Ber–215).

[17] National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, 2115//1/125/2.

[18] Ibidem., 1864/2/323/2.

[19] Ibidem., 1864/2/732/1.

[20] Ibidem., 2114/1/70/7.

[21] National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, 1864/2/732, 838; 2113/1/307, 329, 330; 2121/1/45; 2130/1/39, 83.

[22] Ibidem., 2113/1//287/7.

[23] Ibidem., 2113/1/263/157.

[24] D. Chumburidze, Akaki Chkhenkeli – Public Figure, Diplomat, Patriot, Tbilisi 2018, p. 362–363.

[25] National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, 2121/1/45/3.

[26] Ibidem., 1864/2/728/3.

[27] Ibidem., 2117/1/197/26–27.

[28] National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, 2121/1/45/34.

[29] Georgians in Warsaw, newspaper Damoukidebeli sakartvelo (Independent Georgia) 97, Paris 1334, p. 16.

[30] Tadeusz Hołówko, newspaper Damoukidebeli sakartvelo 69, Paris 1931, pp. 12–13; National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, 2113/1/330/17.

[31] Trial of Hołówko’ s assassins, newspaper Damoukidebeli sakartvelo 94, Paris 1933, pp. 13–14.

[32] Leon Wasilewski, Damoukidebeli sakartvelo 74, Paris 1932, p. 12.

[33] Georgians in Poland, Damoukidebeli sakartvelo 143, Paris 1938, p. 16.

[34] D. Chumburidze, Akaki Chkhenkeli – Public Figure, Diplomat, Patriot, Tbilisi 2018, p. 382.

[35] National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, 2114/1/70/1–2.

[36] National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, 2121/1/45/6–7.

[37] Ibidem., 2113/1/316/35.

[38] After the occupation of Georgia, Simon Mdivani cooperated with the representatives of the Mission of Poland in Istanbul on behalf of the government of Georgia until 1928. He was an active member of the Promethean Movement.

[39] National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, 2113/1/316/75.

[40] The Prometheus Club in Warsaw had branches in Harbin and Helsinki. Its board included Emigrants of Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, The Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus, Turkistan, Crimean and Volga Tatars, representatives of Kuban and Don Cossacks, peoples of Karelia. (P. Libera, ‘Polish Authorities and the Attempt to Create the Caucasian Confederation (1917–1940)’, Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo–Wschodniej (3), p. 249).

[41] P. Libera, ‘The International of the Conquered – The Promethean Movement and Polish Authorities During 1926–1939’, History (Bulgarian Journal of Historical Education), Sofia, 2018, volume 26, number 6, p. 261.

[42] Non–Georgian members of Georgian diaspora were also involved in the activity of Georgian political emigration to Poland. They were the spouses of Georgian emigrants who were not Georgians by origin but they participated in committee meetings and voted for the elections of the committee board. Among them should be noted the spouse of the officer Rostom Shalikashvili and the spouse of the Colonel Bagrationi, Barbare Bagrationi. The meetings of the colony were held in the Polish language because the ethnic group was not similar and not everyone knew Georgian.

[43] Appeal to every Georgian woman, newspaper Damoukidebeli sakartvelo 53, Paris 1930, p. 18.

[44] Shalikashvili Maro, Women in the fight for Independence, newspaper Damoukidebeli sakartvelo 129, Paris 1936, pp. 9–10.

[45] Georgian emigrants published newspapers in Poland at different times: Amirani, Pro Georgia (1922), Pro Partia (1923), Kurier Warszawski (Courier of Warsaw) (1922–1923), Agmosavletis khma (Voice of the East) Głos Wschodu, (1924–1925).

[46] They paid debts, bought books, emigrant periodicals, helped poor families with the money donated from Georgian evenings. The Chairman of the Committee presented the financial report to Konstantine Kandelaki, Minister of Finance and Trade–Industry of the Democratic Republic of Georgia.

[47] D. Chumburidze, Akaki Chkhenkeli – Public Figure, Diplomat, Patriot, Tbilisi 2018, p. 380.

[48] N. Matikashvili, Junkers and others, Tbilisi 2016, p. 194.

[49] Ibidem., Junkers and others, Tbilisi 2016, p. 196.

[50] G. Sharadze, The History of the Georgian Emigrant Journalism, Volume IV, Tbilisi 2003, pp. 309–310.

WACŁAW OSTROWSKI’ S MISSION TO THE CAUCASUS 1918–1921

by Paweł Libera

When Poland regained independence in November 1918, the Polish authorities were faced with the task of consolidating and strengthening the borders and guaranteeing the existence of the free state. Almost all diplomatic, political and military efforts were aimed at achieving these goals. Nevertheless, Polish diplomacy was active in the distant Caucasus between 1918 and 1921. This resulted, among other things, from the concepts of Polish eastern policy at the time, aimed, in simple terms, at building a broad anti-Bolshevik coalition and a buffer to separate Poland from the Communist Russia. These plans originated from the belief that Russia could only be fought on a broad front, and that fighting her alone was doomed to fail. The changes that took place at the time in the Caucasus, which tried to free itself from the Russian/Bolshevik rule, have created very favourable conditions for this. At that time, Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis jointly created the Transcaucasia Seim and the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic but then, in May 1918, they decided to dissolve the mutual state and declare independence of three states: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. From 1918 to 1921, throughout the entire period of independence of the Caucasian states of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Poland had a representation in the Caucasus. Almost throughout this period, with just a short break, this was headed by Wacław Ostrowski. It is worth noting that although Poland formally declared independence on 11 November 1918, a few months later than the countries of the South Caucasus, Wacław Ostrowski had come to Tiflis (Tbilisi) earlier as an official representative of the Kingdom of Poland in the Caucasus. After Poland’ s declaration of independence, he became the representative of the Republic of Poland and he performed this role until 1921. For many years, the attention of historians studying Polish-Caucasian relations focused on the mission of Tytus Filipowicz, who left Warsaw at the beginning of 1920 and was to establish close political and military relations with the Caucasian countries. Due to the importance of this mission, and to the opinion that Filipowicz was a close and trusted associate of Józef Piłsudski, researchers have devoted much more attention to his mission and activities in the Caucasus than to Ostrowski. However, Filipowicz’ s mission was very quickly arrested by the Bolsheviks and was only able to fulfil its tasks partially. Ostrowski, on the other hand, was the representative of Poland who spent the longest time in the Caucasus. He was responsible both for the assistance to Polish citizens and for their repatriation to Poland, and also for maintaining contacts with the governments of the Caucasian states. He was a very active advocate of the recognition of the South Caucasus countries by Poland’ s authorities.

The mission of Wacław Ostrowski has already been of interest to Polish researchers. Marek Mądzik wrote the most about it, already in the 1980s[1], later this subject featured in the work of Wojciech Materski,[2] and then again by Marek Mądzik and Marcin Kruszyński[3]. Much more attention was paid to the subsequent mission of Tytus Filipowicz. However, preserved archival material makes it possible to resume research on the activity of Wacław Ostrowski in the Caucasus. First of all, there is new archival material that has not been used in this research so far. On the one hand, this includes the files commonly known as ‘Qualey’ s addition’ which have supplemented the Foreign Ministry group at the Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN; Archives of Modern Records) in Poland in the mid-1990s. On the other hand, the ‘Adjutancy – Commander in Chief’ files, kept in the archives of the Józef Piłsudski Institute in New York. The latter mainly contain correspondence from Constantinople to Warsaw. At that time, Ostrowski was supposedly the closest and best source of knowledge about the events in the Caucasus for the Polish authorities. In practice, this was not always the case, mainly due to difficulties in sending mail, and therefore the representative of Poland in Turkey played a very important role in informing Warsaw about the Caucasus. Reporting materials sent from Constantinople have not been used by researchers in this context so far, yet they bring a certain amount of new information and allow supplementing and ordering of the state of research on Polish knowledge about the events in the Caucasus between 1918 and 1920. It should be noted, however, that in recent years the source base on Poland’ s relations with the Caucasian states during 1918–1921 has probably been reduced by absence of important documents. This means the collection of Tytus Filipowicz, which had been kept at the library of the SGH Warsaw School of Economics, and in which Prof. Marek Mądzik had found copies of Tytus Filipowicz’ s mission reports many years ago. Unfortunately, a query conducted by this author in the same materials in 2018 brought a negative result. In recent years, the Filipowicz collection has been reworked, with both the file reference numbers and the original sequence of the archive collection changed. I have not been able to find most of the materials referred to by Prof. Mądzik in his 1987 work. This situation was confirmed by the query of Prof. Wojciech Materski, conducted in a similar period in the same collection.

The purpose of the following text is to supplement previous research on Wacław Ostrowski’ s mission in the Caucasus in 1918–1921, with particular emphasis on his political activity and relations with the Caucasian states.

The situation in the Caucasus in 1918

After the February 1917 revolution in Russia, power in the South Caucasus was exercised by an authority of the Russian Provisional Government known as the Transcaucasia Special Committee, the so-called OZAKOM (from the Russian acronym of the name: Особый Закавказский комитет, ОЗАКОМ). After the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917, the rule in the region was taken over by the Transcaucasian Commissariat, consisting of representatives of left-wing Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian parties. Initially, it had no political ambitions, but ultimately, as a result of changes in Russia, in January 1918 the Transcaucasian Commissariat led to the forming of the Transcaucasia Seim, which announced the establishment of the sovereign Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic on 22 April 1918. The republic only lasted a month. Conflicts between representatives of the three nations led to the dissolution of the Transcaucasia Seim on 26 May 1918 and the establishment of three independent states: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

What was the attitude of Polish political groups to the events in the Caucasus in the first half of 1918? Most of the lands of central Poland were under German and Austrian occupation at the time, but in order to win the Polish society over, by the act of 5 November 1916, the German and Austrian authorities promised to create a Kingdom of Poland closely subordinated to the German Empire. Soon, the Provisional Council of State was established, followed in October 1917 by the Regency Council, which was to govern the Kingdom of Poland. Due to the fact that the Kingdom of Poland was a dependent entity, the powers of the Council were limited to some aspects of internal policy, while foreign policy fell within the competence of the Central States. Despite this, the Department of Political Affairs within the Regency Council tried to conduct Polish foreign policy. The division of authority made in April 1918 by the Regency Council was a clear step in this direction. From that moment on, the Department of Political Affairs was to take care of the Poles interned at home and abroad, which in practice involved establishing direct relations with foreign countries.[4] This context explains why the Polish side, the Regency Council, failed to react officially, first to the establishment of the Transcaucasia Seim, and then to the declarations of independence by Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in May 1918. However, the situation of Polish organisations in the Caucasus was different, as these were not established by the state authorities, but were formed in the course of spontaneous processes and could take a stand and express their position in the face of current political events.

After the first Russian revolution in 1917, the Polish communities in Tiflis established the Polish Democratic Union associated with the circle of Aleksander Lednicki. In a declaration of 16 May 1917, this organisation recognized that the Provisional Council of State in Warsaw should be recognized as ‘the beginning of a government, the first legitimate Polish government, and therefore it should enjoy due obedience wherever Poles have been thrown by the fate’. The declaration was confirmed by the congress of Polish organisations, convened in August (September) 1917 by the Executive Committee of the Council of Polish Organisations in Tiflis. The congress elected the Polish District Council in the Caucasus, consisting of 16 people, and its executive body, the National Executive Committee, consisting of 9 people. The Polish Military Headquarters was also established at the Polish District Council in the Caucasus[5]. On 11 November 1917, Dr Władysław Jarecki was elected as the head of the Committee, and in December the Committee announced that it recognized the Transcaucasian Commissariat and its authority, and that it declared neutrality.[6] Georgia’ s declaration of independence on 26 May 1918 was not met with an immediate response from other countries. The reaction depended primarily on the balance of power and influence of Western states in the Caucasus. For this reason, Germany was the first to recognize Georgia de facto, on 28 May 1918.[7] This did not mean, however, an immediate establishment of direct relations with the Regency Council of the Kingdom of Poland.

The beginning of Wacław Ostrowski’ s mission

Little is known about Wacław Ostrowski himself. Basic information about him was included in the encyclopaedic biographical note written over ten years ago by Marek Mądzik. According to the note, Ostrowski was born on 1 September 1870 in Warsaw. He was a civil engineer by trade. He first studied in Warsaw, then at the University of Zurich, and graduated from the Polytechnic in Munich. He worked in Germany, building railways, before the outbreak of World War I, and during the war of 1914–1918 he was in Russia. Apparently he arrived in Tiflis during the summer. In 1918, he became a member of the Polish District Council in the Caucasus in Tbilisi, in August of that year he became a trustee of the Regency Council, and from 1 October 1918 he headed the Polish State Representation in the Caucasus. In 1920 he was called back to Warsaw.[8] The same author stated in one of his earlier works that Ostrowski was in the Caucasus during 1914–1918 as a war refugee.[9] This information can be supplemented and corrected with more detailed data contained, among others, in the military service files of Wacław Ostrowski[10]. They show that, contrary to the findings of Marek Mądzik, Ostrowski was not a war refugee and that he did not come to Tiflis in the summer of 1918.

In fact, Wacław Ostrowski was born on 1 September 1870 in Warsaw, the son of Wiktor and Maria née Krasińska. He was educated at the 3rd Gymnasium and at the Warsaw Real School, then studied at the University and Polytechnic in Zurich, and at the engineering department of the University of Munich, where he graduated in 1895. He then worked as a construction engineer for several years, mainly in the construction of railways in various regions of Germany. At the beginning of the 20th century, for family reasons (education of his children), he left for Galicia (the north-eastern part of Austro-Hungary), where he worked in various industrial institutions and ran his own industrial activity. Formally, he was a Russian subject, which had a very significant impact on his military situation. Even before starting his studies, he served in the Imperial Russian Army, where he received the rank of praporshchik (ensign), and in 1903 he was transferred to the reserve. Despite this, after the outbreak of World War I in 1914, when mobilisation was announced, he had to report to the unit. He was sent to Kazan and posted to a mobilisation militia squad sent to the Caucasus. He served in Armenia, where, at the rank of a captain, he commanded a railway protection company. On 1 August 1916, he was transferred to Persia, where, at the head of two companies, he was to protect the Tabriz railway, guard the Russian-Persian border, and deal with the relations of the local population and the Russian army with the Russian consulate general in Tabriz. He spent almost a year and a half in Persia and at the beginning of 1918 he was ordered to leave with his subordinate troops and go to the headquarters in Tiflis. We have no precise data as to when Ostrowski arrived in Tiflis, but it was certainly in the first months of 1918, or six months earlier than Marek Mądzik had reported when he claimed that Ostrowski probably appeared in Tiflis in the summer of 1918. It was then, at the beginning of 1918, that he probably joined the activities of local Polish organisations, headed by the Polish District Council. Soon, he was appointed the General Plenipotentiary of the Polish District Council. His main task was to organise the repatriation of Polish refugees from the Caucasus, which he handled using the favourable attitude of German authorities. Years later, he recalled: ‘Thanks to my personal relations and my accidental acquaintance, dating back from Warsaw, with Count Schulenburg, who had been a [German] consul in Warsaw before the war, and now came to Tiflis on behalf of the [German] occupiers, I was able to secure the possibility to leave for large numbers of our refugees and demobilised soldiers’. Ostrowski claimed that he sent a total of nearly two thousand Polish refugees back to their home country.[11] He handled that on behalf of the Polish District Council until he was appointed trustee of the Regency Council of the Kingdom of Poland.

According to Marek Mądzik’ s findings, Ostrowski was apparently to act as the trustee of the Regency Council from August 1918. Mądzik assumed that the question of Ostrowski’ s appointment had been raised in connection with the disbandment of the Polish Brigade and the evacuation of Poles to their home country in the summer of 1918. At that time, Dr Jarecki also left for Warsaw, and he probably reached the Regency Council and demanded the appointment of a representative in Tiflis, namely Wacław Ostrowski, one of the members of the Polish District Council in the Caucasus[12]. In reality, it happened somewhat differently. In the second half of 1918, the Polish District Council sent one of its members, engineer Tadeusz Tydelski, the Vice-President of the Council, on a mission to the Regency Council of the Kingdom of Poland in Warsaw. Tydelski was to demand the appointment of a representative of the Regency Council for the Caucasus. He was supposed to suggest that it would be best if the current plenipotentiary of the Council, Wacław Ostrowski, was appointed to the post. According to the information of the Council included in its last letter, dated 31 October 1918, this request was accepted.[13] The exact date of Tydelski’ s mission is not known, but it probably took place in August/September 1918, because, according to surviving correspondence, as late as August of that year there was no ‘political agent at the Georgian government who would defend the fair Polish affairs’ in Tiflis, while on 21 September 1918, Ostrowski received a notification from the Foreign Affairs Office in Berlin that he had been appointed the trustee of the Regency Council in the Caucasus. A few days later, on 1 October 1918, he received telegraphic confirmation from the Imperial German Delegation in the Caucasus, followed by a telegram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was not until 20 October 1918 that engineer Tadeusz Tydelski arrived in Tiflis, and brought to Ostrowski the decisions of the Department of State of the Regency Council regarding this matter, dated 3 and 5 October 1918, and then Ostrowski himself notified the governments of the three Caucasian republics about his new role.[14]

As a consequence of appointing a trustee of the Regency Council, the Polish District Council in the Caucasus dissolved, and stated in a letter to the Department of State that ‘currently, care for Polish society in the Caucasus passes into the hands of the representative [of the Regency Council of the Kingdom of Poland] and the mission of the [Polish District] Council [in the Caucasus] in this respect is completed, and the Council relieves itself of this state activity, which it had to take into its own hands at one time, so that the Council considers its functions finished.’[15] However, the appointment of Ostrowski as a trustee did not meet with unequivocal support. Reservations to his territorial competences were raised by Stanisław Wąsowicz, the representative of the Regency Council for re-emigration in Baku. Much earlier than Ostrowski, on 23 August 1918, he had received an unofficial authority from Aleksander Lednicki to handle the re-emigration of Poles from Azerbaijan and was appointed a representative of the Central Re-Emigration Office in Baku.[16] This conflict turned out to be short-lived and was soon resolved.

The activity of Wacław Ostrowski in the Caucasus

It quickly turned out that precise definition of his competences was as important as the appointment itself. As mentioned above, the Kingdom of Poland was not a fully sovereign entity and could not conduct foreign policy. For this reason, it could only grant limited powers to Ostrowski, primarily regarding the issues of re-emigration and care for Poles in the Caucasus. Meanwhile, both the Polish District Council in the letter quoted above, and Wacław Ostrowski himself expected that he would receive letters of credence, which would be tantamount to appointment of him as a diplomatic representative of the Kingdom of Poland and to recognition of Georgia by the Kingdom of Poland. The authorities in Warsaw did not have these powers.

The fact that Tadeusz Tydelski failed to bring the letters of credence did, according to Ostrowski, ‘to some extent disturb the Governments of those [Caucasian] Republics, which may have taken it as a certain disregard or refusal to recognize their independent existence’. In this situation, Ostrowski asked the Imperial German Delegation to confirm to the governments of the three Caucasian states that he had received such a nomination and to reassure them that ‘such letters of credence would be presented to them’. He also asked to have telegrams on this matter sent to the governments of the Caucasian states, and stressed that the representative of Lithuania, also subordinated to Germany at that time, had already received such documents. Ostrowski aspired to the position of a diplomatic representative of the Regency Council. In his letter, he informed about the activities he was taking or planning, including diplomatic ones.[17] Such understanding of his mission is also evidenced by the contents of the certificates he issued to his employees. These contained information that the employees were serving in the representative office of the Kingdom of Poland to the governments of the republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia and that they should be treated as ‘members of the Polish diplomatic corps’. A certificate issued to Ostrowski by the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a similar wording. It granted him a statute equal to the diplomatic one, as it guaranteed extraterritoriality and inviolability of the person, home and correspondence.[18]

The content of the reply Ostrowski that received to his letter is not known, but he certainly received it before 20 November 1918 and it was not satisfactory for him: it did not contain promises that the requested letters and credentials would be sent. After the official declaration of independence by Poland on 11 November 1918, Ostrowski wrote back that the reply he had received ‘failed to cover all matters’ and he demanded that the letters of credence be sent. Trying to put pressure on the authorities in Warsaw, he wrote: ‘The governments [of the Caucasian republics] eagerly await these documents, because they feel to some extent offended that the Polish Government does not consider it necessary to acknowledge their independence, bypassing this practice accepted invariably in the diplomatic world. They emphasize this repeatedly in conversations and they will undoubtedly appoint their representatives in Poland as soon as this form is respected for them.’[19] Despite the pressure from Ostrowski, he did not receive letters of credence, which he still complained about in his correspondence to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in early May 1919.[20] The refusal from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was undoubtedly related to Poland’ s decision to refrain from recognizing Georgia and other Caucasian states. Sending letters of credence to Ostrowski would be tantamount to recognition of the Caucasian states, for which Warsaw was not ready, either in the second half of November 1918 or in May 1919, mainly due to the international situation.

Ostrowski tried to interpret the geographical territory under his jurisdiction flexibly. Formally, he was supposed to represent the Polish authorities in the three Caucasian countries. However, at the very beginning, there was a conflict between Ostrowski and Stanisław Wąsowicz, Aleksander Lednicki’ s representative in Baku, who was convinced that he had been assigned a mission in Azerbaijan and initially did not want to recognize Ostrowski.[21] After exchanging correspondence with Wąsowicz, Ostrowski decided to personally take over contacts with Azerbaijan. To this end he sent his deputy Tadeusz Tydelski with the secretary of the representation office, M. Rogoyski, to Baku in January 1919, in order to establish relations with the local authorities there.[22] The Azerbaijani authorities were convinced that Poland should establish a separate diplomatic mission in Baku. Ostrowski believed, on the other hand, that this was not necessary and that one Polish representation would be enough for the entire Caucasus.[23] Ostrowski did not limit his activities to the three countries, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, but in practice he also dealt with the North Caucasus, the Terek region, and even with more distant areas of the former Russian Empire. When, in early 1919, he received information about numerous Polish prisoners of war, former Austrian citizens, in Turkestan, he was convinced that the Polish representation in Tiflis should undertake their evacuation to Poland, as it was the nearest one to them. The more so that Austrian authorities were not interested in evacuating these prisoners. In order to carry out this operation, Ostrowski asked for funds, and also for an officer and a doctor who could undertake this task.[24]

As before, Ostrowski’ s activities focused on caring for the Polish community that remained in the Caucasus and on enabling their repatriation to Poland. At that time, there were three groups of Poles in the Caucasus: refugees, former Imperial Russian military and civil officials, and Poles who lived permanently in the Caucasus. As Ostrowski recalled, the first two groups were the most numerous and required the most help, especially so as members of these often lacked livelihood, and the prices in the Caucasus were very high at that time. The Polish representation paid them allowances and helped them organise their departure to Poland.[25] Ostrowski issued certificates and passports and made efforts to release Poles from the obligatory military service in the armies of three Caucasian countries and to provide them with transport to Poland. Especially the issue of leaving for Poland was difficult to carry out, as priority was given to the German army, which evacuated from Georgia at that time.[26]

Assistance to war refugees from Poland was not the only activity of Wacław Ostrowski. He also undertook assistance to Poles who had lived in the Caucasus for many years. The many brave social reforms implemented by the Democratic Republic of Georgia included in particular the nationalisation of great landed property[27]. It also concerned few Polish citizens who lived and owned landed estates in Georgia. Ostrowski intervened in their favour with the Georgian authorities, trying to obtain for Polish citizens the right to receive compensation for the lost land. On 17 November 1918, he was scheduled to submit a note on this matter to the Georgian Government, and the following day he personally discussed the matter with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Evgeni Gegechkori.[28]

The daily work of the representation was severely hampered by the difficulties in communication with Warsaw. This translated both into a lack of regular guidelines for Ostrowski and an insufficient inflow of information about the situation in Poland. On 30 December 1918, while sending courier named Weissfeld with a series of questions and a request for instructions to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ostrowski wrote: ‘I am asking for the grace of establishing permanent communication, either by couriers, or in some other way, because the Polish colony in the Caucasus, and further east, is absolutely without any information about what is happening in the home country. For this, it would be very needed to organise a periodic consignment of daily newspapers which could be used by the colony via the Representation.’[29]

Despite the lack of clear confirmation from Warsaw, Ostrowski was convinced that his mission was diplomatic in nature as well, and tried to expand his powers into the political and diplomatic areas. His initiative immediately after the Polish authorities sent out information about Poland regaining its independence on 13 November 1918 was a very clear signal of this. He presented the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a note on the establishment of postal and telegraph relations. He received a positive answer on this matter.[30] The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also tried to use Ostrowski’ s presence in the Caucasus to collect information of a nature that went far beyond the care for the Polish community and their repatriation. Among other things, he was entrusted with researching and overseeing the political and military situation. In the summer of 1919, he was ordered to send the text of the Azerbaijan-Georgian military convention,[31] which was certainly to be used to analyse the military potential of the Caucasian states at that time. Apart from that, Ostrowski was also deeply involved in establishing close relations between Poland and Georgia.

The issue of recognizing the independence of Georgia by Poland

The first step towards establishing Polish-Caucasian relations was made by activists of Polish organisations in the Caucasus at the end of 1917, when the National Executive Committee announced that it recognized the Transcaucasian Committee and its authority. Soon after Poland’ s declaration of independence, Georgian diplomats established relations with representatives of Polish diplomacy. The first letter, of 27 November 1918, was sent by them to the Polish Legation in Berlin. In it, they informed about Georgia’ s declaration of independence and, referring to the common past, expressed the hope that Poland would recognize Georgia formally (de facto). The representative of the Republic of Poland in Berlin at the time limited himself to confirming the receipt of the letter and promised to send it on, to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[32] The next step was made during the meeting of the Georgian Diplomatic Mission and the Polish Legation in Bucharest on 30 January 1919. Representatives of the Georgian mission, headed by Assatiani, expressed the wish to establish closer relations with Poland and support at the peace conference in Paris. ‘The Georgian mission asked me to ask our government to regulate the diplomatic and consular representation between Poland and the Georgian Republic’ wrote the representative of the Republic of Poland in Bucharest at the time, and he also noted that the mission was not received officially due to the fact that Georgia had not yet been recognized internationally.[33] Ostrowski constantly strove to have the mutual relations regulated and for Georgia to be recognized by Poland. In May 1919, he wrote: ‘My legalisation towards the local governments so far is based only on a radiotelegraph notification and on presenting me to these governments by the former German Mission as a representative of the Polish Government, which places me in a very vague position. Such a vague situation cannot continue any longer, so I kindly ask you to send me a document prepared in the French language, confirming my mandate as the Representative of the Polish State for the Caucasus, that is for present-day Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Terek Oblast’. He explained that it was difficult for him to help Poles ‘without undeniably formal and strict grounds for legalisation, and more and more difficult to explain why the Polish Government, notifying in advance with its telegram six months ago about my appointment, has so far not reacted with anything more to the presence of the Delegation in the Caucasus.’ He even sent a pattern of a letter that other representatives had from their governments.[34] The Georgian side addressed Ostrowski as the diplomatic representation of Poland.[35]

Władysław Jodko-Narkiewicz, the Polish representative in Turkey, supported Ostrowski in his attempts to convince the Polish authorities about the necessity to establish close relations with the Caucasus. In his reports, he dealt primarily with political issues and was a strong supporter of the formation of a broad bloc of nations against Bolshevik Russia. This does not mean that he did not mention other issues, especially if they could prove useful for Poland’ s eastern policy. For this reason, he informed in his letters that there was a possibility of concluding a transit treaty with Georgia and asked if the Polish authorities were interested in concluding such an agreement. In a letter of 1 December 1919, Jodko reported on a meeting with Georgia’ s representative in Turkey and the idea of concluding a transit treaty. ‘(…) the issue of recognizing or not recognizing Georgia should not be an obstacle, as the treaty may be of a temporary nature until the fate of the Caucasian states is resolved by the Peace Conference’ he wrote, trying to counter the potential arguments of Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials.[36]

Ostrowski acted in a similar way and, unable to persuade the Polish authorities to enter into closer political relations, tried to revive Poland’ s economic contacts with the Caucasus. In August 1919, Ostrowski sent his associate Tadeusz Tydelski to Warsaw, who was to provide information about the need to establish economic and, above all, trade relations with the Caucasus.[37] Tydelski probably stayed in Warsaw for longer. In an extensive memo prepared by Tydelski in Warsaw in mid-December 1919, he emphasized the demand in Poland for raw materials from the Caucasus and that for the production of Poland’ s industry in the South Caucasus.[38] The manuscript of this memo ended up in the archives of Tytus Filipowicz, so it is not known whether it was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs directly or via Filipowicz.

No major changes in Polish-Caucasian relations took place in 1919. In December 1919, Ostrowski wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Georgia had previously decided to send its representative to Warsaw, but for tactical reasons this had not happened yet. ‘In recent meetings with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Gegechkori, and the head of State, Mr Zhordania, I have already met with their apparent wish to enter into a closer relationship with our country. In general, it must be admitted that the Transcaucasia states emphasize their absolute friendship for Poland very clearly’. According to Prof. Marek Mądzik, there was no response or reaction to the suggestions made by Ostrowski and his associates on Poland’ s side despite this insistence, ‘these governments were still ignored by our Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ wrote Ostrowski in February 1920.[39]

De facto recognition by Poland

A change in the existing relations between Poland and the countries of the South Caucasus took place in early 1920, when Poland recognized Georgia de facto. Marek Mądzik argued that the evolution of Poland’ s attitude to the recognition of Georgia was influenced by a change in the international situation, but it could also be related to the issue of trust in Ostrowski, who could have been seen as a nominee of the Regency Council. No information or document could be found that confirmed the latter thesis. Indeed, Ostrowski, appointed by the Regency Council, was not as closely associated with the new government as other newly appointed diplomats but as regards Poland’ s recognition of Georgia he held the same position as Józef Piłsudski’ s close associate, Jodko-Narkiewicz.

Argentina recognized the independence of Georgia on 15 September 1919.[40] The Entente waited longer. It was only the conviction that the Bolsheviks were going to win in Russia that prompted the majority of the states belonging to the Supreme Council of the Entente to recognize Georgia and Azerbaijan on 12 January 1920. This stance was not unanimous: the United States spoke out against it, considering Georgia’ s independence equal to a partition of Russia. Japan initially claimed having no directives, but eventually recognized Georgia on 7 February 1920. On this basis, the delegations of both Georgia and Azerbaijan were invited to the peace conference in Paris. In fact, their powers remained the same as before. An attempt to persuade the Entente to recognize Georgia de jure was unsuccessful. Although representatives of Georgia and Azerbaijan managed to convince the Allies to recognize Armenia as well, but they failed to achieve this as regards the Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus[41]. Immediately after the Entente’ s decision, on 18 January 1920, Jodko-Narkiewicz sent a telegram to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs informing that the Entente had de facto recognized the independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan and suggested that Poland also recognize them.[42] The reply came relatively soon. On 7 February 1920, Poland recognized Georgia de facto.[43]

The course of events described above might suggest that Poland’ s decision followed the decisions of the great powers. It is worth noting, however, that the issue of recognizing Georgia had probably been considered earlier in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the end of 1919, when the mission of Tytus Filipowicz to the Caucasus was being prepared. Unfortunately, there are no documents that inform about backstage preparations of this decision at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, so any changes in the concept of the tasks that were set for Filipowicz are not known. Only documents relevant to the preparation of the trip have survived, and from these it is known that the matter was discussed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs already at the end of 1919. The staffing of the mission changed several times, but it was known that the mission was going to replace the Representation of the Republic of Poland in the Caucasus headed by Ostrowski and to establish political, economic and military cooperation, as well as to organise a consular network and complete the re-emigration of Poles still resident in the Caucasus.[44] The date of departure and the membership of the mission changed several times. Ultimately, the mission left Poland at the end of February 1920 and arrived in Bucharest on 3 March 1920, and in Tiflis on 30 March.[45]

Even before the mission arrived in the Caucasus, on 24 March 1920, Minister of Foreign Affairs Stanisław Patek sent a letter to his Georgian counterpart, Evgeni Gegechkori, informing him about the de facto recognition of Georgia by Poland and about the mission of Tytus Filipowicz being sent. Two days later, the Georgian representation in Poland, headed by Sidamon Eristawi, was given the rank of a diplomatic mission.[46] After arriving in Tiflis, on 31 March 1920, Filipowicz handed his letters of credence. Press reports at that time informed that the ceremony took place with an etiquette resembling the establishment of diplomatic relations. It is known from later reports that after the mission’ s arrival, a draft military alliance with Georgia was prepared, Polish assistance in the supply of weapons and a plan for military cooperation were planned.[47] Unfortunately, a study on the Promethean movement prepared by the 2nd Department of the General Staff in 1938 for Marshal Rydz-Śmigły is the only source that informed about such far-reaching military negotiations. No documents could be found to corroborate such events. Nobody has found a draft of such an agreement, nor any correspondence or reports drawn up on an ongoing basis, either in Polish or Georgian archives. For this reason, this version of events should be treated with great caution and considered unlikely. The issue of a military alliance was probably discussed by both sides, but it is doubtful whether it reached the stage of project preparation.

Shortly after arriving in the Caucasus, Filipowicz’ s mission was arrested by the Bolsheviks in Baku and could not continue its activities.[48] For this reason, after the arrest of Filipowicz’ s mission, Wacław Ostrowski took over his duties again.[49]

The next stage in establishing mutual relations was to recognize Georgia de jure. However, the matter dragged on, and the Allies were in no hurry to recognize the Caucasian states and admit them to the League of Nations. Poland supported the idea of recognition of the three Caucasian states, also on the international arena and in the League of Nations (the speech of Ignacy Jan Paderewski on 16 December 1920 is an example).[50] The idea of a common front of nations against Bolshevik Russia was still alive all the time. This is also how the role of Georgia was seen by Piłsudski’ s close associate, Jodko-Narkiewicz, who first of all proposed establishing closer relations with Turkey and persuading it to attack the Bolsheviks. ‘For us, such a settlement of the Turkish question would have the advantage that we would get a real ally in our war against the Bolsheviks, and such a decision would force the Entente to enter the path of definitive recognition of small states (Georgia, Azerbaijan would become a battlefield, and therefore would have to be respected), which is also in the interest of Poland.’[51] In July of that year, he demanded to come to Warsaw to discuss various issues with Piłsudski.[52] Despite ambitious plans, Poland could not recognize Georgia de jure on her own. This was solely due to the complex international situation. The official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was presented, probably in January 1921, to the Georgian representative in Poland, S. Eristavi: ‘despite all the ardent sympathy that Poland has for Georgia, de jure recognition is currently not possible due to the peace negotiations in Riga and to the undecided position of the allied powers that Poland must take into account in her current conditions.’[53] Eventually, the Allied Council decided to recognize Georgia de jure on 26 January 1921.[54] The Polish government recognized the Republic of Georgia de jure on 28 January 1921.[55] Information about the recognition of Georgia by the Conference of Prime Ministers reached Poland in early February.[56]

Conclusion

Relations between independent Georgia and Poland between 1918 and 1921 have most often been associated with the name of Tytus Filipowicz, who left for the Caucasus in early 1920 and stayed there for a very short time. Meanwhile, from mid-1918 until the arrival of Filipowicz’ s mission, Polish interests in Georgia and other Caucasian countries were represented by Wacław Ostrowski. In addition to the role of humanitarian care towards the Polish community, he also dealt with Poland’ s relations with the Caucasian countries and was one of the absolute supporters of Poland’ s rapprochement with the peoples of the Caucasus. Georgia was the last state of the Caucasus to be conquered by the Bolsheviks in 1921, and Ostrowski left the territory with the fall of Georgia’ s independence. Further fates of Polish consular representation in the Caucasus concern the post that formally operated in the Soviet Union. Almost the entire history of the Polish representation in independent Georgia is associated with the person of Ostrowski.

Ostrowski’ s fates after the end of the mission in the Caucasus are worth mentioning. According to the previously quoted biography by Marek Mądzik, after returning from the Caucasus, Ostrowski apparently returned to work at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he worked until 1922, and then until 1936 he was the director of the Polish-French Chamber of Commerce in Warsaw, while his further fate was unknown, as was even the date of his death.[57] These data can now be supplemented. Indeed, after returning to Poland, he worked for a very short time at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Wacław Ostrowski was then the director of the Polish-French Chamber of Commerce at least from 1926 and until 1937. It was not until 1938 that this post was taken over by Stanisław Kocot.[58] Later, he was probably less active professionally. He lived in Warsaw. Data collected in post-war exhumation lists show that during World War II he lived in Warsaw at 65 Wspólna Street. He died in the Warsaw Uprising, on 17 September 1944.[59]

[1] M. Mądzik, Działalność społeczno-kulturalna i polityczna Polaków w Gruzji na przełomie XIX–XX wieku, Lublin 1987; Idem, Próby nawiązania stosunków politycznych między Polską a Gruzją w latach 1918–1921, ‘Rocznik Lubelski’, vol. 29–30, 1987–1988, pp. 77–87.

[2] Among others: W. Materski, Georgia rediviva. Republika Gruińska w stosunkach międzynarodowych 1918–1921, Warszawa 1994.

[3] M. Kruszyński, M. Mądzik, Polskie misje dyplomatyczne na Kaukazie w okresie międzywojennym, [in:] Kaukaz w stosunkach międzynarodowych: przeszłość – teraźniejszość – przyszłość, ed. P. Olszewski, K. Borkowski, Piotrków Trybunalski 2008, pp. 199-215.

[4] Archiwum Akt Nowych [AAN], Gabinet Cywilny Rady Regencyjnej, ref. no. 120.

[5] M. Mądzik, Działalność…, pp. 128–130, 134–136.

[6] M. Mądzik, Działalność…, p. 140.

[7] W. Materski, Georgia…, p. 54.

[8] M. Mądzik, Wacław Ostrowski, [in:] Encyklopedia polskiej emigracji i Polonii: P–S, K. Dopierała (ed.),Toruń 2003, p. 127.

[9] M. Mądzik, Próby nawiązania stosunków…, p. 78.

[10] Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe, akta personalne Wacława Ostrowskiego, ref. no. 2607.

[11] CAW, Ibidem.

[12] M. Mądzik, Działalność…, pp. 150, 156–157.

[13] AAN, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, ref. no. 6674b, p. 157, Polska Rada Okręgowa na Kaukazie do Królewskiego Polskiego Departamentu Stanu, 31 X 1918.

[14] Ibidem., pp. 164–165, W. Ostrowski do J. Radziwiłła, 31 X 1918.

[15] Ibidem., p. 157, Polska Rada Okręgowa na Kaukazie do Królewskiego Polskiego Departamentu Stanu, 31 X 1918.

[16] Ibidem., pp. 57, 157, Zaświadczenie dla S. Wąsowicza z 23 VIII 1918 r., pismo Wąsowicza do MSZ, 30 X 1918.

[17] Ibidem., pp. 164–165, W. Ostrowski do J. Radziwiłła, 31 X 1918.

[18] See a copy of this document, dated 9 November 1918: Ibidem., pp. 174 and 175.

[19] Ibidem., p. 176; W. Ostrowski do MSZ, 22 XI 1918.

[20] See: Ibidem., p. 148, W. Ostrowski do MSZ, 5 V 1919.

[21] Ibidem., p. 176; W. Ostrowski do MSZ, 22 XI 1918.

[22] Ibidem., pp. 210–212, T. Tydelski do W. Ostrowskiego, 10 II 1919.

[23] Ibidem., pp. 208–209, W. Ostrowski do MSZ, 19 II 1919.

[24] Ibidem., pp. 220, pismo do MSZ z 15 I 1919.

[25] Ibidem., pp. 193–194, W. Ostrowski do MSZ, 20 XII 1918.

[26] Ibidem., pp. 182–184, W. Ostrowski do J. Radziwiłła, 31 X 1918.

[27] E. Lee, The Experiment: Georgia’s Forgotten Revolution, 1918–1921, Bloomsbury Academic 2017

[28] AAN, MSZ, ref. no. 6674b, p. 176; W. Ostrowski do MSZ, 22 XI 1918.

[29] Ibidem., p. 243.

[30] Ibidem., p. 176; W. Ostrowski do MSZ, 22 XI 1918.

[31] Ibidem., pp. 38 et seq.

[32] Ibidem., pp. 102–105.

[33] Ibidem., pp. 91–91 et seq.

[34] Ibidem., p. 148, W. Ostrowski do MSZ, 5 V 1919.

[35] See, for example, letters from Georgian authorities in: Ibidem., pp. 91–91, 122.

[36] Ibidem., pp. 68–69.

[37] See: M. Mądzik, Próby nawiązania stosunków politycznych…, p. 79.

[38] Biblioteka SGH, Spuścizna Tytusa Filipowicza, ref. no. 147, T. Tydelski, Zapiska w sprawie nawiązania stosunków handlowych z Kaukazem Południowym, 15 grudnia 1919 roku.

[39] See: M. Mądzik, Próby nawiązania stosunków politycznych…, pp. 79–80.

[40] W. Materski, Georgia…, p. 151.

[41] W. Materski, Georgia…, pp. 158–161.

[42] Józef Piłsudski Institute of America [JPIA], Adjutancy – Commander in Chief [ACinC], ref. no. 74, p. 65, W. Jodko-Narkiewicz do MSZ, 18 I 1920, otrzymany 21 I 1920.

[43] W. Materski, Georgia…, p. 168 (referencing ‘Kurier Poranny’ no. 38, 9 II 1920).

[44] M. Mądzik, Działalność społeczno-kulturalna…, p. 166.

[45] M. Mądzik, Działalność społeczno-kulturalna…, p. 167.

[46] W. Materski, Georgia…, p. 169.

[47] M. Mądzik, Działalność społeczno-kulturalna…, p. 167.

[48] W. Materski, Uwięzienie szefa Misji Specjalnej RP do republik Kaukazu Południowego (w świetle szczątkowej dokumentacji), Pro Georgia 29, Warsaw 2009, pp. 137–158.

[49] CAW, Akta personalne, Curriculum vitae W. Ostrowskiego.

[50] W. Materski, Georgia…, pp. 205–210.

[51] JPIA, ACINC, ref. no. 66, pp. 63, 68, W. Jodko-Narkiewicz do MSZ, 20 I 1920,

[52] Ibidem., ref. no. 69, p. 157, W. Jodko-Narkiewicz do JP, VII? 1920,

[53] AAN, Ambasada RP w Paryżu, ref. no. 77, p. 5, Notatka wydziału wschodniego departamentu politycznego MSZ z 21 stycznia 1921.

[54] W. Materski, Georgia…, p. 212.

[55] M. Mądzik, Działalność społeczno-kulturalna…, p. 174.

[56] For example: ‘Goniec częstochowski’, 2 II 1921, no. 25, p. 6.

[57] Encyklopedia Emigracji…, p. 494.

[58] See: Rocznik Polityczny i Gospodarczy 1937, Warszawa 1937, p. 561; Rocznik Polityczny i Gospodarczy 1938, Warszawa 1938, p. 829.

[59] https://www.1944.pl/ofiary-cywilne/waclaw-ostrowski,31710.html

KPT. VIKTOR VAKHTANG LOMIDZE (1900–1956). AN ARCHIVAL REPORT POLISH INSTITUTE AND SIKORSKI MUSEUM, LONDON[1]

by David Kolbaia

Viktor Lomidze was born on 7 February 1900 in Ganja. When he was nearly eighteen, he entered the Tiflis military school. After Georgia was conquered by the Bolsheviks in 1921, he came to Poland,[2] where he joined the Polish Forces[3] and, after undergoing specialist training, became a sailor. He hel a number of command posts with the Polish Navy. During 1925–1926 he was the executive officer of the monitor ORP ‘Warszawa’ in the Pinsk Flotilla. He was the captain of the hydrographic ship ORP ‘Pomorzanin’ between 1 November 1931 and 1 June 1933. From 3 November 1933 until 1934 he was the captain of the gunboat ORP ‘Generał Haller’, of the torpedo boat ORP ‘Kujawiak’, and of the sea tug boat ORP ‘Smok’. Between 1935 and 1939 he was the executive officer of the training ship ORP ‘Iskra’, the captain of the small minesweepers ORP ‘Jaskółka’ and ORP ‘Czajka’. Just before the war broke out, he was the deputy of kmdr ppor.[4] Stefan Kwiatkowski, the captain of the minelayer ORP ‘Gryf’.[5]

After Kwiatkowski’ s death on 1 September 1939, he assumes command. Seeing the incoming formations of enemy bombers, he decides to jettison the mines in order to save the ship from an explosion in which most of the crew would be killed.[6] After the ship was damaged as a result of the air attack, he ordered, in accordance with the procedures, to jettison the remaining unarmed mines, and then took ‘Gryf’ to the harbour at Hel. There, the ship was docked for a condition inspection and repairs of the steering gear. Since the entire supply of mines available to the Polish Navy was stored on scows anchored off Jama Kuźnicka, it was impossible to immediately load these in order to allow ORP ‘Gryf’ to repeat the attempt to set a mine barrage, despite the damage suffered by the ship. In this situation, kpt.[7] Lomidze decided to transform the ship into a floating gun battery in the Hel harbour and abandon completely the operation ‘Rurka’, aimed at setting a mine barrage. This decision, strongly criticised from today’ s perspective by most historians, was dictated by the anxiety of further air raids that would bring the threat of the ship being destroyed, by the sustained damage, and by the poor technical condition of the mines, the mechanisms of which may have lost their adjustment due to the shocks they had undergone. According to historians, it was an obvious error of kpt. Lomidze that he failed to notify his orders to the Fleet HQ or the captain of the destroyer ORP ‘Wicher’, kmdr[8] Stefan de Walden, who, unaware of the failure of the entire operation, took his ship to the patrol area near Pillau.

When the severely damaged ‘Gryf’ entered the harbour at Hel, the wounded Lomidze was replaced by kmdr Stanisław Hryniewiecki. The following day, the guns of the ‘Gryf’ takes part in a duel with an enemy destroyer, which they seriously damaged. The ‘Gryf’ eventually fell victim of the hugely superior German air force. Hit by several bombs, the ship caught fire and sank, resting on the bottom of the harbour. Rescue operation on the ship was prevented by unserviceable fire-fighting pumps and systems, as well as by the exploding stock of anti-aircraft ammunition. The crew was evacuated, and the ship continued to burn for the next two days. Adm.[9] Józef Unrug, realising the hopeless situation of Hel’ s defenders, allows the commissioned officers and petty officers not engaged in the peninsula defence to escape using motor launches and fishing boats. Kpt. Lomidze (with kmdr Stanisław Hryniewiecki and other officers) the ‘Albatros’ fishing boat to evacuate to the port of Liepaja in Latvia, where he was interned.[10] After they were placed in a camp, some of them immediately joined the escape preparations as planned by previously interned members of the Polish 5th Air Regiment from Lida.[11] Unfortunately, the plan failed and they were all taken back to the camp. According to kpt. Jerzy Koziołkowski, kpt. Lomidze took part in that excape attempt. To this end, he left the hospital, where he had been admitted due to weakness after severe stomach disorders caused by the inability to digest the food available in the camp. However, being weakened, he was unable to run far, was caught and detained.

As recalled by Koziołkowski, during the entire time of internment, Lomidze showed no signs of fear, and all five navy officers formed ‘a well-knit group, distinguished by their behaviour and mood among the rest of the interned, who were quarreling, suspicious, and who made it difficult for each other to leave Latvia, in order to obtain personal gains.’[12]

The interned officers were transferred from Liepaja to Riga. As a result of diplomatic efforts, they eventually arrived in Britain via Sweden. There, Lomidze reported to the Polish Navy HQ and applied for reinstatement in the Polish Navy that was reformed by the Polish Government in Exile. Promoted to the rank of kmdr ppor., he was posted to the Chief of Staff of the Navy HQ of the Polish Armed Forces, wiceadm.[13] Jerzy Świrski,[14] where he was appointed to the high post of Personnel Officer.[15] For medical reasons, he never served on operational ships again. He underwent a period of treatment after he came to Britain, as he only had one kidney and suffered from stomach ulcer.[16] In 1944, he married Irmina née Sokołowicz (1912–1964), who was Polish.

After the disbandment of the Polish Navy in Britain, Lomidze worked for British intelligence services in Cyprus. A few years later, while in London on a month’ s leave, he became ill. Surgery revealed a brain tumor.[17] He died without regaining consciousness. He was buried in Brompton Cemetery in London.[18]

Doc. 1.

Kpt. Lomidze Viktor

Before the war: Operations Officer, Coastal District HQ

During the war: executive officer of ORP ‘Gryf’[19]

27 February 1940

Report

HEAD OF THE POLISH NAVY HQ[20]

London

-----------------------------------

(For his personal attention)

After graduating from the Advanced Tactical Course, along with other students, I was placed at the disposal of the Chief of Staff of the Fleet HQ, for special work related to the escalation of the conflict and the expected war between Poland and Germany.

There was quite a lot of confusion in the HQ, due to conflicting information received from higher authorities, from our intelligence and from Polish pilots from Gdańsk.

I do not know if there was a plan or a project of operations in the event of a war with Germany, prepared in peacetime. It is possible that there were just guidelines known only the Fleet Commander and the Chief of Staff. Accounts by the Heads of the 3rd Department of the Fleet HQ, who were ex officio deputies of the Chief of Staff, suggest that they, too, knew nothing, nor did they have any files of this kind in their safekeeping. It seems to me that HQ officers were seen as clerks dealing with day-to-day office activities rather than as officers assigned to true staff work. It was only possible to guess about our operational intentions from frequently conducted war games.

It was probably on the basis of guidelines received from the central authorities that we were requested to prepare plans, orders and operational instructions, and in particular:

1. Plan of mine barrages and relevant operational orders for the Polish Navy ships.

2. Detailed operational orders in the event Gdańsk should be blocked.

3. Instructions for s/s ‘Kościuszko’, which was planned as the blocking ship.[21]

4. Operational orders for the Covering Force in this operation.

5. Orders and Instructions for submarines.

6. Orders and Operational Instructions for the Destroyer and Minelayer Squadron.

7. Plan of the requisition of fishing ships and boats.

8. Plan of use of the requisitioned ships and boats.

9. Plan of the requisition of food from duty-free warehouses and a method of evacuation to Hel.

If I am not mistaken, all these studies were sent to Warsaw for approval by the Admiral.

Orders and instructions were sent to the ships and units in sealed envelopes that displayed the execution codeword.

The Destroyer Squadron, the Submarine Squadron and ORP ‘Gryf’ were ordered to stand on the Oksywie and Gdynia roads.

Every night, one destroyer patrolled the Hel-Schievenhorst line[22], and one minesweeper patrolled inside the Gdynia Bay. Additionally, observation from the shore of the water foreground was intensified by the Border Guard at Orłowo, by the 2nd Battery of the 1st Marine Anti-Aircraft Artillery Squadron (1 MDAPl) ‘Plu’ at Redłowo and by the 11th Battery (Cannet) at Oksywie.

Submarines were sent in turns for observation off Pillau[23], while aeroplanes patrolled throughout the day hours in the sea routes parallel to the coast of Hel. Their tasks were to identify the number of ships and the type of war material transported.

All the orders issued by the HQ were hectic, in order to manage as quickly as possible in the event of an armed conflict. Fortunately, there was a temporary detente, which allowed the HQ to analyse the issued orders and possibly supplement them.

Students of the Advanced Tactical Course were appointed to various establishment posts. Among others, I was posted to the HQ of the Coast Defence Commander as a tactics officer for maritime affairs, the post having been temporarily held by kmdr ppor. Jabłoński Bruno[24].

To find out more about the work that awaited me, I started researching old acts: any operational projects related to the defence of the coast aggainst attacks from the sea. Unfortunately, apart from loose conclusions prepared on the basis of two-sided exercises held a few years before, when the defence possibilities were very slim, I found nothing.

Kmdr ppor. Jabłoński provided me with a detailed study of faults in armament and equipment at Hel and in the units reporting to the Coast Defence Commander, and guidelines for the Commander of the CWSF[25] (kmdr ppor. Ciszewski[26]) for the defence of the port of Gdynia against attack from the bay.

For this purpose, the Commander of the CWSF had at his disposal: ORP ‘Bałtyk’[27], four 47 mm guns, completely obsolete, six 47 mm guns set on the wave breakers of the military and commercial port, an assault company of sailors and a tug boat to handle floating barriers at the entrance to the outer port and to No. 1 basin.

Manning the guns on the wave breakers encountered many difficulties due to the remoteness of the gun positions from the place of accomodation of the staff (ORP ‘Bałtyk’), to the lack of a direct route to the positions (entrance to the outer port), and to the lack of even makeshift shelters for ammunition and people in case of bad weather. The crews of these guns were to be delivered by a tug when alerted. Considering the limited number of transport means and the high demand for these at that time, this would take so long as to make it virtually pointless. On the other hand, it was impossible to keep the staff at the positions at all times, because these people were simultaneously attending courses and manning the ship.

However, it was necessary to prepare the defence of the ports and the coast from the bay in case of war. I have, therefore, asked the Commander, kmdr Frankowski[28], for orders, and was instructed to prepare some projects that I was to submit for approval, but I was not given specific instructions. I was under the impression that kmdr Frankowski either did not attach much importance to the developing situation, or, seeing no real possibilities of defence, did not want to analyse it. He displayed more interest and energy as regards the land defence, where he had a free hand in implementing his projects, without worrying about any interference of the Fleet HQ Staff, who treated these matters neglectfully.

The illness of adm. Unrug[29], the Commander of the Fleet, resulted in the appointment of kmdr Frankowski as his temporary deputy, and kmdr Zajączkowski as the Deputy Commander of Coast Defence[30].

The taking over of the land and sea units of the Coast Defence HQ by kmdr Zajączkowski was at the same time an inspection of the combat readiness of these units. It was only then that I noticed some shortcomings in training and equipment, especially in the land troops (except for the Marine Rifle Battalions).

Battery commanders of the MDAPl’ s, who were army artillery officers, were not able to engage ground targets (which later turned out to be in high demand due to the lack of field artillery). The question of communication was treated particularly negligently. All batteries lacked enemy aircraft silhouettes, and if there were any, they were obsolete.

After the navalisation of the DAPl’ s, the anti-aircraft artillery officers were dispirited and did not care much about their duties, which made the work of the newly appointed squadron commander, kmdr ppor. Jabłoński Stanisław[31], much more difficult, as he was also burdened with many other duties. Since he realised the serious political situation, he could not apply draconian measures to those officers, up to relieving them of their duties, as he would not receive new officers to replace them.

On the basis of this inspection, kmdr Zajączkowski criticised the current combat status of the troops and he prepared several operational projects based on our real defence capabilities. Since this criticism hit directly at kmdr Frankowski, the de facto Commander of the Coast Defence and the Fleet HQ, most of these projects were not approved, a characteristic example is provided by the project to remove 6 or 4 guns from ORP ‘Gryf’ and use these to create 1 or 2 modern batteries at Hel, where there was no artillery, except for a 152 mm battery, to effectively engage light enemy forces from the sea and the bay.

Because in the war with Germany ORP ‘Gryf’ could not be used for offensive tasks without proper escort (there was no such escort) this powerful artillery was essentially useless for her, but it would effectively increase Hel defence capability.

The Fleet HQ Staff did not approve the project, using the argument that too much time would be needed to do that. After the sinking of the ‘Gryf’ in Hel, removing these guns was considered, but there were neither the time nor the resources to do that at the time.

At that time, the reorganisation of the Coast Defence HQ took place. According to the new organisation, two separate HQs were formed - sea defence and land defence. Shortly thereafter, there was a change at the post of the Land Defence Commander, held by płk[32] dypl. Sas-Hoszowski, who had been the Deputy Commander of the Coast Defence for two years, so at least he was familiar with the entire organisation and also a little familiar with cooperation with the Navy. The new commander, płk Dąbek, assumed command a month before the war and encountered great problems because he had to reorganise the HQ of the new formation, learn the defence matters of the inland side of the coast, get to know his troops, familiarise himself with quite a large area, and at the same learn the basics of an organisation completely unknown to him: the Polish Navy, and most importantly, to cooperate with it in a war. Despite many difficulties, he was, without a doubt, much better at this post than his predecessor.

Listed here are some of the organizational shortcomings that emerged later:

1. Gdynia, as a defence sector on the side of the sea, did not have a separate maritime commander. After the transfer of the Fleet and Maritime Defence HQ to Hel, Gdynia was essentially left without an HQ that could decide independently in this sector. It was only on the 4th day of the war that kmdr por. Hryniewiecki was appointed to this post.[33]

2. The Naval Defence Commander had anti-aircraft batteries at his disposal, while a searchlight company reported to the Fleet Commander.

3. The newly created 75 mm batteries of the Coast Defence had a very small stock of ammunition, while the same guns mounted on gunboats and the ‘Mazur’ had double stocks reserved only for the use of these ships.

4. The communications company was assigned to the Land Defence Command, but it also included a fixed communications platoon, which remained at the disposal of the Maritime Defence Commander and which had a huge scope of activities (maintenance of the underground line cable chambers, checking, repairs and maintenance of all telephones in Gdynia, and maintaining the Peacetime and Wartime Telephone Centres). This platoon’ s establishment was extremely small. Efforts of the company commander, kpt. Nowak[34], to increase the establishment, had no effect. The newly arrived por.[35] Grabowski was appointed to command the platoon, but he was not able to learn his duties in such a short time. Kpt. Nowak, who had commanded the communications company for 10 years, and who had in fact organised this company and knew the area very well, was transferred at that very time to the post of the signal officer of the Maritime Defence HQ, where he had to, essentially, learn the maritime matters anew.

5. The organisation of field communications in the land troops of the Maritime Defence was insufficient, in particular, the telephone patrols consisted of only 3 men instead of 5. There was not enough telephone wire during the war.

6. Coastal and Anti-Aircraft Artillery Squadron Commanders’ demands for larger amounts of ammunition were not taken into account by the Armaments Directorate because according to their theoretical calculations, the firing accuracy would be ineffective due to the wear of the barrels. E.g. the 40 mm Bofors battery in Hel had 1,000 per barrel and after using it up, it was able to fire a minimum of 500. During the war, this would have been very useful, when the Germans were flying insolently at low altitudes.

On the basis of the new organisation, the naval defence included: ORP ‘Gryf’, the Minesweeper Squadron, the Gunboat Group, ORP ‘Mazur’[36] and the Flotilla of fishing boats. In the time of the war, these were also joined by ORP ‘Bałtyk’ and various auxiliary vessels such as the ‘Smok’, ‘Nurek’, ‘Lech’ and torpedo boats.

The HQ staff was expanded by increasing the establlishment: the Chief of Staff, Operations Officer and Specialist Officers (those of gunnery and torpedo armament were duplicated).

Kmdr por. Gintowt[37] was appointed the Chief of Staff.

The tasks of the Sea Coast Naval Defence HQ included:

1. Defence of the Hel Peninsula from the sea, the bay and land.

2. Defence of the Coast from Rzucewo to Orłowo, including the navy and commercial harbours in Gdynia.

Political clouds grew more and more dense. Situation reports with serious warnings and reports kept coming in from various directions.

My inquiries with the Chief of Staff of the Maritime Defence about operational work were treated as infringing somebody else’ s competence.

After a while, I received guidelines from the Chief of Staff to prepare the evacuation of the HQ to Hel and to move the (completely obsolete) torpedo tubes from ‘Mazur’ onto the wave breaker in Gdynia. As for the latter, I presented my opinion, namely that: first, the design aspects of the tubes and the wave breaker, and the operation of these devices face serious difficulties, and, second: that even if these problems are solved, tactical considerations are against, because it is difficult to imagine that enemy ships should approach so close that the (low speed and short range) torpedoes could be launched. Against this background, there was a serious disagreement between the Chief of Staff and myself, so I submitted a report with a request to dismiss me from my post.

As for the evacuation plan, I developed it in detail, but I must point out that it made a very bad impression on the junior personnel, because only the strict HQ staff, and nobody else, was scheduled for evacuation, as was the case with the Fleet HQ. Upset officials were coming to see me and request that I include them in the evacuation, for serious personal reasons.

About 20 August 1939 top-secret orders of emergency alert came in. The orders only applied to HQ staff officers and team commanders. On that day, several officers’ families left Gdynia. There was no way to hide it, and there was panic in the city. To prevent this, they were ordered to bring their wives back.

In general, all military news reached the civilians sooner than the military.

The high summer season was a serious problem at that time. There had not been a similar influx of holidaymakers (women and children predominated) for a long time. It was fortunate that the war did not start sooner, otherwise the consequences would be simply dire. It seems to me that, in view of the acute conflict, the authorities should not have allowed holidaymakers to come that season.

Evacuation of local people from Gdynia consisted in sending away the families of officers, principal officials and wealthier civilians. Servants were left behind in all homes to guard the apartments. Bitterness among the rest of the people had peaked. They proclaimed loudly that, naturally, nobody cared about the poor and, needless to say, threats were voiced.

About 23 August 1939 the Fleet HQ Staff moved to Hel, followed shortly thereafter by that of the Naval Defence. Again, this was impossible to hide, which again gave rise to malicious comments.

It seems to me that an evacuation of the high command can only take place in the event of a threat to the chain of command. This was not the case here. It would have been possible to successfully evacuate on the night of the 1st day of the war, the more so as the land connection with Hel existed until 9 September, and the sea one until 14 September. There was no immediate danger yet. During the political conflict, gen. dyw.[38] Bortnowski[39] came to Gdynia several times and had conferences with the Fleet Commander on the topics of the Coast Defence against the inland side. During these conferences, guidelines were specified for the operational plan for the Coastal Area Defence, which was quite opposite to the existing previous plan. I remember that most of the Land HQ officers were very upset by this.

According to the new plan, the defence was to consist of:

1. Holding the advanced positions for as long as possible.

2. The ground troops deployed on the Orłowo-Jeziora Kartuskie line were to withdraw through Gdynia to Kępa Oksywska[40], while the troops deployed in the Puck – Wielka Wieś – Hallerowo sector were to withdraw to the Hel Peninsula.

3. Gdynia to be left without fighting.

4. Transform Kępa Oksywska into the last defensive line, to be defended until the end. I do not know if that was the exact wording of the order, but that was its meaning according to accounts of the Land HQ Staff officers.

Kępa Oksywska was a completely open space, sheltered from the east by the bay, from the north by swamps, from the south by port channels, while from the west, i.e. the direction of the expected enemy attack (Grabówek and Chilonia), barbed wire entanglements were made and anti-tank obstacles were built. After our own troops withdrew, bridges and viaducts were to be blown up, and other facilities destroyed.

Due to the prevailing drought, the swamps had dried up and no longer represented a natural obstacle for the enemy. From the side of the bay, the enemy did not even try attacking, despite our very weak defence, only firing at our combat positions from the battleship ‘Schleswig-Holstein’[41] and bombing from the air.

According to the further development of the operational plan, the Hel Fortified Area[42] was to defend itself for the longest time and at the same time serve as a base for the Fleet. The tasks for the Hel Peninsula were as follows:

1. The first defence line: a section of the port at Władysławowo, which was blocked a few days before the war by scuttling 2 berlinkas[43] at the entrance to the basin. Active defence consisted of a battery of two 75 mm field guns on naval mounts and 12 machine guns.
Tasks: a) counteracting an enemy landing, b) cover the withdrawal of troops from Puck and its environs, c) upon withdrawal of those troops destroy the guns and withdraw further up the peninsula.

2. The second defensive line: halfway between Jastarnia and Góra Lubek.
Five strong permanent fortifications were built across the peninsula for anti-tank guns and heavy machine guns (not all were completed before the war broke out). Dense barbed wire entanglements were made, both in the forest and in the foreground of these fortifications, as well as anti-tank and anti-armour obstacles. Destruction of other facilities was also planned. Anti-tank obstacles were also made along the beach facing the open sea. The supporting artillery consisted of two 75 mm field gun batteries on naval mounts and possibly of ships on the side of the bay.

Tasks: a) use all forces to counteract the advance of the enemy up the peninsula, b) counteract any amphibious landing in this sector.

3. Third defence line: Jurata sector at the line of the Officer Holiday Homes.
Field fortifications, barbed wire entanglements, anti-tank and anti-armour obstacles were made.

Active defence consisted of infantry units with heavy machine guns, with anti-tank guns. The supporting artillery was to consist of the 23rd battery of the 2 MDAPl. This section also included wound-dressing and distribution points for the 1st and 2nd defence lines.

Tasks: a) To support the 2nd and 4th defence line with reserve troops, b) to counteract any amphibious landing in this sector, c) to cover withdrawing units of the 2nd defence line.

4. The fourth and last defence line: the tip of the Hel Peninsula (the Hel Fortified Area proper). Permanent fortifications and defensive measures – known.
Tasks: a) To counteract any amphibious landing in this sector, both from the sea and the bay, b) after the withdrawal of units from the other defence lines, to defend against enemy land attacks, c) to support own ships with artillery fire, d) to counteract the bombardment by enemy ships both on the side of the sea and the bay.

As for the tasks of the Naval Air Squadron, I cannot say anything, because we had no combat machines at all; while the existing machines could not be used during the war in the only roles for which they were suitable, i.e. for close reconnaissance and patrolling, due to the fact that they were almost incapable of any action during the evacuation from Puck on the first day of the war. In addition, we were constantly attacked, so we had tangible news about the enemy, and at the same time the enemy had air supremacy in our area with modern air force.

Our defence preparations progressed slowly. In the meantime, the political situation continued to worsen. Gdańsk pilots (Poles) no longer wanted to go perform their duty for fear of being arrested. Most of them were retired officers of the Polish Navy. And therefore they were suspected by the German authorities of espionage for Poland. Indeed, we had constant factual information from them regarding war preparations. Among others, as the last piece of information that gave a lot of food for thought (provided by kpt. Jacynicz Mieczysław), that the battleship ‘Schleswig-Holstein’ is constantly moved in the Gdańsk port channel in order to find a place with good firing sectors towards Gdynia and Hel. The Head of Pilots, kmdr ppor. (in reserve) Ziółkowski, intervened and protested against this, for which he was arrested. He was released after a few days, but just before the war he was arrested again and I do not know what happened to him later.[44]

Taking into account the possibility of being cut off from the rest of Poland, duty-free warehouses were confiscated, but their contents were not used. It was only during the war that transfer of the food to Hel began. The Polish White Cross also helped in this, transporting it with lorries. It seems to me that the rest of the food was distributed among civilians.

The residents of Gdynia slowly calmed down and awaited the war with some impatience. The Germans did all they could to disturb the peace, such as:

1. Frequent flights of aeroplanes across forbidden zones, which resulted in us firing at these aeroplanes. At this point, I must mention that this looked like a planned action to destroy our troops and exhaust our ammunition, because they flew too often and at high levels.

2. Planned action of buying out silver coins on the coast.

3. Spreading false news with the help of saboteurs among Polish people.

4. Creating constant tension by arresting Poles in Gdańsk and torturing them.

5. Constant crossing of the Polish border by German soldiers in full gear. It must be assumed that this was also an organised operation to prepare saboteurs for the future, to operate in the rear of our army.

6. At the same time, they lulled the vigilance of Poland by creating the appearance of fear, such as accepting an invitation by civilian dignitaries from Gdańsk, headed by Forster, and by the commander and officers from the battleship ‘Schleswig Holstein’ to a banquet at the General Commissariat, which took place a few days before the war. As the Commissioner General had previously refused to accept an invitation from Forster to a banquet, this was seen among us as a proof of weakness of the Germans.

Spreading rumors with the help of the Gdańsk Germans (supposedly favourable towards Poland) that the Germans were afraid of Poland and that they would absolutely not start a war, but they only threaten to intimidate and force Poland into making some minimum concessions to save their prestige.

They achieved their goal because they actually lulled our vigilance to the point that our military authorities, despite receiving alarming reports about the real situation, did not believe in the possibility of war.

On 20 August 1939 I was embarked on ORP ‘Gryf’ at the post of Executive officer of the ship. The captain, the late kmdr ppor. Kwiatkowski Stefan[45] introduced me to the existing operational orders and instructions in case of war. It took me several days to familiarize myself with the ship and the organisation of the service. It seems to me that on the night of 29/30 August 1939, the destroyers left Gdynia. Despite being kept top secret, the departure of these ships became public news and made a bad impression, even worsened when that evening the German radio reported that ‘the rats are leaving the sinking ship’. I do not know if in this case it was necessary to explain to the public the essential reasons for sending the destroyers, but it seems to me that in a similar situation it was necessary to at least deny the rumors in order to calm down the agitated public.

On 30 August 1939, increased activity of the German Air Force over our facilities, patrols crossing the border in several places, the brutal murder of a soldier from 2 MBS[46] who had inadvertently crossed the Gdańsk border, radio broadcasts attacking Poland, and defiant behaviour of the Germans in the coastal area, all this indicated the approaching critical moment.

At that time, ORP ‘Gryf’ was at anchor on the Oksywie road. At. At 18:00 the captain called me to a meeting during which, after discussing the situation, we came to the conclusion that we should expect an ‘executive signal’ any moment. Therefore, the captain ordered me to prepare everything for the operation. Then the navigator, kpt. Mostowik,[47] was called with maps. We opened the envelope and marked the appropriate positions on the map and on the tracing paper.

According to the regulations, the envelope may only be open on a signal, but assuming that the operation was to take place nearby and that the signal might come at the last moment, I believe that the captain did the right thing.

Then, the captian went to ORP ‘Wicher’[48] for a war conference with kmdr ppor. De Walden[49] and with the commander of the Minelayer Squadron, kmdr ppor. Boczkowski, who were supposed to cover the operations of the ‘Gryf’.

Due to the fact that the port mine lift was malfunctioning, and the mine-laying operation could take longer because of this, we had to move the mines after dark from the ‘tween-deck to the upper deck and from the mine compartment to the ‘tween-deck.

We did not get the executive signal, so in the morning of 31 August 1939, the mines were moved to their compartments and the ship entered No. 2 basin and moored at the shipyard to repair the lift.

Both divisions of the crew were released to the land in turns to take care of family and personal matters. At. 2000, after the crew returned from the mainland, I ordered an anti-aircraft combat watch.

On 1 September 1939 at 05.00 the officer of the watch ordered anti-aircraft alarm as a result of spotting 3 enemy aircraft coming from the direction of Chylonia[50] at an altitude of over 4,000 m. These aeroplanes probably flew from Puck after they bombed it. Kmdr por. Szystowski[51] was killed in Puck, while 1 kpt. (mat. officer), 1 petty officer, several privates and civilians were wounded badly or slightly.

ORP ‘Gryf’ opened fire first. There were no hits. The aeroplanes probably flew over the navy harbour for intelligence purposes. After the alert ended, ORP ‘Gryf’, ‘Wilk’, and ‘Żbik’[52] unmoored and left the port. ORP ‘Mazur’ and ‘Nurek’ moored in place of the submarines.

An hour after the first raid, a second raid took place, but this time by bomber machines that dropped a dozen bombs on No. 1 basin, aiming at the submarine pier in the belief that they were there. It was evident that they had this information from the aeroplanes of the first raid. One of the bombs hit the ‘Nurek’, tearing it apart, the entire crew with the captain, chor.[53] Tomasiewicz[54], was killed. Apparently, nat. Weber[55] survived. A second bomb hit the pier next to ‘Mazur’ and cut her in half. 32 men were killed. From eyewitness accounts I heard about the brave behaviour of por. Denel,[56] who, while already standing in the water at the stern, was still personally firing the 40 mm cannon.

ORP ‘Gryf’ headed to the road of Jastarnia and circled there, zigzagging at low speed. We had protection there, at least from enemy submarines. Mine scows were anchored at the same road, with no crew.

Throughout the day, Westerplatte, Gdynia, Puck and Hel were bombed by the enemy air force. ‘Gryf’ and, in fact, all our anti-aircraft artillery were powerless, because the aeroplanes approached at very high altitudes. They came to Hel mostly from the direction of Puck, probably from bases located on the coast of German Pomerania.

‘Gryf’ and other ships had not moved yet. We received no orders concerning the emerging situation.

‘Wicher’ zigzagged at high speed on the Hel-Orłowo line, the minesweepers circled the bay, and all the auxiliary ships did the same. Tugs (Belgian) of the Harbour Construction Cny fled in panic from the newly built port in Hel in the direction of Dekl. Aeroplanes from Naval Air Squadron flew from Puck and alighted along the beach from Jastarnia to Jurata. Some of these were towed, including the Cant. Fortunately, it was not noticed, or the enemy did not want to distract from the task, because they could destroy it with ease and impunity, as the Cant was completely defenceless.

Several air raids against all the above locations took place, mostly military facilities of combat importance were bombed.

In Gdynia, one of the bombs accidentally hit the Kaszubski Square without causing major damage, and another near the Maritime Office, which killed 8 onlookers.

Finally, around 17.00, we received the executive signal ‘Rurka’.[57] The captain wanted to start operations around 22.00, due to the short nights. Fearing that he would not be able to prepare the operation in time, he decided to approach the ‘Wicher’ and the minesweepers, which in the meantime had moved to Babi Dół road, to discuss some details of the joint operation.

Personally, I advised the captain not to approach them during the day, so as not to be together in a larger group and thus not attract the enemy air force. The captain agreed with me, but assumed that the due to the late hour the enemy would not attack us. So we went to meet the ships in the direction of Babi Dół, keeping close to the shoal.

A certain delay occurred due to the approach of the tug ‘Kaper’, which sent us some signals. After approaching the ship’ s side, it turned out that the master of the tugboat, st. bosman[58] Mielnik, was slightly wounded during the bombing of Hel and asked for a dressing and further orders. After having him treated, the captain ordered him to go to Jastarnia.

We moved on. The captain went downstairs, leaving me on the bridge. After a while, he returned dressed in a new uniform with full orders. Talking to me, he said that he would not survive this war and he actually sensed his imminent death.

The captain ordered ‘action stations’ after we passed the Depki buoy. I left the bridge to check the ship’ s combat readiness. While I was in the officers’ quarters, a bomb exploded near the ship, which gave the whole ship a shock.

In the officers’ and the commander’ s mess, all the doors were ripped open, all mirrors and light bulbs in the cabins were broken.

I jumped onto the deck and met a messenger running with the report that the captain had been killed. I ran to the bridge and took command of the ship from the 1st Gunnery Officer, por. Męciński.[59] I found a massacre on the bridge. The captain in agony, por. Wachtel[60] seriously wounded, 2 sailors killed, 2 sailors seriously and 3 slightly wounded. The doctor, por. (reserve) Neuman, was summoned and a moment later he pronounced the captain dead. The killed and wounded were taken below the deck. I instructed the Ship Adjutant, ppor. Dandelski,[61] to take the keys from the commander’ s pocket and take care of the secret files of the ship.

The ship was in a very difficult position. About 20 aeroplanes were circling above us at an altitude of 300-400 m, mostly keeping in the bow sectors and dropping bombs on the ‘Gryf’, while strafing the bridge and the gun positions with their machine guns.

Apparently, they were well aware of the possibilities of our ship’ s artillery. We could only fire our heaviest machine guns (13 mm) and regular machine guns from the bow sectors, while the stern ones were covered by a 40 mm Bofors. No special air tactics were used in the attack on the ‘Gryf’. They probably meant to destroy the ‘Gryf’ at all cost. This is how I explain such a risky behaviour of enemy aeroplanes attacking from low altitudes and in larger numbers. Of course, they also counted on lower accuracy due to the nervousness and casualties among the gun crews.

From the first bomb, the rudder and the machine telegraphs were disabled, and the voice tubes on the upper deck were pierced. I ordered switching to the stern rudder and telegraphs until the damage was repaired and I controlled the ship using the voice tubes of the navigation platform indirectly via the 2nd Navigating Officer, ppor.[62] Szczepanowski.

I did not decide to make a turn that would give the stern artillery a field of fire, because I did not want to create a larger and more convenient target, and also, due to the partial loss of manoeuvrability of the ship, such a turn would take too long. Moreover, when going forward to meet an aeroplane head-on, it is easier to dodge the bombs that are dropped.

In this case, if the ‘Gryf’ was not hit, this must be credited to an exceptional luck, as evading many aeroplanes that throw bombs not on the target but to cover a certain area occupied by the target may not actually be effective.

About 30 bombs were dropped on the ‘Gryf’, which usually fell at a distance of 10–20 m aft of the waist of the ship on both sides. The spread of the bombs was quite large and in some cases reached 100 m.

Unfortunately, although the fire of our artillery was quite heavy, because the ‘Wicher’ and 5 minesweepers, temporarily not under attack, also fired at the same time, it seems to me that we did not shoot down a single one there. (It is true that later st. bosman Kosiński,[63] who was an eyewitness to this combat as the master of the tug ‘Lech’, told me that he saw clearly 3 aeroplanes depart one by one towards Gdańsk and fall into the sea).

I attribute this to the fact that it was the crew’ s baptism of fire, they were upset, had difficult aiming conditions due to the manoeuvring of the ship, to nearby bomb blasts that caused the ship to shake strongly, and to machine gun fire from aeroplanes and fragments of exploding bombs.

The captains of all ships and the master of the tug ‘Lech’ later said that for some time the ‘Gryf’ could not be seen beyond water columns. They thought an explosion had already occurred and the ‘Gryf’ had sunk.

Some aeroplanes broke away from the ‘Gryf’ and started chasing the minesweepers, bombing them and strafing them with machine guns. They virtually did not touch the ‘Wicher’. About 1,000 m away from us, ‘Wicher’ was moving at high speeds and firing at the aeroplanes.

The minesweepers were completely defenceless against the aeroplanes. ORP ‘Mewa’ was immobilised by a bomb blast nearby, the captain, kpt. Lipkowski[64] suffered numerous wounds and was brought down from the bridge. Pchor.[65] Sokołowski, and eight petty officers and sailors killed. Most of the rest of the crew were seriously or slightly wounded. Bosm.[66] Gieryga took command. Later, the ‘Mewa’ was towed by another minesweeper to the naval harbour at Hel.

The combat lasted about 20 minutes. On the ‘Gryf’, after repairing the rudder and the engine telegraphs, another bomb explosion near the ship’ s side damaged and jammed the rudder again, and did that at the moment when ‘Lech’ was crossing my heading. We nearly collided. We missed each other within about 50 meters.

I turned back and went towards Hel. The aeroplanes stopped their attacks, apparently due to a lack of bombs. I ordered the damage repaired hastily. I must mention the excellent behaviour of the 1st Engineer Officer kpt. Sielanko[67], who repaired the damage quickly and efficiently, boosted the morale of the machine crew and encouraged their efficient work.

Expecting a second attack immediately, and not wanting to expose the ship to complete destruction in the event of a bomb hit, I ordered to start jettisoning the mines from the ‘tween-deck. They managed to jettison away about 30 minutes by sunset. When it started getting dark, I ordered to stop jettisoning the mines. About 19.15 I was 1.5 nm S/E off Hel. The ‘wicher’ and the Minesweepers was also nearby.

When asked by ‘Wicher’ whether the mine-laying operation would take place, I replied that probably not that night. The bomb explosions derailed all mines. This led to mine maladjustment. The depth weights became unrolled. Re-adjustment and preparation of the mines would take at least 8 hours. Then I called one of the Minesweepers with the flashing lamp and ordered her to approach the naval harbour and ask for a permission for me to enter the harbour in order to transfer the dead and wounded and repair the damage. Meanwhile, I ordered ppor. Skowroński, the 2nd Torpedo Officer to put the mines derailed by bomb explosions shocks back on the tracks on the ‘tween-decks and in the mine compartment.

About 20.30 the ‘Wicher’ gave me the flash signal ‘jettison mines’. At the same time, a minesweeper brought permission to enter the harbour. Thinking that the Fleet HQ, unable to establish communication with me due to damage to my radio station, transmitted this order indirectly via ‘Wicher’. I ordered the signal repeated – they received the same. Knowing about the prevailing fear of mines exploding in the harbour basin, I assumed the Fleet HQ allowed me to enter port after the mines had been jettisoned.

Since the order to ‘jettison mines’ could not apply to the execution of the operation (in our terminology there are clear signals such as: ‘lay mines’, ‘lay a mine barrage’ or ‘execute the mine-laying operation’), I ordered jettisoning the disarmed mines attached to anchors on two specific headings. (A detailed sketch was made, and all signals and orders were entered in the ‘log of combat operations’).

German spies reported this as laying a barrage. For the next few days, several aeroplanes and a squadron of German minesweepers searched for it and swept the line Hel–Gdańsk.

About 23.00 I entered the Hel naval harbour and moored at the Ost pier. I ordered the doctor to bring an ambulance. It took until about 00.30 when the wounded and killed were taken from the ship.

I went to the phone and reported to the Chief of Staff of the Fleet HQ about the combat, its consequences, the damage, and finally about jettisoning the mines according to the order received. I got a reply that there was no such order and that we should wait by the phone for further orders.

I was surprised by the fact that there had been an error in the signals which I could not understand, because the signallers in the fleet were well trained, and when this signal was received, the Signal Officer kpt. Jagielski[68] was there.

I waited for an hour. Finally, the Chief of Staff telephoned and told me to wait for kmdr Frankowski, who arrived half an hour later. After hearing a brief report of the casualties and damage, he ordered me to wait until the morning and left.

At the same time, kpt. Borowiec came in and talked on the phone to the Chief of Staff about the departure of the Cant to Warsaw in order to get it armed. It did actually fly away about 01:00.

After the wounded and the dead had been taken away, I ordered the crew to rest, leaving only the anti-aircraft watch. The night passed rather quietly.

That night, ORP ‘Wicher’ went towards the site of the operation, where she encountered a light cruiser, Königsberg class[69], and 2 destroyers, but being on the moon side she was, fortunately, not spotted. She joined us in the harbour at dawn.

The casualties on the first day of the war on the ‘Gryf’ were as follows:

The captain and 2 sailors killed,

1 officer and 6 sailors seriously wounded (one died the next day),

2 officers, and 16 petty officers a sailors slightly wounded (ppor. Strengiel wounded in his hand and I slightly wounded in my leg).

Light wounds mostly from machine guns and small bomb fragments, heavy wounds from bombs only. All the wounds were large and lacerated, so any survivors will be crippled permanently.

Ship damage:

1. damage to the cable, and the rudder, and the engine telegraph on the combat bridge.

2. damage to 1 fire pump.

3. failure of the entire radio station: broken antenna, perforated cables, broken switchboard, and several broken radio tubes,

4. damaged bow rangefinder,

5. the sides, the funnel and the bridge perforated in several places above the waterline, and

6. all the wooden doors from the mess to the stern were torn off their hinges,

7. two boats damaged,

8. most of the light bulbs broken.

On 2 September 1939 at 08.00 kmdr por. em. Hryniewiecki as the new captain of the ship. Having briefly acquainted himself with the condition of the ship, he instructed me to set the ship in such a place in the basin to have a relative peace and to allow people to work on repairing the damage. I sent the Navigating Officer to examine the depths next to the dock and then I unmoored and entered the ship between the dock and the shore and set the stern towards the pier, mooring at the dock (intentionally scuttled). The ship had about 1.5 meters of water under the screws.

I had barely moored the ship when the first raid began. One of the aeroplanes coming in from NE dropped 8 bombs from an altitude of about 1,000 m, which fell in a stick into the water between the military and the commercial harbour at Hel. There were several more raids that day, both on Hel and the military harbour, which, however, caused no damage.

S/s ‘Gdynia’, which acted as the base ship for a fleet of fishing boats, was sunk between Depki and Babi Dół. Kpt. em. Jugan was the commander of the flotilla and por. rez. Kosko (the Head of the Nautical School) was the captain of the ship. Aeroplanes strafed the survivors in the water with heavy machine gun fire. Among others, por. Kosko was seriously wounded in the water and died a few days later in a hospital in Gdynia.

Gunboats, minesweepers and auxiliary ships ran around the bay completely aimlessly. Finally they would make up their minds and enter some harbour. That was the case with gunboats, which were chased by 3 aeroplanes and bombed, but finally broke away from them and entered the commercial harbour at Hel. They were disarmed there, the guns were mounted on the shore and the crews were incorporated into various troops. Kpt. em. Jacynicz Mieczysław[70] was the commander of the gunboat group and also the captain of ORP ‘General Haller,’[71] while kpt. Mieszkowski[72] was the captain of ORP ‘Kmdt Piłsudski’.[73]

On the second day of the war, the crew had already become accustomed with the danger and manned the guns eagerly and efficiently.

Anti-aircracft guns of the ‘Gryf’ and ‘Wicher’ have significantly strengthened the air defence. That day, the ‘Gryf’ and ‘Wicher’ shot down 3 aeroplanes, one of those being a large 2-engine Dornier.

The semi-fixed 40 mm Bofors battery (commander, por. Krzywiec) operated very efficiently and energetically.

To reduce the risk of fires, I threw ashore all the motor launches and boats, as well as two 2-tonne petrol drums. I ordered the latter to be buried in the sand.

In the morning, kmdr Frankowski and his staff arrived on the ship. After inspecting the ship, he ordered the damage to be repaired as soon as possible, because the ship would probably have the task of shelling Gdańsk and the battleship ‘Schleswig-Holstein’ from the sea. I believe that in this case she was greatly overestimated. During the day the ship, with her slow speed and manoeuvrability, would be a rather good training target for that very ‘Schleswig-Holstein’ and possibly for submarines. At night, on the other hand, she would have barely left the harbour when she would have already been identified by enemy surveillance ships, because the ‘Gryf’ made such noise with her motors that she could be heard from a distance of a good few miles.

Kmdr Hryniewiecki arrived on the ship in the afternoon, accepted the positioning of the ship, and after a conference ordered that the crew not engaged in air alert duties be deployed in the forest not far from the ship. This order was reasonable, as it did not unnecessarily expose people to casualties.

Kmdr ppor. Kuczkowski[74] also arrived at the ship in the afternoon, reporting as the 1st Engineer Officer to replace kpt. Sielanko, who was supposed to go to France. This order was already late because communication with the rest of Poland had already been interrupted.

There were two more raids by the evening and mostly on the ‘H.L.’ batteries. Among others, one of the bombs fell on the headland, where two soldiers were standing at the time and it literally tore them to pieces. In addition, two cottages caught fire. The fire was quickly extinguished. More than a dozen men from various batteries and troops were wounded.

The night of 2/3 September was extremely restless. Almost every hour there was a raid in various parts of the peninsula. Several fires were started again, two of them in the forest, but also quickly located.

The weather was perfectly good and the nights were very bright, which made orientation easier for German air crews.

That night, there were also many raids on Westerplatte, Orłowo, Oksywie and the environs. There were big glows from fires everywhere.

A notification about an apparently forthcoming amphibious landing on Hel was received on 3 September about 06.00. The ‘Gryf’ was ordered to defend the harbour sector on the side of the entrance. Therefore, the captain ordered to land 1/20 of the sailors armed with rifles in order to man this sector. The rest of the crew, apart from the anti-aircraft men, went ashore to rest.

Kmdr Hryniewiecki, myself and ppor. [Dandelski] went to rest. Half an hour later, ‘action stations’ was played on the ‘Gryf’. We jumped up to run to the ship.

At that moment, the first salvo from a ‘Leberecht Maass‘ class destroyer was fired. One shell hit a group of the landed men, killing two, severely injuring four and slightly injuring four. Another shell fell close to us, killing ppor. Dandelski and hurting me on one side of my body. I got to the ship, from which the main guns of the ‘Gryf’ and ‘Wicher’ had already started firing. German destroyers appeared from the direction of Pillau and from a distance of 15,000 m they opened fire on the ‘Gryf’. The first salvo was 50 m to starboaard, the second was too long, the third had 2 hits. One caused a fire in the fore room. The fire water lines were perforated so that it was hard to extinguish the fire. One petty officer (bosm. mat[75] Marzec) and 2 sailors killed, ppor. Jagusiewicz (lip cut and a tooth knocked out) and three sailors slightly wounded.

The guns of the ‘Gryf’ and ‘Wicher’ also hit in their third salvo, hitting the leading destroyer. A steam burst was observed, then the destroyers turned towards Gdańsk, simultaneously setting a smoke screen. – As reported by Hel Observation Post, one of the destroyers failed to reach Gdańsk, overturned and sank. – That seems very likely, because later there were several raids one after the other, specifically against the ‘Gryf’ and ‘Wicher’, both finished off the same day. – It was always like that, when the Germans suffered any casualties: i.e. raids and shelling from ‘Schleswig-Holstein’ were more intense.

After the alert ended, the captan ordered me to go to the hospital. The field hospital at Hel was overcrowded. The badly wounded lay still untreated due to a lack of personnel. For this reason, por. Neuman[76] was taken from the ‘Gryf’. The Head of the Medical Service, and at the same time the chief surgeon, kmdr por. Uniechowski, was constantly slightly drunk out of fear and therefore unfit for work, in any case he was not eager to work, as was never around.

The Hospital Commandant, kpt. Wierzbowski[77] (internist) had a lot of work organising the staff and placing the wounded. Por. Neuman and ppor. Komorowski (internists) treated only the wounded who did not require special procedures. All heavy operations had to be performed by por. Czajkowski,[78] who completely accidentally turned a first-class surgeon, and the head nurse Mrs Getkowska (the mother of ppor. Ponikiewski). They all worked selflessly for almost 20 hours a day, and without losing their cheerfulness. And their conditions were very difficult, not to mention the shortages of surgical instruments or narcotic drugs. They treated most of the wounded without anesthetics, keeping the drugs only for the seriously wounded.

Despite the fact that my wound was light, the doctors, fearing an infection, forced me to stay in the hospital.

In the afternoon there was a new raid on Hel, during which the ‘Wicher’ and ‘Gryf’ were sunk. Two sailors drowned with the ‘Wicher’, several were killed, and several seriously or slightly wounded. The latter included ppor. Mamak, who had his arm and leg torn off, but he survived and did not even lose his cheerfulness, and bosm. Jurkiewicz, whose entire face was burned and his arm broken by an explosion.

The ‘Wicher’ lay on her side and sank. The ‘Gryf’, on the other hand, settled on the ground so that the upper deck was above the water.

As I heard later, the fire spread throughout the ship and continued for two days. The small casualties on the ‘Wicher’ and ‘Gryf’ were thanks to the fact that both ships had their unoccupied crew on the shore.

In view of the anticipated night-time amphibious landing of the enemy, the hospital was forced to evacuate all the wounded to Gdynia, so that it could be able to accept more wounded. This amphibious psychosis kept everybody on the alert. The Germans probably knew very well about our fears of their landing (exercises were done quite often), and they spread rumors about a landing in order to harass and tire the Hel crew.

In fact, in the situation they produced, they did not need to capture Hel by a landing, during which they would have to suffer a lot of casualties, and experience in other parts of the coast has shown they avoided that.

Apparently, the fear of a landing continued until Hel surrendered.

On the night of 4/5 September about 80 wounded were evacuated to Gdynia to the hospital organised in the Nautical School. Only the seriously wounded were treated at the Sisters’ Hospital at Kaszubski Square. Dr Cetkowski was the registrar there and the wounded said that he made superhuman efforts to save people from disability.

Kpt. Dolatkowski was the commandant of the Hospital at the Nautical School. Thanks to his energy and attitude several hospitals were organised in Gdynia in a short time, thanks to which it was possible to accept large numbers of wounded arriving from various sectors of the Coastal front line.

During my stay in the hospital, kmdr ppor. Macioch was also there, he came with some internal disease and he clearly lacked his nerves. Later I met kpt. Lipkowski and ppor. Stengl as convalescents.

From the hospital, I watched the shelling by ‘Schleswig-Holstein’ every day. She did it just like gunnery practice, even with a lunch break. The air raids took place every hour or two from the morning until 12.00 and from 16.00 to 19.00, and at night.

The ‘Schleswig-Holstein’ usually shelled Westerplatte only with the 150 mm guns, I think, and combat facilities in Gdynia and the surrounding area with 280 mm guns. She liquidated the 3rd battery of the 1 MDAPl, set on fire Nowe Obłuże (there was a battery of 105 mm field guns positioned there). However, there was no way she could hit the 11th battery (Cannet). Firing at the 11th battery, the battleship hit the Armament Workshops and three times hit ORP ‘Bałtyk’, where fires broke out.

Finally, on 7 September, Westerplatte, the pride of the Polish Coast and Poland, surrendered because there was almost nothing left of it. The whole forest was cut down by shells, all buildings in ruins, the whole area covered with craters from bombs and shells. An ethnic Pole, a Latvian citizen, who was in Gdańsk at that time, told me this. After Westerplatte had been eliminated, the ‘Schleswig-Holstein’ was positioned at a pier at the very entrance to the channel, from where it had an excellent field of fire. Meanwhile, it did not touch Hel.

There was almost no opposition for German aeroplanes in Gdynia, because the 2nd battery of the 1 MDAPl (in Redłowo) could not harm them due to lack of shells. So, the aeroplanes flew very low and strafed people. Among others, kmdr Siemaszko was chased by an aeroplane along Świętojańska Street (perhaps his officer’ s insignia flashed, reflecting in the sun).

It was generally evident that the Germans had orders to liquidate the officers in the first place. This is what they did, firing at the bridges during raids against ships, at the artillery control units of MDAPl batteries and at ground HQs.

Wounded officers and men of the Coastal land forces continued to stream into the hospital at the Nautical School. Their stories were downright fantastic. For example, they said that a company held a several-kilometer section in uneven terrain, wooded and full of lakes, so that often both sides were at each other’ s back without knowing it. Communication with neighbouring troops was almost non-existent. There were often cases where platoons, having lost communications, would withdraw far beyond the line of Polish positions. Of course, there was a lot of confusion about it, inadvertent desertions. There were also actual desertions. Ruthenians or sympathizers of the Germans prevailed in this. Several were shot for that.

Individually, the troops fought with great courage and endurance, and when strongly disturbed by the enemy artillery, they often made raids and crushed the Germans. In general, the Germans avoided cold steel attacks and they were clearly afraid of such warfare. If they were going to occupy a certain section, the area was usually heavily shelled by artillery, then penetrated by aeroplanes, and only then infantry troops advanced, preceded by tanks and armoured cars. The German infantry units were heavily armed, e.g. a squad had 4 light machine guns. All weapon brand new. Soldiers very well dressed, but without any gear. German troops were often changed and sent to the rear to rest. They always had hot food. Our troops, on the other hand, did not have a moment of rest or hot food for about a fortnight. They were forced to make long and heavy marches, either withdrawing or making raids again. With full load, needless to say.

The 2 MBS[79] and the navy battalion, made up of sailors of various sunken ships and liquidated troops, called by the Germans ‘blue devils’ for their crazy courage and bravado, distinguished themselves particularly. They were commanded by the late infantry officer, kpt. Nowalsetti.[80] This battalion was usually transported by buses and lorries to the most endangered section, where it usually beat the Germans, always capturing firearms and machine guns, that was always in short supplyon our side, and rolling stock.

The 2 MBS was particularly attacked by the Germans, but this sector remained in our hands until it was decided to abandon it. Not only did they not let themselves be pushed back, but often attacked with cold steel, throwing the Germans far back.

The ‘Kartuzy’ Company[81] of the National Defence, which was harrassed during the day by the Germans, made raid against their battery at night and wiped the crew out but was unable to either take the battery with them or destroy it. On the other hand, the left-wing platoon, having lost contact with the company, ran into them later and they opened fire on each other. It was only thanks to the presence of the company commander’ s mind, that a slaughter among friendly troops was avoided.

An improvised armoured train manned by sailors fought very bravely, commanded by kpt. Błeszyński[82], who was seriously wounded in Wejherowo by a saboteur shooting from a window (and died in a hospital the same day). Lt. Hubicki[83] was his deputy.

The morale among the wounded was generally good, but they were often irritated and no wonder, because several times a day and at night, they wounded were ordered to go down into the cellars during an alert, and to carry the heavily wounded, and that in complete blackout. Needless to say, they were not handled very delicately due to the rush. Basically, it was done unnecessarily, because the Germans, as it showed in practice, spared Gdynia and did not bomb any buildings. There was some excitement among the wounded and the public due to rumors deliberately disseminated by the authorities about gen. Bortnowski’ s troops approaching Gdynia and about the English fleet coming to help.

Gdynia residents behaved completely calmly and showed no fear, to such an extent that after a few raids they became completely at ease with these and did not even hide in shelters. It was worse with the surrounding villages. The people of these villages and other coastal towns, probably ordered by the authorities, moved in various directions with their carts and all their belongings, not knowing where to go. as they met on the roads, they created congestion and confusion, gave contradictory messages to one another, and thus caused panic.

Social organisations displayed much energy in coming to the aid of these refugees. The new Management of the City of Gdynia placed fugitives in abandoned houses and organised many free eateries. Children who became separated from their parents during this journey were given special care.

On 13 September I learned that Gdynia was to be handed over to the enemy that night. Not wanting to be captured, I ordered myself released and reported to kmdr Hryniewiecki in Oksywie. The wound was not healed yet, so I did not get any posting. Likewise, many navy officers and men got no postings for lack of armament and posts.

All units withdrew to Kępa Oksywska, as the last line of defence. The tightness was incredible. Several men sat under each tree and bush. All the rolling stock was located in the forests of Babi Dół. The highways were cluttered with motor vehicles, including quite a lot of those captured from the enemy. Large amounts of requisitioned cattle grazed in the fields.

The HQ of the Land Defence Command was temporarily located in a bunker (by the officers’ blocks), the telephone exchange and all services were also there.

Thanks to kpt. Nowak and por. Grabowski, the communication functioned smoothly.

On 14 September kmdr por. Hryniewiecki suggested whether I would like to try to reach Poland with him going by sea. The situation seemed hopeless. Due to the impossibility of further defence, Oksywie’ s surrender was a matter of a few days, so another prospect of being captured. Having no assignment, I agreed to the offer. We went to Babi Dół, where we received a telephone authorisation from the Fleet Commander for this undertaking, and to take as many navy officers as possible.

Our intention was to break through by sea to Latvia and, after reporting as civilians, get back to Poland in order to join various troops.

The day of 14 September brought particularly high numbers of wounded and killed. Lorries and ambulances kept transporting the seriously wounded to the hospital at Babi Dół. Again, thanks to the inexhaustible energy of kpt. Dolatkowski, they somehow managed to arrange and treat the wounded. Several Sisters of Mercy, mostly Gdynia residents (one of them was the wife of ppor. rez. mar. Nagorski, an officer of the merchant fleet). They worked vigorously, concentrated and serious.

Fr Miegoń,[84] a chaplain, distinguished himself by his dedication and devotion, when he kept moving among the wounded in his surplice and with a cross, comforting them and preparing them for death. In view of the large number of the wounded, they had to be placed under trees as well. Although aeroplanes were still flying and strafing, Fr Miegoń did not go away.

Our anti-aircraft defence virtually did not exist any more, the aeroplanes flew at altitudes of up to 150 m and strafed the gun crews and the forest full of troops with their machine guns. They also fired at vehicles on roads and at the grazing cattle.

It appears that there were many killed and wounded in the first, third and fourth batteries of the 1 MDAPl. From the the stories I heard I learned about brave performance of the squadron commander, kmdr ppor. Jabłoński Stanisław. Apparently he was very badly wounded, but as it turned out now, he is alive and in captivity.

Despite the difficult situation in Kępa Oksywska, our troops were still able to keep the enemy in check. The right wings were particularly exposed (from the side of Depki). In order to relieve our troops, the minesweeper squadron supported them successfully from the bay by artillery fire.

Air raids continued almost non-stop and all the surrounding villages were bombed.

On 14 September at about 20.00 embarked the cutter ‘Albatros’ and, with quite strong wind and light rain, we put to the sea, heading towards Hel, and then to the north. The entire bay was lit by the glow of fires from in the surrounding villages.

In my opinion our breaking through the patrol line of enemy ships was a case of extraordinary luck, otherwise they would have to spot us because we were going without any stealth, because our motor was very noisy and sparks were pouring from the funnel. After getting about 60 nm north we turned towards Liepaja. To deceive the enemy, we used the sail, and we repainted the home port to be Estonian.

On 15 September night, following a 28-hour journey, we anchored in the port of Liepaja. In the morning on 16 September kmdr por. Hryniewiecki went to the phone, made a telephone call to the military attaché, mjr[85] Brzestwiński, who, instead of informing us immediately about the hopeless situation in Poland, told us to await news from him. Meanwhile, the customs authorities arrived, followed by the military authorities who interned us. We were met very kindly and they even arranged a small party. We were visited by a lot of Latvian officers, and they expressed their sincere condolences to us. Latvian Navy officers never visited us, except for kmdr ppor. Turowski (he had had an internship with us in Gdynia), and even that probably resulted from our repeated requests. The same happened later in Riga, where Admiral Spade[86] did not even reply to a letter from kmdr por. Hryniewiecki.

After a week, about 250 officers and 100 men of various services of the Polish Forces were brought to Liepaja. The attitude towards us was tightened to such an extent that we were treated not as internees, but as prisoners. The camp was surrounded by a triple line of barbed wire, a soldier with a loaded rifle every 20 steps, we were not allowed to correspond and members of the local Polish community were not allowed to visit us. The food we received was bad, and the treatment was bad.

The Polish community in Latvia, very patriotic, tried to help us somehow, but at the moment they could do nothing. However, they willingly undertook the role of middlemen (at risk to themselves) between us and the organisation that helped us escape. The Polish community was so hostile towards Germany that they sometimes did dangerous things. Especially Polish women were willing to take any kind of risk. Among other things, it was known that one of the Polish women got onto a ship with German repatriates and planted a bomb with the mechanism set. The bomb exploded near the Gdańsk Bay and the ship sank. The Germans reported that the ship ran over a mine.

A few weeks after our internment, a sudden personal search for weapons was made at our place. At płk Perkowicz’ s place, the commander of a national defence brigade, not only his own weapon was found, but also those of several of his officers, which he had not reported earlier upon request. To protest against this behaviour of the Latvians, we announced a hunger strike, which all Polish soldiers joined spontaneously.

The personal search was probably caused by an incident that had taken place when a dozen or so Silesian Germans tore off their rank insignia and the eagles from their headgear and reported themselves as Germans. At this, our soldiers, outraged, beat them and threatened to shoot them.

On the third day of the hunger strike, we received a message from a Polish hairdresser (our go-between) – who definitely deserves an award, mjr Brzestwiński will know her name – that everything was prepared for an escape that night. Therefore, at 23.00, 50 airmen and five of us, after cutting the telephone line and electric wires and breaking down the gate, escaped from the camp. The posts began firing heavily, wounding one airman.

The escape was unsuccessful (we were all caught the following day in various places in Latvia, more or less distant) due to the excellent organisation of Aizsargi (an organisation similar to our ‘Strzelec’[87]), who were on duty within the entire territory and border of Latvia within two hours after the alert.

However, the hunger strike and the escape did their job, and all the press of the Baltic States wrote about this fact. The diplomatic missions of America, England and France protested strongly against the way we were treated, as a result of which the camp was moved to Riga and the conditions of our life changed completely. It was here that the Polish community particularly showed their love for the old country. They tried to help our moral and material misery any way they could.

I have to admit that the Latvian people were kind and compassionate towards us. The Latvian authorities, on the other hand, had to act differently because at that time they had very big problems with the territorial claims of the Soviets and with the repatriation of the Germans.

Later, as a result of an agreement between the Soviet, German and Latvian Governments, we were allowed to travel to neutral countries. By this route we, too, ended up in England. While in Sweden, I visited the camp at Vaxholm, where our submarine crews are interned. They are treated very well.

The morale among the submarine crews was not very high. There is moral depression because they have not managed to get out of the Baltic Sea. Junior officers make this an accusation against their captains. There are also officers there who came from Hel on the ‘Batory’ guard motor boat[88]. They told us that after our break out, two fishing boats were prepared at Hel, in which young navy officers were to try to escape, but after the German radio announced that we had been caught, even quoting our names, the Fleet Commander canceled the attempt.

Notes:

1. The Polish coast, as an independent front, was to counter the enemy with its own forces as long as possible, at least in the initial stages of the war with Germany. – It seems to me that the role of the coastal navy was not appreciated by the decision makers. Or the coast, which had first-class terrain conditions, if adequately fortified and armed, could have checked effectively the enemy from the side, thus forcing them to form a special front in this sector.
In the current war, against our lean forces, the Germans deployed a full 1.5 military divisions not counting the supporting shipborne artillery and the air force.

Thanks to the fact that the mobilisation in Poland was delayed and the reservists with postings inland did not manage to leave, there were plenty human resources, but nothing to equip them with. On the second day of the war, about 1,500 young and very willing reservists reported to the Military Clearing Office, where they were registered and released. These people were extremely disappointed, so they started to be assigned jobs such as digging trenches, building shelters and anti-tank barriers in Gdynia, and even a company armed with scythes[89] was formed. One of these companies, formed by kmdr por. Jacynicz was actually saw action.

2. Mobilising retired and very old reservists as officers and posting them to combat posts is completely pointless. These men are generally uprooted from military life, they do not know how to behave towards their subordinates, they are usually unfamiliar with modern combat tactics, and besides, some of them are too nervous.
It seems to me that this element must only fill functional positions and they must be prepared for this purpose during peacetime, i.e. they must be called up as for normal exercises and undergo hands-on training in offices, factories, workshops, etc.

3. As regards thes operation of our ships in the conditions we had, i.e. without good bases or secure roads, the only good solution was to send them away from Poland because, without support from their own bases, they had to perish in the first days of the war just like the others did or at best to get interned.

4. From the beginning of the conflict, our ships, both the surface vessels and the submarines, were used pointlessly and unproductively, in particular:

1. Submarines were constantly dispatched to patrol stealthily near Pillau. They could not approach closer than 10 nm off the coast because the area was training exercises by the German naval and air forces.
According to the stories told by our submarine crews, they had to spend up to 18 hours submerged without even surfacing the periscope, because the Germans were constantly deliberately organising various exercises above them and were so insolent that they even reported on the radio about the planned drops of hydrostatic bombs at this place.

It seems to me that submarines should only be sent for observation when an action is to be taken as a result, or to prevent enemy action. Otherwise, the equipment is wasted unnecessarily and the nerves of the crew are strained.

The task of our submarines was to ascertain the movement of warships and military transports. First, we had this information completely certain and without any risk from various agents, and second, the same information was provided by our air arm, which patrolled enemy sea routes throughout the day.

All our larger ships were on the roads off Oksywie and Gdynia, not protected at all against attacks by enemy submarines and motor boats, and this being near enemy operational bases, as Gdańsk and Pillau could be considered just that at that time. In this case, it would have been absolutely impossible to prevent a surprise because, on the one hand, the movement of Polish and other countries’ ships to Gdynia and Gdańsk was not limited or controlled, so subversion was easy, and on the other hand, even if the patrolling ships spotted some movement of the enemy, they would have to identify it first, this not being easy at night, and subsequently, if they had not been sunk by then, they could alert the ships on the road. And those were at 6-hour readiness

The crews were released to the land until 24.00 hours. Anchor lights on.

One of the destroyers patrolled the Hel–Schievenhorst line at night. One minesweeper patrolled inside the bay.

Under the conditions, the ships had to stay in harboours, where they were protected against surprise by light enemy forces, the more so, as we had certain news that several motor boats had been spotted in Gdańsk, which had made their way from Pillau via Frisches Haff and the Elbląg Canal[90] to Gdańsk.

However, in order to prevent the concentration of all ships in one place, they could have been deployed in various places of the commercial and military harbour in Gdynia, which covers a very large area, as well as at Hel and Jastarnia.

5. The requisition of fishing vessels and cutters was carried out efficiently, but I believe that most of these were not useful in this war due to a lack of combat preparation or tasks for them. For transport and communication purposes between the peninsula and Gdynia, about 50 large newer cutters would have been enough.

6. The question of wartime pilotage and of the change of signs and navigation lights had not been studied in peacetime. It was only about 10 August that I and kmdr ppor. Pogorzelski we got this issue to work out.

7. The change of the Reich government’ s decision to send the battleship ‘Schleswig-Holstein’ to Gdańsk instead of the light cruiser ‘Königsberg’ gave much food for thought. It seems to me that our reaction should have been to inadvertently block the entrance to the port of Gdańsk (the blocking plan was developed in detail and the object was prepared). It could then all be blamed on subversion against Poland. In any case, it would take aat least a dozen or so days to clear the fairway, which would have prevented the bringing of the battleship to Gdańsk. She would not have been able to operate from the open sea, for fear of our submarines.

8. Hel, selected as the supply and repair base, could not meet the required tasks. Under constant attack from the air, the naval harbour basin was immobilised. The dock was deliberately flooded for fear of damage. For example, ORP ‘Ryś’[91] entered the harbour to repair damage. To do it somehow, she had to lie down on the bottom.

9. It seems to me that the operation of laying mine barrages should have taken place in the last days of August, when everything indicated that the enemy would not allow this to be performed during the war.
Almost from 1 August any movement of ships to Gdynia almost stopped. On the other hand, traffic in the southern Baltic Sea towards Pillau and Gdańsk intensified, only by German ships. Therefore, even if a warship or a German transport vessel blew up on such an early barrage, it would have been difficult to prove that it was blown up, to have a certain compensation paid. The war was inevitable anyway, and the enemy movements would have been limited by our tactical actions.

10. Mine scows were set at Jastarnia road by themselves. It is strange how the Germans, who knew all our secrets, did not find out about that and did not destroy them.
When the ‘Gryf’ was sunk, a mine barrage could still have been laid by the minesweepers which could collect mines from the mine scows. Instead, a very small barrage was laid by 2 submarines.

11. Training of our artillery in anti-aircraft firing was based on the tactics of classic air attacks, i.e. an aeroplane approaches for the target run from a distance, depending on the speed of the aeroplane, until the ‘target run’ from which the bomb was released. This moment was the basis for the artillery to open fire in order to prevent the release of the bomb.
According to the lectures that we had at the Advanced Tactical Course, reports on the activities of the German air force on the Spanish front indicated that the so-called diving flights were absolutely impossible, due to the fact that neither the human body nor the machine could withstand the high speed, and that the air force failed during the Spanish war, because of to high losses due to good air defence and nervous exhaustion of the flyers. In practice it was the opposite, e.g. in the first days of the war, when our anti-aircraft artillery was still useful, German aeroplanes approached combat objectives in formations at altitudes of 5–7,000 m, and only before the specified target they split up and individually descended to 3–2,500 m, simultaneously strafing the crews of the gunnery HQ and of the anti-aircraft guns. Then they dived to 700 m and dropped their bombs from an altitude of 300–200 m, after which the aeroplane was recovered to a low level flight. After covering a certain distance they gained height again and repeated the attack if they had not managed to drop all their bombs. It was difficult to tell if the bombs were attached to the wings or below the landing gear. It was also difficult to catch the moment of the bomb release, but observation suggested that this happened before the aeroplane was levelled, i.e. while still in a diving flight.

Usually, the manoeuvre to recover to a level flight after dropping the bomb was assumed by the sailors as the fact of shooting down the aeroplane. For this reason, reports of downed aeroplanes grew immeasurably.

In relation to ships armed with strong anti-aircraft artillery, they used the tactics of a mass raid from various altitudes and mostly concentrating on the bow sectors. It is difficult to outmanoeuvre so many aeroplanes, but a manoeuvre combined with other defence factors give the ship the ability to evade the attack, even if not completely then at least not quite damaged.

Manoeuvring the ship at the same time makes it difficult for own gun layers to aim effectively. Fire control by the gunnery officer from a distance is out of the question. The gun layers must have a free hand in choosing the target, because it does not matter which aeroplane is hit earlier, as long as they can shoot down as many as possible. There is no question of preventing aeroplanes from dropping their bombs under such conditions.

At night, the aeroplanes used different tactics: they approached mostly (e.g. on Hel) at high altitude and then, with the motor switched off, they descended to the target to a very low altitude, so that against the background of a dark forest they were almost invisible, while the German pilots had easier orientation, because the sausage shape of the peninsula was perfectly outlined on the glassy surface of the sea.

We also helped them with their orientation, namely, on the order of the Head of Security, kmdr ppor. Łuszczkiewicz (probably in agreement with the Staff HQ) the ‘Depki’ entrance buoy was lit. The repeated interventions from the ‘Gryf’ gave no result. At the same time, some saboteur was giving light signals from near the German church in Hel, which, in combination with the ‘Depki’ buoy, gave a perfect heading for the promontory battery. Later it was explained that the bouy was lit in order to make it easier for fishing boats to cross Depki. Completely unnecessary, because the nights were very bright, and fishermen generally know this passage so well that they can pass through there with their eyes closed.

Sunset is a dangerous time for ships, when incoming aeroplanes are difficult to see, while ships are briskly reflecting on the sea surface.

The German aeroplanes operating on the coast were painted silver, in the sun they were shining at very high altitudes against the bright sky, almost invisible.

As regards the saboteurs parachuted from aeroplanes in Hel, this is nonsense, because during the day they could not be dropped unnoticed, while at night the dropped person would either end up in the water or would collide with the trees. Anyway, they did not need to do this, because they had an abundance of spies and saboteurs among us.

12. Despite the meagre defences and the shortcomings of every kind, the Coast had passed the test of this war with flying colours, fighting with great courage and self-sacrifice.

Signature

(V. Lomidze, kpt.)

Doc. 27 February 1941

In addition to my report, I provide the following fact: on the night of 1/2 September 1939, ORP ‘Wicher’ under kmdr por. De Walden went spontaneously to the rendez-vous place, despite the fact that the operation of laying a mine barrage had been canceled, ORP ‘Wicher’ being supposed to escort ORP ‘Gryf’ during that operation.

ORP ‘Wicher’ observed at a distance of about 2 nm a light cruiser of the ‘Königsberg’ class and 2 destroyers of the ‘Lb. Maas’ [‘Leberecht Maass’] class. By skillful manoeuvring, she withdrew unnoticed, otherwise she would have been completely destroyed by the overwhelming enemy, all the more so that the way to the base was cut off.[92]

Signature

V. Lomidze Kmdr

Doc. 3

Kapitan marynarki Jerzy Koziołkowski[93]

Captain of ORP ‘S O K Ó Ł’

at current location, 24 October 1942

STATEMENT[94]

--------------------------------

At the request of kmdr ppor. Viktor Lomidze, I state that:

1. Kmdr Lomidze, at the time executive officer of ORP ‘Gryf’ was wounded twice during the operations of ORP ‘Gryf’ on 1–3 September 1939 and was sent from Hel to the City Hospital in Gdynia. After ORP ‘Gryf’ was sunk and destroyed by fire, the ship’ s crew was partly split among the land units in Hel, and partly placed without assignment in the forests of Hel.

2. On 12 September 1939 the city of Gdynia was evacuated by military troops. On 13 September 1939 in the morning I met kmdr Lomidze in Oksywie, in a weak condition, and found out that he had escaped during the night from the hospital in Gdynia to Oksywie.

3. When kmdr por. Hryniewiecki, by the order of the Fleet Commander, gathered all the officers without postings for departure, kmdr Lomidze volunteered despite his wound and weakness.

4. When an escape was organised from the internment camp in Liepaja, kmdr Lomidze took part in it and especially for this purpose left the hospital, where he was due to weakness after severe stomach disorders caused by the inability to eat the camp food. On his escape, being weak, he could not run far and was caught and arrested.

5. Throughout my stay together with kmdr Lomidze, he showed no signs of fear, neither during the risky departure from Gdynia, nor during his stay in the camp.

6. Throughout the stay in the camp, all 5 officers of the Polish Navy constituted a well-knit group, distinguished by their behaviour and mood among the rest of the interned, who were quarreling, suspicious, and who made it difficult for each other to leave Latvia, in order to obtain personal gains.

Report of the kpt. Viktor Vakhtang Lomidze (27 February 1940).

Kpt. Viktor Vakhtang Lomidze 1901–1956. Brompton Cemetery London.

[1] The full texts of these documents, original versions of which can be found in the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, London, are cited in the second part of this article. In addition, these analyses have not been published to date.

[2] D. Kolbaia, Pod skrzydłami Rzeczypospolitej. Emigracja gruzińska w Polsce 1921–1939, Warszawa 2019.

[3] W. Materski, Gruzini – oficerowie kontraktowi Wojska Polskiego, Pro Georgia 16, Warsaw 2008, p. 17.

[4] Komandor podporucznik (Lieutenant Commander).

[5] See: Polska Marynarka Wojenna. Dokumentacja organizacyjna i kadrowa oficerów, podoficerów i marynarzy (1918–1947), [in:] Kadry Morskie Rzeczypospolitej, vol. V, ed. by J.K. Sawickiego, Gdynia 2011, pp. 201, 228, 236, 316–318, 320, 321.

[6] J. Tumaniszwili, Wspomnienia pisane za oceanem, Pro Georgia 2, Warsaw 1992, p. 41.

[7] Kapitan (Lieutenant).

[8] Komandor (Captain).

[9] Admirał (Vice-Admiral).

[10] Por. J. Tuliszka, Komandor porucznik Stanisław Hryniewiecki (1896–1943), [in:] Dowództwo Marynarki Wojennej. Muzeum Marynarki Wojennej. 60 Rocznica Wybuchu II Wojny Światowej, Biuletyn Historyczny 16, Gdynia 1999, pp. 190–198.

[11] Por. J. Tuliszka, Komandor porucznik Stanisław Hryniewiecki (1896–1943), 196–197.

[12] Oświadczenie Kpt. mar. Jerzego Koziołkowskiego, Dowódca ORP ‘Sokół’, z dnia 24 października 1942 [in:] D-two Floty i obsz. Nadmorskiego oficer operacyjny. Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, ref. no. MAR. A. II. 2/3.

[13] Wiceadmirał (Rear Admiral).

[14] Wadm. Jerzy Świrski headed the Polish Navy HQ from 11 October 1939 until March 1947.

[15] His further service was as follows: on 15 January 1940, he was transferred as a Course Master of the Polish Navy Cadet Officer School to a reserve group of officers on the depot ship ORP ‘Gdynia’; from 2 February 1940 he was the acting executive officer of ORP ‘Gdynia’; contracted as kmdr ppor. in the Corps of Marine Officers on 3 May 1940 Temporary ranking 1a; on 17 December 1940 he was appointed the head of the Special Maritime Training Centre Centrum Wyszkolenia Specjalnych Morskich; between 23 August 1943 and 9 September 1943 posted to the destroyer ORP ‘Orkan’; he deputised as the Chief of Staff of the Polish Navy HQ from 9 July 1943 to 8 August 1943 and from 1 December 1943 to 4 January 1944. He was contracted as a kmdr por. (komandor porucznik, Commander) in the Corps of Marine Officers. Temporary ranking 2. From 10 July 1945 to 1947 he was the 1st Staff Officer of the Polish Navy HQ. See: Przebieg służby Wojskowej od stycznia 1940 r. Korpus. Oficer. Wojskowej kpt. mar. Wiktor Łomidze [in:] Kadry Morskie Rzeczypospolitej, vol. V.

[16] J. Tumaniszwili, Wspomnienia pisane za oceanem, p. 43.

[17] Death certificate of Viktor Lomidze from Hammersmith Hospital w Londynie, Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, ref. no. MAR. A. II. 2/3.

[18] Grave 201747, section J206/46. The headstone quotes the year of birth as 1901. See; Andrzej Suchcitz, Non omnis moriar. Polacy na londyńskim cmentarzu Brompton, Warszawa 1992.

[19] Minelayer, the largest Polish warship in September 1939. Due to her strong armament (which included six 120 mm guns) and high displacement, she could even be seen as a light cruiser (although its maximum speed was too low). The ship was considered a failure because the design was intended to achieve too many goals (including the role of a flagship and the ability to operate away from the base). On 1 September 1939, after several air attacks and shelling by German destroyers, the ship was scuttled in the harbour in Hel. On 3 September 1939, she was bombed by German aircraft and destroyed by fire. Several guns were removed and used in defence of Hel. After the war, the wreck was used as a gunnery target and was eventually scrapped.

ORP ‘Gryf’ minelayer, personnel. 1. Commander of the ship: kmdr ppor. Stefan Kwiatkowski; 2. Executive officer of the ship: kpt. Viktor Lomidze; 3. Navigating Officer: ppor. Witold Szczepanowski; 4. 1st Gunnery Officer: por. Tadeusz Męczyński; 5. 2nd Gunnery Officer: ppor. Zbigniew Jagusiewicz; 6. 1st Torpedo Officer: por. Konrad Wachtel; 7. 2nd Torpedo Officer: ppor. Jerzy Skowroński; 8. Signal Officer: kpt. Adam Jagielski; 9. 1st Engineer Officer: kmdr ppor. Ignacy Kuczkowski; 10. 2nd Engineer Officer: por. Eugeniusz Hulanicki; 11. Purser: por. Jan Pielat; 12. Medical Officer: por. Jerzy Neuman; 13. Watch Officer: ppor. Juliusz Bilewicz; 14. Watch Officer: ppor. Lech Dandelski; 15. Watch Officer: ppor. Henryk Strenger. There were also officers on board who were in the process of handing over the posts they had held: 1. Executive officer of the ship: kpt. Józef Mostowik; 2. 1st Engineer Officer: kpt. Józef Sielanka. See: Kadry Morskie Rzeczypospolitej, vol. V, p. 327.

[20] D-two Floty i obsz. nadmorskiego oficer operacyjny. Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, ref. no. MAR. A. II. 2/3. pp.1-43.

[21] The Polish ship s/s ‘Kościuszko’, a trans-Atlantic liner, was to be sold to a foreign shipowner in 1940. Immobilised in the port from 1938, she managed to leave Gdynia before the German invasion of Poland, and on 1 September 1939, she was already in the North Sea, heading for Dartmouth. In the initial period of the war, renamed ORP ‘Gdynia’, she served as the depot ship of the Polish Navy. Rebuilt in 1941, she resumed her former name and was used for troop transport until the end of the war.

[22] The line between Hel and Schiewenhorst (now Świbno).

[23] Now Baltiysk, the westernmost town and seaport of Russia, until 1946 known in German as Pillau. [At the time in East Prussia.].

[24] Kmdr Brunon Jabłoński (1902–1984). He completed a submarine navigation course in France in the second half of the 1920s, and then lectured at the Polish Navy Training Centre. In 1931 he was a member of the team that brought ORP ‘Wilk’ underwater minelayer from France. At the rank of kmdr ppor. he participated in the only Avdanced Tactical Course of the Polish Navy, which took place betweem 7 January 1938 and 31 March 1939. In 1939/1940 he was in the ground of officers who completed an internship in the French intelligence service, and then formed the backbone of the reconstructed Intelligence Section of the 2nd Department of the Supreme Commander’ s HQ. In Britain, he served for a while at the headquarters of the 2nd Dept. as well as at the HQ of adm. Świrski. Following the suicide of kmdr Bogusław Krawczyk, he temporarily (1941–1942) took over the command of ORP ‘Wilk’.

[25] The Fleet Specialist Training Centre, established in Gdynia in 1935, where training of naval specialists was concentrated. It soon turned out that the training of sailors was very effective, as proved by their heroic actions in the tragic days of September 1939 and during the naval campaigns of World War II. After the German occupation of Poland, training took place in France and Britain.

[26] Kmdr ppor. Ludwik Ciszewski (born 1891, died 1 May 1941).

[27] ORP ‘Bałtyk’ was purchased by the Polish Navy in 1927 as a training hulk. She was the first Polish ship to be called ORP ‘Bałtyk’ and the largest ship ever in service with the Polish Navy. After the outbreak of World War II, she was captured by the Germans and, following a short period of use, scrapped by 1942. Kpt. Viktor Lomidze was one of her commanders, during 1937–1938.

[28] On 1 June 1939 the Sea Coast Defence HQ was split into the Maritime Coast Defence HQ and the Land Coast Defence HQ. Kmdr dypl. Stefan Frankowski commanded the Maritime Coast Defence. Kadry Morskie Rzeczypospolitej, vol. V, p. 236.

[29] As of 1 September 1939 kadm. Józef Unrug was the Commander of the Fleet. Kadry Morskie Rzeczypospolitej, vol. V, p. 229.

[30] According to the organisation and staffing of the River Flotilla, kmdr Witold Zajączkowski was apointed the Commander of the Flotilla after the mobilisation of 1 September 1939. Kadry Morskie Rzeczypospolitej, vol. V , p. 221.

[31] Kmdr ppor. Stanisław Jabłoński (1898–1970), see: Kadry Morskie Rzeczypospolitej, vol. V, p. 454.

[32] Pułkownik (Colonel).

[33] Kmdr por. Stanisław Hryniewiecki, captain of ORP ‘Gryf’ on 2–3 September 1939. He died as the captain of the destroyer ORP ‘Orkan’ in the Atlantic. See: J. Tuliszka, Komandor porucznik Stanisław Hryniewiecki (1896–1943), pp. 190–198.

[34] Kpt. Edmund Nowak (1901–1989).

[35] Porucznik (Sub-Lieutenant).

[36] ORP ‘Mazur’, a torpedo ship, and then a training gunnery ship used in 1922–1939, former German ‘V 105’ from World War I, one of the first ships of the Polish Navy. She served as a training ship for gunners. Sunk on 1 September 1939 by the German air force.

[37] The Chief of Staff, kmdr ppor. dypl. Romuald Gintowt-Dziewałtowski (1893–1960).

[38] Generał dywizji (two-star general).

[39] Gen. dyw. Władysław Bortnowski (1891–1966), he commanded the ‘Pomorze’ Army during the Polish campaign of 1939.

[40] The defence of Kępa Oksywska was one of the most important battles in Pomerania in September 1939, and it was the last act of the Land Defence of the Polish Coast. Fierce defensive battles were fought on land from 1 September. The superiority of the Germans was overwhelming, and the situation was worsened by the fact that the northern part of Poland was cut off from the rest of the country after the gradual withdrawal of the ‘Pomorze’ Army between 4 and 8 September.

[41] On 1 July 1939, the battleship ‘Schleswig-Holstein’ was earmarked to pay a visit to the Free City of Gdańsk in August. According to secret plans she would be used to shell the Polish outpost at Westerplatte. On 1 September 1939, at 4:45 a.m., the battleship started shelling the Polish outpost using the largest guns. On 18 September, she fired on the Oksywie and Obłuże districts of the city of Gdynia. On 23 September, the battleship fired on the ‘Heliodor Laskowski’ battery at Hel. The same day, the Hel battery opened fire on the battleship and hit the starboard 150 mm gun casemate. 3 sailors from the gun crew and 4 cadets in the aft washroom were wounded.

[42] The defence of Hel consisted in the defence of a 142-kilometer-long Baltic Sea coast, the sector extending from Lake Żarnowieckie in the west to the present border between Gdynia and Sopot, at the Swelinia stream. Half of the coastal strip of the pre-WWII Poland was made up of the 70 km long Hel Peninsula, which was 150 m wide at the narrowest point and up to 3.5 km in the widest.

[43] Berlinka was a type of powered river barge.

[44] Kmdr Tadeusz Ziółkowski (1886–1940), foreign trade mate, commander of the pilots of the Gdańsk port, ‘The First Sailor of the Polish Republic’. On 25 August 1939, when the battleship ‘Schleswig-Holstein’ entered the port of Gdańsk, Ziółkowski, along with several other Polish employees of the Gdańsk Port and Waterways Council, was arrested by the police for refusing to bring this ship into the port instead of the cruiser ‘Königsberg’ previously announced by the Germans. After a few hours he was released and restored to his post. He was arrested again in the morning of 1 September 1939. He was imprisoned in the camp at Nowy Port, and then imprisoned in the newly established Stutthof concentration camp. He was killed on 11 January 1940 in one of the mass executions of Polish activists in Gdańsk. His remains were exhumed and transferred to the Zaspa Cemetery in 1947.

[45] Kmdr ppor. Stefan Kwiatkowski was the captian of the minelayer ORP ‘Gryf’ from 1 April until 1 September 1939.

[46] 2nd Marine Rifle Battalion. Its task was to defend Gdynia in the event of attack from the south and south-west, that is from the border with the Free City of Gdańsk, with particular emphasis on the defence of the Gdynia-Sopot road and railway line. On 24 August 1939, the battalion began mobilisation, during which it was reformed into the 2nd Marine Rifle Regiment.

[47] Navigating Officer, kpt. Józef Mostowik (1902–1981).

[48] The destroyer ORP ‘Wicher’ was one of four ships of this class owned by Poland in September, but the only one that took part in the defence of the Polish coast. The remaining ones (‘Burza’, ‘Błyskawica’ and ‘Grom’) left Oksywie on 20 August 1939 as part of the ‘Pekin’ plan, and they arrived in Britain on 1 September. ORP ‘Wicher’ was sunk on 3 September by German aircraft at the military harbour in Hel. German attempts to repair the ship and commission her into the Kriegsmarine failed. After the war, the wreck was scrapped.

[49] Kmdr Stefan de Walden (1896–1976), the captain of the destroyer ORP ‘Wicher’ during the defence of the Polish coast in 1939.

[50] The name of Chylonia (a district of Gdynia) misspelled as ‘Kilona’ in the original document.

[51] Kmdr por. pil. Edward Szystowski (1895–1939), co-founder of the Naval Forces of the pre-WWII Poland and commander of the Naval Air Squadron. He was killed on 1 September 1939 during a Luftwaffe raid and is considered to be the first Polish commissioned officer killed during World War II.

[52] ORP ‘Żbik’, a ‘Wilk’ class submarine, took part in the Polish campaign in September 1939, following which she was interned in Sweden until the end of the war. CAW, 1799/91/108, Akta Marynarki Wojennej, Dziennik nawigacyjny ORP ‘Żbik’.

[53] Chorąży (Midshipman).

[54] Diving boat ORP ‘Nurek’ (in service from 1 October 1936). Captain: por. Wacław Lipkowski 1 October 1936 to 20 January 1938; acting captin: chor. Wincenty Tomasiewicz 20 January 1938 to 1 September 1939. On 1 September 1939 the ship sunk in the Gdynia-Oksywie military harbour, hit by a bomb during an air raid. Chor. Wincenty Tomasiewicz was killed on the ship during the bombing. 15 more sailors from his crew died along with him that day. See: Kadry Morskie Rzeczypospolitej, vol. V, pp. 322.

[55] Chor. Alfons Weber.

[56] Por. Jacenty Dehnel (1911–1984) executive officer of the training ship ‘Mazur’ during the 1939 campaign, later participating in the defence of Hel, for his heroic attitude he was twice awarded the Order of Virtuti Militari.

[57] The 1939 ‘Rurka’ operational plan, to lay a mine barrage in the Gdańsk Bay in the event of a war with the Third Reich. Developed as part of the ‘Zachód’ (‘West’) plan, it was to be executed on the orders of the Supreme Commander. The decision was issued on 1 September 1939, but the entire operation failed in result of the afternoon attack on Polish ships by German bombers. As part of the defence plans in the event of an expected German aggression, the Polish Navy was tasked with supporting the defence of the Polish section of the coast until the arrival of the expected assistance from the Western Allies: Britain and France (under the alliance agreements). One of the active actions of the Polish ships was to lay a defensive mine barrage blocking the Bay of Gdańsk and obstructing German sea communication with Gdańsk. The plans for such an operation were developed in the Polish Navy HQ from the end of 1938, when it acquired the large minelayer ‘Gryf’. In the spring of 1939, they were made specific and included, alongside with the ‘Worek’ plan for the operation of submarines, into the overall defence plan ‘West’.

[58] Starszy bosman (Senior Chief Petty Officer).

[59] Por. Tadeusz Męczyński, 1st Gunnery Officer of ORP ‘Gryf’ June – 3 September 1939.

[60] Por. Konrad Wachtel (1911–1994), 1st Torpedo Officer of ORP ‘Gryf’.

[61] Ppor. Lech Dandelski (1916 – 3 September 1939), served aboard ORP ‘Gryf’ according to the crew list of 23 March 1939.

[62] Podporucznik (Acting-Sub-Lieutenan).

[63] Probably Franciszek Kosiński.

[64] Kpt. Wacław Lipkowski was the captain of the small minesweeper ORP ‘Mewa’ between 18 July and 1 September 1939. The ship sank at the Hel harbour on 3 September 1939, bombed by the German Air Force.

[65] Podchorąży (Cadet Officer).

[66] Bosman (Chief Petty Officer).

[67] Kpt. Józef Sielanka (1901–1945), was the 1st Engineer Officer on ORP ‘Gryf’ between May V 1938 and 1 September 1939.

[68] Kpt. Adam Jagielski (1910–1946), the Signal Officer on ORP ‘Gryf’.

[69] A K-class light cruiser. On 3 September 1939 she participated in mine-laying in the North Sea.

[70] Kpt. Mieczysław Jacynicz was the captian of the gunboat ORP ‘Komendant Piłsudski’ from 24 August to 3 September 1939, ppor. Michał Anaszkiewicz was his deputy, and bosm. pchor. Ludwik Zaborski was the acting watch officer. The captain of ‘Piłsudski’ was called up from the reserve and this is how he recalled that moment: ‘During 1938–1939 I worked as an employee of the Port Council as a sea pilot in the Free City of Gdańsk. On 24 August 1939, I was mobilised and ordered to take over command of ORP ‘Komendant Piłsudski’ and the duties of a gunboat group commander from kpt. Puzyna, who notified me about my future tasks: cooperation in the land defence operations of the Polish Coast with the base in Gdynia.’ Kadry morskie Rzeczpospolitej, Vol. V, p. 236; M. Jacynicz, Kanonierki w kampanii wrześniowej, Morze 9, 1973, p. 16.

[71] ORP ‘Generał Haller’ was mainly used as a training ship in the Polish Navy; she took part in the 1939 campaign. Sunk on 6 September 1939 in the harbour at Hel as a result of bombing by German aeroplanes. Por. Viktor Lomidze had been the captain of the ship (June 1933 – May 1934).

[72] Kpt. Stanisław Mieszkowski (1903–1952).

[73] ORP ‘Komendant Piłsudski’ was mainly used for training, and for most of her service she was formally part of the Minelayer Squadron. She took part in the 1939 campaign, probably scuttled in the Hel harbour.

[74] Kmdr ppor. Ignacy Kuczkowski (1897–1980).

[75] Bosmanmat (Petty Officer).

[76] Por. Jerzy Neuman was the Medical Officer on ORP ‘Gryf’ from August until 3 September 1939.

[77] Kpt. Zbigniew Wierzbowski, doctor, personnel as of 1 September 1939. See: Kadry Morskie Rzeczpospolitej, Vol. V, p. 242.

[78] Por. Paweł Czajkowski, medical officer 1939–September 1939.

[79] 2nd Marine Rifle Battalion. Its task was to defend Gdynia in the event of aggression from the south and south-west, i.e. from the border with the Free City of Gdańsk, with particular emphasis on the defence of the Gdynia-Sopot road and railway line. On 24 August 1939, the battalion started mobilisation, during which it was reformed into the 2nd Marine Rifle Regiment.

[80] The Land Defence of the Coast also included sub-units deployed mainly in the area of Gdynia and Oksywie, the 3rd Reserve Battalion,under kpt. Eugeniusz Nowalsetti.

[81] The task of the ‘Kartuzy’ Coast Defence Company was to maintain contact with the ‘Pomorze’ Army, whose positions were in the Pomeranian ‘Corridor’ and in the Tuchola Forest, south of the area defended by the Land Defence of the Coast.

[82] Kpt. Jerzy Błeszyński, the Head of the Organisation Office, died on 9 September 1939.

[83] Por. Florian Hubicki (1911–1978), engineer training instructor and the 2nd Engineer Officer on the destroyer ORP ‘Błyskawica’ (during 1937–1938).

[84] Fr Władysław Miegoń (b. 1892, d. 1942 at Dachau concentration camp), a Polish Roman Catholic priest, now a blessed of the Catholic Church, a senior chaplain in the Polish Army, a chaplain of the Fleet and the administrator of the Gdynia Oksywie Parish, a participant of the 1920 Polish-Bolshevik war and of the 1939 campaign, awarded the Order of Virtuti Militari. A patron of the Polish Armed Forces. See: kmdr por. dr Dariusz Nawrot, Ksiądz komandor podporucznik Władysław Miegoń – pierwszy Polski kapelan błogosławiony, [in:] Dowództwo Marynarki Wojennej. Muzeum Marynarki Wojennej. 60 Rocznica Wybuchu II Wojny Światowej, Biuletyn Historyczny 16, Gdynia 1999, pp. 199–214.

[85] Major.

[86] Teodors Spāde (1891–1970) was a Latvian Navy officer between 1931 and 1940. After the Soviet occupation of Latvia, Spade was deported from the country. He died in the Kazakh Soviet Republic. In 1990, he was exhumed and re-buried in his homeland.

[87] ‘Strzelec’ has been a Polish para-military organisation.

[88] A patrol boat of the Polish Border Guard mobilised into the Polish Navy during the 1939 campaign as ORP ‘Batory’. She was famous for her escape on 1 October 1939 from the surrendering Hel to Sweden, where she was interned.

[89] Scythes with the blades mounted upright had been a traditional weapon of Polish peasants.

[90] The Kraffohlkanal, now known as the Jagiellonian Canal.

[91] At the beginning of the 1920s, a project to expand the Polish Navy was formed. It included, among others, the construction of nine submarines, including three minelayers. Eventually, only the three mine laying submarines were ordered. ORP ‘Ryś’ was one of these. ORP ‘Żbik’ and ORP ‘Wilk’ were the other ships of the class. The ships were ordered from French shipyards. In September 1939, ORP ‘Ryś’ performed patrols and laid mines on shipping routes. She was attacked several times by submarine chasers and by aircraft, sustaining damage. Due to insufficient amount of fuel, she was unable to attempt reaching Britain and on 18 September she entered the Swedish port of Stavnas, where she was interned. In 1945, the Swedes released the ship to Poland. She then served as a combat and then training ship until 1955, and was scrapped in 1956.

[92] D-two Floty i obsz. Nadmorskiego oficer operacyjny. Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, ref. no. MAR. A. II. 2/3.

[93] Kpt. mar./kmdr ppor. Jerzy Koziołkowski (1911–1990), commanded the submarine ORP ‘Sokół’ between 29 July 1942 and 12 December 1944. See: Kadry Morskie Rzeczpospolitej, Vol. V, p. 412.

[94] Oświadczenie kap. marynarki Jerzy Koziołkowskiego. D-two Floty i obsz. Nadmorskiego oficer operacyjny. Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, ref. no. MAR. A. II. 2/3.

DOCUMENTS

GREAT BRITAIN’ S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE FUTURE OF GEORGIA AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS IN LATE 1918 AND 1919

by Pawel Olszewski

The key theme presented in this paper is the analysis of the attitude of the British government towards the question of the future of Georgia and other republics of South Caucasus, also known as Transcaucasia. This stance has been outlined in four memoranda prepared by English officials by the end of 1918 and in the early 1919. These documents seem to be worthy of note as an attempt to define the United Kingdom’s policy toward the Transcaucasian republics and Dagestan in the aftermath of the Great War. What is more, these documents have not been published to date.

The importance of the documents is highlighted by the fact that due to the presence of a rather sizeable British military contingent in Transcaucasia until October 1919, the government in London shaped the policy of the victorious Entente powers towards South Caucasus in the first year following the conclusion of World War I. The policies pursued by the Entente states had a major impact on the international standing and the domestic situation of Georgia and its South Caucasus neighbours after 1918. Thus, the presentation of certain elements of these documents seems relevant in the context of the analysis of the international position of the South Caucasus after World War I. What is more, the comparison of the proposed assumptions of British policy towards Transcaucasia outlined in these documents and their implementation can be of interest for the study of the history of Georgia and the South Caucasus in 1918–1921.

Before discussing the main theses of the analyses presented, for a better understanding of the context in which these documents were created, it would be appropriate to mention the changing circumstances and the situation in Georgia and the South Caucasus in the final months of World War I. By the end of May 1918, three independent states were established in Transcaucasia: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. In June 1918. Georgia was subordinated to Germany, while Armenia and Azerbaijan were controlled by Turkey.[1]

In the first half of 1918, the governments of the Entente powers kept a keen eye on the situation in Transcaucasia. Despite gestures of sympathy, extended in particular towards Russian Armenians, Western politicians failed to recognise the independence of the Transcaucasian republics and continued to treat their territories as a part of Russia – an ally of the Entente. Refusing to recognise Vladimir Lenin’ s government, Allied countries supported the Russian White Armiesy, which continued their fight against the Bolsheviks. What is more, back in December 1917, the British and French authorities agreed that the British would provide assistance to anti-Bolshevik centres forming in Transcaucasia.[2] Undoubtedly, this definition could include the governments of the democratic South Caucasus republics; however, the lack of direct access to the region for the Entente powers meant that they provided no significant military assistance to the Transcaucasian states.

By the end of World War I, German troops were stationed in Georgia, while Ottoman troops were stationed in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Under the terms of the armistice, these formations withdrew from Transcaucasia, while British troops entered the area in accordance with the December 1917 agreement.[3] The presence of these forces made the issue of determining the London government’ s policy towards the South Caucasus states an important matter, which resulted in the development of the documents presented below.

Of all the documents, the key one was a memorandum drafted on 1 January 1919 by Sir Erle Richards – a professor of International Law and Diplomacy at Oxford University – for the Foreign Office. It was supposed to be a set of guidelines for British delegates to the upcoming Paris Peace Conference. The memorandum was further amended with three other documents, as well as two notes drafted in November and December 1918 that elaborated on certain statements made in the January document. Since this document, officially dated on 1 January 1919, was an element that brought together the conclusions from a number of earlier documents and works, the author decided to forgo the chronological order and analysed the memorandum first. The paper encompasses only a number of reflections that came to the author’s mind while analysing the document of 1 January 1919, as well as the subsequent memoranda. Forming the conclusion as to whether these observations were correct is left to the reader, after reading the texts of the documents in question.

The title of the January document – Memorandum on Armenia and the Transcaucasia – highlighted the need to consider the future of the South Caucasus together with the future of Armenia, which encompassed six eastern Turkish vilayets (provinces), sometimes referred to as so-called Turkish Armenia. This analysis consisted of two parts. In the first section, on Armenia (Turkish Armenia), the author underscored the region’s great geopolitical and economic importance. Then, he moved on to an analysis of the ‘Armenian question’ in Turkey until 1914, outlined the persecution of Armenians by the Turks during World War I, and pointed out Britain’s moral obligations to Turkish Armenians.

All of the aforementioned circumstances have led the author to highlight the need to create a ‘national home’ for the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia in the fourth fragment of the first part of the memorandum, titled ‘General Policy’. It was to be established by an independent Armenia that would ensure the safe growth and development of the Armenian population. The state would also act as a natural obstacle curbing the development of pan-Turanianism, which could have an adverse impact on the situation in the Caucasus and Asia. An independent Armenia was supposed to remain under a mandate. The best candidate for the role of a mandate power was France, provided that the authorities in Paris would agree to the expansion of Great Britain’ s influence in Syria and the Arabian Peninsula;

However, from the point of view of the main issue of this paper, the second part of the memorandum entitled ‘Transcaucasia (including Dagestan)’ was more interesting. What immediately captures attention is the fact that Dagestan was included in the region of Transcaucasia, despite the fact that from the geographic point of view it is a part of North Caucasus. In the characterisation of the South Caucasus, the author pointed out the great national and religious diversity of the region, noting that the presence of British troops in Transcaucasia since December 1918 has contributed to the stabilisation of the situation in the region.

The next part of the document characterises the Transcaucasian states. Among them, Georgia in particular was predestined to form an independent state because it was characterised by the best economic and cultural development. In addition to that, it was a linguistically homogeneous state, with a centuries-long history, uniform territory and sea ports in good locations. The question of Georgia’ s independence was greatly complicated by the importance of Batumi, which should have become an international port in addition to Poti. In addition, it would be beneficial to include the Muslim Georgians living in Batumi within the borders of the country, as well as to annex Lazistan Sanjak.

The next issue concerned the future of Dagestan, which was highly diversified in terms of linguistic communities. The memorandum highlighted its geopolitical importance and pointed out that, according to Foreign Office assessments, the people of Dagestan may have desired for the country to eventually become a part of Azerbaijan. In contrast, when considering the future of Russian Armenia, also referred to as: the ‘Republic of Yerevan’, the author emphasised its great diversity of nationalities and lack of territorial cohesion as well as being landlocked. What is more, the differences in interests between Russian Armenians and Turkish Armenians may have hindered the merger of Russian Armenia with Turkish Armenia.

In the case of Azerbaijan, the author pointed out the strong Armenian-Azerbaijani antagonism in the country and emphasised that Azerbaijan’s ruling elite expressed a pro-Turkish sentiment. The Azerbaijanis sought to reunite with the Azerbaijani population in Persia and create a Turkish state, a pursuit incompatible with British interests. The conclusions to the memorandum posited that at the current time, it was not possible to recognise the independence of Azerbaijan and that of Russian Armenia and Dagestan before seeing how the situation in the region would play out.

The memorandum in question featured contradictory opinions. It was pointed out that the emergence of strong and independent Transcaucasian states was in line with British interests, which is why the government in London should support independence aspirations in the region. At the same time, the authors highlighted that the country should pursue a policy in such a way as to avoid accusations of the Russian side that British authorities took advantage of its weakness to bolster their influence in the South Caucasus.

It was also considered likely that the assistance of a mandate power would be needed to support the Transcaucasian states in establishing a sustainable basis for their existence. Among the candidates for the mandate powers, the memorandum mentioned the United Kingdom, France and the United States.

The fact that the British military was stationed in Transcaucasia made it likely that other victorious powers would ask Great Britain to agree to a temporary occupation of the region. At the same time, London’ s military presence in the South Caucasus was important from a strategic point of view, since this would allow Great Britain to maintain control of the transportation route to India. For the same reasons, a French mandate over Transcaucasia would be contradictory to British interests. In contrast, the United States’ mandate over the region was seen as less controversial from the same point of view.

At the same time, the author of the memorandum pointed out that if the countries participating in the Peace Conference put pressure on London to accept a mandate over Transcaucasia, the government might agree to the proposal only after a thorough examination of the matter. In addition, if Great Britain was to fulfil the role of a military power in control and charge of Transcaucasia, the possibility of stationing an international armed force in the region under British administration should be taken into consideration.

In the summary of the considerations listed in the memorandum, it was pointed out that Turkish Armenia should be made independent. What is more, it should be under a temporary mandate exercised by one of the powers entrusted by the League of Nations. Great Britain should support France’s candidacy for that role.

In the conclusions to the memorandum of 1 January 1919, an idea of a federation comprising the Transcaucasian states was also brought up, despite not being mentioned in the main body of the document. The authors also pointed out that regardless of whether such a federation would be established, or whether the South Caucasus states would remain separate, was a matter of their own choice. In addition, the conclusions also highlighted the need for Britain to maintain control over the Caspian Sea, as well as the need to declare the cities of Batumi, Poti, Trabzon and Baku as free ports, as well as to secure seamless transportation on the Batumi-Baku railroad line. Other conclusions included the need to conclude a special agreement to ensure international interests in Baku and the oil fields surrounding the city.

In the process of assessing the conclusions of the 1 January 1919 memorandum, it would be appropriate to point out that although half of the memorandum was devoted to Turkish Armenia, only two points were devoted to the summary of British policy towards its future. They boiled down to a claim that Turkish Armenia should be separated from Turkey and placed under a mandate of one of the powers exercising this role on behalf of the League of Nations. What is more, the authors concluded that from the point of view of British interests, the French mandate would be beneficial, since it could possibly negatively affect Paris’ position in Syria and in the Arabian Peninsula.

In contrast, the conclusions concerning British policy towards the future of Transcaucasia were much more elaborate, encompassing a total of ten points. This was due to the fact that at the beginning of 1919 the situation in the South Caucasus and Dagestan had turned out to be much more complex than in the case of Turkey, which was made to submit to the victorious powers. The conclusions on the South Caucasus clearly indicated the need for independent states in the region. At the same time, the author of the document seemed not to notice that there had already been independent republics in the region since the end of May 1918. The conclusions also featured a clear suggestion that Great Britain’ s policy towards Russian Armenia would depend to a large extent on the geopolitical situation in Turkish Armenia, in particular on which of the victorious powers would take over the mandate over Eastern Anatolia. The memorandum’s conclusion also highlighted the role of the Transcaucasian states’ relations with the Russian government as an important factor in the process of shaping their future.

The memorandum of 1 January 1919 had a number of appendices in the form of other documents. Among them, particularly noteworthy was the Foreign Office memorandum of 1 November 1918 concerning the issue of the future of Transcaucasia with particular emphasis on British interests. The conclusions presented in the document have contributed to the final text of the aforementioned memorandum. Unlike the previous analysis, the area of the Transcaucasia outlined in this memorandum encompassed only the territories of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

In the introduction to the document, we read that the question of the future of the South Caucasus was part of the overarching question of the future of the states formed in the borderlands of former Russia. At the same time, the characteristics of the territory of the Transcaucasia meant that the future of this region would also hinge upon a number of distinct conditions.

The author or authors of this memorandum – the author’ s name was never specified – indicated that the basis for consideration of determining the future fate of the region should be the recognition of Georgia, Armenia, and the ‘Tatars’ as independent states. The memorandum did not use the term ‘Azerbaijan’ to denote the existing Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in the Transcaucasia – instead, the authors preferred the terms such as ‘Tatars’ and ‘Tatar State’, used interchangeably. The three states of the South Caucasus were to eventually establish a federation. While the memorandum put strong emphasis on the claim that these states should remain independent of Russia, the possibility of their future return to the so-called ‘Federation of Russian States’ was not ruled out.

The memorandum of 1 November 1918 also pointed out the need to bring the newly independent Transcaucasian peoples living in the newly independent states under the supervision and control of one of the victorious powers. In contrast to the first presented document, the November memorandum also highlighted that the best choice to assist the Transcaucasian states on behalf of the Peace Conference, as well as to control them, would be Great Britain, which could thus extend its protectorate over Mesopotamia. The list of candidates also included the United States, mainly due to the American interests in Armenia and among the Armenians. What is also worthy of note in this context is the link between the presence of both powers in the South Caucasus and their policies towards the territories of the former Ottoman Empire. The exclusion of France’s candidacy as a potential power controlling the situation in Transcaucasia seemed to be just as important.

The emphasis on the importance of control of the South Caucasus states by the victorious powers, which was clearly visible in this memorandum, was somewhat dialled down in the document of January 1919. The January memorandum highlighted the importance of the choice of the mandate power governing the Transcaucasia on behalf of the League of Nations, which would act as a protector and provide assistance to the fledgling Transcaucasian states rather than as a controller and overseer of their activities.

Another part of the document mentioned Georgia – due to the fact that it was the most politically and economically developed area, Georgia had a special right to have its independence recognised by the powers. This statement was repeated in the memorandum of 1 January 1919. At the same time, it should be noted that the 1 November 1918 document repeatedly included the term ‘Georgians’ to denote a nation that was particularly predestined to create an independent state.

The 1 November 1918 memorandum further indicated that British commercial interests required that Batumi be made a free port and that free access be provided to railroads running through Georgian territory to Armenia, Baku and Persia. At the same time, a significant conclusion was the fact that Batumi was treated as a free port, but located within Georgian territory.

The memorandum went on to point out that because of the Georgians’ historical past, they had a much stronger claim to independence than any other nation of the former Russian Empire, since Georgia had never been conquered by Russia. On the other hand, there was the issue of demarcating Georgia’s borders due to unreliable population data, an influx of Armenian refugees from the Ottoman Empire and the unclear national identity of some Georgian Muslims. Therefore, the analysis suggested that this issue should be tackled by an allied commission that should go to Georgia.

An important part of the document was devoted to the considerations regarding the Armenians’ right to independence. In this case, unlike Georgia, the author or authors noted that an independent Armenia should form an Armenian protectorate under the international guarantee of a mandate power. This protectorate should be established as a result of the unification of the six vilayets (provinces) of Turkey, Cilicia and Russian Armenia.

Another issue pointed out in the memorandum of 1 November 1918 was the question of the so-called ‘Tatar Republic’, or Azerbaijan. The document pointed out the fact that the ability of the Tatars (Azerbaijan) to form an independent government was highly debatable. It was also pointed out that in the absence of the possibility to establish an independent Azerbaijan, its territory could fall back under Russian rule.

The conclusions to the document highlight that from the point of view of British interests in the East, it may have been necessary for the United Kingdom to establish a protectorate over the three Transcaucasian states, or at least provide them with assistance to help them build independent political entities based on ethnographic boundaries. The author or authors also pointed out that it might have been beneficial to limit Russia’ s influence to the North Caucasus and create an obstacle in the South Caucasus to prevent its future expansion to the south-east. The memorandum also posited that the areas to the north-west of the Caucasus was populated by Kuban and Danube Cossacks, who could assist the rebuilt Russian state in the expansion into the south-eastern lands. What is more, the expansion of the Kuban Cossacks towards Sukhumi at the time was to enable a military campaign along the shores of the Black Sea and the invasion of the entire Transcaucasia – according to the authors of the document, this would serve the military interests of Russia. At the same time, one should note that military campaigns were in fact ongoing in the northern parts, in the vicinity of Sochi, which at the time was also considered part of Abkhazia.

It seems that the conclusions of the memorandum of 1 November 1919 has boiled down to stating that the Transcaucasian states could, with British assistance, form an obstacle preventing Russia’ s southward expansion in the future. This was the most important conclusion of the document, which affected all further policy of the British authorities towards the South Caucasus in particular in 1919. This was especially evident in the moves of the military representatives of the English authorities in the region. Another key conclusion concerned the actions of the Kuban Cossacks in Abkhazia, which were seen as a preparation of further Russian expansion and occupation of the Transcaucasian lands.

It seems worthy of note that the memorandum of 1 November 1918 made no mention of the Volunteer Army of General Anton Denikin, who was actually responsible for the military action against Georgia in Abkhazia. By the end of 1918, Kuban Cossacks made up a large part of this formation; however, military operations in the vicinity of Sochi were carried out primarily on the initiative of the ‘volunteer’ command.

It is worth noting that from the point of view of Britain’s attitude toward the existing Transcaucasian states, it was somewhat characteristic that the authorities in London did not recognise the existence of independent states in the South Caucasus. On the other hand, the common belief was that these states were yet to be established with the prominent assistance, and – which should be pointed out – under the supervision and control of the victorious powers. Instead of terms such as Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, the memorandum included terms such as Georgians, Armenians and Tatars, thus denying the existence of sovereign South Caucasus states.

The conclusions of that memorandum, particularly concerning the need to create an obstacle against Russia’ s renewed expansion towards the south-east in the Transcaucasia at the expense of British interests, as well as the need to establish a mandate over Russian Armenia and Turkish Armenia, were repeated in the analysis dated on 1 January 1919. At the same time, the January document did not emphasise the Georgians’ particular right to have their state’ s independence recognised by the Entente Powers, which was mentioned in the November memorandum.

Another document that served as the foundation of the memorandum of 1 January 1919 was a Foreign Office analysis on the prospects for the territorial policy in the so-called Caucasus regions of 7 November 1918. Its author was Sir Eyre Crowe, a senior Foreign Office official. Unlike the later document, the memorandum of 7 November 1918 clearly separated the issue of the future of Turkish Armenia from Transcaucasia. Dagestan, in turn, was also included as a subject of the analysis of the future of the Transcaucasian territory, which was later reiterated in the memorandum of 1 January 1919, which is essential for this analysis.

The first part of document dated on 7 November 1918 stated that since the people of the South Caucasus had already declared their independence, the basis of the Transcaucasian policy pursued not only by Great Britain but also by other Allied powers should be the recognition of the rights of the people of the region to independence. The author also pointed out that the situation in which Russia could accuse the Allies of having taken advantage of its temporary weakness to recognise the independence of Transcaucasia should be avoided, a sentiment reiterated in the memorandum of 1 January 1919. Thus, the author indicated that the independence of the ‘national governments’ in Transcaucasia should be recognised in such a way as to not predetermine the outcome – their eventual independence or reunification with Russia. In reality, this would be difficult to achieve. At the same time, the use of such a mechanism for recognising independence could have been facilitated by the recognition of these fledgling independent states by the League of Nations.

In the consideration of the political future of the South Caucasus, the author noted the great difficulties associated with the creation of a federation by these four political entities due to their weaknesses, as well as the lack of strong common historical ties. In addition, in his analysis, he suggested that in the event of the creation of independent states in Transcaucasia, they would need the help of a superpower in the form of advisers and officials, as well as financial support. Should the same superpower provide assistance to all four Caucasian states, this could in fact be a common ground leading to the establishment of a federation of these states.

Another item highlighted the fact that due to the fact that the Transcaucasian states bordered the Middle East, which was a region with tangible British interest, it would be important not to allow the countries of the region to fall into the ‘state of anarchy’. At the same time, the author viewed as highly unfavourable from the point of view of future British-Russian relations for Britain to become a mandate power in Transcaucasia and Dagestan.

These conclusions were followed by deliberations on the situation in specific areas of the South Caucasus and Dagestan, which were generally in line with the contents of the January memorandum. In characterising Georgia, the author pointed out that it had the most cohesive territory, was highly developed politically, had a tradition of political independence and had a relatively linguistically homogeneous population. Therefore, the author assumed that it would be relatively easy to recognise Georgia’s current independence, provided that it broke off its close ties to Germany.

In the case of Russian Armenia, on the other hand, the author pointed out difficulties that would make recognising its independence a tall order – national diversity, as well as lack of economic self-sufficiency due to it being a landlocked state. A suggestion was made that despite of the above, the British government should recognise the government of Russian Armenia and avoid opposing its union with Turkish Armenia.

It was also assumed that in the event of the two Armenias becoming a single state, the power that would be given a mandate to assist Turkish Armenia should also extend its support to the united Armenian state. This conclusion seems to have contradicted, at least in part, the statements in the initial part of the document, which claimed that the issue of Turkish Armenia should be considered separately from the Transcaucasian issue. It is reasonable to assume that the author of the 1 January 1919 memorandum came to the same conclusion, as he clearly pointed out the need to consider the future of Turkish Armenia and Transcaucasia at the same time.

Another issue brought up was the problem of the future of Russian Azerbaijan, which was brought up in the memorandum of 7 November 1918. The author stated that this issue was highly contentious, due to reasons also mentioned in the earlier document. The main problems concerned the multitude of ethnic groups and communities, as well as Azerbaijani-Armenian ethnic conflicts. What is more, the memorandum had a negative outlook concerning Azerbaijan’s ability to form a government capable of maintaining law and order, which is why the author opted against British recognition of the then Azerbaijani government, which was supported by the Ottoman Empire.

The November analysis also highlighted the need for a strong foreign protectorate over Azerbaijan. Pointing to the particular importance of its oil fields to the world economy, the British called for the establishment of an international body overseeing Azerbaijan’ s oil resources, akin to the Danube Commission.

According to the authors, the situation was particularly dire in Dagestan, which comprised a mix of Muslim tribes and was characterised by a low level of development; however, the memorandum also stated that the inhabitants of this region cannot be left to their own devices due to the geographic and strategic importance of this region – it featured an important railroad connecting Baku with Russia, among other infrastructure. In addition, the oil fields in Baku and Grozny, where the British had significant economic interests, could fall prey to attacks from Dagestani tribes.

Thus, the best solution – according to the authors – was to ensure Dagestan’ s reunification with Russia. Given the circumstances at the time, Russia was not in a position to take on this task. As a result, restoring and maintaining peace and order in Dagestan was a difficult task. What is more, the authors of the memorandum failed to indicate which superpower should take on this burden.

The last part of the document was focused on considerations as to which of the superpowers should assume the mandate over Transcaucasia. As with the 1 January 1919 memorandum, the authors rejected a number of candidacies, including Russia, Great Britain and Italy, as well as a number of smaller European countries, namely Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Switzerland. This left them with the United States and France.

In the analysis of France’s candidacy, the favourable attitude of Armenians toward this power was brought up as a key factor. It was assumed that if Paris accepted a mandate over Turkish Armenia and Russian Armenia, or even over the entire Transcaucasia and Dagestan, it would be beneficial to British interests, since the government in London could then demand certain concessions in Syria, Mesopotamia and Palestine from its French counterpart. This would have strengthened Britain’ s influence in the Middle Eastern territories of the Ottoman Empire at the expense of France, while getting Paris involved in Eastern Anatolia and Transcaucasia. The opposition against the French mandate, on the other hand, stemmed from the fact that the French presence on Persia’s northern borders could diminish British influence there.

Given the point of view of British interests, the United States’ mandate over Transcaucasia would be a better solution; however, in that case, the British would have to relinquish the ability to exert pressure on the French government to concede some of its demands concerning the Middle East, which the United Kingdom found inconvenient.

The optimal solution, given the point of view of the British authorities, would be a French mandate over Turkish Armenia and Russian Armenia, and the American mandate over Georgia, Russian Azerbaijan and Dagestan. According to British assessments, the President of the United States was less likely to agree to such a solution, compared to the possibility of a United States candidacy for the Armenian mandate. Thus, the memorandum is concluded with a statement that highlights the French mandate over Turkish Armenia and Transcaucasia as the best solution. These considerations were reflected in the memorandum of 1 January 1919.

Another document, which served as the basis for the January memorandum was a British General Staff analysis of the future of Transcaucasia from a military point of view, drafted on 5 December 1919. Right at the start of the document, one can read that it would be unfavourable for the British to entrust the mandate to France in order to ensure the stability of Transcaucasia and Dagestan, as France was an ambitious military power that was an ally of Britain at the time, yet at the same time it was a historical rival ofGreat Britain London. Thus, it was militarily disadvantageous to cede authority over areas that could have facilitated access to India to France.

Instead, the authors made the suggestion that Dagestan and the South Caucasus should end up under British military control. They also stressed the importance of securing the railroad lines running through Transcaucasia, both from the north on the Russian side and from the east to the west – from Batumi to Baku, as well as the railroad line that could be built and connect Alexandretta (now Iskenderun) to Tbilisi and Baku.

If the French assumed a mandate over Eastern Anatolia, as well as Transcaucasia, France would have the opportunity to build a strong army based on the Armenian and Kurdish populations. What is more, these areas were characterised by significant deposits of precious minerals, which could be used for producing armaments. Such a conclusion could be a threat to British interests in India, Mesopotamia and Egypt.

The memorandum’ s authors also pointed out that a future alliance between France and a rebuilt Russia could not be ruled out, and that it could threaten British interests in Asia. Thus, the British should undertake efforts to establish a barrier between the Russian and French spheres of influence in the Middle East. The role of said barrier could be played by three countries – Georgia, Azerbaijan and Russian Armenia.

The authors then pondered the question of whether the three South Caucasus states should constitute independent states, or an attempt should be made to establish a federation. They highlighted the enormous economic and military importance of the railroads controlled by the governments of Georgia and Russian Armenia and their links. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that they opted for a Georgian-Russian-Armenian relationship in the first place – this approach directly stemmed from the close economic ties between the two countries.

At the same time, the authors pointed out that British control of Batumi could have prevented Russia’s southwards expansion along the western shores of the Caspian Sea. With Britain’s strong military contingent in Georgia and Russian Armenia, the issue of controlling Azerbaijan was no longer as important, at least until Russia could rebuild its military power. At the same time, due to the importance of British control over Russian Armenia, the region should be separated from Turkish Armenia – which is why the basis of English policy in the Caucasus should be to keep Russian Armenia separate from Turkish Armenia and to curb the French influence along the former Russian-Ottoman border.

It was also pointed out that the Georgian issue would not pose a major problem for London, as it was only necessary to recognise Georgia’ s independence aspirations. The authors, however, pointed out that the issue may have needed to be resolved as soon as possible, as British troops were preparing to arrive in Batumi.

On the other hand, the future of Azerbaijan remained a contentious issue. The authors pointed out that the so-called ‘republic’ was established in the region, and that said republic wanted to be recognised by the Allies; however, they also claimed that Azerbaijan, with its poorly educated population, would never be able to function as an independent state. They claimed that it would remain the ‘prey of the international financial community’ due to its natural wealth. Thus from the point of view of British interests, it would be best to leave the question of recognising Azerbaijani independence unresolved until Russia is once again ready to take over administration of the region. At the same time, the authors pointed out that the Caspian Sea should be controlled by the British Navy.

They also posited that as soon as the British troops took control of Transcaucasia, it would be possible to establish a British administration to bring stability to the region. What is more, under the guidance of British political representatives, a total of three states could be established, along with the so-called ‘Transcaucasian Council’ in Tbilisi, which would bring together the representatives of these states. This council would later become the basis for the establishment of a federation of South Caucasus states.

The belief that without British assistance, the peoples of Transcaucasia were unable to form independent states may come as a surprise, given that sovereign republics already existed in the region at the time. What is more, the document seems to overstate the role of British troops in stabilising the situation in Transcaucasia. Naturally, from the point of view of the situation in the region in 1919, the presence of British troops undoubtedly contributed to some extent to ensuring internal stability in the South Caucasus; however, it would be wrong to claim that the region was in a state of complete chaos before the British troops arrived.

In the further part of the memorandum, the authors claimed that France could oppose the expansion of British influence in Transcaucasia; however, the argument for strengthening London’ s position in the region was that it was Britain that defeated the Ottoman Empire, and thus had the right to secure its interests in the Middle East. This remark points to a suggestion that the question of the French and British policies as well as those of other Allied powers concerning the future of the Transcaucasia was closely related to their Middle Eastern policies and the determination of the division of their spheres of influence in the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, this conclusion clearly indicates the belief shared by British authorities that Britain should further its interests in the Middle East, even if it comes at the expense of weakening the position of their French allies in areas previously considered to be France’s sphere of influence. Besides, the British-French talks on the future of Syria, which were held in 1919 and 1920, indicated that the government in London was trying to weaken France’s position, especially in the region in question.

The conclusion of the 5 December 1918 memorandum pointed out that from the standpoint of the British military interests, England should focus its attention on the establishment of independent states of Georgia and Russian Armenia. In addition, Azerbaijan should be maintained as a separate territorial entity until Russia manages to resume its control over it. The authors also suggested creating a federation council of the three Transcaucasian states, but only if such a possibility arose after the assessment of the situation in the region by Britain’s political representatives. It should be noted that although the memorandum discussed the solution to the question of the future of the Transcaucasia from a military point of view, it clearly emphasised the importance of the assessment of the political situation in the region by the political representatives of Great Britain upon their arrival in the South Caucasus. Another important aspect concerned the possibility of including Azerbaijani representatives in the Transcaucasian federal council. This was a clear contradiction in the views of the memorandum’ s authors, who devoted the earlier part of their analyses to denying Azerbaijan’s right to become an independent state. What is also important, the December memorandum’ s authors also failed to note that independent states in Transcaucasia had already existed for several months at the time.

On the other hand, one may arrive at the conclusion that the authors of this document, as well as other memoranda analysed in the earlier part of this paper, firmly believed that the Allied powers, and especially the United Kingdom, would be able to shape the political reality in Transcaucasia at will, as well as establish states in the region according to their political, economic and military interests. This approach clearly negated the political upheavals in the South Caucasus, which took place in 1917 and 1918. These realisation of these assumptions was clearly impossible given the extant political circumstances in the Transcaucasia, which had forced British representatives to establish relations with the governments of the South Caucasus states established in the territories of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and recognise them as centres of real political power.

The conclusion of the December memorandum reiterated the need to prevent the expansion of the French sphere of influence, since it was a superpower characterised by a great military potential, spanning from the Mediterranean coast to the Caspian Sea, as well as to curb the Russo-German expansion on the north. The conclusions clearly state that Azerbaijan should not be allowed to return under Russian control, and the British fleet should not be withdrawn from the Caspian Sea until it is clear that Russia will not pursue an aggressive policy toward Persia and India – something which was not mentioned in earlier sections of the document. This indicated that British military officials believed it was necessary to take advantage of Russia’s temporary weakness in order to prevent its future expansion into what was considered Britain’s sphere of influence in Asia.

This objective was to be pursued by the establishment of a bloc of states in the Transcaucasia friendly to London, which were supposed to form a barrier against Russia’s southwards expansion. Georgia and British control of Batumi were the key to ensure this outcome. This notion was made clear thanks to statements indicating that Georgia could be both an important obstacle curbing French expansion to the east and Russian expansion to the south. Batumi, on the other hand, could have been an important foothold for the operations of English military aimed at defending the Caspian Sea. Such statements have been also included in the memorandum of 1 January 1919.

At the same time, it should be pointed out that following the occupation of Transcaucasia by British troops, the British authorities did not put forward the political recognition of Georgia as a priority issue, contrary to the conclusions included in the memoranda in question. This was particularly apparent during the 1919 Peace Conference. In contrast, they put a much stronger emphasis on the situation in Russian Armenia and Azerbaijan. This change stemmed from the need to determine the future of mandatory Russian Armenia jointly with Turkish Armenia and to solve the Armenian issue in Turkey. In the case of Azerbaijan, on the other hand, it was caused by the need to work out concessions for British companies concerning the export of Azerbaijani oil.

The above memoranda were also complemented by two short notes. The author or authors of ‘Note A’ pointed out that Eastern Anatolia and Transcaucasia were rich in abundant natural resources and fertile soils, which meant that under French administration, these areas could develop economically at a rapid pace. The tone of the note made it clear that from the point of view of British interests, giving up this region and letting the Paris government assume control over it. The last document, referred to as ‘Note B’, highlighted the importance of Britain’s involvement in the military action against the Ottoman Empire for the Entente’ s victory over the Central Powers.

Based on the analysed documents, one could come to the conclusion that despite pointing out that the question of British policy toward Transcaucasia and Dagestan should not be conflated with the great power’ s s policy toward Turkish Armenia and the Middle East, the authors of the memoranda continued to mention the importance of the South Caucasus in London’s policy from the point of view of the superpower’s Asian operations. The threat of strengthening France’s influence in the Middle East at the expense of Britain in the event that Paris extends its influence over part or all of Transcaucasia with a mandate was made clear. In addition to this, the authors of these analyses were concerned about Russia’ s new push for southwards expansion in Asia, which would come at the expense of British interests.

These threats to British influence in the Near and Middle East led to repeated mentions and suggestions that London should support Georgia, Armenia and, to a lesser extent, Azerbaijan – the states that could establish a bloc curbing both French and Russian expansion in Asia.

Another important common element of the memoranda is the emphasis on Georgia’ s special role in the South Caucasus, in spite of the fact that their authors continued to ignore the issue of the existence of already independent states in this region. They also repeatedly mentioned the ability of the Georgians to build a state, followed by Russian Armenians. What is more, they vehemently denied the ability of Azerbaijan to become an independent state.

It seems that in 1919, the British government decided to forgo the recommendation of recognising the Transcaucasian states, as mentioned in the many memoranda, stemming from the political and military support for the Volunteer Army and its commander, General Anton Denikin, who opposed the independence of Transcaucasia among the authorities in London. January 1920 marked a return to this policy, when the de facto independence of the South Caucasus republics was eventually recognised.[4] Given the geopolitical situation at the time, with the growing influence of Bolshevik Russia in the North Caucasus, this decision had virtually no political significance.

At the same time, the January analysis and earlier documents also pointed out the importance of maintaining good relations between the United Kingdom and Russia. Above all, the authors highlighted that such a policy was necessary – in particular in the context of Azerbaijan, so that the British government would not be accused in the future by the authorities of a restored Russia of interfering in its internal affairs, especially in an event the South-Eastern Caucasus would once again fall under the Russian rule. The fears of a negative Russian reaction were much lesser in the context of greater British political involvement in Georgia and Russian Armenia. The documents have also reiterated the importance of military control of Batumi by England, which would indirectly enable military control of the entire Transcaucasia by the British Empire.

Naturally, the question of how the British authorities were going to try and realise the assumptions listed in these memoranda in 1919 and 1920 remains open. There are no doubts that the British authorities made an attempt at supporting the governments of the Transcaucasian states in order to form an obstacle to curb the possible future Russian expansion to the south. This was immediately evident by observing the military representatives of the British authorities in the South Caucasus. In contrast, the London government’s support of the anti-Bolshevik Volunteer Army led by General Anton Denikin, which operated in the North Caucasus, led to the separation of the question of the future of Dagestan, which was part of the North Caucasus and therefore considered a sphere of influence for the Volunteer Army, from the question of Transcaucasia.

What is more, despite the memoranda authors’ emphasis on the need for the British government to support an independent Georgia, the question of the future of Russian Armenia had turned out to be a far more important aspect of London’ s Transcaucasian policy in 1919, partly due to the emerging plans to establish an Armenian mandate, brought up during the meetings of the Paris Peace Conference. What is more, Great Britain conceded its ambitions to continue its military presence in South Caucasus and to establish a mandate, when it became apparent that it could have led to the need to greatly expand the military contingent in the region. Until at least July 1920, the government made efforts to keep Batumi under British military control, as it was aware of the military and economic importance of this Black Sea port.

Other than Armenia, the question of determining the superpower’s policy towards Azerbaijan remained a major issue in London’s Transcaucasian policy in 1919 – in particular following the assessments of the authors of the analysed memoranda, who claimed that the Azerbaijani people would be unable to establish an independent state. Besides, it seems that this assessment of the national and state aspirations of the Azerbaijani people might have been unfair, as they had no less right than Georgians and Armenians to establish a sovereign state, given the political upheaval that took place in Russian Azerbaijan in 1917 and in 1918. The reality of the situation in the South-Eastern Caucasus, coupled with the need to enable the export of Azerbaijani oil by British companies as well as the urge to assuage the situation in the region by pacifying the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhchivan, meant that British representatives in Transcaucasia had to treat the Azerbaijani government as a partner in the process of making various decisions about the future of the eastern part of the South Caucasus.

At the same time, from the point of view of the analysed memoranda and the changes in the South Caucasus in 1919–1921, the stabilising role of the British presence was greatly overstated. One could conclude that the British did not appreciate the highly complicated nature of the ethnic, religious, political and territorial circumstances of Transcaucasia. As a result, the British military, accustomed to colonial rule in India, was unable to bring lasting peace to the region. Besides, it is reasonable to think that any Entente power that would attempt to assume control over the South Caucasus would be unable to handle the tensions in the region.

In 1919–1920 the region saw a dynamic change of the circumstances concerning southern Russia and the North Caucasus, with the initial dominance of the Volunteer Army followed by the victory of Bolshevik Russia. What is more, Eastern Anatolia also saw a period of upheaval resulting from the rise of the nationalist movement in Turkey. All of these factors have caused the proposed assumptions of British policy towards Transcaucasia in the presented memorabilia to become obsolete and lose their relevance in 1919–1920. The previous belief that the French expansion in Eastern Anatolia could potentially threaten British interests in the region was superseded by a new threat – the Turkish nationalist (Kemalist) movement, which led Turkey to regain part of Transcaucasia that the Ottoman Empire had lost in the 19th century. On the other hand, the concerns about the expansionism of the renewed Russian state was quickly pushed out by the fears of the expansion of a new Bolshevik Russia, which used – in addition to the old-fashioned and traditional methods of political, economic and military expansion – a new tool in the form of ideological expansion and communist propaganda. Naturally, the authors writing their analyses in late 1918 and early 1919 would be hard-pressed to take into account these two new factors shaping the situation in Transcaucasia and the neighbouring regions – Kemalist Turkey and Bolshevik Russia. On the other hand, it seems that reading these British documents from late 1918 and early 1919 may be of interest from the standpoint of the analysis of Britain’s policy in the future towards the South Caucasus and Eastern Anatolia pursued in 1919–1921.

DOCUMENTS

(signature: National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 29/2: Cabinet Office: International Conference: Minutes and Papers ‘P’ (Peace) Series)

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COMMITTE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE5

PEACE

‘P’ SERIES

PAPERS 35-117

(WITH SUBJECT INDEX)

VOL. II

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Printed for the use of the War Cabinet[7]. January 1919

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PEACE CONFERENCE

MEMORANDUM ON ARMENIA AND TRANS-CAUCASIA

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W

January 1, 1919

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NOTE. – This Memorandum on Armenia and Trans-Caucasia, intended for the guidance of our Delegates at the Peace Conference, was prepared by Sir Erle Richards, and is now circulated as a draft, in order to elicit any criticisms or alterations which the War Cabinet may wish to make.

ARMENIA AND TRANS-CAUCASIA

INTRODUCTORY

1. THE territories described as Armenia in this Memorandum may be taken broadly to be the Turkish six vilayets of Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, Sivas, Kharput, and Diarbekr. They are shown in Map No. 1[8] (Appendix), and include the area coloured yellow and the northern and eastern parts of the blue area. The exact boundaries of these territories, and in particular the eastern boundary of the yellow area towards Erivan and Kars, and the southern boundary in the blue area towards Adana and Alexandretta are as yet undetermined.

2. Under the Agreements of 1916 (Appendices, Nos. 3, 4[9]) the blue area was to become part of the French sphere and the yellow area of the Russian sphere. But Russia having dropped out of war the arrangements in regard to her lapse. Apart, therefore, from the question, as to the enforcement of the agreement with France, the future control of the yellow sphere falls to be determined at the Peace Conference.

3. The territories described as Trans-Caucasia comprise the three new States of Trans-Caucasia proper, namely, Georgia, Russian Armenia, and Azerbaijan, together with the new State of Daghestan, which, though it lies north of the Caucasian range, may conveniently be treated as part of Trans-Caucasia for the purpose of the present discussion. These territories are shown on Map No. 2[10] (Appendix)

For convenience of reference this memorandum is arranged as follows:

(A) Armenia, p. 2

I . Importance; population, p. 2.

II. Position before the War-Treaties-Turkish policy, p. 2.

III. Our Commitments in regard to Armenia, p. 3.

IV. General policy:

(a.) Establishment of an independent Armenia, p. 4.

(b.) Mandatory Power, p. 4.

(B.) Trans-Caucasia (including Daghestan), p. 5.

I. Description, p. 5.

II. History, p. 5.

III. Military operations in the present War, p. 5.

IV. The new Trans-Caucasian States:

(a.) Georgia, p. 6.

(b.) Daghestan, p. 6.

(c.) Russian Armenia (the ‘Republic of Erivan’), p. 6.

(d.) Azerbaijan, p. 7.

Policy as to recognition-guiding principles, p. 7.

V. Mandatory Power, p. 7.

Conclusion, p. 8.

Appendix, p. 9.

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(A.)-ARMENIA

(I.) –Importance-Population.

1. Armenia is of importance politically because it constitutes an open gateway between the East and the West; and commercially in the main because of its mineral wealth (notably oil and copper)

2. There are no reliable statistics as to the population, and estimations very considerably. According to one calculation there were, before the war, altogether alone 2,900,000 Armenians: in Turkey 1,500,000; in Russia 1,000,000; in Persia 150,000; in Europe, America, and East Indies, 250,000. Another estimate gives the total number of Armenians in the world as nearly as 4,000,000. The Armenian population in Turkey was recently reduced considerably as a result of the massacres; indeed, it is stated that of 1,800,000 solus a third of them thus perished. (See infra, p. 3)

(II.)-Position before the War-Treaties-Turkish Policy.

1.In the early part of the nineteenth century Sultan Mahmoud adopted an anti-feudal, centralizing policy, which benefited the Armenians intellectually and economically. The Turks regarded with fear this Armenian progress, but the Armenians, being scattered over Ottoman territory and being in a minority everywhere, had no rallying-pont for a national revolt (such as the Greeks had). Indeed the aim was to preserve the integrity of the Turkish Empire rather than to assail it, and to secure an understanding with the Turks. This aim appeared to be realisable about the middle of the century, when Ottoman Administration showed signs of adopting more liberal views, thanks to the policy of the Sultan Mahmoud and the influence of Great Britain and France. A Constitution (with Central and Provincial Councils) was promulgated for Armenia (1852).

2. But, later, events took a different turn owing to the crisis through which the Empire passed in 1875-1878, with the revolt of the subject Christian populations, and to its effect on the new Sultan, Abdul-ul-Hamid (who ascended the throne in 1876). Thenceforth is policy was set to the nationalities against each other, the Armenians (along with the Macedonians) being his special victims.

3. When, in the Russo-Turkish War, the Sultan sued for peace, the Treaty of San Stefano was concluded (1878), whereby (article 16) he undertook to carry out reform ‘in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and guarantee their security against the Kurds and Circassians’. A scheme was then approved for establishing the provincial autonomy of the six vilayets of Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, Sivas, Kharput (Memuret-el-Aziz) and Diarbekir, but this was disregarded as soon as the Russian evacuation of the Armenian plateau was made certain.

4. In the Treaty of Berlin, the 13th July, 1878, a similar engagement to the six Power was substituted for that to Russia. Article 61 was as follows:-‘The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, with further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds. It will periodically make known the steps take to this effect to the Powers who will superintend their application .’ The Porte further promised complete religious liberty, with the protection of sacred places and persons. (It will be noted that article 61 is couched in general terms; it does not refer specially to the six vilayets, nor does it make any other geographical limitation.)

5. Also in the Cyprus Convention, the 4th June, 1878, the Sultan pledged himself to the Great Britain to introduce necessary reforms ‘for the protection of the Christians and other subjects of the Porte’ in the Turkish territory in Asia.

6. As the result of the Berlin Treaty, the Armenians ceased to look to Russia for sole protection; and, as the Sultan ignored his engagements, the Powers presented a collective note (June 1880) to the Porte reminding it thereof, but it failed to produce a satisfactory result.

7. In 1881 a circular Note from Great Britain to the five Powers was evasively answered. In Russia an anti-Armenian policy was adopted after the assassination of Alexander II (1881), the friend of Armenia; and, in the case of Germany, Bismarck intimated (1883) that his country cared nothing about Armenian reforms, and that the matter had better be shelved.

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8. In these circumstances the Armenian nationalists determined to secure their object by means of such disturbances as had brought about amelioration in Bulgaria. On the other hand, the governing authorities instigated the nomad Kurds and the Moslem Arabs against the Christian Armenians; the formed were armed and the latter disarmed. In 1894 the Sultan called upon his loyal subjects to aid in suppressing an alleged revolt, and the brutal massacre at Sasun followed, in which Turkish troops took part. It was later established (November 1894) that there had been no attempt at revolt to justify the action of the authorities.

9. In the winter of 1894-1895, the British Government-with lukewarm support from France and Russia-pressed for administrative reforms in the six vilayets, but was met with unsatisfactory counter-proposals. The three Powers then submitted a scheme (May 1895), but Sultan resorted to dilatory tactics. Russia, however, refused her consent to coercion proposed by Great Britain.

10. A series of massacres followed: on October 1-8,1895, at Trebizond[14], where armed men from Constantinople took part; June 14-22, 1896 at Van, Egin, and Niksar; August 1896, at Constantinople, where from 6,000 to 7,000 Gregorian Armenians perished in two days.

11. The massacres, which occurred nearly always in the six vilayets, were organised deliberately and carried out according to prepared plans. In some places the troops and police took an active part. Where the authorities intervened the massacres ceased. The perpetrators were not punished; indeed, many were rewarded. The number of victims is estimated variously at from 100,000 to 600,000. Many were deported, many forced to embrace Islam, and numbers were reduced to poverty. Many emigrated to the Russian Caucasus and to the United States.

The complicity of the Porte is established by the following facts:-

(1.)The organised procedure;

(2.)The participation of the local authorities (including the soldiery and the police);

(3.)The attacks being confined almost entirely to the Gregorian and Protestant Armenians (the Roman Catholics being protected by France and the Orthodox Greeks by Russia).

The British Government alone endeavoured to put stop this murderous conduct of the Turks. The pressure applied appeared to have some effect for the time being, but soon afterwards the old inhuman policy was resumed.

12. The Armenian nationalists, undeterred by such wholesale slaughter, continued their propaganda, and further massacres occurred here and there, notably at Mush (1904) and Van (1908). After the overthrow of Abdul-ul-Hamid and the establishment of the new Constitution (1908), the Armenian people, hoping that the wide breach made by the old régime between themselves and the Ottoman States would be remedied, espoused the cause of the Young Turk regime. But shortly afterwards (1909) a massacre took place at Adana.

13. In the Balkan wars, when the Turks were fighting for their existence, the Armenians, who had been allowed to bear arms since 1908, fought loyally by their side in order to save the Ottoman Empire.

14. But when Turkey declared war against Russia in 1914 the Armenians were regarded with suspicion and disarmed. Then followed the deportations and massacres on large scale than ever. They were undeniably organised and carried out by the Turkish Government, which was animated by an Ottomanising fanaticism. Lord Bryce’ s[15] Report (Cd. 8325) refutes the Turkish contentions as to wrongful conduct on the part of Armenians, proves that the war was not cause but an opportunity for the atrocities, shows the complicity of the Young Turk Government, sets forth the procedure adopted, and calculates that out of 1,800,000 Armenians a third perished, a third are still alive in their place of exile, and the remainder were either forcibly converted to Islam, fled into hiding in the mountains, or escaped from Ottoman territory.

III.-Our Commitments in regard to Armenia.

1.To the Armenians.-We are not bound to the Armenians by any contractual obligations. But we are morally committed to them, first, by article 61 of the Berlin Treaty (which has already been mentioned); secondly, by promises made by our spokesmen from time to time during the war, of the friendship succour, and of emancipation

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from the Turkish yoke (e.g., Mr. Lloyd George’ s speech of the 6th January 1918*), thirdly, by a written statement contained in the reply of the Allies (January 1917) to the American note to the effect that one of their war aims is ‘the liberations of the peoples who now lie beneath the murderous tyranny of the Turks’, fourthly the acceptance of President Wilson’ s Fourteen Points as the basis for the conclusion of armistice, his eight point demanding autonomous development for the non-Turkish nationalities of the Ottoman Empire.

2. To (a) France and (b) Russia.-Our engagements to France and Russia in respect of the Armenians were made during the war by the Agreements of April-May 1916 (See Appendix). (a) Cilicia and the greater part of the three Armenian vilayets o Sivas, Kharput, and Diarbekir, were incuded (‘included’- amendment by the author of the article) in the blue area (see Appendix, Map I) assigned to France, wherein we recognised her right to establish such administration or control as she may require. (b.) The remaining vilayets of Erzurum, Van, and Bitlis as well as the vilayet of Trebizond, were included in the yellow area assigned to Russia.

3. The part of the agreement concerning Russia has lapsed, because of her withdrawal from the war contrary to her previous undertaking.

IV. –General Policy.

(a.)Establishment of an Independent Armenia.

In view of our pledges on the one hand, and of our political interests on the other, our policy is to bring about the establishment of an independent Armenia. The particular considerations dictating such a course are as follows:-

1. It is imperative to provide a national home for the dispersed and suffering peoples of the Armenian race, so that they may be enabled to establish such Government as will render more secure than hitherto their life, their property, and their honour, and generally will ensure equal justice for all religious and nationalities. So long as they are scattered in helpless and hopeless minorities in areas inhabited for the most part, by Turks or Kurds, they are subject to oppression and persecution and have no chance of a settled life or autonomous existence.

2. An independent Armenia would constitute a barrier against the Pan-Turanian movement, which, aiming at Turkification inside the Ottoman Empire and at the Turkish Irredentisme outside it, might affect the Caucasus regions, and carry great peril to the countries of the Middle East and East. (there are about 27 million Turks in the world, of whom 8 millions are in Ottoman territory, 16 millions in Russian territory, and about 3 millions in other States.)

3. An independent Armenia would also serve as a barrier against possible aggression on the part of any foreign Powers impelled by ambition or other motives to press forward in the direction of the Arab countries.

4. The establishment of an independent Armenia emancipated from Turkish rule would be means of removing a continuing menace to the peace of the world.

(b.)Mandatory Power.

1. It is generally agreed that after the establishment of an independent Armenia (consisting either of the six vilayets or of a smaller area), and until it stands on secure basis, it will require the advice and assistance of a mandatory Power.

2. Conformably to our general policy of national self-determination an opportunity should be given to the Armenians to determine their own future, if such a course be practicable. But it would be extremely difficult, especially in the present conditions, to ascertain their desire. It seems probable, therefore, that either the Peace Congress or the League of Nations will be called upon to nominate a mandatory.

3. In either case Great Britain should refrain from undertaking any responsibility of from advancing any claims from herself.

4. France and the United States are the only other Powers possible for the purpose.

*‘Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine are in our judgment entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions. What the exact form of that recognition in each particular case should be need not here be discussed, beyond stating that it would be impossible to restore to their former sovereignty the territories to which I have already referred.’-The ‘Times’, January 7, 1918.

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(a.) France.-Under the Sykes-Picot[16] Agreement France has acquired (so far as we are concerned) a direct political interest in the future of the area coloured blue in Map I (Appendix.) If she is to have in addition the area coloured yellow, that must be a matter of bargain, and we should insist on obtaining compensation in Syria and Arabia.

(b.) United States.-It seems unlikely that the United States will be willing to accept the responsibility of controlling the yellow area, or of assuming definite responsibility for a new Armenian State.

5. It is doubtful which of these two Powers would be, from our point of view, the more acceptable mandatory. It is thought that for political reasons the United States would be preferable, but it will be more to our interests to support the claims of France, provided that in return she agrees to revise in our favour the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

(B.)-TRANS-CAUCASIA (INCLUDING DAGHESTAN).

I.-Description

1. Trans-Caucasia was, before the war, part of the Russian province of Caucasia under a Governor-General. The task of Government was always difficult, and a force of some 150,000 men had to be constantly maintained there to keep the regions in order.

2. The area of Trans-Caucasia is 95,000 square miles, and the estimated population on the 1st January, 1915, was 7,500,000. The people consist of a great variety of races, the main elements being Slavs, Turko-Tatars, Georgians, Armenians, Lesghians, and Iranians. Most of the Slavs and Georgians belongs to the Orthodox Greek Church.

II.-History.

Caucasia was conquered by Russia only after persistent efforts extending over a long period, from the time of Peter the Great. Russia assisted the local rulers against the Turks, then became suzerain over certain provinces, and afterwards annexed them (e.g., Georgia, 1801). By the peace of Gulistan (1813) Persia ceded to Russia a portion of Eastern Caucasia, though thirty years’ further warfare was needed to subjugate the mountain tribes. The northern edge of the Armenian plateau was acquired in 1828-1829, and the Caspian coats region of Daghestan in 1831-1832. It was not till 1864 that the Caucasian tribes were finally overcome; whereupon numbers of them left their native lands and emigrated to Turkish territory. In the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 they made a fruitless attempt to regain their independence. Under the Treaty of Berlin (article 58) Russia acquired the districts of Kars, Batum, and Ardahan. In 1903-1904 the whole of the Caucasus was embroiled in a sanguinary civil war as a result of racial feuds and religious fanaticism. The Russian Government was unable to cope with the disorders, which only ceased, through the exhaustion of the combatants, in 1905.

III.-Military Operations in Trans-Caucasia.

1. Following the collapse of Russia, the Turks, with eight divisions, began their advance into the Caucasus about the 13th February, 1918, moving on three general lines-along the coast to Batum, due east to Alexandropol and eventually Baku, and south-east into Persian Azerbaijan. On the 15th April they captured Batum; but their advance on Baku was impeded through friction with Germans. The British were handicapped by their difficult line of the communication and by the hesitating attitude of the population of Baku.

2. On the 1st August the Turks attacked Baku without success.

3. By the 6th August our advanced troops reached Baku, and General Bicharakoff[17], who had withstood the Turkish attack, moved his regular troops north towards Derbend.

4. After several engagements, in which the local troops proved most unsatisfactory, the British force of three battalions and a filed battery evacuated the town on the night of 14-15th September and returned to Enzeli; so that the Turks were enabled to enter.

5. On the 19th September General Allenby’ s[18] offensive began, and the Turks commenced to withdraw most of their troops to Constantinople, and some to Mesopotamia in view of General Marshall’ s[19] expected advance.

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6. The Turks, foreseeing the approaching surrender of their country, were preparing to disband their regular troops (who were, however, to remain in Azerbaijan as subjects of the newly-established republic and part of its army) when the armistice with Turkey was signed on the 30th October.

7. The Turks endeavoured to evade the terms applicable to the Caucasus; but on the 17th November Baku was evacuated by the Turkish forces and occupied by the British.

8. Thus the military situation in December was as follows:-

(a.) The evacuation of the enemy troops was making definite though dilatory progress;

(b.) The appearance of a British brigade at Baku, Batum, and Tiflis had a stabilising effect on the railway and oil situation; and kept the port of Baku available for British naval operations on the Caspian.

IV.-The New Trans-Caucasian States.*

An attempt to set up a Trans-Caucasian Federal Government, with Tiflis as the capital, was made at an earlier stage of the war, but it proved a failure. Trans-Caucasia in now divided into four States, each claiming to be independent, namely Georgia, Daghestan, Russian Armenia (the ‘Republic of Erivan’), and Azerbaijan. Georgia and Azerbaijan (which are nearly the same size) are the largest of these States and Russian Armenia is the smallest. (See Appendix, Map II.)

Georgia.-This is the most highly-developed, progressive, and cultured of these States.† It comprises a compact territory with railways and suitable ports. It has an independent history; for more than 2,000 years it was the most powerful State in Caucasia. It is now practically homogeneous in language, and nearly so in religion. After it declared its independence on the break-up of the short-lived Trans-Caucasian Federation, it made terms both with the Turks and the Germans. To the Turks it ceded the Mussulman areas around Batum, when that place was handed back to Turkey by the Bolsheviks.

Georgia has the strongest claims to early recognition of its independence. The question of its independence, however, is somewhat complicated by the fact that Batum, its main port, is a place of international importance. In these circumstances it is desirable to make Batum, and also Poti, free ports; and to secure freedom of transit along the railway from Batum to Baku. It is desirable to include within the boundaries of Georgia the Moslem Georgians of Batum and Lazistan.

2. Daghestan.-This is a little mountain State on the west of the Caspian and on the northern spurs of the Caucasian range, and is not easily accessible from the Russian steppes. The Daghestanis, who are Moslems, speaking many languages, and with very little cohesion, were subjugated with great difficulty by Russia. The country is of commercial importance because it contains the coast railway from Petrovsk to Grozhny (with its oil wells), Derbend (one of the few ports on the west coast of Caspian), and Baku. All reasons-geographical, racial, &c.-tend to throw Daghestan into the orbit of Russia rather than that of Trans-Caucasia, but Russia would no doubt have to fight long to regain it. For the moment the independent existence is not very secure.

It would appear, from the evidence submitted to the Foreign Office, that the Daghestanis might ultimately desire to join a Tatar State in Azerbaijan, if such were brought into existence.

The recognition of the independence of Daghestan would at present be premature as it must necessarily depend on the march of events, and the successful assertion of a de facto autonomous existence.

3. Russian Armenia (the ‘Republic of Erivan’).-This is small State lying south of Georgia and east of Turkish Armenia. It proclaimed itself a republic in May 1918, with its capital at Erivan, and still has some kind of existence.

The Armenian population, which now include refugees from Turkish Armenia, is mixed with Azerbaijanis and Kurds.

The territory is not self-sufficing geographically, since it has no sea-board.

It has been suggested that it should form part of the proposed lager Armenia; but certain reasons have been advanced to show that such policy is inexpedient:-

(a.) There is a difference between the aims and aspirations of the Russian Armenians and those of the Turkish Armenians. It is doubtful if they will wish to join, though a recent expression of opinion is in the affirmative.

*See infra, p. 19.† See infra, pp. 17, 20.

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(b.) Many Russian Armenians have great interests in Baku.

(c.) If France is to be the tutelary Power of the new Armenia, there are strategical reasons against the incorporation therein of Russian Armenia.

If Russian Armenia is not united to Turkish Armenia then the recognition of its independence is a question depending on future developments, as in the case of Daghestan.

4. Azerbaijan.-This State is bounded on the north by Daghestan and Georgia, on the west by Russian Armenia, on the south by Persian Azerbaijan, and on the east by the Caspian Sea. The principal towns are Baku and Elizabetopol[20]. The population contains Armenian elements, who are hostile to the Azerbaijanis.

At the moment the government is in hands of the Tatars landowners, and a difficulty arises from its attitude, which is pro-Turk, anti-Armenians, and anti-Persian. The people aspire to join themselves with their brethren across the Persian border, and to set up a Turkish State in that part of the world. The problem created for us is therefore that whilst on general grounds we might welcome a new State there, the from it seems likely to assume might well prove to be a menace to us.

As to recognition of its independence, it is impossible to accord it at present for the same reasons as apply to Daghestan and Russian Armenia.

Our General Policy as to Recognition of Independence.

The establishment of strong, independent States - off-shoots of the former Russian Empire – is not incompatible with our interests. But with regard to the actual our general policy should, as far as possible, be one of non-committal, and may be expressed in the two following propositions:-

(1.) We ought not to do anything that might suggest that we are indifferent to their claims to independence, because we contemplate a possible resuscitation of Russia in the future.

(2.) On other hand, we ought not to take any step that would be in conflict with such resuscitation or with a possible Russian reunion at a later date; that is, our course, while not lacking in sympathy with the aspirations of the nascent republics, should be such as would cause a minimum of resentment and bitterness to a reconstituted Russia, and leave her no ground for complaining that we had taken advantage of her temporary helplessness.

V.-Mandatory Power.*

It is not improbable that a tutelary Power will be necessary for a period, in order to assist the States to establish themselves on affirm basis, and also to safeguard the railway from Batum to Baku, and the pipe-line, which are great international concerns.

Only three Powers are eligible for the task, namely, Great Britain, France, and the United States. Russia and Italy have also been suggested, but it is though that they may be ruled out; and the smaller European Powers are ineligible, as they have not sufficient military force and prestige behind them.

At present the British military forces, as has already been stated, are in occupation of Baku, Batum, and Tiflis, in order to protect the railway and the pipe-line, and to keep open a base on the Caspian for the British naval forces. The presence of these troops in Trans-Caucasia and the contiguity of that area to regions of direct political interest to Great Britain render it probable that the British will be called upon to maintain a provisional occupation. There are strategic reasons in favour of the retention by Great Britain of some control over a route which offers access to India. These reasons are stated in a memorandum by the General Staff (see Appendix, No. 9). The same reasons point to the conclusion that the vesting of the control in France would be opposed to British interests. The presence of the United States in Trans-Caucasia would not be open to the same degree of objection, but is not desired, and it seems very unlikely that she would consent to undertake the task. On the other hand, the acceptance by Great Britain of the duties of the mandatory Power in Trans-Caucasia would be a serious extension of her responsibilities. If. Therefore, these duties were pressed upon Great Britain at the Peace Conference they could only be accepted after a complete investigation of the liabilities they entail, and of the

*See infra, pp. 20. 21.

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resources necessary to fulfil [‘fulfill’ – note from the author of article] them. It seems more probable that temporary military occupation of the two main ports and the railway will be necessitated, in international as much as in local interests; and if for any reason Great Britain is unable or unwilling to continue the task the alternative of an international force may have to be considered.

CONCLUSION.

The following conclusions, delivered from the above considerations, have been adopted by the Eastern Committee[21]:-

I.-Armenia.

1. It is essential to establish an independent Armenia, comprising either the six vilayets or a smaller area, and to place it provisionally under the protection of the Great Power conformably to the mandate of a League of Nations or the option of the people concerned.

2. Great Britain should refrain from advancing any claims, and should support the United States or France-preferably France, if she consent to revise the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 in our favour.

II.-Trans-Caucasia.

1. It is necessary to set up in Trans-Caucasia a number of independent States.

2. Of these Georgia, being the most progressive, has the strongest claim to early recognition. It is desirable to include within its boundaries the Moslem Georgians, Batum and Lazistan. (This conclusion is conditional on No. 9 below).

3. Recognition of the remaining States, viz., Daghestan, Azerbaijan, and Russian Armenia, must depend on the course of events and on their successful assertion of their de facto independence.

4. Whether Russian Armenia shall be separate State or shall be joined to Turkish Armenia must be determined in the main by the populations concerned; but from our point of view it is expedient to keep it separate, if France be the mandatory for Turkish Armenia.

5. Whether the Trans-Caucasian States combine hereafter in a federation or prefer to remain separate is a matter of their own determination.

6. Similarly their relation to the present of future Government or Governments of Russia is a matter that must be settled with their own consent.

7. The services of a Great Power are necessary for a period to promote peace and stability in these States, and specially to protect the international interests involved. The selection of the United States would be preferable to that of France for political and strategic reasons, but is not in itself desirable. Only in the last resort, and reluctantly, might Great Britain accept the task provisionally if pressed to do so by the Peace Conference or a League of Nations, as the case may be, and subject to such guarantees as will make it unnecessary to maintain large British forces in the region concerned.

8. For the time being Great Britain must maintain naval control of the Caspian Sea.

9. Batum, Poti, Trebizond, and Baku should be declared free ports, and free transit on the railway from Batum to Baku should be secured.

10. The international interests in the city and oil-fields of Baku should be safeguarded by special arrangement.

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(…)

[Documents 1-5 on the agreements between the Entente Powers on the division of spheres of influence in the former Ottoman Empire signed in 1916-1917, which were attached to the memorandum of January 1, 1919, are not included in this article because they are commonly known and do not concern Georgia and the South Caucasus.]

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No. 6.

FOREIGN OFFICE MEMORANDUM ON THE FUTURE SETTLEMENT OF TRANS-CAUCASIA, WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO BRITISH INTERESTS. NOVEMBER 1, 1918.

(Based on P.I.D. Russia/016.)

1. THE future of Trans-Caucasia is part of the general problem of the future of the Russian Border States, though it has special features. The establishment of an armistice with Turkey, especially if this opens up the Black Sea to the British fleet, will make it both possible and urgently necessary to consider at once the lines of a future settlement of these districts. It is suggested that the wisest plan would be that any settlement should start from the principle of self-determination; this would imply the recognition of Georgia, Armenia, and Tatars as free independent States, which it is hoped will ultimately come into federal union with one another. This would also imply that they should be free, at any rate in the meantime, from Russian dominion, and that the Caucasus should become the frontier of a restored Russia. The possibility of their voluntary return into a stable and liberalized Federation of Russian States should not, however, be absolutely foreclosed.

2. All this almost necessarily implies, however, that it may be necessary to depute some Western Power to watch over, assist and control these nationalities in their efforts with self-government, and if some such sort of control was found to be necessary, it would of course be most convenient since no suitable Government is likely to be established in Russia for a considerable period, that this duty should be delegated by the Peace Conference either to Great Britain-an extension of a Mesopotamian Protectorate,-or to the United States of America, because of her Anatolian and Armenian interests.

3. The first desideratum, of course, is the withdrawal of all Turkish and German forces, including all individuals, whether civilian or military, who may have been left behind for the purpose of propaganda. This particularly important with regard to Georgia. In addition to being the most compact and homogeneous, Georgia to-day is probably the most advanced, politically and economically, of the three nationalities. During the later years of war the Georgians have been the special object of German attention, both on account of their racial characteristics and the potential wealth of their country. Latterly, in face of force majeure, and particularly in order to withstand the aggressive designs of the Turks, the German orientation of the Georgians became distinctly pronounced, although they have never committed themselves in a degree comparable, for example, to that of Finland. Several independent sources testify to their desire to be absolutely free from German domination. There seems to be no doubt that certain far-reaching business contracts have been entered into between the German authorities and the Georgian Government, sometimes with Swedes as intermediaries for the exploitation, for example, of the manganese deposits. So far as anything in the nature of commercial treaties has been entered into between these Government, a demand should be made for their cancellation; while, on the other hand, in view of British trade interests, Batum should be declared a free port, as was provided for in the Treaty of 1878, with free access by railway to Armenia, Baku, Persia, and Central Asia.

4. The Georgian claim for independence is based upon their historical continuity from the third century (B.C.), and the maintenance of their political independence till 1801 under a series of most trying circumstances and invasion. The Georgians are not merely anxious to state their claims to independence under the principle of self-determination endorsed by the Allies, but also on their treaty rights of 1783 with Russia, which were violated by that country. De jure Georgia has full right to determine her position. In this respect she is in a stronger position than any other nationality in the former Russian Empire, for she was never conquered by Russia. The boundaries of a soundly historic and ethnographic Georgia can be traced at any rate provisionally, although complications may arise in more than one border district, owing to the influx of Armenian refugees in past decades, and expressions of doubt as to the orientation of certain Moslem Georgian elements. Owing to the ravage of war, all pre-war statistics and population-distributions are more or less untrustworthy to-day, the whole situation seems to call for investigation on the spot by a joint Allied Commission.

5. The Armenian claim for independence, or, to express it otherwise, the formation of an Armenian protectorate under an international guarantee with mandatory power to one of the guarantors, would naturally involve the union of the six Turkish vilayets and

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Kilikia, and the Russian Armenian provinces. This represents the main current of Armenian opinion. It is possible, however, that such a union, which must come about if there is to be any Armenia at all, will not be favourably regarded by all Russian Armenians, some of whom have never professed any interest in their compatriots of Turkish Armenia, and may even prefer to remain linked with Russia rather than enter such a united Armenia. A territory of this extent, with an outlet to the Black Sea at Trebizond, is greatly disproportionate to the present Armenian population, and would be shared to a very large extent with the Kurds, whose rights would require to be safeguarded. There is some reason to suppose that these two peoples would not have great difficulty in coming to an understanding if left to settle matters by themselves, i.e. apart from Russian or Turkish intriguing and interference, under the aforesaid Protectorate.

6. The third element is the potential Tatar Republic, comprising the Governments of Baku and Elisabetopol, to which Daghestan on the North and Persian Azerbaijan are added in the minds of Tatar and Turkish expansionists like Enver Pasha.[22] The crux of the situation is the question of the ability of a possible Tatar element composed of Baku and Elisabetopol to form a self-governing element alongside of Georgia and Armenia; for if this is not possible, it would be difficult to avoid handing these last elements back to Russia, which raises the final question of the relation of these three elements to Russia.

7. We assume then that the Georgians are able to conduct their own affairs, and the Armenian Protectorate likewise able to be self-maintaining; and it may be pointed out that other countries, like Modern Greece, have not been at any more advanced stage of political development than these two elements are to-day, at the time that independence was given to them. At the present moment, so far as indications go, the onus of disproof of the ability of the Tatar element also to maintain itself in co-operation with and alongside of the other two, would seem to lie with those who are opposed to the idea of the formation and federation of the three Trans-Caucasian States, and while the question of their possible future reunion with Russia ought not to be foreclosed, the following considerations ought to be borne in mind:-

8. The Russian elements in Trans-Caucasia numbered at the beginning of the war 280,000, including an army of 150,000, out of some 7,000,000. In view of the collapse of German aspirations beyond the Danube, it looks as if the keystone of British policy with regard to the Farther East may need to be the assumption of a protectorate over these three Trans-Caucasian elements or at least the furnishing of them with assistance towards their development as political unities on ethnographical lines. From this point of view it is therefore a serious question whether it may not be better to discourage Russian advance beyond Cis-Caucasia , that is to say, confine her to the northern side of the Caucasus, thus making Trans-Caucasia a barrier to any future Russian aspirations towards the south-east. For it is advisable not to close our eyes to the fact that the populations to the north west of the Caucasus are the Kuban and Don Cossacks. The Ukraine also has a large Cossack element, and it is probable that sooner or later these elements will attempt to revive the old Russian policy of aggressive expansion towards the south-east. This policy may also be stimulated by the pressure of immigration from Northern Russia, unless this can be diverted regularly towards Siberia; but, on other hand, the attraction of the warmer south and its waters will always be irresistible. With an internationalized Dardanelles, Russian aggressive movement beyond the Caucasus could only be predatory in purpose, and the difficulty of restoring Baku to Russia lies in the fact that if she is given any footing in Trans-Caucasia she will inevitably attempt to recover all her former possessions. With the oil-fields of Grozny and Maikop and the ports of Derbend and Petrovsk she will not suffer essential loss or means of direct communication with her Trans-Caspian possessions.*

9. At the moment, the Ukraine appears to be working hand in hand with the reactionary elements in Great Russia, with the object of assuming some power of attorney for all Russia at the Peace Conference. It is probable that the Ukraine will press for the association of Eastern Galicia, Bessarabia, and the whole of the Caucasus on the pretence of creating a federation of these centres; and the present pressure of the Kuban Cossacks towards the Sukhum district is probably instigated by military considerations with a view to keeping the door along the Black Sea open for a later invasion of the whole of Trans-Caucasia.

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* The main objection to this policy lies in the circumstance that, under the Supplementary Treaty between Germany and Russia, the town of Baku was felt to Russia, and it might be invidious for the Allies to impose upon Russia terms more disadvantageous than those allowed by Germany. Moreover, the oilfields of Baku are of really vital interest both to Russian and to European industry.

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No. 7.

FOREIGN OFFICE MEMORANDUM ON A POSSIBLE TERRITORIAL POLICY IN THE CAUCAUS REGIONS, NOVEMBER 7, 1918.

1. APART from the Armenian provinces of Turkey, there are four separate areas calling for special consideration: (1), Georgia; (2), Russian Armenia; (3), Russian Azerbaijan; and (4), Daghestan.

2. Persian Azerbaijan and Turkish Armenia are not discussed in this memorandum. The former will not be involved in the peace settlement, since we are practically pledged to secure Persia’ s integrity. The latter constitutes a separate problem.

3. The areas here considered all belonged to the Russian empire before the revolution. The three first are separated from European Russia by the Caucasus range; whilst Daghestan, though on the north side of the main chain, is a mountainous province not easily accessible from the Russian steppes.

4. All four areas are non-Russian in nationality (in contrast to the Kuban, Stavropol, and Terek districts which border upon them on the north), and all four have declared their independence since the revolution. They have claimed the right of self-determination, and a practical politician will start with the recognition of this claim. In applying the principle, it will, however, be prudent to follow a course which may be calculated to cause the minimum of resentment and bitterness to a reconstituted Russia, and leave her no ground for complaining that the Allies had taken advantage of her temporary weakness.

5. It would appear safe to begin by recognizing effective national government in any areas in which they have established, in such a form as not prejudge the question of their permanent independence or reintegration with Russia. With this view it may be desirable to contemplate from the outset, and even make provision in some formal declaration, or other instrument, that any arrangement now made or agreed upon shall be regarded as open to reconsideration and revision after the lapse of some fixed time. The League of Nations, if established, might offer the necessary machinery for this purpose. The duration of the provisional settlement should be long enough to allow, on the one hand, of the possibility of a return of Russia to a state of stable political equilibrium, and to permit, on the other hand, of the three South Caucasian States having a fair chance of finding their own feet under the conditions of complete political autonomy guaranteed to them in the interval by the Allies. If Russia recovers rapidly, they might conceivably rejoin her in some federal relation; if the anarchy in Russia lasts many years, their present separation from her will probably be permanent. Our policy towards the Caucasus should be framed to meet either eventuality.

6. If we proceed to build on the provisional foundation of four independent Caucasian States, the question immediately arises whether in fact these four units are strong enough, placed as they are, to stand each by itself, or whether greater stability should be sought by superimposing some system of federation. A more detailed examination of the conditions prevailing in the several territories, as briefly outlined below, will show that there are great practical difficulties in the way of any very close federation, such as would consist in the setting up of a joint legislative body or of federal executive departments of government, and, in the absence of monarchical institutions, even the looser link of a personal union or common sovereign offers no solution. Independent sovereignty, however, of each of four units does not necessarily imply that they will be able to dispense with the active support of some outside Power which would furnish expert advisers and administrators and financial assistance in some shape. If it were to be arranged that such advice and assistance should be given to each of the four States by one and the same foreign Power, this would supply a unifying element sufficiently strong to take the place of the federal link. But even this may prove a counsel of perfection.

7. It is undoubtedly a British interest that regions so near to those countries in the Middle East in which we have a direct stake should not be allowed to lapse into anarchy. On other hand it would be undesirable, because dangerous from the point of view of our future relations with Russia, that England should be the Power whose mandate it was to offer advice and support to the Caucasian States. Our interest would best be served by this task being entrusted to some other Great Power friendly to ourselves, whose assistance would be accepted by the populations concerned. Subject to these general considerations, the situation in each of the several areas may now be examined.

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8. Georgia is a compact territory with suitable ports and railways, inhabited be a population with a tradition of political independence altogether homogenous in language, and nearly so in religion-except for a Moslem minority in the south-west, a minority which would be increased if the Georgian-speaking element over the Turkish border (Lazes) were united with Georgia. It would be comparatively simple to recognise the present independent Georgian Government, though we should have to insist upon its breaking off its special relations with Germany. Foreign assistance in the internal administration of Georgia would be needed little, if at all. As the most compact, and highly developed politically, of the three States, Georgia will probably works best with that Power which would demand least of her and ride her, so to speak, with the lightest bridle. On condition, however, might with advantage be imposed, namely that Batum and perhaps also Poti should be free ports, and that there should be freedom of transit, along the railways in its hinterland, for trade with Azerbaijan, Daghestan, Armenia, Persia, and Central Asia.

9. Russian Armenia is less homogeneous in population than Georgia (the Armenian element being mixed with Azerbaijanis and Kurds), and not self-sufficing geographically, since it has no seaboard. It has also been ravaged by the war, and the position is further complicated by the fact that the Russian Armenians may either now or hereafter desire union with those formerly subject to Turkey. Our natural line of policy would be to recognise the present independent Government (the Armenia ‘Republic of Erivan’), and not to oppose its union with Turkish Armenia if desired. The corollary of such a union would be that whatever foreign Power received the mandate of assisting Turkish Armenia would extend its good offices to the united country.

10. Russian Azerbaijan presents a more difficult problem. There is not a homogeneous population, Armenians and Azerbaijanis being intermingled (and at daggers drawn) in the mountainous districts in the west. Baku, the capital is a cosmopolitan city, containing Armenians, Russians, Persians, Jews, and the people of all nationalities engaged in the oil industry. And the Azerbaijanis are a comparatively backward Moslem Turkish-speaking race, who are probably incapable in their present stage of establishing an orderly, civilized Government, and certainly could not cope, by themselves, with the administration of Baku, where their recent entry has been marked by pillage, and the massacre of the non-Azerbaijani elements. It would hardly be advisable for us to recognise the present independent Government, which has been set up under the aegis of the Turks by the Azerbaijani land-owning class and the handful of Azerbaijani industrials at Baku, the oil industry there being almost entirely in the hand of the other nationalities. The connection of Azerbaijan with Turkey, which rests on community of nationality and religion and a common hostility to the Armenians, will be much harder to break than that of Georgia with Germany. A strong foreign protectorate is therefore desirable. A special problem arises over the Baku oil-fields, the produce of which is vital to the industry and transport of European Russia, and is also of great importance to the rest of the world. Whatever political régime is set up in Azerbaijan, it might be desirable to place the oil-fields under some kind of direct international control on the model, perhaps, of the Danube Commission.

11. Daghestan is a conglomeration of wild Moslem tribes, speaking many languages (none of them Turkish, except along the coast), and with no cohesion, which it took Russia nearly a century to conquer. They are now independent again; but they can hardly be left to themselves, since the railway from Baku to Russia runs through their territory, and the oil-fields of Baku and Grozhny, in which there are important British interests, would be exposed to their raids. Grozhny has in fact been beset by them for many months since the revolution. On geographical grounds there would be much to be said for reunion with Russia, since Daghestan lies on the northern slope of the Caucasus chain. But Russia in her present condition is clearly not competent to reassume her responsibilities in the Daghestan mountains. The task of establishing and maintaining law and order will be a thankless one and possibly formidable, from the military point of view.

12. There remains the selection of the Mandatory Power, which is the crux of the problem. If we approach a solution be a process of elimination, it will probably be conceded that we can begin by ruling out Russia, England and Italy. There remain France, the United States, and the minor European Powers: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Switzerland. Possibly President Wilson may favour one of these minor Power, or make a show of doing so. It is, however, difficult to believe that such a suggestion can survive a serious and honest study of the problem.

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The influence of the Mandatory Power and its capability of exercising authority in any shape must rest either on the exercise, or show, of military force, or upon prestige. None of minor Powers command either. For practical purposes they must be left out the account. That leaves France and the United States.

13. The choice of France present several advantages. The first is that it would probably be welcomed by the Armenians so far as Armenia is concerned. In a recent letter to Mr. Balfour the Armenian National Delegation at Paris have put forward the demand of an independent Armenia, comprising the six vilayets and Cilicia, together with Russian Armenia, if the latter desires to come in, the whole to be under the collective protectorate of the Allied Powers, of whom one should afford assistance as their mandatory during a period of transition. The second argument in favour of chosing France as the mandatory is that this would square with the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916. It might even be possible, by including in the territories covered by the mandate, the four Caucasian States which form the subject of the present memorandum, to induce France to make concessions as regards French claims in Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine.

14. It is of course necessary to remember that France has so far no connection with the Caucasus, and there is no certainty that she would be welcomed by the populations. Nor would her appearance on the northern frontier of Persia be likely to improve our position in that country. This may, however, be regarded as a minor evil, and, provided the consent of the populations was forthcoming, the French solution might well be accepted by us as on the whole satisfactory, especially if the French mandate derived its authority from a league of nations and remained subject to some, however indefinite, control of that nebulous body.

15. It may be urged that a mandate for the United States would on the whole suit us better, although we should thereby lose the lever by which we could hope to make France relinquish some of her inconvenient claims under the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916. There is, unfortunately, little hope that the Americans will be ready to come forward unless we are to assume that their ostensible reluctance is only a pretence and that they would gracefully yield under the friendly and flattering pressure of the rest of the world.

16. A third alternative would be even more in accordance with our interest: that would be to let France be mandatory for Armenia (including Russian Armenia if desired by the inhabitants) and confer the mandate for Georgia, Russian Azerbaijan, and Daghestan on the Americans. But President Wilson would probably be even less willing to accept this arrangement, which would undoubtedly throw upon the United States a considerable and difficult burden, without any countervailing glory or profit.

17. The best hope for a practical solution seems to lie in a French Mandate for Armenia and the South Caucasian territories.

[Memorandum No. 8 of November 21, 1918, presenting the position of the Foreign Office on the future of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula and attached to the Memorandum of January 1, 1919, was omitted in this article because it did not directly concern Georgia and the Transcaucasia.]

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MEMORANDUM BY THE GENERAL STAFF ON THE FUTURE SETTLEMENT OF TRANS-CAUCASIA. (DECEMBER 5, 1918)

(The military aspect of the case)

1. It appears to be contemplated by His Majesty’ s Government that it may be necessary to grant a mandate to some Great Power to ensure the stability of Trans-Caucasia and Daghestan for the future, and that this Power would probably be France,* in which case, the establishment of a French protectorate stretching from Alexandretta to Baku would be implied.

From the military point of view it would be most undesirable for the approaches to India from South Russia, the Black Sea and Turkey in Asia, which converge at Baku, to be placed at the disposal of an ambitious military Power, which, although friendly to us at the moment, is our historical world rival. In fact, it does not appear to the General Staff that any other Power except Great Britain can be permitted by her to function in this matter.

2. The communication which we have to consider are the Russian railway leading from the Ukraine, the Batum-Baku railway, and a potential railway from Alexandretta through Erzerum to Tiflis and Baku, with an important branch to Tabriz threatening either Persia or Upper Mesopotamia.

Should France be placed in a dominating position in the Trans-Caucasia States it is the last named of the above three lines of communication leading from her base at Alexandretta that we should have most to fear. For her situation in virtual possession of the six Armenian vilayets would place her in close contact to the recruiting fields of Anatolia as well as in control of a population comprising Kurds and Armenians, who would provide valuable military material for the French instructors.

3. It may be argued that the above factors can form no real danger so long we maintain

control of the seas. But the question cannot be dismissed so lightly, for during a period of peace, with the present superabundance of war material all over the world, there would be no difficulty for France to put sufficient war material into Armenia to form, from the central position presented to her, a serious menace to our position in India, as well as in Mesopotamia and Egypt.

Also, it must be remembered, that the area which it is contemplated making over to the French is rich in ores of all kinds and might easily become, under an enlightened administration, self-contained regarding military essentials. It is not difficult to imagine munition factories being established at Kharput and Tiflis. (In this connection attention is drawn to Note A.) It is obvious, therefore, that should France to be placed in the position indicated, we should be compelled on our part to maintain abnormally large garrisons in Egypt and Mesopotamia for all time, while the situation would be rich in opportunities for international dissension.

4. A still greater danger would be a potential alliance between a reconstructed Russia and France. Can it be said that the imagination of the French Eastern School fails to visualize such a situation in the future?†

It is, therefore, clear that from the military point of view, we should regard this matter in a wide sense, and our policy should be directed to maintaining a self-contained block in the Middle East between Russia and French sphere of influence on the one hand and between any potential Western combination and the Caspian on the other hand. Fortunately the means are available, provided by the three States of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Russian Armenia, which each have their own national aspirations. This conglomeration of States has been aptly compared to the Balkans, and though no one desire to establish such another cock-pit of future strife, it is for consideration whether even another ‘Balkans’ would not be preferable, from our point of view, to a future liaison between Russia and France towards the Caspian.

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* Vide paragraphs 13 and 14 of Memorandum by Sir Eyre Crowe on possible territorial policy in the Caucasus region, dated Foreign Office, 7th November, 1918 (Appendix 7, supra, page 19).

†France has already claimed that her existing alliance with Russia gives her the right to reconstruct the Russian Army.

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Daghestan is not considered in detail here. It is on the northern side of the Caucasus range, which forms a natural barrier, west of the Caspian, between Russian and British spheres of influence, and its future appears to be a side issue which is not really very material at present from the point of view of the British Empire, though its development must be watched carefully.

5. Accepting for the sake of argument that it is desirable to form some such independent block, as indicated above, it remains for examination how the three States in question should best be treated, i.e. whether they should be set up as three independent States or an attempt made to amalgamate them into on federation; and in this respect too much importance should not be attached to the recent failure of the Trans-Caucasian Central Government, which was a war product and was bound to fail owing to its then isolated position, and the dislocation which occurred on the collapse of the Russian Army.

6. In this, as in all similar problems, it is best to look to communications, when a solution will unfold itself. A glance at map shows:-

(a.) That Georgia controls the railway leading from Batum and Poti to Baku; and

(b.) That Russian Armenia controls any railway leading from Erzerum towards Baku, either by Tiflis junction or by the Araxes valley (as well as the railway into Persia via Tabriz).

An excellent object lesson in this respect has been furnished by the recent clash of German and Turkish interests in these districts, where each side was able to throttle the other by possession of one of these sections of railway.

7. It is apparent then that if we can secure the protection of the railway through Georgia and Russian Armenia we may feel safe as regards any threat towards the Caspian from the West, and can afford to be more or less indifferent as regards the control of Russian Azerbaijan until such times as Russia may have been resuscitated. Even then, provided the Constantinople straits remained open, our sea power could enable us to utilize Batum as a base for operations against the flank of any southward advance from Russia along the western shore of the Caspian.

8. It therefore seems, from the military point of view, that the first essential in Trans-Caucasia is that the British position in Georgia and in Russian Armenia should be firmly established.

9. This makes it necessary that Russian Armenia should be kept separate from Turkish Armenia, or in other words, that the French influence must cease approximately on the line of the pre-war Turco-Russian frontier, and it seems that the maintenance of the present separate entities of Armenia, each of which has its own characteristics and interests, should form the keynote of our Caucasian policy.

It does not seem that we need have any hesitation in pursuing this policy, for the interests of the Russian Armenians lie far more in the wealth of Georgia and Baku than towards future developments in ‘French’ Armenia, while there is believed to be serious divergence of opinion and interest between Russian and Turkish Armenians, and during the recent political rapprochement between the Erivan Government and Constantinople no anxiety was apparent for their junction with their co-religionists in Turkish Armenia.

10. The problem of Georgia presents no great difficulties, for it merely seems necessary to accept the desire of Georgian independence; but it may be remarked that this question will call for an early settlement, as our troops are now on the point of arriving at Batum.

11. It then remains to consider the province of Azerbaijan. This has already established a so-called republic, of which it desires Allied acceptance. It is probable that this State, with its illiterate population, could never stand alone, and that its wealth or resources would render it the prey of international financiers. Probably the best solution for this State would be for us to hold it in pawn until such time as Russia was again prepared to take up its administration, and that during this period the British Fleet should continue to patrol Caspian.

Apart from those of Russia and the three Caucasian States, the interests represented in Baku are not very widely scattered and comprise a few Swedish, Dutch and British companies.

12. As soon as the British troops at Batum and Baku have joined hands an our control has been established astride the railways, including the Tiflis-Julfa line, there seems no reason why the stability which would accompany British administration should not enable us to establish the three States as above, under the guidance of British political officers, and it might seem advisable to establish, with the consent of

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the States concerned, a central council at Tiflis, with representatives of each of them, with the idea of forming a federation. But this suggestion must at present be considered as tentative, and the question could best be decided after the arrival of our troops and political officers on the spot; but in this connection it cannot be too strongly emphasized that a first rate political officer should accompany our troops to Batum.

13. The French would probably urge that it is intolerable that Great Britain, who stands to gain so much by the war, should also expect to extend her influence to these regions,* but we should reply that it is we who have defeated the Turkish Army and that this gives us the right to safeguard our own position in the Middle East. And here it may be emphasized that a tendency is apparent at home and abroad not to make sufficient capital out of great military (not to mention political and administrative) effort put forward by the British Empire in the Turkish theatre of war.

14. At the Dardanelles the British practically single-handed broke the of the Turkish Army, as may be judged by the fact that no Turkish division encountered afterwards in the field was ever up to establishment.

Until the Russian collapse the British and Arabs contained and defeated 30 Turkish divisions, and after the Russian debacle Great Britain shouldered the increased burden and was opposed by 40 Turkish divisions in Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia with such effect that on the day the Armistice was signed only 27 nominal divisions remained of 62 Turkish divisions which had been formed during the war. The legitimacy of this effect from the point of view of our Allies is explained in Note B, and the realization and representation of this fact at the Peace Conference should go far to strengthen the hand of His Majesty’ s Government.

15. The conclusion is that, from the military point of view, our policy should be concentrated on the formation of independent States of Georgia and Russian Armenia, while Azerbaijan should be maintained as a separate entity until Russia is again prepared to take charge, though there would be no objection to the formation of a federal council representing the three above States at Tiflis, should this appear practicable after the arrival of our political officers there.

A case has been stated why it is undesirable to allow a great military Power to establish itself from Alexandretta to the Caspian from a point of view of a potential attack from the West, but at the same time it may be pointed out that the maintenance of a separate block of country in Trans-Caucasia would be equally useful to meet a possible Russo-German threat from the North, for Azerbaijan would not be handed back to Russia, nor would the British naval police force be withdrawn from Caspian until it was clear that Russia had no aggressive policy towards Persia and India.

It will be realized that Georgia faces both ways, and while Batum is accessible to our Navy will always provide a useful base for operations in defence of the Caspian.

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*In this connection it must be remembered that by the Franco-British Agreement of 23rd December, 1917, the whole of the Caucasus (Cis and Trans) lies in the British sphere of activity for intervention and reconstruction in Russia.

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NOTE A.

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Though the economic possibilities of the area which it is contemplated bringing under French control lie in the future, the aptitude of the French for such exploitation is well know, and they would find ample material for really important development, especially when the practical certainty of a great railway running north-eastwards from Alexandretta is considered. Important tracts of the country between Alexandretta and the Caucasus are of great fertility, and under a competent and enlightened government with a powerful financial backing are capable of a large output of agricultural stuffs, and past Turkish performance can form no criterion of what would have to be expected from the French.

The potential resources of the area under consideration may be summarized as follows:-

Transport animals (mules and oxen).

Wool.

Goat’ s hair.

Cotton.-The Araxes valley is already an important producer, as is also to a less extent the Adana plain. A further extension of irrigation will lead to greatly increased output, and cotton will certainly be one of the principal sources of wealth for Trans-Caucasia.

Flax.

Hemp.

Opium.-A most important source of various medical requisites.

Tobacco.-Plantations already exist in Georgia.

Tea.- Plantations already exist in Georgia.

Sugar.- Plantations already exist in Georgia.

Rice.-A beginning has been made in parts of the Araxes and Kura valleys.

Silk.-Silk culture is well established in Zakataly and around Shemakha.

Liquorice.-The Kura valley has for some years exported liquorice to America.

Timber.-Except for Georgia and the Black Sea coast, where there are extensive forests, the area under consideration suffers from a great lack of timber.

Oil.-The Baku oilfields need no comment.

Coal.-Reported in various places in the Turkish zone of the area, but only as lignite. Coal is worked near Kars, and in Georgia at Tkviboli; but the quality of latter is poor for fuel purposes, though it is used as coke for smelting pig-iron and for other metallurgical purposes.

Iron.-There do not appear to be any important deposits in Trans-Caucasia. Rich beds are reported north and west of Alexandretta, in the Central Taurus, and near Erzingan, Kighi and Arghana Maaden.

Copper.-A very valuable mine is worked at Arghana Maaden. Production could be largely increased. Copper is also worked near Batum, near Kars, north of Karaklis, at Kedabegh in the Taurus, and at Lijassi. The copper resources of the area would be very great.

Manganese.-Very rich deposits exist in Georgia at Chiaturi and are already extensively developed.

Magnesinm [‘Magnesium’ – note from the author of article].-Reported in Lazistan.

Zinc.-Already worked in small quantities in Trans-Caucasia.

Antimony.

Asbestos.

Chromite.

Lead.-Already worked in small quantities in Trans-Caucasia.

It will be seen from above that the natural resources of the whole of this region are very great and that, although the mineral resources of Turkey may have been exaggerated in the past, the French would have ample opportunities of successful economic development. The region is amply self-supporting in food, excepting Georgia and Baku town and, if the iron deposits can be developed and the lack of good coal obviated by the utilization of the Baku oil and the abundant water power of Trans-Caucasia, Lazistan and much of the northern part of the Turkish zone of the ‘French’ sphere, there will be good opportunities for the creation of important manufactures, even though any real industrial development on a large scale may only be achieved in the remote future.

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NOTE B.

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LEGITIMACY OF BRITISH EFFORT AGAINST THE TURKS.

It may be argued by the French that our campaign against the Turks had result of withholding troops from a more decisive theatre in France during the critical period of the war, but the legitimacy of our action can best be realized by a consideration of what would really happened if we had not engaged the Turks in the Middle East.

Taking the Turkish Army at a comprehensive total of 50 divisions, it may be assumed that 10 of these would, in any case, have been retained by the Turks for use against the Russians. Had Great Britain then not engaged the remainder in a theatre where she could bring her Indian Army into play undisturbed by submarine warfare, Turkey could have put into France at least 40 divisions of first class fighting material, representing the best part of 500,000 rifles, and this before the British Army had been developed to its present numerical and material strength for the assistance of France. We could only have attempted to counter this by transporting our few available Indian divisions to France, which would have meant their fighting under unsuitable conditions and would have involved further casualties (which would not have affected Great Britain alone) to our shipping by the necessity for bringing more of our tonnage into the submarine area.

On other hand, had Turkey retained a larger proportion of her army in the East and been allowed by us to develop a concentrated attack against the Suez Canal, our Empire would have been cut into two, with a resultant loss of power to persecute the war in Western Europe.

Without any wish to exaggerate the share taken by the British, it is urged that the above aspect of the case should be made quite clear at the Peace Conference in the interests of the British Empire.

[1] T. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan 1905-1920. The Shaping of National Identity in Muslim Community, Cambridge 1985; pp. 130-132; W. Materski, Georgia Rediviva. Republika Gruzińska w stosunkach międzynarodowych 1918-1921, Warsaw 1994, pp. 52–58; P. Olszewski, Polityka państw Ententy wobec Zakaukazia w latach 1918-1921, Piotrków Trybunalski 2001, pp. 37-38.

[2] Documents on British Foreign Policy. 1919-1939. First Series, vol. III, London, 1949, pp. 369-370; G. A. Brinkley, The Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in a South Russia 1917-1921. A Study in the Politics and Diplomacy of the Russian Civil War, Notre Dame 1966, pp. 27-28; P. Olszewski, From the History of the South Caucasus and the Middle East in 1914-1923. Outlines, Piotrków Trybunalski 2019, pp. 34-35.

[3] Ibidem., p. 66.

[4] W. Materski, Georgia …, pp. 158–159; P. Olszewski, Polityka Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec Turcji i Bliskiego Wschodu w latach 1918–1921, Piotrków Trybunalski, 2015, pp. 168-169.

[5] Committee of Imperial Defense was established in 1904 as the permanent advisory committee of the Cabinet on defense matters –The Records of the Cabinet Office to 1922, London 1966, p. 2.

[6] A number of the page at the top of the document in the volume of documents.

[7] The War Cabinet had been formed by Lloyd George in December 1916 and had been dissolved at the end of October, 1919; at the beginning the War Cabinet had five members – the Prime Minister, Lord Curzon, Lord Milner, Bonar Law and Arthur Henderson – The Records of …, pp. 2–3.

[8] This map was not attached to the memorandum included in the volume of documents.

[9] The appendices Nos. 3, 4 are not included in this article because they are commonly known and do not concern Georgia and the South Caucasus.

[10] This map was not attached to the memorandum included in the volume of documents.

[11] Number of the page at the bottom of the document in the volume of documents.

[12] The original page number of the this memorandum.

[13] The number of the page at the bottom of the document in the volume of documents, different page numbering in a volume of documents.

[14] Trabzon.

[15] Lord James Bryce, 1st Viscount Bryce with the assistance of the historian Arnold J. Toynbee prepared a documentary record of the Armenian massacres in Turkey in 1915 that was published as a Blue Book by the British government in 1916.

[16] Colonel Sir Tatton Benvenuto Mark Sykes, 6th Baronet, British diplomat, expert on the situation in Ottoman Empire; François Marie Denis Georges–Picot, a French diplomat and lawyer, the Consul–General of France in Beirut before the world war I.

[17] Colonel Lazar Bicherakhov commander of 1 500 men from the Persian Cossack Brigade was created by Russians in Persia before the world war I – T. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan …, pp. 137–138.

[18] Gen. Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby, 1st Viscount Allenby, Commander–in–Chief of British Empire’ s Egyptian Expeditionary Force in Palestine in 1918.

[19] Lieutenant–General Sir William Raine Marshall, Commander–in–Chief of the British forces in Mesopotamia in 1918.

[20] Currently Ganja.

[21] The Eastern Committee had been created by the War Cabinet and dealt regularly between March 1918 and January 1919 with problems concerned with Middle East policy of England – The Records of …, p. 16.

[22] Ismail Enver Pasha, Turkish war minister and de facto Commander–in–Chief of Turkish Army, he and Talaat Pasha and Cemal Pasha held the rule over the Turkey from 1913 until the end of World War I.

SERGO KURULISZWILI’ S LETTERS FROM WARSAW (1920 – 1922). MATERIALS FOR STUDYING THE HISTORY OF GEORGIAN EMIGRATION TO POLAND

by Shorena Murusidze and by David Kolbaia

The Funds of the Central Historical Archives of the National Archive of Georgia preserves the letters of Sergo Kuruliszwili, a Georgian emigrant working in Poland. The letters had been sent to the Chairman of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia Noe Zhordania, the representatives of the diplomatic missions of Georgia in Bern, Paris and Rome. His report was also sent to the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, Noe Ramishvili and Chairman of the Constituent Assembly, Karlo Chkheidze. The chronological framework of the documents covers the period from April 14, 1920 to May 30, 1922. The letters were sent from Warsaw. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s archival documents[1] are an important source for studying the history of Georgian emigration to Poland and Polish – Georgian relations. In particular, the letters contain information about the establishment, goals and activities of the Georgian Emigration Association of Poland – ‘Georgian Committee in Poland’, about the Georgians who found themselves out in detention camps as a result of World War I and the Civil War of Russia; about the establishment of the Polish – Georgian Club and its goals; about the steps and measures taken for bringing Georgian – Polish states together and about the biography and activities of Sergo Kuruliszwili.

Sergo Kuruliszwili (1894–1925) was born on September 4, 1894 in Sachkhere district, in the family of Vano Kuruliszwili and Ekaterine Nazarishvili. He was an engineer–architect by education, but worked as a journalist, poet and writer. Sergo Kuruliszwili went to Poland in 1918 during the period of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. When he settled in Warsaw, Sergo Kuruliszwili began an active work with a small group of Georgian emigrants living there to introduce Georgia to the Polish society. The ‘Georgian–Polish Club’ was founded in 1920 by his initiative. He was the Chairman of the Constituent Committee of the Club and then the Chairman of the Council after the Polish government granted a status to the club. The members of the club in Poland at that time were well–known scientists, writers and journalists, including Professors Anton Sujkowski and Jan Kourtney, Stanislaw Sedlecki, Vladimir Wakar, Stefan Gralewski and others. On December 29, 1921 Sergo Kuruliszwili sent a request to the Chairman of the Polish government Józef Piłsudski to become an honorary member of the ‘Georgian–Polish Club.’ In addition to the establishment of the ‘Georgian–Polish Club’, Sergo Kuruliszwili published magazines and newspapers, collaborated with the Polish press in which he often wrote articles about Georgia both in his name and under the pseudonym of ‘Typhoon’ for the purpose of introducing Georgia to Poland. Sergo Kuruliszwili provided information to the Polish readers about the problems of Georgia at that time in the pages of the weekly magazine Przymierze. It should be noted that from 1921 the magazine was published by the Union for the Reconciliation of Liberated Peoples operating in Poland. The single magazines Amirani, Pro Georgia and Pro Patria were published in 1922–1923 by the Committee of the ‘Georgian–Polish Club’. It should be noted that in the years of 1922–1923, by the initiative and leadership of Sergo Kuruliszwili, a popular magazine such as Kurier Warszawski was published. The magazine paid great attention to the problems of the East and especially Georgia. In 1924 this magazine was renamed Głos Wschodu. Famous Polish writers published their letter on its pages. After the death of Sergo Kuruliszwili, in 1925 his brother Jan Kuruliszwili and his wife Maria Kuruliszwili published several issues of the magazine Głos Wschodu.

In addition to journalism and writing, Sergo Kuruliszwili tried to assist Georgians living in detention camps because of World War I and the Civil War of Russia, as well as Georgians living in Poland. For this, on March 1, 1920 he founded a ‘Georgian Committee in Poland’[2] together with Georgian emigrants living in Poland.

Sergo Kuruliszwili was the initiator and active participant of all cultural and organizational activities commenced in Warsaw at the beginning of the twenties of the twentieth century. Considering his activities, it can be said that he was the first Georgian Prometheist who was involved in active political and social works.

Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s death is full of mystery. He was murdered in a cafe by Stefan Likiernik on March 25, 1925[3]. This assassination caused a great resonance throughout Poland[4]. The obituaries dedicated to Sergo Kuruliszwili reported on his great energy and amazing diligence, which was manifested in the articles, brochures, poems and in all his activities published on the history, culture and life of Georgia in Poland.

In the years of 1921–1923 Sergo Kuruliszwili published 6 collections in Warsaw. These are:

1. Kuruliszwili Sergiusz, Gruzja. (Translator: Jan Weyher), Warszawa 1921, Druk. Synów St. Niemiry, 47 pp.

2. Kuruliszwili Sergo, Gruzja pod jarzmem bolszewickim, Warszawa 1922, Druk. W. Piekarniak, 28 pp.

3. Kuruliszwili Sergo (Tajfuni), Róże pijane. (poetry Tadeusz Kończyca) with preface, Warszawa 1923, Druk. W. Piekarniak, 74 pp. 2 nlb.

4. Kuruliszwili Sergo (Tajfuni), Gwiezdny Szlak, (Zdzisław Dębicki) with preface, Warszawa 1923, 106 pp. 2 nlb.

5. Kuruliszwili Sergo (Tajfuni), Fale. (Julian KI. Dębicki) with preface, Warszawa 1923, Druk. W. Piekarniak, 70, pp. 1 nlb.

6. Kuruliszwili Sergo, Bolszewickie niebezpieczeństwo, Warszawa 1923, 12 pp.

DOCUMENTS:

1. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to Noe Zhordania,[5] the Chairman of the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia

April 14, 1920, Warsaw

Dear respectful Noe[6] Nestori’ s[7] son,

I would like to inform you that Georgians living in Poland are experiencing extreme hardship. The Committee[8] cannot assist them. We can’ t protect their interests. Please raise this issue in the government so that the government can inform the Polish government to allocate 50 000m for us. I can’ t describe the unfortunate situation of Georgians in this letter. I could not arrive there to report the local situation to the government personally.

It’ s almost a year since I have been in Poland, I speak Polish well and protect the interests of Georgia. The Russians arriving here defile the government of Georgia, and I, as the former Secretary[9] of the government, Georgian poet and writer could not ignore the curse of my government, and defended the interests of Georgia through the Polish press. Today, Poland knows Georgia very well due to my letters. It’ s a year since I have been working here for Georgia and I hope our government will pay attention to this as well.

I do not have an official mandate to represent Georgia in Poland, which is an urgent need, so I would like to ask you Mr. Noe to nominate my candidacy in the government so that they appoint me as their representative or Ambassador in Poland.

I know the whole staff of the Polish government and I am treated with great respect.

You might remember me; I was the Secretary of the government during the period when Noe Ramishvili[10] was the Chairman of the government and then I moved to the engineer Vaso Ardishvili.[11] All the members of the government, including Pavle Sakvarelidze,[12] Arsenidze[13] and others know me.

Mr. Noe, I hope that you will not reject my appointment on your behalf.

Forever Yours,

Engineer Sergo Kuruliszwili

(S. Typhoon[14])

2. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Georgia sent to the Paris Peace Conference[15]

May 28, 1920 Warsaw

Rue Tvarda №10 m. 92

To the Georgian delegation[16] in Paris

Each of our open letters to the Paris delegation goes unnoticed, the reasons for which are completely unclear to us. We are not interested in any personal benefits, but we cannot look indifferently at the hardship of numerous Georgians whose situation is getting worse.

I would like to inform you that many subordinates[17] of Georgia in the Polish detention camps are in terrible hardship. We can free them but we cannot return them to their homeland because of shortage of money. 300 Georgian captives are coming from Estonia, asking us for urgent assistance. The Committee received food for 50 people and we are opening a canteen these days, we also received clothes for 75 people which will be sent to Georgians in different cities. The Committee has recently officially obtained the general authority of the embassy such as issuing personal and travel cards, visas and others.

If you feel sorry for the Georgians, want to deepen good neighborly relations between Poland and Georgia, please find some ways quickly to assist us, otherwise, let us know that you do not recognize us and will not help us and then our last hope will be lost.

Chairman of the Committee,

Engineer S[ergo] Kuruliszwili[18]

3. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to Mikheil Sumbatashvili,[19] the representative of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Switzerland

May 29, 1920 Warsaw

To higly respectful Mr. M. Sumbatashvili,[20] the representative of Georgia in Bern

I got your card dated May 12 №513 to which I want to thank you sincerely. The Georgians here felt hopeful that with your help we will be able to receive general assistance from Paris in a short time. Recently the Committee has obtained general authority of the embassy such as issuing personal and travel cards, visas and others.

Just imagine our situation: plenty of Georgians in a hard condition, detention camps full of Georgian prisoners of war, these days 300 Georgian prisoners of war are arriving in Poland and all of them ask for urgent organizational assistance, but currently we do not have even 100 simple Marks. The Polish government does not provide any assistance to us, and the Georgians, left to the mercy of fate, are spending their last days in a foreign country in such conditions.

These days I am opening a free canteen for 50 people, I received all kinds of clothes for 75 people from the Americans and the British and distributed them to all poor Georgians. I am doing my best and I will continue working hard for the benefit of Georgians in the future too. I am requesting you to inform Paris to provide urgent assistance to us and continue giving us your kind advice and assistance as well on your behalf. I am looking forward to the magazines and newspapers.

Yours,

Engineer S[ergo] Kuruliszwili (S. Typhoon) – with a signature

Secretary: I. Guramishvili,[21] with a signature

4. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to the delegation[22] of the Democratic Republic of Georgia sent to the Paris Peace Conference

June 2, 1920, Warsaw

Rue Nowy Świat №17 ap. 2.

I am honored to inform the Georgian delegation in Paris that from June 1 the Committee has been moved to Nowy Świat №17 m. 2.

I also would like to inform you that at the second meeting[23] of Georgian citizens it was unanimously decided that the Chairman of the Committee, Engineer Sergo Kuruliszwili should take responsibility for accepting the Georgian representation in Poland until the Georgian government officially approves him at this position or appoints someone else (please notify the government of Georgia about it). Therefore, on May 20 the Georgian Committee in Poland has already obtained the general authority of the embassy to issue personal and travel cards, visas and others.

On June 13, by the initiative of Engineer S. Kuruliszwili there was founded[24] a Georgian – Polish Club. The aim of the Club[25] is to bring Georgians and Poles together to get to know each other and more. Lectures and essays will be read about Georgia and Poland. There will be held Georgian – Polish evening, etc., and this will deepen the strong political and economic ties between Poland and Georgia.

We distributed clothes to 75 Georgians. We could not officially open the canteen due to lack of money, but we still give food to those who wish.

But when I heard the horrible news[26] of Gori, I was shocked and forgot everything. Every Georgian, wherever they are, is obliged to give a hand to the innocent victims of the Gori tragedy. That is why I am red with shame when I bother you for the Georgians in Poland, but there is such saying ‘hunger will break through stone walls.’

And after Mr. Ilomaz Dadeshkeliani[27] came to you, we hoped that we would receive funds upon his arrival there. But it turned out now that his arrival in Paris ended our hope for any kind of aid from you, because according to one of our people Kuradze (his identity is mysterious and already expelled by us), Mr. Dadeshkeliani had been a fierce enemy to our Committee, he had wanted to close it and was going to make a proper report to you about it. But I believe that the Paris delegation will listen to my, as the Georgian poet and writer’ s request and will not lead the second tragedy of the Georgians in

Poland to the worst condition.

Sincerely,

Engineer S[ergo] Kuruliszwili (S. Typhoon)

Postscript on the ending: 300 Georgians will arrive from Estonia these days, there are numerous Georgians in detention camps. Every day we receive cards from various regions. They ask for urgent organizational assistance. We expect funds from you.[28]

5. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter[29] to Mikheil (Ilamaz) Dadeshkeliani[30]

June 2, 1920, Warsaw

Rue Nowy Świat №17 m.2.

Hello Ilomaz! (sic) [Ilamaz]

Why is it that we have not received any cards from you after Mr. Kuradze was informed about the situation in Paris. We thought that we would receive aid as soon as you arrived in Paris, but according to Kuradze, you did not want to provide aid but to close the committee, and you would have made a proper report about it in Paris. Despite this, I know your courageous heart in every hardship, I also know how enthusiastically you helped me and I don’ t believe in this non – Georgian person’ s words. We have already expelled him because he does nothing but speculation. Therefore, please inform us whether Kuradze’ s words are true. Please help us quickly, as 300 Georgians are coming from Estonia, we also need to release many prisoners of war and so on. Send us the magazines, newspapers, etc.

Waiting for your response and money.

Please be informed that on May 20 we obtained the authority of the embassy to issue personal and travel cards, visas and other. Say regards to your wife.

Yours,

Sergo Kuruliszwili

6. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to Mikheil Sumbatashvili,[31] the representative of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Switzerland

June 12, 1920, Warsaw

Nowy Świat №17 m. 2.

To the representative of Georgia in Bern, Prince M. Sumbatashvili

In response to your letter dated June 7 №567, we are honored to inform you that 300 Georgians who were mentioned previously, are in the city of Riga and are going to travel to Poland to us. Their current material situation is very distressing and sad. They may arrive these days and we can’ t afford to aid them in any way. Of course, we will do our best to provide organizational assistance as soon as possible.

I would also like to inform you that there are 300 Georgian citizens in the Polish detention camps[32] whose conditions are unnecessary to describe. Their delegates arrived in Warsaw yesterday and ask for their urgent release and return to homeland. They are the members of the army of General Bredow, who took refuge in Poland and surrendered and this is the army where the three hundred subordinates of Georgia are found. Their personal documents that are kept at the Committee Chancellery, clearly prove that they are Georgians and residents of Georgia. (They were mobilized by force because Denikin[33] did not recognize Georgia). During the negotiations with the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs it was revealed that they would be released from detention camps upon our first request, so the Committee is sending their delegates to release them. And then whether they will be accommodated here or returned to homeland is not know for us because the Committee does not have a single penny at the moment, unfortunately.

There are also 1000 Georgian subordinates in different cities of Poland. The Georgians in Ukraine, which was liberated by Poland ask us for help. We helped them as we could but we expect money from the government and the Paris delegation. And the three hundred Georgians in Riga are those who escaped from Bolshevik Russia. A Georgian – Polish Club will be opened tomorrow through which will be developed Georgian – Polish economic and political relations. The Club will host the Poles and Georgians to get to know each other, magazines will be published through which Poland will know more about Georgia, a trade Georgian – Polish commission will be established, a Georgian – Polish bank will be founded, the Club will hold Georgian evenings, etc.

Please send the copies of this card to the delegation in Paris and the government of Georgia. Since we have no information from the Paris delegation, please provide us with information about Georgia from time to time. The Committee moved to a new location: Nowy Świat №17 m.2.

Sincerely, Chairman of the Committee

Signed: Engineer S[ergo] Kuruliszwili

Signed on behalf of the Secretary: I. Antadze

Please respond to us urgently and let us have a connection with you in the future too.

7. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to Mikheil Sumbatashvili,[34] the representative of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Switzerland

June 17, 1920, Warsaw

Nowy Świat №17 m.2.

To Prince Mikheil Sumbatashvili, the representative of Georgia in Bern

We are sorry to bother you but you need to know everything we are doing. We would like to ask you to send the copies of this card urgently to the Georgian delegation in Paris and the government of Georgia for whom it will be clear to approve us as an embassy and give us credit.

We are writing to inform you that on June 13 of this year, by the initiative and efforts of the Chairman of the Georgian Committee, Sergo Kuruliszwili, a Georgian – Polish political economic club was founded. This meeting was attended by all the Ministries in Poland, well – known writers, poets, bankers, we received many greeting telegrams from high official branches. S. Kuruliszwili made a nice speech at the meeting and added that the current situation requires political economic relation between Georgia and Poland, deepening neighborly, friendly connection, as the life of Georgia and Poland in the past had much in common, which unites these two restored nations. His speech was followed by continuous applause of the whole Polish society. After a great debate it was decided: to open Georgian – Polish, political – economic club in Warsaw, the aim of which will be to promote the connection, friendship between Georgia and Poland; to open a cultural – educational department near the club which will be intended to introduce two new states – Poland and Georgia –to each other; to publish a weekly magazine in Polish, to hold Georgian – Polish evenings, deliver lectures and essays about Georgia, Poland in the club and other…

To open a Georgian–Polish ‘Chamber’ of Commerce, which will facilitate the exchange of goods between the two new states. A Georgian–Polish bank will be opened, which will connect the two countries economically. The management of the club was elected, which was joined by the Georgians: Engineer S. Kuruliszwili, Giorgi Guramishvili and Engineer Edmund Frick,[35] by the Poles: Prince Czesław Puzyna,[36] Viochorkowski, Colonel Makarewicz,[37] Engineer Makhleid,[38] Engineer T. Tedelski[39] and Engineer S. Łopiński (sic) [Łapiński].[40] The Board has already started to complete the above. The Polish press and almost all the newspapers warmly welcomed the results of the meeting and opening of the club. A large number of letters about the club and Georgia were published, they write about the honest personality of the Chairman and so on. We will collect all these newspapers and send them to you these days. Regarding the operation of the Committee, in particular, the work of the Chairman, you can ask all the ministries of Poland, famous persons and especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who will prove our honest, productive and hard work for the benefit and well–being of Georgia.

In addition, we would like to inform you that there are up to 300 Georgian citizens in Bredow’ s[41] army, who surrendered[42] in Poland. These citizens will be released in a week by the Committee. All measures will be taken to return them to their homeland. We helped 30 Georgians in Radyvyliv[43]. We receive cards from Georgians every day, who ask for urgent organizational assistance. We will help them as we can. The Committee officially obtained the authority of the embassy and these days it will start issuing passports, visas and others. Please send a delegate from Paris, who will find out the situation locally and then it will be clear for everyone that our cards are not just ‘beating the air’ but the truth, reality of which you will be convinced. We received a letter from the government of the colony in Kiev, who ask for immediate assistance and sending a courier there. These days the Chairman will be accepted by Piłsudski, the Head of Poland. It is necessary for the Georgian government to give an official image to our Committee, because sending the whole mission to Poland today will not be necessary. Everything that was needed, was done and sending the mission will cost our small republic a lot.

On behalf of the Committee: Secretary, Prince Guramishvili[44]

8. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to Mikheil Sumbatashvili,[45] the representative of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Switzerland

June 28, 1920, Warsaw

Nowy Świat №17 m. 2.

To Prince Mikheil Sumbatashvili, the representative of Georgia in Bern

Your cards filled us with hope, and we were sure that the Georgian delegation in Paris would be happy to help and encourage us, but we got disappointed, and we no longer expect anything from you. Their card №2316 dated June 14 tells us that they will reply to us again, they can’ t afford to aid us, and they are surprised that the Chairman of the Committee considers himself the representative of Georgia. Regarding this, reply cards are sent to the Paris delegation, and we need to inform you that we are not committing any illegal action, we created everything out of nothing. The Committee has been officially approved by the Ministries of Foreign and Internal Affairs, and we deserved respect so much from Poles that all are ready to help us. We helped the subordinates of Georgia as we could, we are releasing Georgians in detention camps, etc. We are establishing a Georgian–Polish club and others. Today we no longer need the help of the Paris delegation, and we are surprised that they believe all except us, who did so much work. Our Chairman has never considered himself as the diplomatic representative of Georgia, on the contrary, until the arrival of the representative on May 15 the General Meeting entrusted him to be the representative of Georgia temporarily, to protect the interests of Georgia, etc. but it is impossible because it requires approval from the government of Georgia. Our Committee is protecting the interests of the subordinates of Georgia even without the need for it. 6 months ago when the Committee did not exist (the Committee has existed since March 1), when the Russian ‘bureaucracy’ coming from Georgia defiled the holy name of Georgia, he, as a Georgian and representative of the nation came out to protect the interests of Georgia. At the end of the letter it was written ‘representative of Georgia’, it did not imply an official representative but the representative of the nation. And today those ‘gentlemen’, who were expelled from our committee as unreliable people, who would undermine Georgia and its existence at the moment, who cannot reconcile the independence of Georgia and the fact that we created our own organization by our efforts to defend our interests and introduce Georgia to Poland, have no idea what to do when we create a Georgian–Polish Club and do nothing but writing ‘things’. Please ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland about us and they will give you a clear answer who we are and what we do. These scoundrels arrive in Paris and spread a thousand kinds of information, but we are not afraid of that. We know that the truth always flashes and glitters. I hope that neither you will pay attention to the chatter of these scoundrels and provide us with the information and magazines, as promised. Please, if you could, send us a big picture of the staff of the government and our famous writers.

Sincerely, Sergo Kuruliszwili

Secretary, Prince Guramishvili

9. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to the delegation[46] of the Democratic Republic of Georgia sent to the Paris Peace Conference

July 20, 1920 Warsaw

Nowy Świat №17 m. 2.

To the Georgian delegation in Paris

I am honored to inform you that today the Bolsheviks are near the city of Warsaw and it might be captured[47] in a short time. Today the subordinates of Georgia, escaped from the cities occupied by the Bolsheviks, gathered in Warsaw. We don’ t know which way to choose, we should either let the Committee operate in Warsaw to defend the interests of the subordinates of Georgia since it will be safe there because Georgia made a Treaty with Bolshevik Russia,[48] or we might expect any trouble, who knows. The Committee provides aid to the escaped Georgians as much as possible. They give them food, clothes, etc. We are sending prisoners of war these days.

Please let us know urgently through a telegram how to proceed. I would like to ask you to give me an order through an express telegram saying that I am obliged to protect the interests of the subordinates of Georgia in Poland and the lives and property of the Georgian subordinates will be saved in this case. I hope the Georgian delegation will see the need for this, otherwise, the situation of Georgians in Poland will be disastrous.

Chairman, S[ergo] Kuruliszwili

10. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to the representative[49] of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Italy

July 26, 1920, Warsaw

Nowy Świat №17

To the representative[50] of Georgia in Rome

The Georgian Committee in Poland is honored to inform you about the situation of the Georgian Committee and the Georgian subordinates in Poland.

The Committee released up to one hundred captive Georgian subordinates, who are currently in Warsaw. We are waiting for them to return to their homeland. These are the officers and soldiers in Bredow’ s army, and as you know, General Bredow’ s army took refuge in Poland and surrendered there. At the moment it is possible to send only 30 men. The embassy of Serbia did not agree to let Georgians in their territory, as Serbia has not acknowledged Georgia as an independent state yet and they still cannot reconcile the disintegration of huge Russia. Therefore, with great diligence we chose a new route and made Czechoslovakia and Austrians agree to let the Georgian troop train go through their territory and give them carriage and food too. As for the Italian embassy, the latter only issues visas and asks three hundred Marks for each, so after the Austrian border the Georgian echelon enters the territory of Italy at your disposal. So I would like to ask you to send your representative to the Austrian–Italian border when we send you a telegram informing you of the day of your departure from Warsaw, so that the Georgian echelon is provided with proper aid and free travel and food from Trieste to Istanbul.

Having informed the above mentioned, please send your response and consent by telegram because the condition of the captives is reaching the highest point.

In addition, I would like to inform you that many Georgians with wives and children come from the cities occupied by the Bolsheviks and they need urgent organizational assistance. The Committee is providing assistance to all as much as possible.

I also would like to inform you that a Georgian–Polish Club was founded by my initiative, which aims to make a friendly relationship and connection between Georgian–Polish republics, to publish newspapers to let the two states get to know each other, and so on. Trade policy, Georgian–Polish bank will be established, exchange of goods will be organized, etc. The branch of the Club will be opened in Tbilisi. The members are the Ministries and founders of the Polish government.

Kindly please send us Georgian magazines – newspapers, big pictures of our government and writers and give us brief information about Georgia. Looking forward to your response. Say greetings to Mikheil Lortkipanidze from Mr. Ostrowski[51] and me.

Sincerely,

Chairman of the Committee, S[ergo] Kuruliszwili (S. Typhoon)

Guramishvili

11. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to the delegation[52] of the Democratic Republic of Georgia sent to the Paris Peace Conference

August 9, 1920, Warsaw

Nowy Świat №17 m. 2.

To the Georgian delegation in Paris

Kindly please let me know urgently by telegram how to act… The Bolsheviks are near[53] Warsaw and today or tomorrow at least, might occupy it. Georgian echelon consisted of 25 men has already left for Georgia. Quite many Georgians remained in Warsaw and in Poland generally, that’ s why I firmly decided to stay here and protect their interests, their life and property to the last drop of my blood.

At present the Committee does not have a penny or food. I would like to kindly ask you to assign me officially by telegram to protect the interests of the subordinates of Georgia in Poland. You will save the subordinates of Georgia in Poland by this.

Looking forward to your telegram.

Sincerely,

S[ergo] Kuruliszwili

12. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to Mikheil Sumbatashvili,[54] the representative of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Switzerland

August 19, 1920, Warsaw

Nowy Świat №17 m.2.

To the representative of Georgia in Bern, Mikheil Sumbatashvili

Since neither of us have received any cards from each other for a long time, let me inform you briefly about the present situation of the Committee.

We sent 25 Georgians to Georgia through Czechoslovakia, Austria and Italy, and a representative of Georgia in Rome should provide some assistance to them in Trieste. The Echelon departed from Warsaw on July 10.

The Committee usually continues helping the subordinates of Georgian staying here.

On July 15, the Bolsheviks were several miles away from the city, but the Polish army made them retreat. Today the Bolsheviks are retreating and may even be defeated forever. And as for me, I had decided, whatever would happen, to stay in Warsaw and protect the interests of the subordinates of Georgia, their property and life. But thankfully, God of battle was on the side of Poland.

The operation of the Georgian–Polish Club resumed.

We were most disturbed by the note of America to the Italians,[55] in which the government of the USA writes that there was time when they were opposed to the fact that the High Council had to recognize Georgia and Azerbaijan. Georgia and every Georgian will fight for Georgia’ s independence to the last drop of their blood.

Please let us know what you think about it. Do you think that this note has any importance or it is just for formality and cannot change the decision of Versailles about Georgia.[56]

In addition, please inform us about the current situation in Georgia.

We would kindly ask you to send us Georgian magazines and newspapers, pictures of our government, writers and kings as well as the publications issued by the press of the Special Bureau in Bern.

I hope you will fulfill my request and continue helping us in the future too.

Until now the Committee has not received any information or assistance from the government of Georgia or any of the embassies.

Forever Yours,

Chairman of the Committee, S[ergo] Kuruliszwili

On behalf of the Secretary, V. Gvatua

13. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to Mikheil Sumbatashvili,[57] the representative of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Switzerland

September 15, 1920, Warsaw

Nowy Świat № 17

To the representative of Georgia in Bern

I am honored to inform you that we received the card №719 dated September 9, for which I thank you very much. I completely agree with the opinion of the representative and add that propaganda is the greatest tool to achieve the goal, and indeed we have not done anything about it in America. As the United States recognized Armenia,[58] the history and past of which is far behind the glorious past and present of Georgia, can only be explained by the fact that there are many Armenian groups[59] in America, who tirelessly work to introduce Armenia to America; It is possible that the Armenians have used their intrigue network even there to insult Georgia. Anyway, the current political situation urges us, Georgians, who care for the country, to work hard for the welfare of Georgia. I would dedicate sonnets of praise to me, as a person. Only due to my efforts Poland is fully acquainted with Georgia today, they love it and the name of Georgia is sacred and clear for everyone in Poland. When I arrived in Poland, the Russian ‘bureaucracy’ shouted at every crossroad that Poles, Russians and others are sent from Georgia, they spread rumors about it. The press of the capital was surprised to hear all those rumors and there was a kind of chaos and strong distrust of Georgia. I then went against those provocateurs and mentioned the attitude of Georgia to Poland and in particular, to the new democratic Russia in the Polish and Russian newspapers. I created a Georgian Committee, which I gave the format of the embassy and the Polish government takes us into account today. We will be officially known. During this time, I worked hard and publish letters about Georgia and Poland in well–known Polish magazines and newspapers. (I speak, read and write Polish perfectly). Not even a day goes by without writing about Georgia by the Polish newspapers. I created a Georgian–Polish Club, which was founded and signed by all Polish Ministers, members of the Sejm and well–known writers and merchants. You already know the goal of the Club. So propaganda is necessary, for example, if I had not been in Poland, even the name of Georgia would not have been known in Poland. In addition, we sent one echelon to Georgia, I obtained permission from the Romanian government, which allowed us to let two hundred Georgians go through the territory of Romania. They will also give us a free carriage and food. Besides, I made the Polish government agree that it will allow them to cross its border and give us a free carriage. There are few Georgians left in Poland, we sent some of them, some joined the Polish army because they did not have any other choice. And 700 Georgians are in Estonia and Latvia and I am trying to get them out of there.

It is a pleasure to have a diplomatic mission and I hope that the mission and the supreme government of Georgia will appreciate my work and encourage me to work more. Enemies won’ t frighten me and the path I have gone through and the work I have done are clear and sacred. Please continue giving us information in the future too. Please inform the Minister, Mr. Gegechkori[60] that if he considers appropriate, he can enroll me in his mission as I will be very helpful to them.

Sincerely,

Chairman of the Georgian Committee, S[ergo] Kuruliszwili

14. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to Mikheil Sumbatashvili,[61]the representative of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Switzerland

September 18, 1920, Warsaw

Nowy Świat №17

To Prince Mikheil Sumbatashvili, the representative of Georgia in Bern

I would like to share my general personal impressions about Georgia and attitude towards our new republic. I dare say this because I felt great sympathy which you have for us and I think you are interested in everything we work here and do for the welfare of Georgia.

We know very well what a number of economic and political crises the young state is experiencing, that Georgia is surrounded by many enemies, and we cannot find a common language with the neighbors – Armenia and Azerbaijan, because the latter ones have always had hostile attitude towards Georgia both internally and externally, they groped for Batumi[62] and others, but the political existence of Georgia requires a relation with them and our government[63] makes every effort to do so. Georgia was orphan in Asia Minor and despite all this, it unmistakably provided the untouched body of culture and civilization to the history.

When the High Council[64] recognized Georgia de facto,[65] then it was affirmed that Georgia is not a simple word and that its glorious past political life proves its existence and future sovereignty. Our government has encountered many difficulties and many are still ahead. The note[66] from the USA made our enemies speak about us for the last time and they are trying to despise Georgia once again, but we will always have a strict policy for those and weapons will solve our fate if needed.

The Bolsheviks showed us how much propaganda is needed today. Georgia, which was forced to remain silent by the circumstances of the time and to follow the path of the Russian imperialists, was completely strange and unfamiliar to Europe.

Therefore, my first attempt to introduce Georgia to Poland and the foreigners there, was here in Poland, which surrounds Europe like an arc. There is a lot in common between Poland and Georgia. Georgia has not chosen yet which union of state it will join as an equal and full member. Poland is one of our good friends. Although Georgia made a Treaty with Soviet Russia, their aggressive politics is clearly seen in their actions in Georgia.

A new journal ‘Przymierze’[67] is published in Warsaw, Poland which defends the interests of the new states and aims to create a strong, unbroken stone from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Discussions are held here every Saturday and a Club of International League of Nations will be opened soon. Official representatives gather here: from Poland, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kuban, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Austria and as it is necessary for Georgia not to be an exception here, I also join this family and here is always heard the holy name of Georgia, which is pleasing to everyone.

We all have one goal. It is the Union of the Nations that originated in the former Russian Empire, which will prevent any threat such as the occupation by Russia. For this, it is necessary to establish the political and economic union of these liberated people.

In addition, ‘third Russia’ is born here, which fully recognizes the independence of Georgia. This group is headed by Boris Savinkov.[68] I had a debate with him, who says that Georgia is sacred and pure for him and the time will come when Georgia will need economic ties with Russia and the new ‘third Russia’ will get it in a democratic way and its sovereignty will be inviolable.

It would be good to hear your opinion about this new ‘third Russia’ as well as the connection of the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. The only obstacle for publishing the journal from time to time for these people of Georgia is lack of money. We have always been proud and […] [69] we can’ t afford. There are 1000 Georgians in Estonia and Latvia and we can’ t afford to send them to the home country. Since the governments of Poland and Romania agree to let Georgians cross their territories for free, it is a pity to lose such an opportunity. It would be good for you to provide information about the current situation in Georgia, which is of great interest to our group.

My sincere greetings and thanks to you. Be blessed.

Sincerely,

Chairman of the Georgian Committee, Engineer S[ergo] Kuruliszwili

15. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to Mikheil Sumbatashvili,[70] the representative of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Switzerland

September 21, 1920, Warsaw

Nowy Świat №17

To the representative of Georgia in Bern

I have an honor to inform you that a telegram has been published in the Polish newspapers today according to which the British political circles say that the recognition of Georgia was a mistake because this republic is Germanophile[71] and wants to get Batumi[72] and Tbilisi[73] from Russia. Part of it must be returned to Russia and its acting representative Wrangel.[74]

It is obvious that this is another propaganda but in a big and serious state like Poland, it raises doubts and that is why I provided the necessary explanation to remove doubts about it.

And this is the provocation, indeed…

In addition, I want to inform you that the group of the ‘third Russia’ would like to have a good relation and contact with us. In my opinion, when sooner or later Bolshevism is completely destroyed there, the real master of Russia will surely appear there. I think that the contact with the ‘third Democratic Russia’, that supports the Wrangel program in general, will not do any harm to Georgia.

I also would like to inform you that the League of Nations, which includes the countries Finland, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kuban[75] and Georgia that emerged and restored in the field of the Russian Empire, publishes a journal, which I am sending to you. This journal defends the sovereign rights of the liberated people and all the representatives of these republics here are assisting this journal. I feel ashamed that the generosity of Georgia is not involved in it. But I hope that when the Georgian Committee reaches the required level, then we will contribute to it as well.

I would kindly ask you to provide us with all kinds of information about Georgia, as well as booklets and new newspapers about Georgia to give these materials to the Polish newspapers, so that the Polish government and the press have a true idea of what is happening in Georgia right now.

I hope you will continue giving us your advice and suggestions.

Looking forward to the newspapers and booklets.

Sincerely,

Chairman of the Georgian Committee

Engineer S[ergo] Kuruliszwili

16. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to the delegation[76] of the Democratic Republic of Georgia sent to the Paris Peace Conference

[Without date] Warsaw

Twarda street 10, 92

To the Georgian delegation in Paris

The Georgian Committee in Poland was formed by the will of the Georgians in Poland. The goal of the Committee is to protect the interests of the subordinates of Georgia in Poland, to provide both material and medical assistance to Georgians and return them to their homeland.

The Committee will also publish newspapers and periodicals in Polish–French–Georgian languages due to which it will give information to Poland and its people about Georgia, its past and present, its political and economic situation. The Committee will publish brochures in Georgian language, which will describe the life and history of Poland to distribute them in Georgia and to introduce the Poles.

The Committee will establish a Georgian–Polish Club, where Poles and Georgians will gather to get to know each other.

The Committee will seek to establish a good–neighborly relationship between Poland and Georgia and it will provide exchange between Poland and Georgia.

Lecture and essays about Georgia will be delivered in the Club.

The Committee will organize Georgian evenings to introduce Georgian music, writing, art and more to the Poles.

The Committee will then try to facilitate the establishment of a Georgian–Polish bank in Warsaw.

In a word, the Committee will try to be developed to the proper level and will not let any immorality insult the saints recognized by it.

As you know, there are numerous Georgians in Poland who suffer from extreme hardships. There were many incidents when Georgians had to end their lives by committing suicide; many Georgians used to go to the Russian canteen and they still do it, where they are laughed at, they sell the ultimate essential items and so on.

Having informed you the above, the Georgian Committee in Poland is asking the Georgian delegation in Paris for assistance. Please send us as much money as the delegation can to the name of the Committee with the help of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland.

Could you also please ask the Polish government to provide us with the necessary assistance and timely and monthly aid.

In addition, the Committee requests the delegation to inform the above mentioned to the government of Georgia. The Georgian Committee in Poland shall also be entitled to protect the interests of Georgia in Poland before it obtains the official representation of Georgia.

The Committee will operate in conjunction with and in contact with the diplomatic mission.

The work of the Committee has already become fruitful and the way to Poland is open for every Georgian today. The Poles long for the friendship and relation with us and we need to welcome them warmly.

Poland treats the Georgian government and Georgians with great sympathy and provides all kinds of assistance to them.

Having informed the above mentioned, the Committee hopes that our request will not be ‘the voice of one crying in the wilderness’.

The Committee will be approved these days and then we will be able to write the address on an official form and stamp it on behalf of the Committee.

Chairman of the Committee S[ergo] Kuruliszwili

Comrade Chairman: K. […][77]

Secretary: Agronomist Ip. Antadze[78]

17. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s Report to the Head of the Constituent Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, Karlo Chkheidze and to the Minister of Internal Affairs, Noe Ramishvili[79]

June 12, 1921, Warsaw.

To the Chairman of the Constituent Assembly of the Republic of Georgia, Mr. Karlo Chkheidze[80] and to the Minister of Internal Affairs, Justice and Roads, Mr. Noe Ramishvili[81]

Report about the political relations between Georgia and Poland

I have an honor to confirm to you the views and political conjuncture that existed and exists in the political circles, government, Sejm and parties of Poland.

Poland is very similar to Georgia with regard to history, but with the difference of the feudal and bourgeois system that is deep rooted in Poland. However, the Socialist Course and Movement have gained a foothold in recent years and have its influence both in the government and the Sejm.

There has always been a chivalrous spirit and courage among the Polish people. Strong love for the homeland has always excited every Pole. While the national spirit was suppressed in some peoples who followed the Russian policy, the same cannot be said about Poland, because the national tendency has always been strong in Poland.

While the self–determination and independence of the nations took place after the domination of the Bolsheviks in Russia, as the history required it and it was necessary to maintain the finding and save them from people and accordingly, the Act of declaring independence was formed in this way, the situation in this regard was completely different in Poland.

When the central states acknowledged defeat to the allies and the lost Germany was still trying to keep some conquered regions, a coup took place in Poland, which was headed by the present Marshal Józef Piłsudski. The Germans left Poland and Poland faced the buffer state Lithuania, which from the day of its existence has had contact with the Germans. Thus, the hostile attitude of Lithuania towards Poland has always existed. City of Vilnius – ‘the Gordian knot’ has remained unsolved to this day.

Polish political life begins to grow and develop. However, there are very few politically mature people in Poland. The only danger was and has been Bolshevism, for which they were always alert. There was a Bolshevik propaganda which was followed by the war. The front was broken and without the ‘Miracle on the Vistula,’[82] Poland would have been destroyed today.

One of the closest allies of Poland is France, under the influence of which is Poland. Between two fires, that is Bolshevik Russia on the one hand and Germany, on the other hand, Poland gathers all its efforts around to maintain its existence.

Bolshevik Russia was defeated. Bolshevism could not gain a foothold here.

Today Poland has two main issues to decide: Silesia[83] and Vilnius.[84] Both issues are vital for Poland and it will not give them[85] up so easily.

* * *

A year and a half ago, when the independence of Georgia had just been declared, Poland had a weak imagination about Georgia and its political life. It was followed by an extensive propaganda of the Russians, who said thousands of slander and false facts about Georgia and its government. According to them, the government of Georgia is pursuing an aggressive policy, confiscates property from Russians and Poles and expels them from Georgia. The press was astonished and misunderstood. I was a newcomer to Poland then, and I was excited by such action of the Russians. It was necessary to work hard before I could remove those rumors through the press. I made connections with political circles and society. I wrote and explained to them about the life of Georgia, its economic and political situation. The Polish press became noisy, demanding close connections with Georgia. Then it became necessary to establish a Georgian representation here, as Poland sent its ambassador to Georgia[86]. I have informed our government about it many times but the ambassador of Georgia did not still appear anywhere.

In addition, many Georgians were scattered in Poland, whose material condition was unbearable. Nobody defended their interests, it was hard for them to find a job because of the ignorance of the state language. Therefore, I convened a joint congress of Georgians in Poland during which the Georgian National Committee was elected. The Committee has a great merit in introducing Georgia to Poland. The Georgians were provided with all kinds of aid and 100 Georgians were sent to Georgia for free in time. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs allowed me to issue documents to the subordinates of Georgia before the arrival of the mission because the Georgians in Poland did not have documents and had no right to live here. The Committee worked hard until the arrival of the mission and after their arrival we considered suspending the operation of the Committee.

In order to bring Georgia and Poland closer, it was necessary to build a connection ‘bridge’, so I established a Georgian–Polish Club, which aims to bring these two countries closer in terms of politics and economy. The Club has two sections. 1) Cultural and social, which aims to introduce Georgia, its past and present, its art, literature and political society to Poland, organize evenings, lectures, excursions, etc. 2) Economic, which aims to arrange exchange of goods between Poland and Georgia, to establish a Georgian – Polish bank, Chamber of Commerce and others.[87]

Many prominent political figures, financiers, economists and others[88] are the members of the Club.

The Club continues to operate but the reason for the obstruction is the lack of funds that prevents to develop more.

* * *

When Poland tried to make a close connection with Georgia, it seemed as if our government was deliberately avoiding it. Poland is the center around which all the new states should gather: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia. When the representatives of the Baltic states were coming to Poland and wanted to make a new union – Georgia was not here at that time, despite the fact that Georgia is greatly respected in Poland with love and have high hopes for it. When Poland made a Treaty with Soviet Russia in Riga, it was necessary to take some steps and a special Article would be included in the Treaty pursuant to which Poland and Russia would recognize Georgia as a sovereign state.

Whole Poland paid great attention to the war between Georgia and Russia. Many free warriors came and asked to be sent to Georgia and so on. The Socialist Party protested and raised the relevant question about Georgia in the Sejm. There was a strong protest. Then work was needed here and political vigilance and who knows whether Georgia would be free again today.

Today, although the territory of Georgia is occupied by the Bolsheviks, there is still strong love for Georgia among Polish people and the government and the Polish government is ready to carry out some political combinations. There is nowhere such sympathy and love for Georgia as it is in Poland. Regardless of the political direction, all people are very excited about the actions of the Bolsheviks and now Poland can assist us greatly.

It is necessary to carry out an extensive propaganda about Georgia in Poland, a special mission must be formed in Poland, which will lead the liberation of Georgia.

It is necessary to make a connection with the Socialist Party, PPS (Polish Socialist Party) which strongly defended and defend the interests of Georgia.

We should hope that our government will pay attention to Poland, where there is strong sympathy and deep love for Georgia, of which you will be convinced.

S[ergo] Kuruliszwili

18. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to the Head of the Constituent Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, Karlo Chkheidze and the Minister of Internal Affairs, Noe Ramishvili[89]

June 21, 1921 [Warsaw]

To the greatly respected Chairman of the Constituent Assembly of Georgia, N.S. Chkheidze[90] and the Minister of Internal Affairs, N. V. Ramishvili[91]

The sorrow accumulated in my heart can’ t find a place. I feel with all my heart that yesterday the truth was violated.

I do not know and it is incomprehensible for me that the crowd, which presented before you yesterday, is famous neither for the past nor the present.

My heart and soul hurt that the best sons of our country did not value my work properly, but I believe that it is a misunderstanding of only the present situation and the future will show the truth and you will be convinced how unfairly you trampled me down and gave inspiration to the dishonest crowd.

Should my two years of hard work in Poland pass so unnoticed? And it happens only because that the best Georgian figures left Poland in time and there remained only ‘pedigreed horses’ who put me, as a socialist, back up . They were the majority and that’ s why you believed them. You did not ask them to say honestly who worked in Poland for Georgia? And even today, who is still watching our republic here?

I believe that the feelings in your heart prompted you to choose who would come to you? Your confirmation is not surprising, since you are the visitors and you don’ t know them well enough. You condemned the good deed and let the thugs despise me.

Their work and discussion were a lie from the beginning to the end. Topchiashvili was given a document only with the consent of the same Antadze and by the approval of the commandant of Warsaw. He also had a document issued in Ukraine.

Neither Sidamon–Eristavi,[92] nor Lado Bakradze[93] had seen the estimate of the Committee and, nor they had refused to pay it. In a word, their words were a lie from the beginning to the end.

When you arrive in Paris, Lado Bakradze will tell you who they were dealing with, you should just give him the names. And after all, you allow them to ‘work’ on behalf of Georgians and Georgia, but who will be to blame for it?

As for the deportation of the Guramovs, I have to tell you that their case has been carried out for a long time and I don’ t think that the local police could deport the innocent people. The mission took measures in time to save them but its seems their case was very complicated. If we consider the fact that Mr. Guramishvili served in the army of Balachowicz[94] and is a strong monarchist, this might be the reason for their deportation.

There is a proverb: ‘when you plot mischief for others, you are preparing trouble for yourself’.

It is clear from yesterday’ s debate that I am the ‘informant’ who disintegrated the group of Georgians.

On the contrary, I was the first to organize this grouping. But it’ s not worth speaking about these ‘pedigreed horses’, since you will realize yourself who they are actually.

The Poles informed you about my work here, didn’ t they? Did you see the situation that way yourself?

Yesterday you confirmed a very bad deed and it hurts my heart that you put me and them at the same level. It is said that there are 30 men in Warsaw. It is a lie. Those who were there, came, except for three men. It is also said that there are many poor Georgians in Poland. Yes, they are but not only in Warsaw. Would it not be better that the great amount of money which the leaders of this Committee spend on drinking is given to the poor? They have dinner with some of them, aiming to get many supporters. But I would not and do not expect if they found supporters among your people.

How did my government pay me for my hard and tireless work and honest and unselfish merit? With nothing. You showed distrust to me.

You would have seen how friendly Georgia is mentioned in all circles of Poland. I deserved their trust and respect but this crowd envies it, and they cannot resist. I have written about Georgia in all organizations and also asked the editors who were familiar to me, to write about it as well. I have written many times about your government’ s and your merit and unselfish work for Georgia. I made the Socialist Party raise the question about Georgia in the Sejm and as Poland recognized Georgia ‘de jure’, I can freely say that I have contributed to it too.

I organized your reception in Warsaw proper to you. Two weeks before your arrival, I prepared the basis in all the circles and the press. I asked the Socialists to organize a conference, coffee reception, transportation to the theatre, holding a meeting, admission to the League of Nations, I invited the representatives of the press, I visited the editors and asked them and the Jews to organize a conference. I have been meeting people for 8 days because the best sons of our country should be welcomed in the best way.

And instead of gratitude I deserved scolding, rebukes and other ‘nice things’.

Why did these gentlemen not answer to your question what they were doing for Georgia in Poland? Why were they silent after this question was asked? The answer is that they were drinking. This is what their business was.

Ask the Polish society about who worked here for Georgia and whether they know the crowd other than the police officers who are in question.

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Minister, after all you want to help them from Paris and let them ‘work’. I think you need to ask our party member Lado Bakradze about them and he will tell you everything. Taking any steps before that will lead to bad results.

Candle, incense won’ t lose its way. I will not let down the flag raised by me. This crowd will not scare me and I will prove to you what they are and you will realize and appreciate my sincere and honest work. It is a pity that Krik is not here who would describe them quite well. I think Krik will be here in a week.

My warm greetings to you and wish you a safe and happy journey. I would like your mission to be ended successfully and find the same ground everywhere as it was in Poland.

Wish you a long life for the welfare of our people and the proletariat of Georgia.

Sincerely,

S[ergo] Kuruliszwili

19. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to the Chairman of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, Noe Zhordania[95]

November 14, 1921, Warsaw

Nowy Świat №17

Chairman of the government of the Republic of Georgia, N. Zhordania

I am honored to inform you that I was addressed with a proposal by a well – known capitalist in Poland, Feikand, who has been instructed from English capitalists to make trade contacts with the Georgian government.

Mr. Feikand asked me to tell you Mr. Chairman that the English capitalists who deeply believe that Georgia will be freed in the nearest future, would like to obtain a concession of black stone[96] and conclude the necessary agreement with you for this purpose.

The English capitalists are ready to give you an advance, prior to the liberation of Georgia and open a credit (loan) for you, as far as our government considers it appropriate.

The British government supports the capitalists, who will conclude a contract with you and take proper steps to protect the interests and property of these capitalists, that is, the subordinates of England, in Georgia that at the same time will speed up the liberation process of Georgia.

They are asking you to appoint a place and a relevant commission for the negotiation. They want the commission to make a report on the current economic and political situation in Georgia.

The capitalists would like that the negotiation takes place in Gdansk (Danzig)[97] and if it is inconvenient for our government, then they will arrive in Paris.

I would kindly ask you Mr. Chairman to inform us your opinion and suggestion, time and place where it can be negotiated.

My deep respect and greetings to you

Chairman of the Georgian Committee

S[ergo] Kuruliszwili

Secretary: N [Nikoloz] Pernadze[98]

20. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to the delegation[99] of the Democratic Republic of Georgia sent to the Paris Peace Conference

Christmas month[100] 22, 1921, Warsaw

Nowy Świat №17

To the delegation of Georgia in Paris

I have an honor to inform you that today 25 Georgian cadets[101] of Tbilisi Military School arrived in Warsaw from Constantinople via Romania. Together with me, at the station they were also met by the representative of the General Staff. The Georgians were placed in the Military School (Szkoła Podchorążych), where they will complete an officer training course that will last 5 –7 months. If it is possible to liberate Georgia before this time, they will travel to Georgia as officers, otherwise they will stay in the Polish army. They will learn Polish language and military equipment. The Polish government bears all the costs. Prior to their arrival in Poland, proper steps have been taken and we achieved the goal. The Polish Ministry of Defense expresses desire to receive another 75 men, about which it is necessary that the Consul[102] of Georgia in Constantinople is informed.

I thanked the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs, as well as the Chief of General Staff for accepting the Georgians.

The Georgian colony in Poland increased in this regard, which is very pleasing to us.

We will do our best to facilitate their life and satisfy their needs as much as possible.

We received information and booklets about Georgia, which were sent to the press, the influential members of the Sejm and the Ministries. The Georgian – Polish Club expressed desire to publish booklets in Polish and distribute them.

I hope you will continue providing information to us in the future.

I think a Georgian newspaper Tavisupali sakartvelo[103] (Free Georgia) is published in Constantinople, – please send it to me.

I would kindly ask you to send us Georgian national and military anthems and notes[104], if you have any.

We are waiting for the answer to our second card about the subsidium.

Our deepest respect and greetings to you

Chairman of the Georgian Committee, Engineer S[ergo] Kuruliszwili

21. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to the delegation[105] of the Democratic Republic of Georgia sent to the Paris Peace Conference

December 26, 1921, Warsaw

Nowy Świat №17

To the delegation of Georgia in Paris

I have an honor to inform you that the Georgian Committee and the Georgian Club in Poland became more active and lively. The colony became more crowded. As I wrote you, 25 Georgians arrived, they are the cadets of Tbilisi Military School and joined the Polish army (Military School). The Committee will soon provide the Polish language courses, workshops to the unemployed and a canteen. And the Club is holding an’ Evening Ball’ under the protection of the Head of Poland on February 18, 1922. It is necessary that the Paris delegation does not forget us and provide us with the information.

In addition, I also would like to inform you that the sender of this letter, Pan Mikołaj Zwierzchowski is a member of the Board of the Georgian–Polish Club. He is a great friend of Georgia (he donated 10.000 Marks to the Committee and 50.000 Marks to the Club). I hope the Paris delegation will provide assistance to him, if needed.

I would kindly ask you to send us the Georgian national ad military anthem and notes, as well as the pictures of our kings and public figures, government, Georgian magazines – newspapers and booklets for our library.

Please do not stop contact with us.

I will inform you about any changes in Poland.

Receive our deep respect and greetings from us.

Chairman of the Georgian Committee,

S[ergo] Kuruliszwili

22. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to the delegation[106] of the Democratic Republic of Georgia sent to the Paris Peace Conference

January 1, 1922, Warsaw

Nowy Świat №17

To the delegation of Georgia in Paris

I am honored to inform you that the notes about Georgia provided by the delegation were sent to the press in Polish, which has already been published in almost all the journals and newspapers. I am sending you some newspapers as a sample. As for the brochures, they were sent to the press, the Ministries, Head of Poland and influential members of the Sejm.

We hope that you will continue providing information to us in the future too. Please send us several copies of the Agreement made in Paris between[107] Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

There are rumors about Skobelev in the press and among the society that he moved to the side of the Bolsheviks. As we know Skobelev was an economic representative of Georgia in Paris and we wonder whether these rumors are true. Please give us some information about it for the press.

Besides, we want to know in whose hands is Batumi at the moment and whether it is true that it is occupied by Enver Pasha.[108]

Our deep respect and greetings to you from us

Chairman of the Georgian Committee, S[ergo] Kuruliszwili

P.S. I would kindly ask you to send us collections of the journal ‘L’ Image’,[109] especially №221

23. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, Konstantine Sabakhtarashvili[110]

May 30, 1922, Warsaw

Nowy Świat №17

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Konstantine Sabakhtarashvili[111]

I have an honor to inform you Mr. Minister about the local situation after your departure.

As you know the issue of Georgia in Poland is very actual. Not a day went by without the letters being published about Georgia (by me or the editorial office).

Work has been going on to improve the situation of Georgian emigrants. We arranged the poor Georgians in the community, whom we help as much as we can. On May 21 we held a concert, but unfortunately we did not have any profit left. We are going to arrange a canteen, reading rooms and more in the community.

As for the arrival of 75 officers from Constantinople, the list[112] of which is already in the local Staff and about whom I filed a petition, has been suspended so far because it costs the government eighty (80) million marks a year. This time 30 men[113] will arrive for this.

I would like to inform you that on May 26 we held a protest evening in a big hall of the self –government of the city on the occasion of the four–year declaration of independence of Georgia. The whole press was full of letters for a week (newspapers were sent to your name) and many warm words were uttered by the representatives of the government and the Sejm. The evening opened with the Georgian national anthem, which was played with the representation music of the commandant. By the way, the presidium included: Al. Lednicki,[114] Archbishop Baron Ropp,[115] representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Count Kossakowski,[116] Shumlakowski,[117] Ne Bondi, as well as General Religioni,[118] Filipowicz[119] could not arrive in time (he was in Plock[120]). Many people attended it. This was our protest, which echoed there too, this was a kind of protest of Georgia that it exists and will not reconcile the occupiers and so on. We published two books Pro Georgia and ‘Georgia under Bolshevik Slavery’ especially for this day. And we have still a lot of work ahead.

The cadets received twenty–twenty francs. I hope you will not forget us either and thus allow us to carry out the great work, the small part of which we are doing here. I hope you will not forget us and we will receive a reply and promise from you in this short time. Greetings from my wife.

My deep respect and greetings to you.

Yours,

S[ergo] Kuruliszwili

P.S. On May 26 I received telegrams and congratulations from almost every city (from the Heads of the city) of Poland, which are kept in the Club cases.

24. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to a stranger/ strangers[121]

[without date][122]

… and to the subordinates of Georgia.

Knowing your foresight and strong talent, who always distinguishes the right from the wrong, on behalf of the Georgian Committee and the whole colony I am applying to you Mr. Chairman, as a deep psychologist, as the best son of our country to provide the necessary assistance to our Committee, whose purpose is material and moral assistance to the subordinates of Georgia.

Knowing the financial situation of our government, we applied to you, otherwise we would not dare do it, but we have in mind the exchange rate of the Polish Mark (though it has increased quite a bit recently) and 4 –5 thousand French francs is enough so far to satisfy the needs of the refugees.

Dear Chairman, we hope that you will not ignore our request.

In addition, I would kindly ask you to give an order so that the Information Bureau located at the Paris delegation make a contact with us and send us everything such as contracts, memorials, appeals, booklets, etc. that are related to Georgia.

Every living force abroad should be used for the restoration of Georgia.

Our deep respect and greetings to you.

Chairman of the Georgian Committee

Engineer S[ergo] Kuruliszwili

1. On December 29, 1921 Sergo Kuruliszwili sent a request to the Chairman of the Polish government Józef Piłsudski to become an honorary member of the ‘Georgian–Polish Club.’

Document from the David Kolbaia’s collection

2. Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letter to the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Georgia

sent to the Paris Peace Conference.

National Archives of Georgia, Tbilisi

3. Lecture of Sergo Kuruliszwili entitled: Turcja (Turkey), November 26, 1922.

Photo: public domain

4. Sergo Kuruliszwili was Chairman of the Executive Council of the Georgian-Polish Club and very active in publishing, editing the Club’ s anniversary daily Amirani’ in 1922.

Photo from the David Kolbaia’s collection

5. Sergo Kuruliszwili with his wife Maria Kuruliszwili (née Kaufman).

Photo from the David Kolbaia’s collection

6. Georgian Committee in Poland, 1920s. Seated from the left: M. Danielov, S. Keskin-Zade, S. Kuruliszwili, V. Guramishvili. Standing from the left: N. Nanadze, A. Antadze, K. Kuradze, V. Kuruliszwili.

Photo from the David Kolbaia’s collection

[1] Sergo Kuruliszwili and Ali Mardan Toptchibachi’ s letters in 1924–1925; Warsaw – Paris – Archives d’ Ali Mardan–bey Toptchibachi, carton n 10/1 [Book.] Топчибаши А. М. Парижский архив 1919–1940. В четырех книгах. – Книга третья 1924–1930. – Составители, предисловие, перевод и примечания Г. Мамулиа и Р. Абуталыбов. Научный редактор профессор И. Агакишиев. Москва, ‘Художественная литература,’ 2017, 720 pp.

[2] A. Woźniak, ‘Stowarzyszenia i organizacje gruzińskie w Polsce w latach 1918–1939. Statut Klubu Gruzińsko–Polskiego,’ Pro Georgia 1, Warsaw 1991, p. 38; ‘Sergo Kuruliszwili (4 IX 1894–25 III 1925),’ Pro Georgia 1, Warsaw 1991, pp. 43–44; ‘Wschód i Polska’ – przyczynek do dziejów emigracji gruzińskiej w Polsce w dwudziestoleciu międzywojennym,’ Pro Georgia 2, Warsaw 1992, pp. 52–56. ‘Międzywojenna Warszawa jako centrum myśli politycznej i ośrodek kulturalny emigracji gruzińskiej w Polsce,’ Pro Georgia 23, Warsaw 2013, pp. 159–188. Por. D. Kolbaia, ‘Gruzińscy prometeiści i Sergo Kuruliszwili ‘Tajfun’ w Polsce międzywojennej,’ Polska Sąsiedztwo bliższe i dalsze. Księga jubileuszowa profesora Wojciecha Materskiego. Redakcja naukowa Ryszard Żelichowski, Warszawa 2019, pp. 504–515.

[3] Description of the Death of Sergo Kuruliszwili №12, 1925 (I–42–12/1925)): ‘It took place in the capital, Warsaw, at the Holy Trinity Orthodox Church in Podwale on March 31, nineteen twenty five. At four o’ clock in the afternoon appeared: Maria Kuruliszwili (Kaufman), living in the city of Warsaw, No 17 Nowy Swiat, 29 years old, engineer’ s wife and Jan Kuruliszwili, a student at the University of Warsaw, living in Warsaw, in No 7 Krucza street, 24 years old, and they informed us that on March 28 of that year, at two o’ clock and thirty minutes p.m. in Lomorowski cafe in No 26 Nowy Swiat street was murdered Sergo Kuruliszwili – son of Jan and Ekaterine Nazarovi, an engineer, born in Georgia, residing in Warsaw in No40 Nowy Swiat, married, Orthodox, 30 years old, who had a wife Maria Kuruliashvili (Kaufman), 29 years old. This Act was prepared after his death and signed after reading by us and them./ Signature/ Priest Anthony Rudlewski. Maria Kuruliszwili, Jan Kuruliszwili’. J. Ostapczuk, ‘Emigracja gruzińska w księgach metrykalnych Parafii Prawosławnej św. Trójcy przy ulicy Podwale 5 w Warszawie w latach 1922–1944,’ Pro Georgia 24, Warsaw 2014, pp. 277–278.

[4] ‘Echa zabójstwa Sergjusza Kuruliszwilego. Co mówi i nim p. Halina Sas-Wóycicka, żona zabócy Le Bruna–Likernika,’ Dziennik Białostocki, Rok III, wtorek 31 marca, 1925, p.1.

[5] National Archives of Georgia, 1864/2/94/11r–v.

[6] Noe Zhordania (1868–1953) – politician and public figure. One of the leaders and ideologists of the Georgian Social – Democratic Party. Chairman of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. After the occupation of Georgia he emigrated and worked there for the restoration of independence of Georgia. For more information, see Book: V. Guruli, Noe Zhordania: Political Portrait, Tbilisi 2018.

[7] Sergo Kuruliszwili makes a mistake in father’ s name. Noe Zhordania’ s father’ s name was Nikoloz.

[8] It refers to the ‘Georgian Committee in Poland’ which was established on March 1, 1920. The establishment of the committee was due to the hard situation of Georgians in Poland, the need to protect their interests. After the end of the World War I, the Georgian prisoners of war fighting in the army of the Russian Empire found themselves in Poland. They were not able to return to their homeland due to the Russian Revolution and the unstable situation in the East. In order to assist them, Sergo Kuruliszwili convened a meeting of Georgians and established a ‘Georgian Committee in Poland’. After the establishment of the Mission of the Republic of Georgia in Poland, the functions of the Committee were taken over by the Mission, so the Committee ceased to exist. However, after the occupation of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, on November 6, 1921, the ‘Georgian Colony in Poland’ was restored and continued its activities. The aim of the integration was to protect the interests of the subordinates of Georgia and assist them; to publish magazines, newspapers and brochures, which would introduce the history and culture of Georgia to the Polish society. They also carried out propaganda activities to restore the independence of Georgia. The Committee was chaired by: Sergo Kuruliszwili in the years of 1921 – 1922, Joseph Salakaia in the years of 1923 – 1933 and Kote Imnadze in the years of 1934 – 1939. Alexandre Godzjaszwili, Rostom Kazbegi, Vasil Atabegishvili, Pavle Tumanishvili, Tite Berishvili and others were actively involved in the activities of the Committee.

[9] After the declaration of Independence of Georgia on May 26, 1918, the National Council approved an interim coalition government consisting of the representatives of Social Democratic, National Democratic, Social Federalist and Social Revolutionary parties. A member of the Georgian Social Democratic Party, Noe Ramishvili was the Chairman of the government until June 24, 1921. Sergo Kuruliszwili should have been the Secretary of the government during this period.

[10] Noe Ramishvili (1881–1930) – Georgian politician, one of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party of Georgia. He was the First Chairman of the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918) and Minister of Internal Affairs (1918–1921). He emigrated in March 1921 and continued fight abroad to regain the lost independence. On December 7, 1930, he was assassinated in Paris ordered by the Soviet special services. For more details, see.: Book: O. Janelidze, Noe Ramishvili, First Prime Minister of the First Republic of Georgia, Tbilisi 2015.

[11] Vasil Ardishvili (1885–1937) – an engineer, he was deported by the Bolsheviks in 1933 after the sovietization of Georgia. He returned from emigration in 1934. In 1937 he was arrested again and shot.

[12] Pavle Sakvarelidze (1882–1937) – Georgian politician, a member of the Constituent Assembly of the Republic of Georgia. He received high education at the universities in Russua and Switzerland. He was a member of the ‘Menshevik’ faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party.

[13] Razhden Arsenidze (1880–1965) – Georgian politician, a member of the National Council and the Constituent Assembly of Georgia, Minister of Justice of the Democratic Republic. He died in Paris.

[14] Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s pseudonym. Under ‘Typhoon’ s’ pseudonym Sergo Kuruliszwili published many articles and poems. Several collections of his poetry were published in Poland such as Mtvrali vardebi (Drunk Roses), Talga (Wave) as well as novels, stories and essays.

[15] National Archives of Georgia, 1864/2/323/4.

[16] After the declaration of the Independence of Georgia (May 26, 1918), the government sent a delegation to the Paris Peace Conference for the purpose to gain support and international recognition of the sovereignty of Georgia.

[17] Georgians fighting in the army of the Russian Empire during the First World War, who were captured during the war.

[18] The letter includes a postscript by another person: ‘to be reported at the next meeting of the delegation. June 9, 1920’.

[19] National Archives of Georgia, 1864/2/324/9–10.

[20] Mikheil Sumbatashvili – Georgian diplomat, a representative of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Switzerland (Bern) in the years of 1918–1920. ‘Memorjał przedłożony przez ks. Sumbatowa, delegata rządu gruzińskiego, przedstawicielom Koalicji w Bernie, w listopadzie 1918 r’. [Przegląd Dyplomatyczny 2, 1919 pp. 90–95], Pro Georgia 1, Warsaw 1991, pp. 33–37.

[21] It must be Giorgi Guramishvili, one of the founders of the Georgian–Polish Club in Warsaw.

[22] National Archives of Georgia, 864/2/323/18 r–v

[23] It refers to gathering the members of the ‘Georgian Committee in Poland’.

[24] The founders of the Georgian–Polish Club were the following: General Second Lieutenant Antoni Religioni, General Second Lieutenant Adolf Kruczewski, Aleksander Litwinowicz Second Lieutenant, Michał Młynarski, Romuald Makarewicz Lieutenant – Colonel, Wacław Ostrowski, Prince Ezhi (Giorgi) Guramishvili, Ipolite Antadze, Engineer Edmund Fryk, Jan Weyher, Engineer Stanisław Łapiński, Engineer Sergo Kuruliszwili, Ryszard Malinowski Lieutenant, Mieczysław Godlewski Captain, Engineer Artur Machlejd, Wacław Przesmycki, Andrzej Niemojewski Editor, General Lieutenant Józef Leśniewski, Engineer Tadeusz Tydelski, Gustaw Kamieński, Juljusz Łukaszewicz, General Second Lieutenant Adam Bieliński, Jan (Vano) Kuruliszwili, Marjan Szadursłd, Stanisław Car, Stanisław Strzetełski Editor, Engineer Stanisław Marszewski, Walenty Miller, Zofja Komorska, Konrad Jocz, Stanisław Śliwiński. See ‘Statut Klubu Gruzińsko–Polskiego’, Pro Georgia, 1(1991), pp. 39–42.

[25] Based on the Decision № S 2650 of the Minister of Internal Affairs of October 18, 1920, the Company called ‘Georgian – Polish Club of Warsaw’ was included in the Register №367 of Clubs and Companies. Statut Klubu Gruzińsko–Polskiego’, Pro Georgia 1, Warsaw 1991, p. 42. The activity of the Georgian–Polish Club ceased after the death of Sergo Kuruliszwili in 1925. It should be noted that in 1995 by the initiative of a famous photographer Sergo Kuruliszwili Junior (Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s nephew) and David Kolbaia (graduate student of the Department of Ethnology and Anthropology at the University of Warsaw), the ‘Georgian Club 1920’ in Warsaw was restored.

[26] On February 20, 1920, an earthquake occurred in Georgia, in particular, in Gori Governorate, with a magnitude of 8–9. The earthquake killed 129 people (according to other sources, up to 200 people died). Several villages located in the epicenter of the earthquake were completely destroyed.

[27] Mikheil (Ilamaz) Dadeshkeliani (1896–1967) – Lawyer, lawyer for the foreigners living in France. He drew up the Charter of the Georgian Church of Saint Nino in Paris.

[28] The letter includes a postscript by another person: ‘to be reported to the meeting of the delegation. June 9. 1920.’

[29] National Archives of Georgia, 864/2/323/19.

[30] See Comment 27.

[31] National Archives of Georgia, 1864/2/324/11r–v, 12.

[32] Russian. Here it refers to the detention camp for the prisoners of war of hostile countries.

[33] Anton Denikin (1872–1947) – Russian General Lieutenant, hero of the Russo–Japanese War and World War I, leader of the White Movement (1918–1920) during the Russian Civil War. Monarchist.

[34] National Archives of Georgia, 1864/2/323/20r–v.

[35] Edmund Frick (1876–1944) – German–Lithuanian engineer and architect. In the years of 1902–1920 he worked in Georgia: first in Batumi, then in Poti and Kutaisi. In the years of 1907–1909, he was a city engineer of Poti. He was also a member of the Society which spread literacy among Georgians. In 1921 he worked in Lithuania.

[36] Prince Czesław Józef ks. Puzyna (1871–1929).

[37] About Colonel Romuald Makarewicz, See: A. Milewska–Młynik, ‘Dzieje rodziny Makarewiczów odtworzone z fotografii i archiwalnych zapisów,’ Niepodległość i Pamięć 14/1 (25), Warszawa 2007, pp. 27–46.

[38] Arthur Makhleid (1868–1947) – Co–founder of the Society of Plant and Flower Growers of Poland. In 1939 he was Vice President of the Polish Horticultural Producers Association and President of the Supervisory Board of the Cooperative Horticultural Bank.

[39] About Engineer Tadeusz Tedelski, See M. Mądzik, ‘Próby nawiązania stosunków politycznych między Polską a Gruzją w latach 1918–1921 Rocznik Lubelski 29–30, Lublin 1987–1988, pp. 78–80.

[40] Stanisław Łapiński (1891–1922) – Polish engineer, Lieutenant – Colonel of the General Staff of the Polish Army.

[41] Nikoloz Bredow (1873–1915) – Lieutenant General of the Russian Empire. He participated in the Russo–Japanese War and the First World War. He was a participant of the White Movement during the October 1917 coup in Russia.

[42] Bredow’ s March – At the beginning of 1920, the White Guardsmen and Refugees fighting under the leadership of Bredow retreated from Odessa to Poland, where they were disarmed and sent to former German military detention camps in Poland.

[43] Radyvyliv – present Chervonoarmeysk, City in Ukraine.

[44] Written by Sergo Kuruliszwili. Signed by Guramishvili.

[45] National Archives of Georgia, 1864/2/401/1r–v

[46] National Archives of Georgia, 1864/2/323/21

[47] In the years of 1919–1921, during the Polish–Soviet Russia War, the Bolshevik Red Army gained an advantage in the summer of 1920. They made the Poles retreat and reach the borders of Warsaw. The Battle of Warsaw took place on August 13–15, 1920, where the Soviet Russian Red Army was defeated.

[48] On May 7, 1920, an Agreement was signed between the Democratic Republic of Georgia and Soviet Russia, by which Russia acknowledged the independence of Georgia. Diplomatic relations were established between the two countries.

[49] National Archives of Georgia, 1864/2/324/19r–v

[50] In 1919, a Georgian mission was sent to Italy under the leadership of Deputy Foreign Minister Konstantine Sabakhtarishvili (1884–1938). The mission also served as a diplomatic representation in Italy. Konstantine Sabakhtarishvili was a lawyer, a member of the Russian Social Democratic Party (Mensheviks). In 1917 he was elected as a member of the National Council of Georgia. In 1918 he was a member of the Parliament of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. At first he worked as the Comrade of the Minister of Internal Affairs and then he was appointed as the Comrade of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was the Deputy of the Constituent Assembly. In 1921, after the occupation of Georgia, he emigrated. He worked with Georgian political emigrants to restore Georgia’ s independence.

[51] Waclaw Ostrowski (1870–1944) – Polish diplomat and engineer. In 1918 he was appointed as the representative of Poland in the Democratic Republic of Georgia. He established relations with the Georgian government and prepared the basis for future political and military cooperation. On March 12, 1919 he attended the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly. In the years of 1921–1922 he worked in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the years of 1922–1936 he was the Director of the Polish–French Chamber of Commerce and Secretary of the Polish–French Society. He was engaged in journalism. He was a foreign press correspondent in Poland.

[52] National Archives of Georgia, 1864/2/323/22.

[53] See comment 42.

[54] National Archives of Georgia, 1864/2/401/2r–v

[55] On August 10, 1920, US Secretary of State, Bainbridge Colby responded to the question of the Italian government about how the US government values Russian–Polish relations. In addition to Poland, Colby’ s note also referred to other political units derived within the former Russian Empire, including the countries of the South Caucasus. Colby’ s note said that the United States does not approve of the decision of the High Council of Paris about recognizing the republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan. Besides, sharing the idea of the integrity of Russia, the US administration put the legitimacy of Georgia’ s independence under question and acknowledged only the freedom of Finland, Poland and Armenia.

[56] On January 12, 1920, the High Council of the Paris Peace Conference recognized the de facto independence of Georgia.

[57] National Archives of Georgia, 1864/2/398/3r–v

[58] The US government did not recognize disorganization of the borders of the Russian Empire and the independence of the new republics. After the collapse of the Russian Empire, the position of the USA towards the sovereignty of the independent states that emerged in the territory of the former Empire, was not uniform. They had a different attitude towards Armenia. On April 23, 1920 the US government acknowledged the independence of the Democratic Republic of Armenia. See also: Comment 55.

[59] Referring to the Armenian diaspora in the United States. Armenians have settled in the United States in the XVII century. In the XIX–XX centuries their number increased significantly. The Armenian diaspora became stronger over time and gained great influence in America. In 1919, there were 77 980 Armenians living in America. Some of them actively sought to protect the state interests of Armenia and to assist the country.

[60] Evgeni Gegechkori (1881–1954) – Member of the Social–Democratic Party of Georgia, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. After the Bolshevik occupation in March 1921, he continued to work in emigration to restore Georgia’ s independence.

[61] National Archives of Georgia, 1864/ 2/ 398/4r–v

[62] On March 3, 1918, a Peace Treaty was signed in Brest–Litovsk between Soviet Russia and the central states – Germany, Austria–Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottomans. According to the Treaty, Batumi, Ardahan and Kars provinces found out under the influence of the Ottoman Empire. After the defeat of the Ottomans in the First World War, Great Britain occupied Batumi district. England considered Batumi district to be part of the Russian Empire, which it occupied as a result of winning the war. At the beginning of 1920, the British government considered the issue to declare Batumi as Porto Franco. The Georgian government was against this and tried to return Batumi district to Georgia through diplomatic methods. The Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan also groped for Batumi. The argument of Armenia was that they had no access to the sea, so Batumi had to be passed to them, while the Azerbaijanis used religious principles for that. As the Georgians living in Batumi district were Muslims, the Azerbaijani Authorities believed that Batumi was to be under their influence. On July 7, 1920, the British passed Batumi district to Georgia.

[63] The government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia tried to sign an Agreement with Azerbaijan and Armenia for the purpose of mutual assistance. On June 16, 1919, a Military–Defense Agreement was signed between Georgia and Azerbaijan, pursuant to which the parties undertook to assist each other in the event of military attack. The governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan offered Armenia to join the Agreement. However, it was not implemented. On April 28, 1920, during the invasion of the Russian Red Army in the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan, the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan did not make any resistance to the intervention of the Red Army. The majority of the members of the parliament of Azerbaijan supported the transfer of power of the country to the Bolshevik Party. In such a situation, Georgia would no longer be required to fulfill its obligations under the Defense Agreement with Azerbaijan.

[64] High Council of Entente, which played a leading role in the ongoing Paris Peace Conference in 1919–1920, after the end of World War I. It included the representatives from the United States, France and Great Britain.

[65] On January 12, 1920, the High Council of the Paris Peace Conference recognized Georgia’ s de facto independence.

[66] See Comment 50

[67] Weekly Polish journal Przymierze (Union), in which Sergo Kuruliszwili published articles about Georgia.

[68] Boris Savinkov (1873–1938) – Russian politician, revolutionist, one of the leaders of the SR Party and member of the White Movement. He was the author of the famous book ‘Memoirs of a Terrorist’. In 1919 he emigrated and made negotiations with the leaders of the Entente countries to gain support for the White Movement.

[69] The word is not readable

[70] National Archives of Georgia, 1864/2/398/5r–v

[71] On May 26, 1918, Georgia declared its independence with the support of Germany. Prior to the defeat of Germany in World War I, the foreign policy orientation of the Democratic Republic of Georgia was German. Georgia signed the first international Agreement with Germany. The German representation in the Caucasus assisted Georgian state to form the armed forces. German troops were organized in different cities of Georgia.

[72] See Comment 63.

[73] Tbilisi was not the subject of dispute. Tbilisi was the capital when Georgia declared its independence on May 26, 1918.

[74] Pyotr Wrangel (1878–1928) – Russian Military Leader, General, Hero of the Russo–Japanese War and World War I, Cavalry of the Order of Saint George. Leader of the White Movement during the civil war of Russia in 1918–1920.

[75] Kuban People’ s Republic was established during the Civil War of Russia in the years of 1918–1920. It covered the entire territory of the former Kuban region of the Russian Empire. At present it is the Kuban region of the modern Russian Federation.

[76] National Archives of Georgia, 1864/2/323/2 r–v 3

[77] Signature is not readable.

[78] The document is written by Sergo Kuruliszwili.

[79] National Archives of Georgia, 2115/1/125/1–6

[80] Nikoloz (Karlo) Chkheidze (1864–1926) – Georgian state and party figure, Chairman of the Parliament of the Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918–1921) and the Cnostituent Assembly. Member of the Social–Democratic Party of Georgia. He emigrated in 1921 and sought international support for the restoration of Georgia’ s independence. He collaborated with the European Social Democrats. See.: Nikoloz (Karlo) Chkheidze – Memorial Album, Tbilisi 2016.

[81] See Comment 10.

[82] Miracle on the Vistula – One of the main battles of Poland and Soviet Russia War, which took place in August, 1920 near Warsaw. By winning this battle, the Polish army was able to stop the advance of the Red Army, to bring about a fundamental change during the course of the war and defeat Soviet Russia.

[83] Silesia – A historical region in Central Europe. Today, most of Silesia is part of Poland and a small part is located on the borders of the Czech Republic and Germany.

[84] Wilno – modern Vilnius, capital of Lithuania, Polish name.

[85] 25 000 killed Red Army soldiers and 80 000 captured – this will be the result of the battle on Vistula. When the Agreement on ceasing fire was signed on October 16, 1920, Poland re–occupied Wilno (Vilnius), Brest–Litovsl and Minsk. Based on the Treaty of Riga on March 18, 1921, the Poles would finally cede Minsk, Kamianets – Podilskyi and Berdychiv and keep Wilno (Vilnius) and Lviv. See also: W. Materski, Polsko–gruziński sojusz wojskowy 1920 r., Wojna polsko–sowiecka. Przebieg walk i tło międzynarodowe, pod red. A. Koryna,Warszawa 1991.

[86] On October 1, 1918, the Polish mission of the South Caucasus began working in Tbilisi, which was led by Waclaw Ostrowski. He established relations with the Georgian government and prepared the basis for future political and military cooperation. After the de facto declaration of the independence of Georgia in March 1920, Poland sent a diplomatic mission to the independent republics of the South Caucasus under the leadership of Tytus Filipowicz.

[87] ‘Statut Klubu Gruzińsko–Polskiego’, Pro Georgia 1, Warsaw 1991, pp. 39–42.

[88] I. Weyher, Al. Godzjawszwili, Major H. Janczewski, Lawyer K. Jocz, Colonel M. Dżawrow, Engineer E. Frik (Secretary), S. Kuruliszwili (Chairman), Major General M. Romiszewski, Major M. Godlewski, Wł. Wakar, Colonel B. Kavtaradze and Editor Br. Zawistowski.

[89] National Archives of Georgia, 2115/1/125/7r–v, 8r–v

[90] See Comment 80.

[91] See Comment 10.

[92] Giorgi Sidamon–Eristavi (1865–1953) – Georgian lawyer and diplomat. In September 1918, he was appointed as the Chairman of the Special Court of Sokhumi. On October 7, 1919, the Constituent Assembly elected him as a member of the Senate of Georgia. On July 31, 1920 he became the Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Georgia to Poland. He emigrated and lived in France after the sovietization of Georgia.

[93] Vladimer (Lado) Bakradze (1884–?) – Politician and literary critic, member of the Social–Democratic Party of Georgia. He was a member of the Mission of the Democratic Republic of Georgia to Poland. He emigrated after the Soviet government was established in Georgia.

[94] Stanislaw Bulak–Balachowicz (1883–1940) – Military figure. General. Participant of the World War I, Russian Civil War and the Polish–Soviet Russian War.

[95] National Archives of Georgia, 1861/3/47/3r–v

[96] Coal–Coal has been extracted in Georgia since 1847. The deposits are mainly located in three regions: Tkibuli–Shaori, Tkvarcheli and Akhaltsikhe. During the Democratic Republic of Georgia in January 1921, the government concluded a contract with a large Italian enterprise on the concession of Tkvarcheli coal. This contract failed to be implemented due to the occupation of the First Republic.

[97] Gdansk – Danzig in German. Present port city in North Poland. In 1793 it was conquered by the Prussians and it belonged to Germany until 1918. In 1919 it was declared a ‘free city’ based on the Treaty of Versailles and was subject to the League of Nations. It was occupied by Nazi Germany during World War II, and at the final stage of the war, it was occupied by the Soviet Army on March 30, 1945.

[98] Nikoloz Pernadze lived in Sena Street 21, in Warsaw. In 1925 he married to Anna Kojalowicz. They had a daughter Nino, born in 1926. See the extract of the Marriage Certificate (NR 24 Z 1925 ROKU (I–42–24/1925) and Nino Pernadze’ s Birth Certificate. Jerzy Ostapczuk, ‘Emigracja gruzińska w księgach metrykalnych Parafii Prawosławnej św. Trójcy przy ulicy Podwale 5 w Warszawie w latach 1922–1944,’ Pro Georgia 24, Waraw 2014, pp. 279–280.

[99] National Archives of Georgia, 1864/2/447/40r–v

[100] December.

[101] Military School – Founded in September 1919, during the Democratic Republic of Georgia. It aimed to train junior officers and sergeants for the Georgian regular army. At different periods the Military Institution was headed by General Giorgi Kvinitadze, General Alexandre Andronikashvili and Colonel (later General of the Brigade of the Polish Army) Alexandre Chkheidze. During the Russian – Georgian war in February–March 1921, most of the cadets of the Military School took part in the hostilities taking place near Kojori–Tabakhmela, in the outskirts of Tbilisi.

[102] It refers to Konstantine Gvarjaladze (1884 – 1969). He was a diplomat, a political figure and a member of the Social – Democratic Party of Georgia. He participated in the 1905 Revolution. In 1917 he was elected as a member of the National Council of Georgia. in the years of 1918 – 1919 he was a member of the Parliament of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. In 1918 he was Comrade (Deputy) Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1921 he left Georgia after the occupation of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. In 1921 – 24 he was the representative of the Georgian government and the Head of the community in Istanbul. He participated in the operation of the Socialist International in 1920 – 30. In the years of 1935 – 1940 he was the editor–in–chief of the branch of the Social Democratic Party Brdzolis khma (Sound of Battle).

[103] A monthly journal of Social–Democratic Movement of Georgia. It was published first in Istanbul and then in Paris in the years of 1921 –1922.

[104] The state (national) anthem of the Democratic Republic of Georgia was Dideba (Glory), the lyrics and music of which were composed by Konstantine Potskhverashvili. For the text and notes of the national anthem, see http://dspace.nplg.gov.ge/handle/1234/56452 (16.04.2021).

[105] National Archives of Georgia, 1864/2/447/41r–v

[106] National Archives of Georgia, 1864/2/447/42

[107] On June 10, 1921, the representative of the four republics of the Caucasus – Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and the North Caucasus Mountains – signed the declaration that recognized the need for the ‘Union’ of Nations in military, customs and diplomatic field.

[108] Enver Pasha (1881–1922) – Military and political figure of the Ottoman Empire. The ideologist of the Pan–Turkism. He was an active participant in the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, one of the leaders of the party ‘Unity and Progress’.

[109] French language journal published in France. №221 of October 1919 was entirely dedicated to the history, economy and culture of Georgia.

[110] National Archives of Georgia, 1864/2/656/1r–v

[111] Konstantine Sabakhtarishvili (1884–1938) – Lawyer, member of the Russian Social – Democratic Party (Mensheviks). In 1917 he was elected as a member of the National Council of Georgia. In 1918 he was a member of the Parliament of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. He worked first as the Comrade of the Minister of Internal Affairs, later he was appointed as the Comrade of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was the Deputy of the Constituent Assembly. He headed the diplomatic mission sent to Italy. In 1921 he emigrated after the occupation of Georgia. He worked for the restoration of the independence of Georgia along with Georgian political emigration.

[112] At first, twenty– four Georgian cadets entered the Cadet School of Warsaw in the first year (August 1921 – July 1922); in the next year, about twenty cadets (August 1922 – July 1923). Sprawa oficerów gruzińskich niezakontraktowanych. Ministerstwo Spraw Wojskowych. Sztab Generalny. Oddział II.Centralny Archiwum Wojskowy. I. 303.4.546; por. Avowed Servants of Motherland Georgia. Contract Officers of the Polish Army 1921–1944, edited by David Kolbaia, Pro Georgia 16, Warsaw 2008.

[113] R. Karabin, ‘Gruzińscy podchorążowie i oficerowie kontraktowi w Wojsku Polskim 1921–1939,’ Pro Georgia 4, Warsaw 1994, pp. 25–26.

[114] Alexandre Lednicki (1866–1934) – Polish public figure, lawyer and philanthropist. Member of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party, President of the Rural Union of the Republic of Poland in 1930.

[115] Eduard von Ropp ( in German: Michael Johann Maria Baron von der Ropp; 1851–1939) – Catholic Bishop in Tiraspol (1902 – 1903), Bishop of Vilnius (1903–1917), Archbishop of Mohilev (1917–1926).

[116] Michal Stanislaw Kossakowski (1883–1962) – Polish landowner, diplomat and banker.

[117] Marian Shumlakowski (1893–1961) – Polish diplomat, President of the Polish Tennis Association (1932 – 1933), Cavalry of the Order of Malta, he died in Spain.

[118] Antoni Religioni (1866–1939) – Polish doctor, General of the Brigade of the Polish Army.

[119] Tytus Filipowicz (1873–1953) – Polish diplomat, politician and writer. During the Russian Empire he fought for the independence of Poland. From March 1920 he was the Head of the Polish mission in the Democratic Republic of Georgia. In different years he was the ambassador of Poland to Finland and Belgium, as well as to the USA and the Soviet Union.

[120] City in the central part of Poland, near the river Vistula.

[121] National Archives of Georgia, 1864/2/656/2r–v

[122] Document is missing the beginning.

DOCUMENTS OF THE ARCHIVE ‘ARCHIWUM AKT NOWYCH’ ABOUT THE POSSIBLE SUPPLY OF WEAPONS FROM POLAND TO GEORGIA (1922)

by Mikheil Bakhtadze and by Otar Janelidze

‘Archiwum Akt Nowych’, a new archive of the Polish history holds many documents closely related to the Democratic Republic of Georgia and the history of its subsequent period. They significantly expand our understanding of the relationship between Georgia and Poland at the beginning of the 20s of the XX century.

But let’ s follow the sequence: on May 26, 1918 Georgia regained state independence and the Democratic Republic of Georgia was established. Georgia was the first state where the Socialists came to power through democratic elections. This political organization had well – known leaders among whom Noe Ramishvili and then Noe Zhordania was elected as the head of the government, and Nikoloz (Karlo) Chkheidze was elected as the chairman of the supreme legislative body – Constituent Assembly. During the short period of its existence, the construction of a Western – type national state which was based on the principles of civil equality was laid foundation in the Democratic Republic of Georgia. The form of government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia was in line with European standards and was fundamentally different from the Russian Bolshevik model. According to the researcher Stephen Jones, the first Republic of Georgia was of complex nature and presented a ‘complex mix of democracy, nationalism and egalitarianism, which was based on respect for private property and pursuit of public welfare.’[1]

More than 20 countries recognized the Democratic Republic of Georgia. But despite great efforts of the leaders of the Republic, the League of Nations did not accept it in its list. Georgia was left alone in the face of Bolshevik Russian aggression.

In February – March 1921, despite a month long selfless battle against Soviet Russia, Georgia was defeated. Having managed and conquered the last independent state in the South Caucasus, the Kremlin established the soviet authority in Georgia. The defeated government did not sign the capitulation and refused to surrender.

Some members of the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, deputies of the Constituent Assembly and some military leaders decided to leave their homeland and emigrate temporarily. They thought it would be temporary because in their opinion the Soviet rule would not last long in Georgia and the country would regain its independence after some time. They emigrated for the purpose that they would help those remaining in Georgia to fight for freedom.

Georgian Bolsheviks themselves acknowledged that neither of the class of Georgian population supported the Soviet government and that the only thing this government relied on was the Red Army.

Once the Soviet government was established in Georgia, the National Liberation Movement began. The population expected that they would soon restore the lost independence and were ready to start even an armed uprising to gain freedom. On August 21, 1921, a well – known Georgian Bolshevik Levan Gogoberidze[2] wrote: ‘Currently, not only the cities but even the villages are in a state of nervous tension, waiting for a quick change of the government. It is enough to visit any village to hear reviling of the Soviet government if the peasant is convinced that you do not know Georgian. Agitation is open and former princes and noblemen, even the member of the Revolutionary Committee of the village are involved in it. I personally know that peasants exchange bread for weapons. As for the attitude of the peasants and workers of the railway, factories and other establishments towards the Soviet government, I see their readiness for an uprising which is propagandized by the Mensheviks. Members of the Georgian Revolutionary Committee are called usurpers, who seized power from the Georgian proletariat by force. ‘We have to destroy and throw them away,’ shout the population and I learned that in the nearest days they are planning to arrange a dream uprising without asking about the expected outcome. The aim of the uprising is to show Europe the current situation that Georgia does not want to have a violent Soviet government and also contribute to the work carried out by Zhordania, Ramishvili and others.’[3]

The anti – Soviet Movement in Georgia was echoed and sympathized with in European countries, particularly, in France, Poland, Italy and others. Public opinion of the West was imbued with sympathy for the occupied Georgia, it expressed solidarity with the Georgian nation committed to freedom and uncompromising with the conqueror.

Emigrant Georgian politicians or military leaders actively sought to gain the public opinion of the West and obtain the aid from European countries. Very soon after the occupation of Georgia by Soviet Russia it became clear for everyone that Georgia would not be able to restore its independence through peaceful manifestations and other protest marches. The Kremlin would not allow this for several reasons: strategic position of Georgia in the region could cause a chain reaction throughout the Caucasus and in general; it was also a matter of principle for the Bolsheviks fighting for the world revolution.

The only way left in such a situation was an armed uprising. It was a very difficult and dangerous way. It was necessary to carry out great and serious work in advance. Anti – Soviet Georgian politicians considered it quite proper that Georgia alone would not be able to defeat the Red Army and common Caucasian uprising was needed. This made things even more difficult. In the event of defeat, the Kremlin would fiercely take revenge. Georgian politicians were also well aware that the successful start of a common Caucasian uprising did not still mean anything. The courage and dedication of the rebels and their supporters would not be enough for the final victory. Aid from abroad was needed. Material aid: weapons, ammunition, etc. and political aid. The latter one meant influencing the Bolsheviks to agree to the demand of the rebels and give up re – conquering the Caucasus. Georgian and Caucasian emigration actively worked exactly for the purpose of the latter one. Just as in the years of 1918 – 1921, Georgia was at the forefront of achieving freedom and building an independent state in the region, in addition, Georgian emigration was the most active and influential in Europe in the 1920s.

The international situation at that time was very hard. The open intervention of the Entente countries in the fight against the Soviet government did not bring any results. For their part, the Bolsheviks suffered a great failure in the war with Poland in 1920, when they failed to make their dream slogan – ‘To Berlin through Warsaw’ – into reality. The situation in the Caucasus was also influenced by Turkey, which on the one hand cooperated with the Bolsheviks and on the other hand was in a certain confrontation with the Entente.

Not all European countries supported the active fight against the Bolsheviks. Great Britain supported the cooperation with Russia and considered Russia as a counterbalance of Turkey (this was well shown at the Genoa Conference).[4] However, there were states in Europe that Georgia could count on for help and one of the first among them was Poland. We agree with the opinion that among the European states Poland was most interested in[5] restoring the independence of the Caucasus.

Head (Naczelnik Państwa) of the Polish state, Marshal Józef Piłsudski was trying to create a large anti Bolshevik front. The Poles experienced themselves the ‘kindness’ of the Russian Empire and ‘good neighborhood’ of the Bolsheviks, especially in 1920. Without the ‘Miracle on the Vistula’, Poland would probably have lost its independence and the ‘red threat’ would be a danger for the Central Europe too. Piłsudski was well aware of the importance of the alliance of the South Caucasus in the anti Bolshevik fight. That is why he sent his closest ally and comrade-in-arms Tytus Filipovich to the Caucasus in March 1920. He had meetings in Tbilisi and Baku. During those meetings possible military alliances[6] were also discussed among other issues.

It is interesting to note that for their part, the Georgians also acknowledged the importance of Poland not only for the Eastern Europe but in relation to Russia as well. Military Attaché of the Diplomatic Representation of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Ukraine, Captain of Artillery, A. Svanadze wrote back in January 1920 that Poland would play an important role in resolving the Russian issue in the near future. He believed that Poland, in military terms, was one of the most powerful states in Eastern Europe with up to half a million well – trained and disciplined soldiers.[7]

The relations of Georgian politicians with the ruling political and military circles of Poland continued and became more active after their emigration. This matter has been studied well by Georgian and Polish historians but there are still many issues that need to be studied, and clarified. Any new document giving us additional factual information, fills the overall image, provides a new way of analysis and often shows the situation in a completely different way by taking new, previously unknown details into account.

In this regard, very interesting documents are preserved in the Archive of New History of Poland ‘Archiwum Akt Nowych‘. This time we will discuss only two of them. One is kept in Constantinople, in the Cases of the Military Attaché of the Republic of Poland, Colonel Leon Bobicki.[8] and the other one is kept in Bucharest, in the Cases of the Military Attaché of the Republic of Poland, Bolesław Wieniawa-Długoszowski.[9] Both concern the same issue – possible assistance from Poland in the event of an uprising in Georgia and the Caucasus.

The first document is dated March 4, 1922. It was first published by Dr. Pawel Libera.[10] The author of the document, Colonel Bobicki does not write who he met but it is easy to find it out, it was the former Chief of General Staff of Georgia, Alexandre Zakariadze.[11] As for the ‘representative of Georgia here’ mentioned in the document, it might mean the representative of Georgia in Turkey, Simon Mdivani. He was one of the leaders of the Socialist – Federalist Party, Deputy Chairman of the Constituent Assembly of Georgia and in the years of 1920 – 1921 he was the Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Georgia to the government of Ankara. Later in 1921 – 1928 he was the representative of the emigrated Democratic Republic of Georgia in Turkey. In the same period in Constantinople existed a political commission of the emigrated government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, which was headed by Konstantine Gvarjaladze, a well-known Social – Democrat and former Deputy Foreign Minister of the First Republic of Georgia. It can be supposed that Noe Zhordania might have instructed him from Paris to make a direct contact with the Polish side. It is interesting that in a letter sent from Constantinople to Warsaw on February 6, 1922, Colonel Bobicki mentions Gvarjaladze as the representative of Georgia (przedstawiciel Gruzji).[12] So, it can be considered that at the meeting General Zakariadze might have been accompanied by Konstantine Gvarjaladze not Simon Mdivani.

Bobicki does not write when the meeting took place but he notes that the issue is urgent. That is why, the Military Attache is likely to have sent the information to the Polish General Staff shortly after the meeting. We can assume that the meeting was held in early March. It is interesting to note the part of the letter where the Attache complains that he did not receive a response from Warsaw – neither positive nor negative. Therefore, we believe that this is not the first information sent to Warsaw about military assistance for Georgia. Perhaps Georgian representatives’ visit (probably repeated) was due to the absence of that specific answer exactly.

The Georgian representatives handed two lists, A and B over to Bobicki, which he attached to his information letter. Unfortunately, these lists have not been found yet. What was written in these lists? Considering the content of both letters, we can assume that list A contained weapons and B contained probably other types of military aid: ammunition, armament, etc. Both lists were probably compiled by Georgians.

As the weapons were to be in Georgia on the 7th day after the start of an uprising, the equipment listed in list B would be needed a month later. It is difficult to say why these certain deadlines were made. The letter emphasizes twice that supply of weapons to Georgians should be carried out after the start of an uprising and it was right. The emigrated government of Georgia could not keep the weapons and it was risky to bring them to Soviet Georgia before an uprising. The Bolshevik government could find out about it and not only would prevent it from being imported but it might have got it itself. Even if it had been possible to transport it secretly, it would have been difficult to hide a large portion of weapons. Moreover, the Soviet government had many agents and was aware of some information about the preparations for the uprising. After the uprising, when at least part of Georgia was freed from the occupation of the Bolsheviks, it would be much easier to get and store the weapons.

The Georgian side supposed that weapons would be supplied from Poland, while they could get the equipment of the list B from other country as well through Poland. In the case of both lists, it was Poland which played the main part.

According to Bobicki, the weapons allocated for aiding the Georgians might be stored in an artillery depot in Lviv. Unfortunately, Bobicki does not specify why it was in Lviv and how they could transfer weapons from there to Georgia.

In a brief letter, Leon Bobicki emphasizes twice that it is important for Poland to have an influence on Georgian policy as well as the whole Caucasus through Georgia because Georgia is dominant in the Caucasus. This is the proper assessment of the role of Georgia and the position fully agrees with the Eastern policy pursued by Poland under the leadership of Marshal Józef Piłsudski. It is important that the Military Attache in Constantinople, who was one of the most informed persons in the affairs of the Caucasus considered it mandatory that the Georgians’ request for the supply of firearms (List A) should be satisfied and negotiations should continue on the rest of the equipment (List B).

The second document is kept in the Fund of the Polish Military Attache in Bucharest. The letter was sent from Warsaw to Bucharest on April 7, 1922 and the Military Attache received it on April 29.[13] The document again tells about the military aid to Georgians fighting for freedom and the meeting described in it is likely a continuation of the meetings that took place in Constantinople. Probably it was difficult to get a specific reply through Leon Bobicki and a Georgian representative arrived in Warsaw directly. The letter emphasizes that it is the repeated request of the Georgian side. This time the surname of the Georgian representative is mentioned. This is Konstantine Sabakhtarashvili[14] but it is unclear why he is called General. Konstantine Sabakhtarashvili was a political figure of the Democratic Republic of Georgia; he held the position of Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs for a certain period of time but still remained a civil person. Later he was elected as a Deputy of the Constituent Assembly of Georgia and at the same time he was the Deputy Foreign Minister.

Konstantine Sabakhtarashvili informed the Second Information Division of the General Staff of Poland about the situation in Georgia. It is interesting which part of Georgia the Georgian representative meant when he spoke about two mountainous regions. One of them is obviously Svaneti. The uprising in Svaneti began in spring 1921, and by the time Sabakhtarashvili was meeting with the representatives of the Polish General Staff, the Soviet government was still unable to suppress the uprising and have control over the region. It finally happened only in summer[15] 1922. It is difficult to identify the second region. It might be Racha – Lechkhumi because despite the fact that partisan detachment, led by Colonel Kaikhosro (Kakutsa) Cholokashvili[16] had been operating in Pshav – Khevsureti and Kakheti since March 1922, while Sabakhtarashvili was in Warsaw the uprising had not yet begun in this region. The uprising broke out here in August.

The letter, sent to the Polish Military Attache in Bucharest, emphasizes the Georgian representative’ s views on the anti – Soviet uprising, in particular, there were mentioned two conditions that were necessary to achieve success. First – the uprising was to start at the same time in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Second – support of Europe so that the Kremlin would refrain from launching a big war against the rebels.

It should be noted that it was not the position of only one person, Konstantine Sabakhtarashvili. Georgian political and military emigration thought so too. On June 10, 1922, a report about the anti –Soviet uprising was made before the Political Commission in Constantinople by Valiko Jugeli[17] and on September 7 it was made by General Alexandre Zakariadze. Both noted that success would be achieved only through a common Caucasian uprising and Georgia alone would find it very hard[18] to fight against the Bolsheviks. Politicians and military servants remained in Georgia shared the same opinion as well, who got involved in the National Liberation Movement as soon as Georgia was conquered. At a secret meeting held in Tbilisi in March 1922 which was attended by a member of the Military Commission of the Social – Democratic Party, Gogita Paghava, General Varden Tsulukidze, General Alexandre Andronikashvili, Colonel Gogi Khimshiashvili and Colonel Rostom Muskhelishvili, it was stated that the uprising started only in Georgia will fail and it is necessary to work all over the Caucasus[19] to prepare it.

Leon Bobicki suggested supplying weapons to the Georgians from Lviv but he did not specify in what way, - the second letter already mentions the route. The cargo was to be transported from Poland to one of the ports of Romania and from there the Georgian side would ship it to Batumi or Poti. It was also due to this fact that the Polish Military Attache in Romania was aware of it. He was given an assignment to find out about the position of the military government of Romania regarding the shipment of weapons in this way. This is a very important point and in our opinion it indicates the real desire of the Polish military government to help the Georgians. Otherwise, they would not have been interested in the position of the Romanian military government in advance.

It is natural that this letter also mentions two lists A and B but it does not include any specific information either.

The Polish side emphasized that they supported and sympathized with Georgian people but due to some problems they were not able to supply weapons at that time, although they promised to help in the event of the uprising.

We would like to note once again that Georgian side assessed the situation in a real way and did not ask for immediate assistance. They needed a guarantee that this help would be provided at the right time. We will provide two excerpts from the speeches of Valike Jugeli and General Zakariadze mentioned above. Valiko Jugeli noted, ‘promises should be expressed only in the supply of weapons and provision of loans in due time. We do not want foreign auxiliary troops, nor do we ask for weapons for Georgia right now. We just want to make sure that as soon as the Bolsheviks are driven out, we will get sufficient weapons in order to immediately build up the armies that will defend the liberated republics[20] as well as to purchase the supplies to support the troops’.[21] General Zakariadze stated the same: ‘uprising will be possible only when the neutrality of the Ottoman is ensured on the one hand and on the other hand, after the liberation we will have full hope for immediate European aid with weapons and money …In four – five days the uprising will end with a complete victory in the territory of Georgia and the rebels will master all the firearms and warehouses of the enemy… This will be the firearms with which they should be able to provide defense within 2-3 months because during this period we should not hope for the import of sufficient firearms from abroad… We must understand that no one will give us either firearms or money in advance. This requires de facto domination of our territory and when a large part of the Caucasus is at our disposal and when the liberated Caucasus, not Krasin, will speak on behalf of Baku, Grozny, Chiatura, Tkvarcheli and Maykop, we too will be able to easily get the money and the necessary firearms and all the equipment.’[22]

Of course, money was an important thing during the preparation for the uprising. Valiko Jugeli directly stated, ‘at present the most serious and primary issue for us is getting money… The Chairman of the government Noe Zhordania, with the Minister of Finance, is going to visit the government leaders of France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Poland for this purpose. Independent Georgia and the Caucasus are in the interests of these countries and therefore they will give us a loan.’[23]

Both of our letters given above are related to the military aid and the issue about the financial aid is not seen. It is natural too. Financial aid was not the competence of either the General Staff or the Military Attache. This issue was probably discussed at other meetings.

The letter emphasizes the role of Baranowsky, Polish Ambassador to Constantinople and Leon Bobicki, Military Attache in the issue related to the assistance of Georgia. Other documents kept in the Polish archives also confirmed that Leon Bobicki actively cooperated with the Georgians and was very well informed about the situation particularly in Georgia and in the Caucasus in general.

This is not surprising given that the military attaches of the Republic of Poland also performed other tasks[24] in certain European countries depending on their location. In Turkey, the Military Attache in Constantinople and then in Ankara ‘was instructed to monitor the southern territories of the USSR, given the importance of the Caucasus. In addition, in the capital of Turkey the Polish Military Attache monitored the ‘campaign of the councils in the Middle East’ and also ‘coordinated the liberation movements in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia’. Moreover, the Military Attache in Constantinople was directly responsible for organizing intelligence activities in the South Caucasus.[25]

It is interesting to note that the Military Attache in Constantinople was more informed about the developments in the Caucasus than the Polish Military Attache in Moscow. The Caucasus, which was part of the Soviet Union, as well as Southern Ukraine and Turkestan were monitored[26] by the Military Attache in Turkey. He worked mainly in three directions: Turkey, Soviet Union, Persia and Afghanistan. In addition to other issues he had to obtain information on the relationship of the Turkish government with Moscow, the Caucasus and the Caucasian emigration, on the situation at Turkish – Soviet border, on military – political situation in the South and North Caucasus, on Anti – Bolshevik Movement, on the activity of the Caucasian emigration in Turkey, on Air Force, armoured vehicles, national military units, military manoeuvres, Black Sea Fleet, Batumi and Poti ports existing in the Caucasus, on the development[27] of industry (oil and mineral extraction) and trade. Intelligence in the Caucasus and Turkestan was the most important task of the Military Attache, including with regard to the Promethean Movement.[28]

It seems that the Georgians relied on Poland the most with regard to the assistance with weapons. They also worked in Warsaw, Constantinople and Paris in this direction. It is noteworthy that after the meeting held in Warsaw, Konstantine Sabakhtarashvili left for Paris to meet with the Military Attache of Poland.

The letter sent to Bucharest also mentions the arrival of Georgian officers in Poland, for service in the army and for training in military institutions as well. This issue is well studied and we will not give time to it any longer,[29] we will just mention that the Polish archive preserves the list of the Georgian soldiers who were the first to leave for Poland[30] in August – September 1922.

It is still difficult to say what promises the Georgian side received from the Poles. However, the documents discussed by us, as well as other information, even Valiko Jugeli’ s statement, ‘we have already got a serious promise on the assistance with weapons and money,’[31] – suggest that Poland was really trying to help the Georgians and there were some guarantees for that.

Another document is interesting in this regard, which is also preserved in the Polish archives. This is the letter sent by Leon Bobicki on September 25, 1923 to the Second Division of the General Staff in Warsaw. It turns out that the Polish side handed over the radio transmitter to the Georgians. Bobicki reports that the transmitter has already been sent to Georgia and it would be assembled on the spot. The Military Attache asks to be allowed to send a specialist to Georgia to assist Georgians in the event of any problems in assembling a transmitter. The letter is attached by a list[32] of the equipment sent to Georgia. This letter clearly confirms that Poland was providing real assistance to the Georgians fighting against the Soviet government.

We believe that further research may reveal new documents that will provide us with even more information about the Polish – Georgian military cooperation in 1921 – 1924.

(Signature: Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warszawa: Fund 1191, Case A II 33 (5), pp. 89, 92.)

Warszawa, dnia 7 kwietnia 1922 roku

MINISTERSTWO SPRAW WOJSKOWYCH.

SZTAB GENERALNY - ODZIAŁ II.

Nr. 8877/. Inf/II. A.

Tel. wewn. Nr. 137.

DO

ATTACHE WOJSKOWEGO

W BUKARESZCIE

Dnia 30 marca zgłosił się do Oddziału II Szt. Gen. p. C. Sabakhtarichwili, podsekretarz stanu ministerium spraw zagranicznych rządu emigracyjnego Gruzji. Pan S. informował Oddz. II o możliwościach ruchu zbrojnego w Gruzji przeciwko bolszewikom.

Według jego informacji nastrój całego społeczeństwa w Gruzji zwrócony jest przeciwko władzy sowieckiej, co wywołało nawet powstanie częściowe w 2 powiatach górskich Gruzji i oczyszczenie ich od bolszewików. Po zatem w całym kraju odbywa się szeroka akcja antysowiecka, objawiająca się na razie w masowych manifestacjach bez użycia broni. Wybuch ostateczny powstania p. S. uzależnia od sytuacji międzynarodowej i podkreśla, iż rząd gruziński na emigracji zdaje sobie dokładnie sprawę z warunków, w jakich powstanie ma wybuchnąć i z konieczności posiadania gwarancji, iż powstanie mija swój cel. W tej sprawie pierwszorzędnej wagi rzeczą jest posiadanie podtrzymania rządu gruzińskiego po powstaniu przez państwa Europy i zapewnienie ich pomocy w celu niedopuszczenia dalszej akcji zbrojnej sowietów przeciwko wyzwolonej Gruzji. Po zatem, według jego informacji, istnieje ścisłe porozumienie w sprawie powstania pomiędzy Gruzją, Armenią i Azerbejdżanem co do jednoczesnej akcji.

P[an] S. zwracał się dalej do Sztabu Gen. z powtórzeniem prośby, złożonej na ręce posła Baranowskiego i ppłka Bobickiego w Kons[tantyn]opolu i o okazanie pomocy ze stroni polskiej przez dostarczenie pewnej ilości materiałów wojennych (bron, amunicja).

Według jego opinii chodziłoby rządowi gruzińskiemu o możność Liczenia na pomoc Polski w razie akcji zbrojnej, której czasu rozpoczęcia nie potrafiłby teraz określić, uważając zresztą, iż dzisiejsza chwila nie byłaby do tego odpowiednią. Technicznie warunki dostawy polegałyby, zdaniem p. S. na dostarczeniu przez Polskę pewnej ilości broni do jednego z portów Rumunii a dalej władze gruzińskie przewiozłyby ją statkiem do Batumi lub Poty.

P[an] S. został poinformowany, iż rząd polski zawsze okazywał i okazuje dużą pomoc i sympatię narodowi gruzińskiemu, a władze wojskowe przychodzą w najszerszym zakresie z pomocą oficerom gruzińskim, dając im możność kształcenia się w wojskowych szkołach Polski. Jednak dostarczenie broni w chwili obecnej nie mogłoby być uskutecznione tak z powodu braków, jakie obecnie odczuwa armia polska, jak też i z powodu całości sytuacji politycznej i woskowej, nie rokującej nadziei powodzenia powstania. Jednak władze wojskowe polskie śledzić będą dalszy rozwój wypadków i w chwilach decydujących dla narodu gruzińskiego niewątpliwie udzielą mu pomocy w jak najszerszym zakresie.

Obserwacja wypadków i ogólna ocena sytuacji została powierzona naszemu attaché wojskowemu w Konstantynopolu.

P[an] S. udaje się dnia 31 marca do Paryża, gdzie ma nawiązać kontakt z naszym attaché wojskowym.

Powyższe podaję się do wiadomości z poleceniem zorientowania się co do warunków przewozu broni według załączonego wykazu z Polski (A i B) do jednego z portów rumuńskich i stanowiska władz wojskowych rumuńskich w tej sprawie.

Otrzymują:

Attaché wojsk. w Kons[tantyn]opolu,

w Paryżu, w Bukareszcie.

M.S. Zagr. D.IV.

z r. Szefa Sztabu Gen.: Szef Oddziału II. ppłk. p.d. Szt. Gen.

[1] https://civil.ge/ka/archives/242426

[2] In 1921 Levan Gogoberidze (1896 – 1937) was the Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee (REVCOM) in Tbilisi. In the years of 1926 – 1930 he was the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. In 1936 he was arrested and shot a year later.

[3] Archive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia (I), №6. Criminal Case N22313, v. 1. pp. 23–27.

[4] The Genoa Conference lasted from April 10 till May 20, 1922. Up to 30 states participated in it. one of the important issues was the settlement of relationship with Soviet Russia. At the conference Soviet Russia also represented the states it had already occupied, including Georgia. The emigrated government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia demanded and tried to admit its delegation to the conference officially. Due to retaliatory attempt of Soviet Russia, this failed. The Catholicos Patriarch of All Georgia Ambrosi Khelaia sent a protest letter to the Genoa Conference. The Catholicos demanded the withdrawal of the occupant Red Army from Georgia and conduction of free elections.

[5] Г. Мамулиа, Борьба за свободу и независимость Кавказа (1921–1945). Тбилиси–Париж 2013. 150; M. Mądzik, Próby nawiązania stosunków politycznych między Polską a Gruzją w latach 1918–1921, Rocznik Lubelski 29–30, 1987–1988, p. 79; Prometheism. Participation of Caucasian peoples in the fight for the independence of Poland in the years of 1918–1921, Journal Akhali poloneti (New Poland) (special edition in Georgian language), Tbilisi 2001, p. 94.

[6] O. Janelidze, ‘Diplomatic Representation of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Poland’, Polish–Georgian Historian’ s’ Commission Collected Works, Volume I, Edited by David Kolbaia, Warshaw 2019, pp. 130–131; M. Bakhtadze, ‘An Attempt of Establishing Soviet Power in Georgia in 1920 and the War between Poland and Bolsheviks’. Polish–Georgian Historian’ s’ Commission Collected Works, Volume I, Edited by David Kolbaia, Warshaw 2019.

[7] Г. Мамулиа, От Тифлиса до Киева и Варшавы. Из истории кавказско–украинского сотрудничества в рамках движения 'Прометей' (1918–1926). http://nowyprometeusz. pl/от–тифлиса–до–киева–и–варшавы–из–исто/ p. 148.

[8] Leon Bobicki (1887–1943), participated in the First World War, served in the 2nd Polish Corps operating in the territory of Russia. He was the Captain at the end of 1917. Then he served in the unit of General Józef Haller. With the rank of Lieutenant Colonel he was Chief of Staff of the 4th Division of Polish riflemen. In 1920 he participated in Polish – Bolshevik War. In October of the same year, he actively participated in the operation to seize the territory of central Lithuania led by General Lucjan Zeligowski, so called ‘Żeligowski's Mutiny’. In the years of 1921 – 1924 he was the Military Attaché in Constantinople. In 1929 he was transferred to the reserve. During his stay in Constantinople, he actively cooperated with Georgian politicians and the military (especially with Konstantine Gvarjaladze and General Alexandre Zakariadze). Many interesting documents are preserved in his Fund which are about Georgia and Georgians.

[9] Bolesław Wieniawa–Długoszowski (1881–1942) – Polish diplomat and a military figure, Józef Piłsudski’ s closest comrade–in–arms. He studied at Lviv Medical University. After the outbreak of World War I, he arrived in Krakow and attended a training course for officers and later became an officer in the Polish legions. In 1915 he arrived in Warsaw and became an adjutant of Józef Piłsudski. He participated in planning the military operations of Vilnius and Kiev, as well as the battle of Warsaw. In November 1921, he was appointed as the Military Attache in Bucharest and actively participated in the preparation and signing of the Polish – Romanian Treaty. In 1924 he became a student of the Higher Military School of Warsaw, which he graduated in 1926. He served in different units of the Polish army. In 1931 he became a Brigadier General and in 1938  – Division General. In 1938 he was appointed as the Ambassador of Poland in Italy. He died in New York in 1942.

[10] P. Libera, II Rzeczpospolita wobec ruchu prometejskogo, Warszawa 2013, pp. 67–68.

[11] Alexandre Zakariadze was a participant in the Russo – Japanese War and the First World War. He was the Staff Officer of the 27th Army Corps. From February 1917 he was an acting Chief of Staff of the 2nd Lithuanian Rifle Brigade. At the beginning of 1918 he was the Chief of Staff of the Georgian Corps. Then he worked in the General Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces. In 1919 he was awarded with the General’ s rank and appointed as the Chief of Staff. He held this position before the occupation of Georgia by Soviet Russia. After emigrating in 1921, he was in Istanbul for a little time from where he moved to Poland. He graduated from the Higher Military School of Poland. From 1923 he was a Brigadier General in the Polish Army. In 1927 he was appointed as the General of the Division. In 1939 he was captured by the Germans but was soon released. At the end of World War II he moved to France. He was a member of the Georgian community in Paris.

[12] Archiwum Akt Nowych. Fund 1191, Case A II 33 (5), p. 1. The letter briefly describes the content of the meeting of Bobicki with Gvarjaladze that took place on February 3. It is noted that Gvarjaladze has contacts with the Committee for the Liberation of Ukraine and at the end of the meeting Gvarjaladze introduced to them the Agreement signed with the Committee. Gvarjaladze’ s position is emphasized about the fact that the Committee for the Liberation of Ukraine should formulate tasks in its program in such a way to consider the interests of Poland.

[13] Poland. Warshawa. Archiwum Akt Nowych. Fund 1191, Case A II 18, pp. 325 – 326.

[14] Konstantine Bezhani’ s son Sabakhtarashvili (1884 – 1938) – Georgian Social – Democrat, he studied at Moscow University, Faculty of Law. He participated in armed marches in 1905. He had to go to Geneva where he proceeded his studies at a higher educational institution. He returned to Russia after the February Revolution in 1917. He was the Head of the city of Batumi, member of the National Council (Parliament), Deputy Minister of the Internal Affairs, member of the Constituent Assembly, Deputy of the Foreign Minister, leader of the delegation sent to Italy. In 1921, after the occupation of Georgia he emigrated. He actively cooperated with military and political circles of Poland.

[15] O. Janelidze, ‘Svaneti Anti – Soviet Uprising in the years of 1921 – 1922’, Caucasus Herald 2, 2000.

[16] G. Saitidze, Kakutsa Cholokashvili, Tbilisi 2012, p. 42.

[17] In the years of 1918 – 1921, Valiko Jugeli was the Chief of Staff, that is Commander, of the People’ s Guard. He was distinguished with amazing personal bravery. He participated in the war against Armenia in 1918, in 1919 in the wars against Denikin and in 1920 he took part in repulsing the first invasion of Soviet Russia. In 1921 he emigrated, returned to Georgia in 1924 as the leader of the Anti –Soviet Uprising but he was soon arrested by the Soviet Special Services. He was shot dead on August 30 after the uprising began.

[18] Sh. Vadachkoria, Georgian Emigration and National Liberation Movement in Georgia (1921 – 1990), Book I, Tbilisi 2018, pp. 424–450.

[19] G. Saitidze, Kakutsa Cholokashvili, Tbilisi 2012, p. 41.

[20] Implying Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia.

[21] Sh. Vadachkoria, Georgian Emigration and National Liberation Movement in Georgia (1921–1990), pp. 430.

[22] Ibid, pp. 435–447.

[23] Ibid, p. 434.

[24] A. Peplonski, Wywiad Polski na ZSRR 1921–1939, pp. 66–68.

[25] Ibidem., p. 99.

[26] R. Majzner, Attachaty wojskowe Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 1919–1945, Częstochowa 2014, p. 343.

[27] R. Majzner, Attachaty wojskowe Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 1919–1945, pp. 344–345.

[28] Ibidem., p. 345.

[29] W. Materski, ‘Gruzini–oficerowie kontraktowi Wojska Polskiego’. Pro Georgia 16 (2008), pp. 16–18; D. Kolbaia, Under Polish wings. The Georgian emigration in Poland (1921–1939), Warsaw, 2016.

[30] Archiwum Akt Nowych. Fund 1191, Case A II (5), pp. 23–24; 30–33.

[31] Sh. Vadachkoria, Georgian Emigration and National Liberation Movement in Georgia (1921–1990), p. 433.

[32] Archiwum Akt Nowych. Fund 1191, Case A II 33 (5), pp. 89, 92.

JOSEPH SALAKAIA (1881–1940) – REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GEORGIAN EMIGRANT GOVERNMENT IN POLAND (LETTERS, 1925–1931)

by David Kolbaia and by Shorena Murusidze

Georgian politician and public figure Joseph Salakaia was born in 1881, in the village Teklati, Senaki Governorate. In his youth he studied and shared Marxist ideology and became a member of the Social Democratic Labor Party (Mensheviks). In the Russian Empire in which Georgia was also included he was politically persecuted due to his revolutionary activities, that is why he had to emigrate at first to Switzerland and then to Belgium. He got his higher education during his stay in Belgium, where he graduated from the Institute of Electrical Engineering. He returned to his homeland in 1917 after the February Revolution and the overthrow of the royal authority in the Russian Empire. During this period, important changes were carried out in the South Caucasus where national unions were being formed in parallel with the process of disintegration of the former Russian Empire, which had to take over local government. Georgian National Council was elected at the first National Congress on November 19–23 in 1917 the member of which became Joseph Salakaia. After the coup of October 1917 when the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia, the influential political parties of the South Caucasus finally withdrew from Russia and started to establish an independent state. On April 22, 1918, the independence of the Democratic Federal Republic of Transcaucasia was declared, which did not last long. Due to the disagreement between Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, the Federal Republic of Transcaucasia was disintegrated on May 26, 1918. On the same day, the Georgian National Council declared the independence of Georgia. The leader of the Georgian Social Democratic Party Noe Zhordania read the Act of Independence of Georgia. This important document was also signed by Joseph Salakaia along with other persons. During the period of the Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918–1921), Joseph Salakaia was a deputy of the legislative branch on the list of the Social Democratic Labor Party of Georgia: member of the Parliament in 1918 and member of the Constituent Assembly from 1919. During his tenure as a deputy, he was a member of the self–government of the legislative branch, budget–finance and foreign affairs. He also held the position of Comrade of the Chairman of the Community Central Bureau and the Chairman of the Community District of Senaki Uyezd. After the occupation of the Democratic Republic of Georgia by Russia in 1921, Joseph Salakaia emigrated. With the emigrated government he actively fought to restore the humiliated rights of Georgia and to de–occupy the country. In the years of 1923–1933 he was the Chairman of the Georgian Committee in Poland and a representative of the emigrated government of the First Republic in Poland.[1] In 1926 Joseph Salakaia, together with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the First Republic of Georgia, Evgeni Gegechkori, participated in the working process of the Congress of the Social Democratic Labor Party of Poland where they raised the issue of Georgia and asked their Polish counterparts for support. During the chairmanship of the Georgian Committee in Poland, Joseph Salakaia cooperated with the officials of the Polish government. He asked the ambassadors of other states in Poland to help Georgian emigrants. Joseph Salakaia provided significant information to the members of the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Paris on the political, economic and social situation in Poland and the Georgians living there. In 1933 Joseph Salakaia voluntarily left the position of the Chairman of the Georgian Committee in Poland and moved to France. After the outbreak of World War II, in 1940 the government of the First Republic sent Joseph Salakaia as a representative of the Republic of Georgia to the emigrated government of Poland in the city of Angers, France. When the German army occupied Paris, he did not go to England with the emigrated government of Poland. He ended his life by suicide in the city of Angers on June 14, 1940, and he was buried there. After the end of the war, in 1948 Georgian emigrants buried his remains in the Georgian cemetery in Leuville.[2] The periodic body of a foreign bureau of the Social Democratic Party of Georgia in Paris ‘Chveni drosha’ (‘Our Flag’) responded to this fact, where the Georgian politician and diplomat Sosipatre Asatiani dedicated a letter to Joseph Salakaia. He describes him as follows: ‘His ideal: implementation of socialism through democracy – establishment of common happiness, membership of an international family of his beloved nation with equal rights – was insulted and he became desperate, he was worried very much about the occupation of the nation… A cheerful person, excited by the hopes of the best future, unstoppable warrior at one time, now, after the occupation you could hardly see him cheerful, even his smile would show his bitter feelings. Although decades passed, these feelings have not been suppressed!…’[3]

The National Archives of Georgia preserves Joseph Salakaia’ s letters sent to the Chairman of the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, Noe Zhordania, the representative of Georgia in France, Akaki Chkhenkeli and the Minister of Finance and Trade–Industry, Konstantine Kandelaki. The chronological framework of the documents includes the years of 1925–1931. The letters were sent from Warsaw to Paris. Joseph Salakaia’ s archival documents are an important source with regard to studying the history of the Georgian emigration to Poland and Polish–Georgian relations.

1. Joseph Salakaia’ s letter[4] to Akaki Chkhenkeli[5]
31/VII/1925, Warsaw

To the representative of Georgia in France[6]

I received your letter on 15/VII/25 because before your letter I had received a letter from the Chairman of the government.[7] I sent the translation of the anti – government letter published in ‘Kurier Warszawski’[8] as well as the reply published in ‘Głos Wschodu’[9] to the name of Meb. K. Kandelaki.[10] I hope you read these letters. All the officers[11] were sent the resolution, which was made by the delegation of the government. I attached to it the explanations which I took from your last letter. I am also attaching here one of the documents sent to the officers.

A week ago at the committee[12] meeting it was determined to elect a chairman of the committee. I was elected as the Chairman.[13] Mr. Tumanishvili[14] refused his candidacy. The relationship between B. Tumanishvili and the Committee has not been over yet. A number of meetings are scheduled to determine this relationship and when the issue is clarified, we will let you know. In addition, the Committee is sending a paper to your name, in which we are asking you that Paris should make an effect on the Prague colony.[15] We hope that the government will pay special attention to the situation in Prague, which has been going on for several days.

I handed over the Letter of Thanks[16] sent by you to Gen[eral] Serda–Teodorski[17] only yesterday because he was not in Warsaw because of work. He was extremely excited and thankful. You will receive the return Letter of Thanks from him in the coming days.

If I am late for sending the letter, it could be explained by the fact that I had bronchitis, I was in bed for several days and I am still feeling sick but I am too busy to be sick. I will give you a much more extensive report soon.

2. Joseph Salakaia’ s letter to Akaki Chkhenkeli[18]
16/XI/1925, Warsaw

To the representative of Georgia in France, Mr. A. Chkhenkeli

As you can see from the telegrams, the government of Mr. Grabski[19] resigned, but Sejm had not showed any distrust towards him as he had the majority in the Sejm. Some projects submitted to the Sejm by him would undoubtedly have been adopted by the majority with several amendments in it. The main projects were the following: 1) loan and 2) economic recovery. He was supported by two large factions such as National Democratic and S[ocial] Democratic factions, though the resignation of the government of Grabski was expected every day. Such was the opinion of politicians but it happened completely unexpectedly. It is not known whether it is true but it is said that several financiers had visited him and said that as long as Mr. Grabski was the Chairman of the government, the Europeans or the United States would not lend to them (as if the financiers, who visited Grabski, had told him this information on behalf of American or other financiers). From the very first day of Mr. Grabski’ s resignation, they had been trying to form a parliamentary government. A broad coalition government failed to be formed. Now Mr. Skrzyński[20] was assigned to form a parliamentary government. As you know, Skrzyński himself was not a member of the parliament. I hope he will form it till evening. It is hard to say because the atmosphere is too roused. Unfortunately, I can’ t write everything to you, they are expecting a coup, if it can be believed.

Now I would like to tell you something very unpleasant. Yesterday we were officially informed that the Chief of General Staff had made a resolution for the senior officers who had not signed the contracts. According to this resolution, about sixteen of our senior officers will be dismissed from the Polish Army from the First of January. From that day all those officers will find themselves out in streets. The motive of the resolution is that they are reducing their troops and the economic crisis on the other hand. The General Staff requires that we urgently notify this decision to all the interested officers. We must immediately gather those in Warsaw and inform them about the resolution of the Staff and those who are not in Warsaw will receive information in writing. You can easily imagine the situation here. I was asked to take every measure. If there is any other way out, we will do our best for it, but currently I have nothing to say about it. The list includes almost all the senior officers starting with Zakariadze.[21]

I have one request with you too. Please send P. Tumanishvili a mandate for the representation of the Red Cross. We decided here that it is not necessary to mention in it that Tumanishvili is a member of the Committee or a Comrade Chairman (such was the opinion of the Committee members and P. Tumanishvili).

J. Salakaia

3. Joseph Salakaia’ s letter to Akaki Chkhenkeli[22]
4/XII/[19]25, Warsaw

To the representative of Georgia in France

The situation of the 16 officers about whom I told you last is still unclear. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs promised me to send an official letter to the Minister of Defense to let the Georgian officers remain in service for political reasons. In addition, I asked the leaders of the party to assist me in this issue. They promised me and some steps were taken already. During the negotiations there was also General Chavachavadze[23] with me. Many people help us in this issue in an unofficial way too. We are waiting for the arrival of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. When everything is clarified finally, we will let you know.

J. Salakaia

4. Joseph Salakaia’ s letter to Akaki Chkhenkeli[24]
15/XII/[19]25, Warsaw

To the representative of Georgia in France

The issue related to the officers is as follows: these days Mr. Skrzyński and the leaders of the two large parties negotiated with General Żeligowski[25] (Minister of Defense) and asked him to revoke the resolution of the Chief of General Staff[26] about the dismissal of the officers. Yesterday’ s official statement of General Żeligowski is as follows: ‘there is no way that the officers are left in the streets. They are only expected to reduce salaries just like everyone else.’ This is a satisfactory answer, so far at least. General Żeligowski looks at our issue well. I hope this issue will be solved quite well, though practically it takes quite a long time to be settled. The officers calmed a little when I told them the words of General Żeligowski.

You are writing about whether the officers who are recruited on the basis of the contract are expected to be dismissed. There are rumours about it but it depends on the fact if the reduction of troops is decided. According to the information I have, if there is a reduction, first of all the contracted soldiers and the sick ones will be dismissed. But nobody knows if there is any kind of reduction. This issue might become a topical issue in a short time and I will tell you then. Now I want to write a little about the situation here. The financial and economic situation is almost disastrous. The exchange rate of Zloty is falling day by day, with prices rising up to 13%. Unemployment is increasing. Three days ago the Minister of Finance provided a financial exposure to the Sejm. He presented the country in such a way that made everyone ponder regardless of their movements. The stock exchange responded to this exposure by dropping Zloty by 30–40% on that day. According to the Minister the only solution is the reduction of costs in all fields. He thinks that there is still no hope for the loan. In addition to this situation, there is a great crime. For example, yesterday the former Minister of Finance Linde was arrested. This happens once in a thousand. A long time will probably pass before the situation improves at least a little. The desire of today’ s leaders is great. I will try to write you about other issues again in the coming days. I got a copy of the agreement. The agreement was met with admiration by the majority but not all. This is the job. There are those who do not want the agreement, you cannot make them agree to it. Probably such people are not only in Poland.

J. Salakaia

5. Joseph Salakaia’ s letter to Akaki Chkhenkeli[27]
11/IV/1926, Warsaw

Dear Mr. Akaki!

From May 1 our officers are staying unemployed. All the remedies are exhausted. The only hope is that the telegram sent by the government to the name of Marshal Piłsudski or to the President might have an effect. I sent a telegram to the government asking them to assist us with whatever they could because we are in an incredibly terrible situation, thirty–seven people are going to be left penniless.

Yours,

Joseph

6. Joseph Salakaia’ s letter to Akaki Chkhenkeli[28]
9/V/[19]26, Warsaw

To the representative of Georgia in France

I will tell you about the condition of the officers. All the officers were given the salaries of the whole month of May. We were promised that none of the officers will be left unemployed, some of them will serve as officials and those who will fail to perform official’ s duties, will be given some sort of monthly contribution. This is the only solution. The second solution for which we have a promise is as follows: they will try to contract the Colonels as the Colonels for Lieutenant – Colonels and Generals (as far as possible). Both are acceptable to us, and I hope they will try to fulfill this promise. Anyway, they have fulfilled at least one promise and one Colonel (Bagrationi[29]) was recruited as an official. He has been working for a week already. Much also depends on what kind the government will be. But the government has not been formed yet. It was assigned to Mr. Witos[30] twice but he failed to form the government of the right wings because the left wings would declare a brutal war against such a government. Then it was assigned to the Socialists and the latter ones asked Marshal Piłsudski to form a government but he categorically refused. After that the President applied to Władysław Grabski. As I know Grabski could not manage to form a government and the President had asked Witos again for that. Probably everything will be clarified in a couple of days. I want to add here that the government of the right wings would have been formed before if Skrzyński had not categorically refused joining the right wing government. This is understandable because Skrzyński’ s foreign policy is supported only by the left entirely. If the government is formed only by the right wings, the foreign policy will probably change, because as you know, the ideal of Dmowski’ s[31] party is to create the union of the Slavs which totally contradicts with the policy pursued by Poland until now. The main battle which may be invisible to everyone is carried out exactly around it. Anyway, many things have become clear recently. Not to forget, I will add here that it is due to the great help of Piłsudski[32] and his friends that our officers are not left unemployed.

I received your document. I am waiting for Lewicki. He is expected every day but he has not appeared yet. I can write you about what we will do only after his arrival. Please write a letter to Sieroszewski,[33] others have not fulfilled their promise yet. Today I am holding a Georgian Evening[34]. I hope we will get a little income. We have a big material hardship.

I have heard recently that Mr. Cholokashvili[35] is arriving, I don’ t know whether it is true or not. Maybe he has an assignment, please write me about it.

J. Salakaia

7. Joseph Salakaia’ s letter to Akaki Chkhenkeli[36]
15/XI/[19]26, Warsaw

To the representative of Georgia in France

I am very sorry that I have not sent a report for so long. I did not have much to tell you and that’ s why I prefered to be silnt. Now I would like to tell you the following. You might have heard that Jankowski[37] was appointed as an Advisor of the representation with the Pope. It is a big loss for us, I doubt that anybody had ever cared about our issue so much. He will leave in two months and will undoubtedly help our representative in his work. Mr. Knoll[38] was appointed in Rome too. I hope he will also assist our representative in his activities. I would like to ask you to write to our representative to meet them both if he is there. Los (Counselor in England) was visiting here these days and I met him. He promised me to assist our people whatever he could. In addition, he wants to get to know the leaders of the ‘Labor Party’[39] because he thinks that they will come to power. Gvarjaladze[40] said that he can make this meeting happen. Please write to Gvarjaladze about it. Wszelaki[41] was appointed as First Secretary in London. He is aware of our issue. Please inform Sumbatashvili[42] and Gvarjaladze about it. Our friends are no longer included in the Foreign Ministry, completely new people appeared about whom not much is said. The memorandum, which you sent me, was translated and printed as a brochure for distribution. Besides we purchased Godzjaszwili’ s[43] book[44] (he published a book about Georgia) and distributed it a lot. The relationships about which you write, I have with some directly or through others (however, I should say sincerely that having relationships in our conditions is not an easy task). Our issue is considered to be a matter of a rather distant future. They believe that Sovedepiya[45] will pave the way for the evolution and I have an impression that they want to have some kind of trade relations with this huge state as soon as possible. Even friends here can hardly believe that stabilization of Sovdepiya is possible. (I think that they want Sovdepiya to exist for years more until they rectify their situation). The interest of America in our issue helped us a little. Nobody believed it here at first. I would be very thankful if you send me a couple more copies, they are interested in it very much.

I do not have much to say about our domestic life here. We are sending the refugees to France because unemployment is high and our people cannot employ them locally. It is very difficult to support the unemployed because it is very hard to earn even a small amount of money. We bored them a lot and that was the main reason for sending the refugees from here. Suladze, who you asked me about, avoids work a little but he seems to be a good guy. His wife and child are left here in a very helpless situation and we have to support them whatever we can. Unfortunately, nobody asks whether we can afford or not.

Warm greetings,

J. Salakaia

8. Joseph Salakaia’ s letter to Konstantine Kandelaki[46]
26/I/[19]27, [Warsaw]

Dear Kotsia!

Warm Greetings. I got a cheque for 200 złoty[47] and I am sending you the receipt. I have one big request with you and I hope you will do it for me if you can. I have just received a letter from General Chkheidze,[48] who is in Poland. He writes to me that Kvinitadze[49] is very sick (Kvinitadze is his close relative) and asks me to send him three hundred (300 Francs) Francs from my salary if it is possible because it is very difficult to transfer money from there. I know my dear Kotsia that you can’ t afford it but if you have anything in the cash box, please send 300 Francs to General Kvinitadze and deduct this amount from my February salary. General Chkheidze will send this money to me. Please do it for me. Forgive me for bothering you so much. Noe[50] is here. If anything is done I will write to you immediately. Unfortunately, I get sick quite often, but now we have a lot of work to do, I am organizing the evening and getting ready for the elections too.

Goodbye so far

Forever Yours,

Joseph

9. Joseph Salakaia’ s letter to Akaki Chkhenkeli[51]
23/II/[19]28, Warsaw

Dear Mr. Akaki!

Warm greetings. This is not an official letter. I hope you received my report. I also sent the report to the Chairman of the government, which I hope you would have read, so I won’ t repeat it. T[adeo]z[52] is arriving in Paris in the middle of March. He will surely see you. Please, in addition to other issues, talk to him about the admission of youths. He has a great influence now and he can do a lot, maybe the issue of acceptance starts from that point. In Poland, now the whole attention is paid to the elections. It’ s quite difficult to predict the result of the elections. There are so many different opinions among politicians here that it is impossible to make any conclusions. Personally, I think that the bloc of the government will gain a lot of votes. According to the extreme right and extreme left wings (communists), there are rumors that the elections will lead to the results unacceptable for the government and the Sejm will be disintegrated again. I think it will happen so. Broad agitation is carried out only by three movements so far: bloc of the government, Socialist and extreme right wings, though thirty four lists have been announced.

On the 26th of this month our colony will also elect a new board. I hope the elections will go well. I will inform you the results immediately. Now I want to write a couple of words about Morchadze.[53] After the elections (if of course the elections go well) I think of giving him a hundred Zlotys as a financial aid from the committee, I will register it in the committee and send the money to your name. ‘Dzalams grtkhint mitinq vagegas, vara omtchkomuna.’[54] Here I get many letters about the aid. Unfortunately, it is impossible because I manage with great effort to earn pennies which is spent on supporting the local helpless emigrants and the committee. Some money donated from the evening was allocated for purchasing the books. Money has already been sent for that. As mentioned before, a subsidiary committee was established here for emigrants. It will have a constant connection with Geneva. I sent three hundred Zlotys to this committee. If I find some other sources, I will send them again. The subsidiary committee has already begun functioning. It made an appeal in 12 newspapers so that the Poles would make their contribution to the helpless heroes of Georgia scattered in different countries. By the way, the composition of the committee is the best: Archbishop Ropp,[55] writers Andrzej Strug,[56] Sieroszewski, Dębicki,[57] Janusz Radziwiłł,[58] Potocki[59] – friends of the marshal. The Chairman is Lednicki,[60] and there are many other famous persons who I hope will help us at least morally in the future. I don’ t know what happened after my mediation. You are probably tired of writing about my health all the time, but actually nothing worked on my health condition.

Say my greetings to Mrs. Makrine[61] with deep respect. Warm greetings.

Yours,

Joseph

10. Joseph Salakaia’ s letter to Evgeni Gegechkori[62]
30/VIII/[19]29, Warsaw

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Evgeni Gegechkori[63]

I got the government Resolution which concerns the issue of the officers (date of sending 24/VIII [19]29). According to the recent statement, we do not yet know for sure who will be dismissed. We, the officials think and said that dismissal will apply to the aged and sick officers, as it happens in the Polish Army. It is very difficult to find out the reasons for the dismissal, but we think that it is probably because several thousand of their people were dismissed. There is no doubt that there are other reasons too but they do not speak about it.

As for the contracts – our officers’ contracts expire every six months and are automatically extended. No law is applied to Georgian officers, they are here as visitors and might be dismissed any time (there is a temporary law for the Poles till 1930, pursuant to which the government can dismiss most of them, that is, old officers serving in different armies.).

At first, it was their personal request to mediate for General Kazbegi[64] (who became 69 years old) and General Bakradze[65] (who became 61 years old) so that they are dismissed from service and provided with the aid (I should point out that under the current law, the deadline of service for the Brigadier General in Poland is the age of 59 and under the temporary law, it is the age of 52). After that a list of all the officers were requested, which had to include the information about when he was born, what rank he held in the Russian and Georgian armies and what his marital status was. Then we were promised that they would be materially insured. Now we are working on this issue how and in what form it will be carried out, but as far as we know, this issue will be decided by the government in the end. We are promised that the officers who became 40 years old or those who are sick, will be eligible for such insurance. We tried not to make it compulsory, especially for those to whom the Polish Age Act is not applied. There are still many issues to be clarified. We do our best to achieve the maximum despite the fact that some officers are against me and General Zakariadze.

Forever Yours,

J. Salakaia

11. Joseph Salakaia’ s letter to Noe Zhordania[66]
11/X/[19]29, Warsaw

To the Chairman of the National Government of Georgia, Mr. N. Zhordania

It is a long time since I have been suffering from my health and forcing myself to fulfill the responsibilities imposed on me by the government. I have been feeling so exhausted both morally and physically especially in recent times that in the end I decided to report to the government to release me from my duties. On my arrival I told the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. E. Gegechkori about it, who considered it unacceptable to leave my post in such conditions. Nevertheless, I insist the government on satisfying my request. I hope I will be notified by the government in a short time.

Always at your service

Salakaia

12. Joseph Salakaia’ s letter to Evgeni Gegechkori[67]
3/VI/[19]30, Warsaw

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia,

Mr. Evgeni Gegechkori

According to the resolution of the government, I am giving you a report on what has been done by me during the last month (May). This year, the Day of Independence and the common Holiday with the Caucasians[68] have failed to be celebrated because of the following reasons: for the last two months the opposition has been attacking the government for the reason that the latter one is getting ready for the war against Russia. there were hints that in Poland there are many individuals supporting the aggressive policy of these kinds of letters. After the discovery of a grenade in the Russian Embassy, the situation between Russia and Poland aggravated a lot. In addition to this, the Sejm was to be convened after May 20 and nobody knew what would follow convening of the Sejm. After the meeting, which was attended by the members of the Independent Committee and I, it was decided that there would be no celebrations this year. (This meeting was also attended by some of our friends).

In the last month I have had political meetings with a number of persons, such as Mr. Łukasiewicz,[69] Military Attache of Japan, Foreign Newspaper employee Mr. Dimmer, Gummerus[70] (Professor in Finland). I met the latter one together with Mr. Secretary and Mr. Galati (representative of the League of Nations). I introduced both, the general situation of Georgia and the recent movement in the Caucasus to them, especially in Azerbaijan. For this purpose I met with several editors: Wielkopolska (editor of Kurier Poranny), Otmar Berson[71] (editor of Gazeta Polska) and others. These two writers dedicated wonderful articles to the Independence Day of Georgia[72]. A number of steps have been taken for opening a Georgian language department. Many people assist me in it, such as professors: Handelsman,[73] Poniatowski, Kotarbinski,[74] Szomer, etc. and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Mr. Suchodolski (Director of the Department of the Ministry of Education).

I petitioned to bring refugees escaped from Solovki[75] to Poland. I will have to go to the Ministry every second day for that. I have a promise from them but the visas are expensive (950 Krones). For the last twenty days I have been discussing the issue of sending a Georgian delegate to the meeting in Athens. I am writing to Chkhenkeli about it and I will not stop here. My attempt to get something for the refugees is still fruitless, I have already told you about it. To introduce our issue, a number of lectures were delivered (Nakashidze,[76]

Kawtaradze,[77] Nanuashvili[78]) at the Eastern institute,[79] which was attended by quite a large number of people. We are going to include the Caucasus Society into the Eastern Institute. At the end of May, the Eastern Institute as well as Prometheus[80] were closed due to the summer. The latter one has not showed proper activity lately. So here is what I can say about my work. In summer months, working process might be slower, but due to many certain issues I will probably have to stay in Warsaw and continue working as long as I am able to.

Warm Greetings,

Forever yours, J. Salakaia

13. Joseph Salakaia’ s letter to Noe Zhordania[81]
10/X/[19]31, Warsaw

To the Chairman of the National Government of Georgia

Mr. N. Zhordania

Your illness has worried us all here. As I was told, you have had very high temperatures for two weeks. Thanks God, you are better now, you need to take care of yourself very much or your illness will be no good for us. I would be very grateful if I could receive a letter from you as soon as you feel better.

I was late to send the report. I was working on the issue related to the elections and that’ s why I stopped sending reports. S. Mdivani[82] would have made a detailed report for you but I still want to share my opinion with you. We scheduled the elections for March 29. About ten days before the elections B. Alshibaia[83] arrived here. He came to see me and told me that he received letters from E. Gegechkori and A. Chkhenkeli several times. They had asked him to arrive in Warsaw and find out what those people were doing (implying S. Mdivani, A. Zakariadze and me). According to him, we are trying to incite the members of the colony against one another, very famous people have been deported due to us, who did not and do not run any opposition but try to reach an agreement with the government and that we are not forgiven by either history or Georgia and that we take advantage of some influential people and make them do whatever we want and that the time is not far when the situation will change and in the end he asked me what we were going to do then, everything would fall on us. M. Alshibaia told me as if we were going to deport him and we would easily manage it but he threatened me again with the near future. After seeing me, he met Simon. He had talked to him a bit softer and he had not told him many things that mentioned with me. (I have a reason to think that an influential Pole advised him to be more restrained, otherwise it would harm him). Simon had explained him the situation in detail, he would have told you this himself.

I had information that he arrived here before the elections[84] to make negotiations with the opposition. At first they had decided to attack us with all fury on the day of the elections but then they got confused again. Since the opposition confused, and I knew they would not dare to make a speech, they invented a new trick to win our people over their side. In particular, they said that the Imereti people, especially Guruls and Megrelians took everything and Eastern Georgia was always oppressed and this was also noticeable in the emigration too. According to them the opposition has information that Eastern Georgia does not share N. Zhordania’ s direction and things like that. This provocation was unfortunately given way to our supporters as well. There was time when the opposition of the East emerged within our circle that would certainly do us great harm in the colony. We compiled the list of candidates in such a way that people calmed down. This list included two persons from East Georgia and three persons from West Georgia. In the Audit Commission two persons were from East Georgia and one from West Georgia. Sorry for telling you about this but the regional issue has influenced our emigrant life so much that it might be followed by many undesirable consequences in the future as well. That is all I have to say about the elections. S. Mdivani would have already told about other issues in detail. Of course, I will not stop here.

I have met Tadeoz[85] twice this week. We discussed many issues because I had not seen him for a long time. He is aware of all the issues. He is very disappointed about the opposition. He said that those who want to work for Georgia, all should gather around N. Zhordania. His discussion has never made such an impression on me. I am very satisfied with this meeting.

Say my deepest regards to your family.

Always at your service,

Salakaia

1. Joseph Salakaia’ s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland.

National Archives of Georgia, Tbilisi

2. Joseph Salakaia’ s letter to Akaki Chkhenkeli.

National Archives of Georgia, Tbilisi

[1] Constituent Assembly of Georgia, 1919, Tbilisi 2016, p. 355.

[2] Sosipatre Asatiani, ‘Joseph Salakaia (regarding his burial in Leuville),’ Journal Chveni drosha (Our Flag), №1, 1949, Paris, pp. 40–41.

[3] Ibidem., pp. 41.

[4] National Archives of Georgia, 1831/2/348/1–2.

[5] Akaki Chkhenkeli (1874–1959) – was a Social Democrat, diplomat and a lawyer. While studying at Tbilisi Theological Seminary he got introduced to social–democratic ideas. Later he joined the Social Democratic Party. After getting legal education, he worked as a lawyer in Abkhazia and fought against the anti–Georgian policy of Russia because of which he was deported from the Caucasus. In the years of 1905–1910 he was in Europe, he participated in Social Democratic Congresses and conferences. He studied at the Universities of Leipzig and Geneva. He was arrested in 1910 and deported to Rostov–on–Don from where he escaped. In 1912 he was elected as a member of the Fourth State Duma of Russia. After the 1917 revolution, he became a member of the ‘Ozakom’ (special committee). In 1917 he was appointed as Comrade Chairman of the National Council. He took part in the establishment of the Georgian University. He was a member of the Transcaucasian Sejm and Commissariat in 1918. He led the delegation of the Transcaucasia during the negotiations with the Ottomans that took place in Trabzon and Batumi. In 1918 he was the Chairman and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the government of the Federal Republic of the Transcaucasia. He was First Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. In the years of independence, he was a member of the delegation sent to Europe and a diplomatic representative in Germany. In 1921 he was appointed as a Plenipotentiary of Georgia in Paris, Rome and London. After the occupation of Georgia, he was the Head of the Georgian delegation in France till 1933. While being in emigration he was involved in diplomatic activities for the restoration of Georgia’ s independence. At the Genoa Conference in 1922, he tried to raise the issue of Georgia, made notes and open letters to protest the repressions of the Bolshevik government. He collaborated with the emigrant press and published analytical articles. About him, see.: D. Chumburidze, Akaki Chkhenkeli, State Figure, Diplomat, Patriot, Tbilisi 2018 (in Georgian).

[6] On February 25, 1921, on the last day of the existence of the independent Republic of Georgia, the French government which had a hostile attitude to the Bolsheviks, accredited the embassy of the non –existent independent state. All the rules accepted for accreditation were fulfilled only in France and the Georgian Embassy became a real member of the Diplomatic Corps. Akaki Chkhenkeli was appointed as a plenipotentiary of the independent Georgia. The aim of the diplomatic work of the Paris delegation of the National Government was to restore the independence of Georgia. National Government defended the issue of Georgia in international conferences and political circles and the Embassy as an official institution, assisted it, it was the center of the ongoing work process. An important direction of the Embassy’ s work was to introduce Georgia to the society and to spread information about its existence in Europe. In 1933 a Non–Agression Pact was signed between the Soviet Union and France, pursuant to Article 5 of which the French government revoked the accreditation of the Georgian Embassy.

[7] Noe Zhordania (1898–1953) – Politician, Social Democrat, Chairman of the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. He was one of the theorists and implementers of the Georgian socialism. He spent much time in emigration fearing the persecution and arrest by the gendarmerie. In 1906 he was elected as the deputy of the First State Duma of the Russian Empire. In 1917 he was elected as a member of the National Council. In 1918 he declared the independence of Georgia. As the Chairman of the government, he was actively involved in building an independent state. He emigrated after Georgia was sovietized. While being in emigration he tried to restore Georgia’ s sovereignty through diplomacy. See more about it.: Book: V. Guruli, Noe Zhordania: Political Portrait, Tbilisi 2018 (in Georgian).

[8] A Polish daily newspaper, which was published in Warsaw in the years of 1821–1939. It had a large audience of readers. The newspaper ceased to exist on the day of the occupation of Warsaw by German troops on October 9, 1939. The pro–fascist newspaper Nowy Kurier Warszawski was published during the occupation. A monthly journal of the same title which is about the topics of Warsaw has been published since 2006.

[9] Journal Głos Wschodu (Voice of the East) edited by Sergo Kuruliszwili concerned mainly the issues of Georgia. After the death of Kuruliszwili, his brother Jan (Vano) Kuruliszwili tried to publish the journal Wschód i Polska in 1925. A. Woźniak, ‘Wschód i Polska’ – przyczynek do dziejów emigracji gruzińskiejw Polsce w dwudziestoleciu międzywojennym’, Pro Georgia 2. Warsaw 1992, pp. 52–57.

[10] Konstantine (Kotsia) Kandelaki (1883–1958) – Georgian Politician, Minister of Finance and Trade–Industry. In March 1921, by the decision of the Constituent Assembly, Konstantine Kandelaki with other members of the national government emigrated. At first he stayed in Istanbul as he was appointed as the Head of the government commission. He managed the property taken from Georgia by the government, was in charge of the Refugee Commission. Later he moved to France. During the World War II he helped the Jews to escape from the Nazi regime and survive.

[11] The military of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, who Poland sheltered and provided military education to them after the occupation of Georgia. They then became contract officers in the Polish army.

[12] It refers to the ‘Georgian Committee in Poland’, which was established on March 1, 1920. The establishment of the committee was due to the hard situation of the Georgians in Poland and the need to protect their interests. For the purpose to help them, Sergo Kuruliszwili established the ‘Georgian Committee’ in Poland. After the establishment of the Mission of the Republic of Georgia in Poland, it took over the functions of the Committee, therefore the Committee ceased to exist. However, after the occupation of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, ‘the Georgian Colony in Poland’ was restored on November 6, 1921 and continued its activities. The aim of the union was to assist and protect the interests of the subordinates of Georgia in Poland as well as the publication of journals and brochures which would introduce the history and culture of Georgia to the Polish society. They also carried out propaganda for the restoration of the independence of Georgia. The Committee was chaired by: Sergo Kuruliszwili in the years of 1921–1922, Joseph Salakaia in the years of 1923–1933 and Kote Imnadze in the years of 1934–1939.

[13] Joseph Salakaia has been the Chairman of the Georgian Committee since 1923. Re–elections of the Chairman of the Committee were periodically held. Here is implied the regular elections of the Chairman of the Committee, according to the results of which he remained in his position again.

[14] Pavle Tumanishvili (1872–1935) – Georgian public figure and philanthropist, leader and of the noblemen and marshal of Tiflis Governorate. Its political direction was national democratic. He patronized and supported the Georgian Catholic Church. He knew very well the Pope Pius XII and often visited the Vatican. He was awarded with the Order of Saint Stephen which the Pope granted him when he was in emigration. Pavle Tumanishvili met his future wife, Polish nobleman Jadwiga Szyszko in Petersburg and got married there in 1915. They lived in Moscow because of their job and their son – Jerzy Tumaniszwili was born there on June 21, 1916, later he was Counter Admiral of the Polish Army. In the years of 1924–1930, Pavle Tumanishvili was the President of the Georgian–Polish community. He died in Poland, city of Suwałki on january 4, 1935.

[15] About the Georgian Colony in Prague, see L. Harbulova, ‘Gruzini w Pradze w okresie m iędzywojenny,’ Pro Georgia 3, Warsaw 1993, pp. 48–53.

[16] The emigrated government sent Letters of Thanks to those who supported and assisted Georgian emigration and their political activities.

[17] Aureli Serda–Teodorski (1860–1942) – General of the Polish Army Division. He got education in Tarnow. He studied at the Faculty of Law in Vienna and Krakow. During World War I he fought in Poland as the Commander of the Dragon Regiment. In 1919 he was the Commander of the reserves of the Eastern Army in the battles for Lwów as well as the Commander of the operative team of General Lucjan Żeligowski. In the years of 1919–1920 he was the Head of the Military Mission with the government of Ukraine. On September 22 1922, the Head and Commander – in–Chief appointed him as the Head of the Higher Military School of Warsaw from September 1, 1922.

[18] National Archives of Georgia, 1831/2/348/11–12

[19] Władysław Dominik Grabski (1874–1938) – was a Polish politician, National Democrat, Economist and Historian, Minister of Finance and Prime Minister of the Second Republic of Poland two times, Author of the Currency Reform. As a result, on May 1, 1924, a new national currency – Zloty came to circulation, the exchange rate of which was equal to the exchange rate of the Swiss Franc.

[20] Aleksander Skrzyński (1882–1931) – a Polish lawyer, Politician, Count, Prime Minister of the Second Republic of Poland. In June 1919 he was presented as the Minister of Bucharest. He was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government (1923) of Władysław Sikorski. After the overthrow of the government he remained in London. On July 27, 1924 he was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Władysław Grabski. On October 2, 1924, he signed a Protocol in Geneva on the peaceful settlement of international conflicts, the goal of which was to avoid agression. He held the Prime Minister’ s position from November 20, 1925 until May 5, 1926. After the coup in May, he held a duel with General Stanisław Szeptycki, who blamed him for the preparation of the coup. He died in a car accident on September 25, 1931.

[21] Alexandre Zakariadze (1884–1957) – the Chief of General Staff of the Army of Independent Georgia, Contract Officer of the Polish Army, General of the Division. He arrived in Poland in December 1922, he was an excellent officer with amazing military education. He served as a representative of the emigrated government of Georgia in pre– war Poland. He was soon released after being captured during the German invasion in Poland. He was banned to leave Warsaw and was under the supervision of Gestapo. He died on May 12, 1957 in Paris.

[22] National Archives of Georgia, 1831/2/348/13

[23] Spiridon Chavchavadze (1878–1952) – Georgian military figure, Major – General. In the years of 1918–1921 he served in the General Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces (Head of the Repair Section). In 1924 the Independence Committee of Georgia appointed him as the Commander–in–Chief of the anti–Soviet uprising. After the failure of the uprising, he emigrated together with Kakutsa Cholokashvili. In 1930s he was the Chairman (Alexandre Asatiani was replaced by him in this position) of the ‘Georgian National Committee’ in Paris. He returned to Georgia in 1947. In 1951 he was arrested by the anti–Soviet government and sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment. He died in prison.

[24] National Archives of Georgia, 1831/2/348/14–15

[25] Lucjan Żeligowski (1865–1947) – Polish General and political figure, Head of the Central Republic of Lithuania.

[26] [Scholium of document] ‘Chief of the General Staff resigned. The situation is such that all Piłsudski supporters are appointed to high posts. It clears what all of this means for us’.

[27] National Archives of Georgia, 1864/2/838/3

[28] National Archives of Georgia, 1864/2/838/6–7

[29] Alexandre Bagrationi (1877–1955) – Lieutenant–Colonel of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. In 1923 he participated in the courses of regimental Chiefs at Rembertów IV Military Training Center. In 1923 he studied at Higher Commissary Institution of Warsaw. After the graduation of his studies, the Lieutenant–Colonel of the Polish Army became a contract officer. He actively participated in the life of Georgian emigration and held important positions in the Georgian Committee of Poland. After the capitulation of Warsaw, he was in a camp of captives of Colditz Germans. He moved to Great Britain after his release from the camp. His wife Barbare was a member of the Women Section of the ‘Prometheus’ Club in Warsaw in 1930 and his daughter Mariam served in the 17th Transport Company and II Field Corps of 218th Company. After the end of the war, he worked as the Head of Stenographers in ‘Radio tavisupleba’ (Radio Liberty). Died in London in 1955. He is buried beside his wife in Brompton Cemetery.

[30] Wincenty Witos (1874–1945) – Polish Politician, active member of People’ s Movement, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland three times (from July 24, 1920 till September 13, 1921; from May 28, 1923 till December 14, 1923 and from May 10, 1926 till May 14, 1926).

[31] Roman Dmowski (1864–1939) – Polish Politician, Leader of National Democracy

[32] Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935) – Polish military, state and political figure. The first commander of the Republic of Poland in 1918–1922. Founder of the Polish Army and Marshal of Poland.

[33] Wacław Sieroszewski (1858–1945) – Polish politician, senator, writer, traveler, ethnographer and researcher.

[34] ‘Georgian Committee in Poland’ held a Georgian ball every year and with the donations obtained, they paid debts, bought books, emigration periodicals, helped the families in need. The Chairman of the Committee submitted the report on the management of finances to the Minister of Finance and Trade–Industry of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, Konstantine Kandelaki.

[35] Kaikhosro (Kakutsa) Cholokashvili (1888–1930) – Military, Colonel of the Army of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. He was a national hero of Georgia. He fought in the World War I. he was awarded with the Golden Sword for outstanding bravery. After the declaration of independence of Georgia, he served in the Georgian army. After the occupation of Georgia by Russia, he was involved in Resistance Movement. He formed a small group of fighters ‘Georgia’ s Sworn Sons’ in Kakheti (region in Georgia), which gave the onset to the partisan battle throughout Georgia and formed secret groups in different parts. He was one of the organizers of the uprising planned against the Bolsheviks in Khevsureti in 1922 and 1924. After the defeat he emigrated and settled in Paris where he died. His remains were reintermented on November 20, 2005. R. Chikhoria, ‘Pułkownik Kakuca Czolokaszwili, gruzińska prawica oraz władze polskie’, Nowy Prometeusz 7, Warsaw 2015, pp. 201–218.

[36] National Archives of Georgia, 1831/2/348/16–18.

[37] Stanisław Jankowski (1891 –1965) – Diplomat and Etruscologist. He was appointed as the Counselor to the Holy See of the Polish Embassy on March 1, 1927.

[38] Roman Knoll (1888–1946) – Polish politician and diplomat. In 1922 he was the founder of the National – State Union. He fought as a volunteer in the Polish – Bolshevik War in 1920. He was the Secretary General of the Polish delegation during the peace talks with Soviet Russia in Riga. From December 16, 1922 to December 30, 1923 he was the Head of the Polish mission as a temporary representative in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. He was the Ambassador of the Republic of Poland to Ankara on June 25, 1924. In March, 1926 he returned to Poland, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He took part in the preparation for the coup of May. On May 13, 1926 he was appointed as the Deputy Foreign Minister. Later he was appointed as the Ambassador in Rome (1926–1928) and in Berlin (1928–1930). During the World War II, he led the Foreign Relations Department of the Delegation of the Polish Government until February 1945. He died in 1946.

[39] Labor Party – a political group, which was formed in 1925 as a parliamentary club. The party was founded by politicians who left the parliamentary club (PSL Wyzwolenie) as a sign of protest. In 1926, the Labor Party supported Józef Piłsudski’ s supporters during the coup in May. Ludwik Józef Evert became the leader of the party. The leading activists were Yulian Pochentowski, Kazimierz Bogatski, Clemens Visotski, Henrik Olsienkevich.

[40] Konstantine Gvarjaladze (1884/83–1969) – Social Democrat, Politician. In the years of 1917 –1918 he headed the Tbilisi organization of the Social Democratic Party of Georgia. In 1917 he became a member of the National Council. During the independence of Georgia, he was the Deputy of the Legislature. In 1918 he was the Deputy Foreign Minister of Georgia. After the occupation of Georgia, he emigrated and fought for the restoration of Georgia’ s independence. In the years of 1921–1924, he was the representative of the emigrated government in Turkey. He took an active part in the activities of the Socialist International. He published articles in the emigrant press. In 1935–1940 he was the editor–in–chief of the periodical of the Foreign Bureau of the Social Democratic Party of Georgia ‘Brdzolis Khma’ (Voice of Struggle).

[41] Jan Wszelaki (1894–1965) – Polish Economist, Diplomat, Political Scientist. He studied at Moscow and Paris universities. He worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland. He held high positions in diplomatic missions. He was appointed as the Secretary of the Embassy of Poland in London from January 1 to December 31, 1933.

[42] Mikheil Sumbatashvili (1885–1954) – Georgian Diplomat, supporter of National Democratic ideology. In the years of 1918–1920 he was the representative of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Switzerland (Bern).

[43] Alexandre Godzjaszwili (1897–1941) – Georgian entrepreneur, Journalist, Military person, Doctor of International Law. He participated in the World War I. He was captured by the Germans and was detained in a concentration camp. At the end of the war he found himself in Poland, where he served as a Rotmister in the Tatar Uhlan regiment named after Mustafa Achmatowicz. After the war ended he studied at the Institute of Political Science and when he graduated he began working as a journalist. Due to the hard economic situation in Poland, he gave up military work and started a private business. He used the trade facility which was his wife’ s dowry and opened a shop called ‘Alexandre Godzjaszwili – Special shop for Coffee and Tea’. His shops were located in Marszałkowska street, the main street in Warsaw. He is considered to be one of the first founders of coffee bars in Warsaw. He was involved in public activities. J.I. Godzjaszwili, ‘Wspomnienia o moim ojcu,’ Pro Georgia 1, Warsaw 1991, pp. 53–55; D. Kolbaia, Under Polish Wings. The Georgian Emigration in Poland 1921–1939, Warsaw 2016.

[44] Alexandre Godzjaszwili’ s paper ‘The objectives of Georgia in light of international law’ was published as a book in Warsaw in 1926. Currently the paper is preserved in the library of the University of Warsaw.

[45] Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) – totalitarian state, which existed in the years of 1922–1991.

[46] BDIC – Bibliotheque de documentation internationale contemporaine (Nanterre). Microfilms des archives du gouvernement georgien, mfm 881, bobine 133.

[47] Polish currency since 1919.

[48] Alexandre Chkheidze (1873–1941) – Contract Officer, General of the Polish Army. He left Georgia in 1921 after the invasion of the Bolsheviks and the Red Army. In 1922 he moved from Constantinople to Poland. In the years of 1922 –1923 he gave courses for regimental commanders at a military academy. In 1923 he became an instructor of Grudziądz cavalry regiment and in the years of 1924–1926 he was an instructor of a military school and the 16th Infantry Division. In the years of 1927–1931 he was the commander of the 14th Infantry Division in Poznan. After his contract expired he moved to Lviv in 1931, where he was arrested by the Bolsheviks in 1939. He was accused of fighting against the Red Army, contract service in the Georgian Independent Army and Polish Army and membership of the Georgian Committee in Warsaw. In 1940 he was transferred to Kiev and then to Moscow on a special escort where it is likely to have been shot in 1941. D. Kolbaia, Under Polish Wings. Georgian Emigration in Poland 1921 – 1939, Warsaw 2019, pp. 229.

[49] Giorgi Kvinitadze (1874–1970) (Giorgi Chikovani) – Georgian Military Figure, General, National Hero of Georgia. He participated in the Russo–Japanese War and the World War I. He greatly contributed to the formation of the army of the Democratic Republic of Georgia and the establishment of a military school. He was a Commander–in–Chief during the occupation of the First Republic of Georgia (February–March 1921). After the sovietization of Georgia he emigrated and lived in France. While being abroad, he published articles. He wrote memoirs. He died while he was in emigration. His remains were reintermented from France to Tbilisi and buried in Mtatsminda on May 26, 2021.

[50] Here is implied Noe Ramishvili who was in Warsaw in this period. He often arrived in Poland about the issues related to ‘Promethean’ Movement

[51] National Archives of Georgia, 1831/2/348/24–25.

[52] Polish official person, his identity is encrypted.

[53] The former cadet David Morchadze, who was wounded in the battles of Tabakhmela. See Alexandre Chkheidze, Military School, prepared for publication, preface, notes and comments were enclosed by Lela Saralidze, Tbilisi 2018, scholium 132, pp. 103–104.

[54] In Megrelian language: ‘Please, do not tell anybody or I will be scolded’.

[55] Eduard Michael Johann Maria Baron von der Ropp (1851–1939) – Catholic Bishop in Tiraspol (1902–1903), Bishop in Vilnius (1903–1917), Archbishop in Mogilev (Mohilev) (1917–1926).

[56] Andrzej Strug – real name, Tadeusz Gałecki (1871–1937) – Writer and Journalist, Activist of the Socialist and Independence Movement, as well as a Screenwriter. His pseudonyms were: ‘Andrzej Strug’, ‘Borsuk’, ‘August Kudłaty’.

[57] Zdzisław Dębicki, pseudonym Dęb, Jaxa, K. Zebrzydowski (1871–1931) – Polish poet, writer, and journalist.

[58] Janusz Radziwiłł (1880–1967) – Polish politician, conservationist. In the years of 1928–1935 he was the member of the Polish Sejm and in 1935–1938 he was Senator. He inherited a large fortune and money. He owned a palace in Warsaw (present Independence Museum building).

[59] Jerzy Potocki (1889–1961) – Cavalry Captain and Diplomat. In 1919 he was accepted into the Polish Army, he served in the General Staff and was a military attache in Budapest. He had been in the diplomatic service since 1933, he was appointed as the Ambassador to Italy in the same year. In the years of 1933–1936 he was the Ambassador of Poland to Turkey and in the years of 1936–1940 he was the Ambassador of Poland to the United States of America. After the World War II, he settled in Lima, the capital of Peru. K. Jankowiak, ‘Jerzy Potocki o Józefie Piłsudskim w listach do matki’ [in] Mazowieckie Studia Humanistyczne 2, 2002, pp. 267–279.

[60] Aleksander Lednicki (1866–1934) – Polish public figure, lawyer and philanthropist. Member of the Central Committee of the Cadets Party, President of the Rural Union of the Republic of Poland in 1930.

[61] Makrine Simoni’ s daughter, Turkia, Akaki Chkhenkeli’ s wife.

[62] National Archives of Georgia, 2121/1/45/30–31.

[63] Evgeni Gegechkori (1881 – 1954) – Politician, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, Social Democrat. In the years of 1907 – 1912, he was the Deputy of the Third State Duma of the Russian Empire. On November 14, 1917 he became the Chairman of the Commissariat of the Transcaucasia. Later he became the Chairman of the Government of the Federal Republic of the Transcaucasia. He was a member of the National Council and the Constituent Assembly. After the declaration of the Independence of Georgia, he was appointed to the post of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on June 2, 1918. In 1921, after the occupation of Georgia he emigrated where he actively fought for the restoration of the independence of Georgia and for the protection of Georgia’ s interests on the world stage. He was an active member and leader of various political emigrant organizations.

[64] Ivane Kazbegi (1860–1943) – Georgian military figure, he served in the armies of the Russian Empire, the Democratic Republic of Georgia and Poland (as an officer). He participated in the Russo–Japanese War (1904–1905) and the First World War (1914–1918). In 1916 he was given the rank of Major General. In the years of 1918–1921 he was the Head of the administrative department of the Ministry of Defense of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. After the occupation of Georgia by Soviet Russia in 1921, he emigrated. He joined the Polish Army with a group of Georgian officers where he served on a contract basis. He obtained the rank of Brigadier General in the Polish Army. After the expiration of his contract on August 31, 1931 he was dismissed from the army.

[65] Zakaria Bakradze (1868–1938) – Georgian General. He participated in Russo – Japanese war and the First World war in the years of 1904 – 1905. He was the recipient of the Orders of Saint Giorgi of the Third and the Fourth Degree. He was also recipient of the Orders of the Russian Empire, such as, ‘Order of Saint Stanislaus’ of the Third Degree (with Swords and Bow, 1900) and of the Second Degree (with Swords), ‘Order of Saint Vladimir’ of the Fourth Degree (with Swords and Bow), Orders of ‘Saint Anna’ of the Third Degree (with Swords and Bow, 1901) and of the Second Degree (with Swords, 1905). He served in a high – ranking position in the Ministry of Defense during the years of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. After the establishment of the Soviet government in Georgia, he emigrated. In November 1922 he moved to Poland and from February 13, 1923 he completed commander courses of the regiment at the Rembertów Experimental Training Center. Then he attended commander courses of the Infantry Artillery at the Central School of Weapons in Torun. After the completion of his compulsory internship, from September 1926 to June 30, 1931 he served in the 15th Infantry Division, where he was the Commander of the Infantry. After his retirement he lived in the city of Bydgoszcz.

[66] National Archives of Georgia, 2113/1/329/1.

[67] National Archives of Georgia, 2121/1/45/34–36.

[68] P. Libera, II Rzeczpospolita wobec ruchu prometejskiego, Tom 4, Warszawa 2013, pp. 40–41.

[69] Juliusz Łukasiewicz (1892–1951) – Polish Diplomat, Envoy. Head of the East Department of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1924 he was a member of the League of Nations of the Polish delegation. In 1925 he was appointed as the Director of the Political and Economic Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1926 he became the Ambassador of Poland to Riga, then to Moscow in 1934–1936 and to Paris in 1936–1939.

[70] Herman Gummerus (1877–1948), Finnish right – winger, politician, diplomat. In the years of 1926–1947 he was the Professor at the University of Helsinki.

[71] Jan Berson (1903–1946) – Polish journalist and Sovietologist, editor of Głos Prawdy and Gazeta Polska. Pseudonym: Jan Otmar. In 1932–1935 he was a permanent correspondent for the Polish Telegraph Agency in Moscow (expelled in 1935). He is an author of three books about the USSR signed under the pseudonym of Jan Otmar. Under the name of Jan Berson he published a book about the Soviet moral crime. During the World War II he left Poland and moved to Sweden through Lithuania. In the years of 1939–1940 he was a correspondent during the Soviet–Finnish War.

[72] L. Piątkowski, ‘Gruzja w publicystyce polskiej lat dwudziestych XX w.,’ Pro Georgia 3, Warsaw 1993, pp. 27–32.

[73] Marceli Handelsman (1882–1945) – Polish lawyer and historian of Jewish descent, Medievalist, historian of modern and recent history, Professor at the university of Warsaw, Director at the Institute of History. He was a member of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the French Academy of Moral and Political Sciences. He was one of the most prominent historians of Poland in the first half of the twentieth century. On July 14, 1944, he was arrested by the Gestapo and sent to Gross–Rosen concentration camp. Then he was transferred to Dora–Nordhausen, where he died on March 20, 1945.

[74] Tadeusz Kotarbiński (1886 – 1981) – Polish philosopher, representative of the Lwów – Warsaw School of Logic. His works on cognitive theory, logic and ethics played a great role on the spread and study of logic and philosophy in Poland. He was the Professor at the University of Warsaw, first Rector of the University of Łódź, Chairman of the Polish Philosophical Society (since 1927).

[75] Solovetsky Special Forced Labor Camp, including two transit and distribution points at Arkhangelsk and Kem, which was organized by the Council of People’ s Commissars (Minutes of meeting 15 of the Council of People’ s Commissars, October 13, 1923, Deputy Head of the Council of People’ s Commissars – Rykov. Forced Labor on the base of Pertomin camp had already had its own branch in Solovki.

[76] Giorgi Nakashidze (1894–1990) – Georgian politician and journalist, activist of the Promethean Movement, participant in the war against the Bolsheviks in Tbilisi. After the graduation from the Gymnasium in Kutaisi, he studied at Tbilisi University. In 1922 he was arrested in the Metekhi Monastery in Tbilisi. The Ambassador of Georgia to Berlin, Vladimir Akhmeteli released 62 prisoners under pressure from European politicians and as a result he obtained permission to emigrate. He studied Law and Philosophy at Heidelberg University, then at the University of Prague. He got a PhD in Law and Philosophy. In 1930 he entered the Department of the Georgian language and literature at Humboldt University of Berlin. Moreover, he represented the interests of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in various countries of Europe. He was a researcher at the Eastern Institute of Warsaw and the School of Oriental Studies. He delivered lectures at the University of Warsaw. In 1927 he became the Vice Chairman of the Promethean Club of Warsaw. In 1940 Grigol Alshibaia, the Chairman of the Pro – German Caucasus Committee was replaced by him. He collaborated with the Georgian National Committee in Berlin. During the Warsaw Uprising (1944) he saved Georgians, Poles and Jews. After the end of the World War II he lived in Munich and then in Argentina. After his wife’ s death, in 1948 he moved to the United States. He delivered lectures at Harvard University. In the years of 1960–1966 he was the Professor of the Georgian language and literature at Columbia University in New York. In his speeches he openly expressed his anti–Bolshevik views (he addressed the US Congress in 1960), criticized the policy of Nikita Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CCP towards Georgia in 1956. In the years of 1974–1978 he compiled a catalog of documents of the Democratic Republic of Georgia preserved in the archives of Harvard University. Giorgi Nakashidze died at the age of 96 in 1990. He was buried in New York. See D. Kolbaia, Pro Georgia 22, Warsaw 2012), p. 287.

[77] Jan Kawtaradze (1897–1944) – Georgian officer of the Polish Army, historian. In 1929 he published a book in Polish about the history of Georgia called ‘Georgia in Historical Contex’ with a preface of Marceli Handelsman. During the Warsaw Uprising he was shot dead along with his wife on August 2, 1944.

[78] Vano Nanuashvili (1902–1974) – Georgian military figure, officer in the Polish Army, political emigrant. In 1921 he was in Istanbul, then he was at the Greek Military Academy in Athens until 1922 and in the years of 1923–1925 he was enrolled in the Polish Military Academy in Warsaw. In 1928, together with other emigrants he founded the Georgian Officers’ Association, of which he was the Secretary for nine years. Vano Nanuashvili was the acting editor of the Georgian military and political journal Mkhedari. In 1939 he, as a member of the Polish Army, fought against Germany. In the years of 1939–1944 he was a prisoner of war in Germany from which he escaped in 1944. After escaping the captivity, he fought in Italy. After the end of the war he lived in London and in 1951 he moved to the United States of America. Vano Nanuashvili wrote military–political essays in the English language. In 1956 he published a paper in Boston entitled ‘Strengths and Weaknesses of the Soviet Union’, ‘What everyone in the free world should know about Russia’.

[79] In 1926 in Poland was established the Eastern Institute of Warsaw for the purpose of studying the history and culture of the East, which assisted Georgian emigrants to implement educational, scientific and cultural programs. The Polish government cared for the education of young emigrants, in particular, their goal was to prepare the youth generation of emigrants for political activities. Thus, in 1929 a circle of young Orientalists was established at the Eastern Institute. I. Maj, Działalność Instytutu Wschodniego w Warszawie 1926–1939, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Warszawa 2007.

[80] In Autumn 1924, supporters of Marshal Józef Piłsudski began to pursue practical activities at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and General Staff to unite the nations of the Caucasus on a single platform in the Caucasus Confederation. The Committee for the Independence of the Caucasus was established in Constantinople in 1926 as a result of their work. It included the representatives of emigration from Georgia, Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus. The aim of the Committee was to free the Caucasus from the Bolsheviks. The Committee for the Independence of the Caucasus began publishing a French journal ‘Prometheus’ in November 1926, in Paris. With the publication of the journal, the Promethean Movement was created, which was later joined by the emigration of other nations conquered by the USSR. P. Libera, II Rzeczpospolita wobec ruchu prometejskiego, Tom 4, Warszawa 2013, pp. 43–47; P. Libera, The International of the Conquered – The Promethean Movement and Polish Authorities During 1926–1939, History (Bulgarian Journal of Historical Education), Sofia, 2018, volume 26, number 6.

[81] National Archives of Georgia, 2113/1/329/1.

[82] Simon (Svimon) Mdivani (1876–1937) – Georgian politician, diplomat, member and Deputy Chairman of the National Council and the Constituent Assembly of Georgia, brother of one of the leaders of the SSR of Georgia and Bolshevik Budu Mdivani. During the years of emigration, in addition to Turkey and France, Simon Mdivani also worked in Poland as a diplomat. He participated in drafting the ‘Caucasus Confederation Pact’, stood at the head of the ‘Promethean’ Movement, he was an apologist for the unity of the Caucasus and a member of almost every anti Bolshevik Union acting at that time (‘Prometheus Club of Warsaw,’ ‘Confederation Council of the Caucasus’, ‘Friendship Committee of Five’).

[83] Grigol Alshibaia (1881–1957) – Georgian political figure, doctor, diplomat, member of the National Democratic Party. In the years of 1920–1921 he was a diplomatic representative of Georgia in Soviet Azerbaijan, he became a political emigrant in 1921. He collaborated with the emigration Newspaper Damoukidebeli sakartvelo (Independent Georgia) issued in Paris. After the occupation of Warsaw by German troops during the World War II, he became the Head of the Caucasus committee ‘Kommisarische Verwaltung’ founded here in 1939.

[84] Implying the elections of the board members of the ‘Georgian Committee in Poland’.

[85] see comment 52.

THE STORY OF PREPARATIONS FOR THE CANONISATION OF FATHER GRIGOL PERADZE

by Rev. Henryk Paprocki

In 1977 I started my doctoral studies at the St Sergius Institute in Paris. After a few days in Paris, in early October, Father Elias Melia (1915–1988), the parish priest of the Georgian parish in Paris and a lecturer at the institute, asked me to meet. The conversation concerned the fate of the founder of the Georgian parish in Paris, Archimandrite Grigol Peradze. At that time, I only knew one thing: he died in the Auschwitz concentration camp. Father Melia asked me to collect all information and material relating to Grigol Peradze’s stay in Poland and his death. I agreed to do it, and after I returned to Poland I started, so to speak, ‘my lifetime adventure’, which ended with the canonisation of Grigol Peradze twenty years later.

I started by collecting all the publications of Father Grigol Peradze in Polish, which was quite easy as the scientific journal of the Faculty of Orthodox Theology of the University of Warsaw published annual reports on the activities of its lecturers. These reports also included information on publications in foreign languages. Nevertheless, it took several years to collect all the publications and prepare a bibliography, because, for example, only one library in a small German town had a full set of the periodical ‘Der Orient’. In 1981, the results of my search were published in Poland.

It was much more difficult to establish the fate of Grigol Peradze during the war. The Pawiak Prison Museum in Warsaw informed that the name Peradze was unknown to them, although it could be found in memoirs of Pawiak inmates: Archimandrite Peradze from Praga was the interpreter in Ward X. As ‘Praga’ is both the name of a part of Warsaw and the Polish name for Prague, the Czech capital, the person index included the following information: Peradze Grigol, Czech. The Museum of the Concentration Camp in Oświęcim could only supply the well-known report of the underground army that Fr Grigol Peradze, an outstanding specialist, died in the camp. The camp books were still in Moscow, as a kind of war prize, and could not be accessed.

Unexpectedly, a huge amount of source materials was found in the archives of the Orthodox Metropolis in Warsaw, including a telegramme from the commandant of the Auschwitz camp that notified about the death of Grigol Peradze in the camp, a copy of his doctoral certificate, and correspondence from Pawiak, which significantly advanced the search. My visits to the Bonn University also resulted in obtaining photocopies of documents relating to the period of studies and scientific work of Grigol Peradze at that university.[1]

In addition, some witnesses to the events were still alive (presumably, none are alive in Poland now). It was from them, mainly from the former students of Father Professor Grigol Peradze, that a huge amount of information was obtained. Thus, I was able to share my knowledge with Father Melia and submit an article about Grigol Peradze for publication in the journal ‘Revue des Études Géorgiennes et Caucasiennes’.

Before that, however, it became possible to organise the first scientific session dedicated to the memory of Father Grigol Peradze, on the 45th anniversary of his death, on 6 December 1987. Work on the life and legacy of Grigol Peradze gained momentum. Rezo Tabukashvili (1927–1990) came to Warsaw, intending to make a documentary film about Grigol Peradze. He collected a large amount of material in Poland, relating to the life and work of Grigol Peradze. It was thanks to Rezo Tabukashvili that the issue of the arrest of Grigol Peradze was largely unraveled. Giorgi Nakashidze (1890–1991), resident in the USA, a pre-WWII lecturer at the University of Warsaw and a friend of Father Grigol Peradze, handed documents from World War II and the immediately post-war period over to Rezo Tabukashvili (these are currently in the archives).

A little digression is necessary here. One hundred and eight Georgian contract officers, including seven generals, served in the Polish Armed Forces before WWII. In addition, there were also large groups of doctors, scientists and officials. Archimandrite Grigol Peradze was the spiritual father of the Georgian colony. The Caucasian Committee was headed by General Alexander Zakhariadze (1884–1957). The situation changed in 1939. The German occupation authorities dissolved the existing Caucasian Committee and set up their pro-fascist committee in its place. Father Grigol Peradze distanced himself from that group of small people. Colonel Vali bey Yadigarov (1897–1971) spoke of 2–3 such persons. However, with the support of the German occupation authorities, they could achieve a lot through terror. The ‘Bill of Indictment’ (‘Obvinitelniy Akt’) against the chairman of this group, compiled by Georgian officers and published after World War II, explains many details regarding the arrest of Grigol Peradze. I will not mention the names of these people, they do not deserve it. It is known, however, that it was because of them that Father Grigol Peradze was arrested.

The scientific session on the 45th anniversary of the death of Grigol Peradze was an opportunity to present the results of the research carried out so far and to allow the then living witnesses of the events to speak. Their testimonies painted a figure of a man of extraordinary intellectual and spiritual values, devoted to the Church and to Georgia. Zurab Chavchavadze (1953–1989) attended the session as an envoy of His Holiness the Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II. Zurab Chavchavadze had also collected materials about Father Grigol Peradze, among others he brought to Georgia photocopies of all significant publications by Grigol Peradze and of documents related to him, as well as copious film footage. Unfortunately, Rezo Tabukashvili died soon, while Zurab Chavchavadze became a political leader. The documentary about the life of Father Grigol Peradze was not made. A third attempt was made by Tamar Dularidze and a Polish documentary film director, Jerzy Lubach. This time it worked. The footage from Poland, Germany, and France was prepared quite quickly. But we could not reach Georgia. We finally got there. It was literally days before the canonisation, which we did not know about. The film In the Search of the White Angel was made in 1995. In 2001, Jerzy Lubach made a new documentary, The Saint Professor, while a documentary by Irakli Tripolski, Grigol Peradze, was made in Georgia the same year, based on the materials of Rezo Tabukashvili. A lot of material about St Grigol Peradze was also featured in Jerzy Lubach’s 2008 documentary Wearing a Four-Cornered Cap and a Tiger Skin.

At the same time, publication of the works of Father Grigol Peradze commenced in Georgia and in Poland. This work goes on. The University of Warsaw publishes all works of Grigol Peradze[2]. The canonisation of Grigol Peradze became possible thanks to the collected material and the testimonies of witnesses.

As a sdie effect of this search, all publications by Grigol Peradze, scattered in various hard-to-reach periodicals, which are of great importance primarily for Georgia, but also for the entire oriental studies, have been found. Grigol Peradze’s work does not suffer from ‘ageing’. The work on Georgian pilgrims’ inscriptions on the margins of books in the Holy Land, the works related to the Georgian liturgy in the first centuries, and catalogues of Georgian manuscripts in various libraries, are of particular importance here. Descriptions of scientific expeditions to the Balkans[3], and to the Holy Land and Syria[4] constitute a separate item. The latter description, unfortunately incomplete, is included in the line of descriptions of Georgian pilgrims: Timothy, the Archbishop of Kartli from 1755, Jonah, the Metropolitan of Ruisi from 1783–1790 and Peter, the Bishop of Alaverdi from 1899. It seems to be one of few journals of travel in the footsteps of Georgians in the Holy Land, and also showing the author’s great literary talent. The well-known and often quoted work Starochrześcijańska literatura w przekładach na język gruziński (Old Christian Literature in Georgian Translations) (OC 1928–1933) has been supplemented and re-published[5] (Dzieła zebrane, Warszawa 2015, IV).

Usually canonisation means the end of the research. In the case of St Grigol Archimandrita is different. It was after the canonisation that the original doctoral certificate of the Bonn University and several very important documents were found, including the original death certificate issued by the camp registry office at Auschwitz.

However, the very death of St Grigol still eludes the hagiographers and historians, as is the death of Mother Maria Skobtsova (1891–1945) and thousands, if not millions. of martyrs of the 20th century. The martyrs of the first centuries died in public view, while the martyrs of our time died in the snows of Siberia or in gas chambers. It is not even known when this happened. In the case of St Grigol, this is known and we also know how it happened.

After the canonisation, scientific Caucasological sessions named after St Grigol Peradze have been organised at the University of Warsaw[6], an Orthodox Church brotherhood in his name was established in Warsaw, a similar brotherhood was established in Georgia (recently this brotherhood published the biography of St Grigol Peradze in Georgian; it was also thanks to their efforts that a street in Tbilisi was named after Grigol Peradze). The Polish brotherhood has organised a pilgrimage to holy places in Georgia every year. So, there are very clear effects, and very positive ones. A chapel dedicated to St Grigol was established in Warsaw at 5, Lelechowska Street, while a church dedicated to him is being built in Białystok at the Dojlidy Górne estate. A commemorative plaque was unveiled in 2020, on the house where St Grigol used to live, at 20, Okrzei Street in Warsaw.

I would like to emphasize here the participation of many people from France, Germany, and Belgium who have given extraordinary help in the search for materials related to St Grigol Peradze. First of all, however, I would like to emphasize that it was thanks to the request of Father Melia that all the materials were collected. It was also actually perhaps the last moment to do that. Had this work been undertaken 10–20 years later, there would have been no living witnesses left. However, I still hope that other documents will be found, which will allow us to reconstruct more completely the last months of the life of the man who played such an important role in the scientific life of Poland and who became the patron of Georgia and Poland. In this sense, the work started thirty years ago still goes on. Currently, it consists in preparing the scientific works of Saint Grigol for publication. We hope that such initiatives will strengthen the ties between Georgia and Poland.

The universalism of Grigol Peradze is also worth emphasizing, as he has published his works in five languages in five countries. At the same time, however, he lived the culture and life of his nation, which became for him a source of the universalism.

The Circumstances of Arrest and Detention of Saint Grigol Peradze in the Pawiak Prison and in KL Auschwitz

Father Grigol Peradze was arrested by the Gestapo on 5 May 1942 in his apartment (no. 11) at 22, Brukowa Street (now Stefana Okrzei Street), in Warsaw. The direct reason for the arrest was provocation and denunciation,[7] as Giorgi Nakashidze said in an interview:

‘… he was denounced (…). I know that his journal was taken to the Gestapo, I know their names. This shame of ours … But now it’s not necessary … Several officers who served in the Polish Army, after all there were Georgians in the Polish Army, were summoned. And these officers said, the three that I personally knew, said that it’s all so scrawled that it’s impossible to read and they refused, but you can always find, and they found, his enemies, enemies of this poor man…’.[8]

This is also confirmed by Sewdia Daredżan (Aka) Lukac-Ugrechelidze:

‘It is difficult for me (…) to add anything to what I have stated several times, and what I have always heard from my father while still in Warsaw, namely that A. and K. were waiting for Peradze and were guilty of his imprisonment and death. My father was sure that it was not only about personal animosities, as A. was on the side of the occupiers, and Peradze on our side, but that (…) he coveted the precious books and incunabula in the possession of Grigol Peradze, and that he also wanted to seize everything that the man kept for those who were wanted or imprisoned, for example Jews and others who were threatened with death by the occupiers, which he clearly (…) knew’.[9]

A similar description can be found in the ‘Bill of Indictment’, prepared after World War II by Georgian contract officers:

‘While A. could easily trade the lives of defenceless prisoners of war or Jews, it was not as easy to accuse and arrest Archimandrite Peradze on the basis of a simple denunciation. It was necessary to justify the accusation against him and this is how A. deceived Archimandrite Peradze. They take photos of A.’s documents, sent from the Gestapo, and with the help of Peradze’s servant, one B. M., they hide the photos in a hole made in the back of an icon in Peradze’s room. Then A. reports on Peradze as an English spy who has photographed his secret documents for the English, and informs the Gestapo about the location of the photographs. The Gestapo searches Peradze’s apartment and finds the photos, so the accusation is true. Peradze is isolated in the camp, where he dies after 18 days of a terrible regime. B. M. receives a good payment from A. and currently lives in Argentina. All this was written down on the basis of testimonies of Georgians serving in the Polish HQ and soldiers currently in London’.[10]

In 1986, seven documents were found in the Archives of the Warsaw Orthodox Metropolis, allowing reconstruction of some events from the period of Father Peradze’s detention:

1) Report from the sealing of Father Grigol Peradze’s apartment on 5 May 1942 (in Polish) (I),

2) Report from the search carried out on 28 May 1942 in the apartment of Father Grigol Peradze (in Russian) (II),

3) Power of attorney signed by Father Peradze on 10 June 1942 that authorised deacon Jerzy Berkman-Karenin[11] regarding the care of the apartment and property (in German) (III),

4) Report on taking personal belongings from Father Peradze’s apartment on 10 June 1942, to be handed over to the detainee (in Polish) (IV),

5) A copy of a letter sent by Father Peradze on 20 June 1942 from Pawiak to deacon Jerzy Berkman-Karenin (in German) (V),

6) Telegram from the Commandant of the Auschwitz Concentration Camp of 11 December 1942 to deacon Jerzy Berkman-Karenin, notifying about the death of Father Peradze (in German) (VI),

7) Letter from the Warsaw Orthodox Metropolis of 15 December 1942, to the Commandant of the Auschwitz Concentration Camp (in German) (VII).

In addition, a few years ago, an envelope with documents of Father Peradze[12], hidden in the archives of the Metropolis, was found, including the original death certificate (Sterbeurkunde), issued by the Standestamt Auschwitz (in German) (VIII).

These documents allow us to establish at least some details from the last period of Fr Grigol Peradze’s life. First of all, it can be said that the arrest of Fr Peradze took place in the first days of May 1942, most probably on 5 May, because shortly after the arrest, the dean of the Warsaw district, Protopresbyter Jan Kowalenko[13] (1875–1950), sealed the apartment of Fr Peradze, located in Warsaw at 22, Brukowa Streeet, Apt 11. The apartment was sealed on 5 May 1942 at 4:00 p.m. (I). According to the information of Fr Atanazy Semeniuk (Afanasiy Semenyuk), Father Peradze managed to call the Orthodox Metropolis just before his arrest and say that ‘they have just come for me’.

After Fr Peradze was arrested, he was imprisoned in the Pawiak Prison in Warsaw. His fate in Pawiak can be recreated on the basis of other inmates’ memories. Leon Wanat, the prison record-keeper, wrote down the personal details, after which the prisoner was directed to a cell of Ward VII, transitional, located in the basement. The stay in Ward VII lasted about 14 days, after which Fr Peradze was transferred to Ward V, known as the transport ward, on the second floor.[14] In Ward V, Father Peradze was used as an interpreter (the cell for the interpreter and record-keeper was No. 117). In early October 1942, Father Peradze was transferred to the working department (the so-called ‘Arbeitzela’, No. 186), also as an interpreter.[15] At the request of Metropolitan Dionizy,[16] Giorgi Nakashidze[17] unsuccessfully intervened with the German authorities in the case of Father Peradze.[18]

On 28 May 1942, at the request of the German police, Protopresbyter Jan Kowalenko, assisted by deacon Jerzy Berkman-Karenin, removed the seals from Father Peradze’s apartment, and the policemen took the money (in American and English currency) from the library cabinet behind the books (II). This indirectly confirms the version that Father Peradze kept the money of Jewish people in his apartment. During his stay in the Pawiak prison, on 10 June 1942, Father Peradze authorized deacon Jerzy Berkman-Karenin to look after the apartment at Brukowa Street (III). At Father Peradze’s request, underwear and a summer coat were taken from his apartment to be handed over to the detainee (IV).

There is also a copy of a letter written by Fr Peradze on 20 June 1942, in Pawiak to deacon Jerzy Berkman-Karenin. This letter is actually a will, since Fr Peradze gave several instructions regarding his personal property. It says, among others:

‘… Please hand over the furnished flats to someone from the Consistory […]. If I am not released, I donate the library to the Metropolis, my personal belongings should be sold and the proceeds donated to our parish orphanage in Wola. […] My Georgian books and documents (including pictures) should be sent after the war by the Metropolis to the Georgian Church…’ (V).

The Orthodox Church, despite its very difficult situation, made efforts to release Fr Grigol Peradze. It also provided certain food and material assistance, as can be seen from the letter to deacon Jerzy Berkman-Karenin.

Fr Grigol was transported to the Auschwitz Concentration Camp, most probably on 18 November 1942. Further attempts to free the prisoner were fruitless, either. On 11 December 1942, the commandant of the Auschwitz Concentration Camp, Rudolf Höss, notified the deacon Jerzy Berkman-Karenin by a telegram that Fr Peradze died at Auschwitz on 6 December 1942, at 4:45p.m. (VI), that is after eighteen days in the Auschwitz Concentration Camp.

At the request of the church authorities of 15 December 1942 (VII) the Auschwitz Registry Office sent an official death certificate (issued on 30 December 1942, sent on 4 January 1943) (VIII). The death certificate is confirmed by the files of the Delegation of the Exiled Government of the Republic of Poland for the Home Country regarding the Auschwitz Concentration Camp for the period from 16 to 31 December 1942: ‘Camps. Auschwitz. Fr Grigol Peradze, Prof. of UJP Faculty of Orthodox Theology[19], Georgian, outstanding specialist, died here after a few weeks stay (recently arrested)’.[20]

In 1945, two unidentified former prisoners of the concentration camp made a verbal statement at the Orthodox Metropolis in Warsaw that Father Grigol Peradze voluntarily reported that he had stolen bread, thereby saving the entire komando[21]. Unfortunately, this statement has not been written down, or it has been lost and waits to be found. In a letter to Patriarch Alexy I of 1 February 1946, Metropolitan Dionizy wrote: ‘… professor of our Theological Section, Doctor of Philosophy, Archimandrite Grigol Peradze, Georgian, graduate of the Seminary in Tbilisi, and then of the Universities of Bonn and Oxford, an expert in languages: apart from his mother tongues, Russian and Georgian, also French, German and English, was arrested, taken to the Auschwitz concentration camp and shot there’,[22] which may be a reference to the information provided by the two former prisoners of the Auschwitz camp.

The death of Father Grigol Peradze still eludes hagiographers and historians. Did he take the place of another man, pleading guilty of a theft of bread he had not committed, and was shot, or was he sent to a gas chamber?[23]

As Bishop Anthony Bloom wrote: ‘No one has greater love than he who lays down his life for his friend’. These words characterize the ideal of the Gospel and are shown as the only correct Gospel way of life. Too often are the words of the Saviour retold as to how a Christian should die. But in this case it refers to life itself; ‘to lay down life’, to donate it for a neighbour, to devote it to a neighbour. Above all it means to live for Him, to live a decent day-to-day life, to live with persistence, to shoulder the burden of life - the whole of life – and not just your own but that of strangers (if that word can ever be used as, after all, we can never be ‘strangers’ in relation to others as we are all without exception ’kindred’). And when one’s love ends in death by the sacrifice of one’s life then that is a triumph and a victory of life.’[24]

Death certificate of Archimandrite Grigol Peradze from KL – Auschwitz, December 30, 1942.

Archive of the Archdiocese of the Orthodox Church in Warsaw

Telegram of the Commandant of the Auschiwtz Cencentarcion Camp, dated 11 December 1942, announcing the deat of Fr Grigol Peradze (in German, 9.I.1943). Archive of the Archdiocese of the Orthodox Church in Warsaw

An envelope with documents belonging to the Father, amongst which was the original death certificate (Sterbeurkunde) in German, issued by Standestamt Auschwitz. Archive of the Archdiocese of the Orthodox Church in Warsaw

[1] All documents related to the person of Grigol Peradze are held in the Archives of the Warsaw Orthodox Metropolis.

[2] [Prepared for publication by H. Paprocki:] Św. Grzegorz Archimandryta, Dzieła zebrane, Warszawa, 2010, I, pp. 246+2 nbl., Dzieła zebrane, Warszawa, 2011, II, pp. 336, Dzieła zebrane, Warszawa, 2012, III, pp. 263, Dzieła zebrane, Warszawa 2015, IV, pp. 128+4 nbl. [Współprzygotowanie: B. Outtier].

[3] Św. Grzegorz Archimandryta, Udział Gruzji w dziejach kultury duchowej na Bałkanach, [in, idem:] Dzieła zebrane, Warszawa 2012, III, pp. 7–29.

[4] Św. Grzegorz Archimandryta, Róże Jerychońskie. Dziennik podróży po Ziemi Świętej i Syrii (5. VII.–28. IX. 1936), [in, idem:] Dzieła zebrane, Warszawa 2012, III, pp. 31–132.

[5] Św. Grzegorz Peradze, Dzieła zebrane, Warszawa 2015, IV.

[6] The role of Dr David Kolbaia in organising these sessions, as well as in promoting the history and culture of Georgia, should be stressed here. Dr Kolbaia is the editor of the Georgian edition of the Collected Works of Saint Grigol Peradze.

[7] H. Paprocki, Analiza dokumentów odnoszących się do sprawy aresztowania w 1939 roku w Warszawie trzech Gruzinów, Pro Georgia 4, Warsaw 1994, pp. 64–77. Compare the statement of A. Lukac-Ugrechelidze [the daughter of Captain Witalis Ugrechelidze (1902–1983)] in the documentary film ‘Wearing a Four-Cornered Cap and a Tiger Skin’ directed by Jerzy Lubach.

[8] Giorgi Nakashidze was interviewed in 1989 by Rezo Tabukashvili.

[9] Letter from A. Lukac-Ugrechelidze of 28 October 2009.

[10] Obvinitielniy akt, b. m. w. r., p. 3

[11] Jerzy Berkman-Karenin (1918–1978), deacon (ordained on 9 November 1941) of the Metropolitan Cathedral of St Mary Magdalene in Warsaw, a friend of Fr Grigol Peradze, he left Warsaw in 1944, after World War II he lived in Brazil, where he was a lecturer at Colégio Vítor Viana in São Paulo, author of the books Vinde a Mim, Criancinhas! (São Paulo 1956) i Doutrina Cristã Ortodoxa (São Paulo 1957; Los Angeles 1999^2).

[12] Which also included Father Peradze’s Georgian passport, his student’s transcript, the original of the doctoral certificate and certificates of passed exams.

[13] Protopresbyter Jan Kowalenko (1875–1950), during 1939–1949 the parish priest of the Metropolitan Cathedral of St Mary Magdalene in Warsaw and the dean of the Warsaw district.

[14] See: L. Karzinkin, Pisarz na V oddziale (7. X. 1941–17. I. 1943), [in:] Wspomnienia więźniów Pawiaka, Warszawa 1964, p. 126; 2nd ed.: Warszawa 1978, p. 117.

[15] ‘In Ward V, in early October, I received more parcels, and because my wife wrote the address in Gothic style, the SS-man Heller, who controlled the parcels, noticed that. He exchanged a few words with me in German, asking about my origin and how I learned to speak the language, and said to the writer that this would be a good dolmetscher (interpreter). (I come from Września and I graduated from a German school). Indeed, the next day I was released from the cell into the corridor as an interpreter in place of Archimandrite Peradze from Praga, who was transferred to the working ward, also as an interpreter…’. See: A. Bruczyński, Byłem tłumaczem na Pawiaku (28. VIII. 1942 – 29. IV. 1943), [in:] Wspomnienia więźniów Pawiaka, Warszawa 1964, p. 144; 2nd ed.: Warszawa 1978, p. 135. However, incorrect information that Fr Peradze was Czech is included in the ‘Person index’, in both editions of the book: 1st ed., p. 429; 2nd ed., p. 431.

[16] Dionizy (Dionisii), secular name Konstantyn Mikołajewicz Waledyński (Konstantin Nikolaievich Valedinskii) (1879–1960), bishop of the Russian Orthodox Church, and then head of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church with the title of the Metropolitan of Warsaw and All Poland. He brought to a successful end the efforts for autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Poland, obtained from the Patriarch of Constantinople. He held the office from 1923 to 1946, when he was removed by the Stalinist authorities and placed under house arrest.

[17] Giorgi Nakashidze (1890–1991), Georgian linguist and political activist, before WWII lecturer at the University of Warsaw and at the Eastern Studies School at the Eastern Institute in Warsaw, lived in the USA after World War II.

[18] Interview with Prof. Giorgi Nakashidze (Part related to St Grigol Peradze), Pro Georgia 19, Warsaw 2009, pp. 213–217.

[19] The actual Polish text said ‘Theology, Law’. This error was caused by the similarity of the word ‘Prawa’ (Law) and the abbreviation ‘Praw.’, short for ‘Prawosławna’ – ‘Orthodox’.

[20] Zeszyty Oświęcimskie. Numer specjalny (I). ‘Obóz Koncentracyjny Oświęcim w świetle akt Delegatury Rządu R. P. na Kraj’ 12(1968), p. 75, annex no. 44.

[21] Information from Archpriest Atanazy Semeniuk (1904–1996) and Protoiereus Mikołaj Lenczewski (1912–2003).

[22] Archiwum Warszawskiej Metropolii Prawosławnej, ref. no. AWMP R IV-2B/1144 (document 5).

[23] See: ‘Matka Maria zmarła w Ravensbruck sześćdziesiąt lat temu. Czy zajęła miejsce innej kobiety, przeznaczonej do komory gazowej, czy też sama została do niej skierowana? Jej śmierć wymyka się hagiografom’, [see:] O. Clément, Wstęp, [in:] S. Hackel, Matka Maria (1891–1945), translated by H. Paprocki, Białystok 2008, p. 11.

[24] Antoni (Bloom), Słowo o Matce Marii, [in:] S. Hackel, Pearl of Great Price: The Life of Mother Maria Skobtsova,1891–1945, p. 9.

REPORT FROM THE SEMINAR OF THE POLISH-GEORGIAN HISTORIANS’ COMMISSION.

NOVEMBER 22 – 26, TBILISI 2019

by David Kolbaia

Conferences, sessions, meetings, membership matters

A meeting of the Polish-Georgian Historians’ Commission were held on 22–25 November 2019, at the State University of Ivane Javakhishvili in Tbilisi, Maro Makashvili Room. The meeting was attended by: Dr David Kolbaia (Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw), Prof. Wojciech Materski (Polish Academy of Sciences), Prof. Grzegorz Mazur (Jagiellonian University), Dr Paweł Libera (Institute of National Remembrance), Prof. Włodzimierz Suleja (Institute of National Remembrance), Dr Otar Janelidze (National Museum in Tbilisi), Dimitri Silakadze (State Archives in Georgia) and Shorena Murusidze (‘Kornel Kekelidze’ National Centre of Manuscripts in Tbilisi). The working languages of the meeting were Polish and Georgian, with Mikheil Mantidze and David Kandrewicz acting as interpreters.

The meeting of the Polish-Georgian Historians’ Commission was opened by the Chairman of the Commission, Dr David Kolbaia. He thanked those present for coming and for their work so far, which had culminated in the publication of the first volume of the Commission’ s work, in English: Polish-Georgian Historians’ Commisssion Collected Works, Volume I, 2019. The volume includes articles by members of the Commission and historians of merit in research on Polish-Georgian relations: the late Prof. Andrzej Woźniak and the late Prof. Marek Mądzik.

In his introduction, Dr David Kolbaia talked about the plans for the future and the new tasks that await the Commission. The Chairman emphasized that the priority is to continue the work of the Commission, prepare new articles and raise funds for the publication of the second volume of the work. Dr Kolbaia reminded the audience that the 100th anniversary of the arrival of the Polish Military and Diplomatic Mission, led by Tytus Filipowicz, to the Caucasian countries was approaching and suggested that the second volume of the Commission’ s work should be devoted to this Polish diplomat. When mentioning him, Dr Kolbaia also recalled the success of the Tytus Filipowicz Award, established in 2018 by the Centre for East European Studies of the University of Warsaw, co-financed by the following universities: Gdańsk University of Technology, Poznań University of Technology, University of Łódź, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, University of Rzeszów, University of Warsaw, the Ossoliński National Institute, and the College of Eastern Europe in Wrocław. The award, established on the Centenary of both Poland and Georgia regaining their independence, aims to honour the contributions of Georgian citizens to the development of science, culture and public life, to the shaping and development of civic society in Georgia (the first award ceremony was held on 11 September 2019 at the Tbilisi State University). while returning to the question of puWblishing the second volume of the commission’ s work, Dr Kolbaia proposed to include articles on Tytus Filipowicz in the publication, and to organise a conference and an exhibition about him in the future. Dr Paweł Libera, on the other hand, suggested that the second volume should include the material already collected, while an exhibition and a conference should be devoted to Tytus Filipowicz, focusing on his entire biography rather than just his activity in the Caucasus.

Dr Kolbaia then proposed to make an application in Georgia to give the name of Sergo Kuruliszwili to one of the streets in his hometown of Sachkhere (in western Georgia) and the name of Tytus Filipowicz to a street in Tbilisi, and declared that he would prepare an appropriate application. Prof. Materski added that it would be good if such a street in Tbilisi could intersect with the Avenue of Marshal Józef Piłsudski. Dr Otar Janelidze said that the idea could be successful in Sachkhere, but it could be very difficult in Tbilisi and even if it succeeds, such a street would be chosen in the suburbs of the city. In connection with the proposal to name one of the streets in Georgia after Sergo Kuruliszvili, Dr Paweł Libera emphasized that in such case a street in Warsaw should be named after a prominent Georgian activist associated with Poland, such as Georgia’ s representative in Poland, Giorgi Sidamon-Eristavi. Prof. Materski suggested, on the other hand, to commemorate Ilia Chavchavadze in this way. All members of the Commission agreed with this idea. During the discussion, a proposal was made that Prof. Włodzimierz Sulea from the Institute of National Remembrance, who had supported the work of the Polish-Georgian Historians’ Commission for a long time, should be made its member. The proposal met with full approval of all members. Prof. Włodzimierz Suleja thanked for this and declared active participation in the work of the Commission, as well as support from the Institute of National Remembrance.

Dr Kolbaia suggested that the next conference should be organised on the anniversary of the proclamation of the independent Democratic Republic of Georgia. Dr Paweł Libera suggested that a series of events should rather be organised, both in Warsaw and in Tbilisi. It was provisionally agreed that the conference would take place between 26 and 28 May 2020. It was also proposed to prepare an exhibition for this occasion and to display, among others, the Tytus Filipowicz collections held at the library of the SGH Warsaw School of Economics and at the Archives of the Polish Academy of Sciences.

Subsequently, Dr Paweł Libera and Dr David Kolbaia presented reports on their recent research that corresponded to the work of the Commission. At the end of the meeting, the Chairman of the Commission once again thanked everyone for their efforts so far and wished them further success in their work.

Opening of an exhibition at the Youth Palace in Tbilisi (former Viceregent Palace)

Official opening of the exhibition ‘Saint Grigol Peradze (1899–1941) – Martyr, Scientist, Ecumenist’ took place in the evening, at the Youth Palace in Tbilisi. The exhibition was opened by its author, Dr David Kolbaia and the Polish Ambassador to Georgia, Dr hab. Mariusz Maszkiewicz, Prof. Włodzimierz Suleja and Prof. Wojciech Materski each spoke, and then Dr David Kolbaia showed the audience around the exhibition.

Saturday, 23 November 2019. A visit to the National Defence Academy in Gori

On Saturday, members of the Polish-Georgian Historians’ Commission and representatives of the Institute of National Remembrance visited the National Defence Academy in Gori. The scientific event was opened by Brigadier General Malkhaz Makaradze and by Dr David Kolbaia, the Chairman of the Commission. As part of the visit, Prof. Włodzimierz Suleja gave a lecture on Józef Piłsudski, thus promoting a book about the Polish statesman that he has authored, recently published in Georgian.

Subsequently, the promotional event of the album ‘Under the Wings of the Republic of Poland. Georgian Emigration in Poland 1921–1939’ by Dr David Kolbaia took place. The event was followed by the ceremonial opening of the exhibition ‘Georgian Contract Officers in the Polish Army’. Brigadier General Malkhaz Makaradze and the exhibition’ s author, Dr David Kolbaia, acted as guides.

Visit to the State University of Gori

After the visit to the National Defence Academy in Gori, the Polish delegation visited the State University of Gori, where an official meeting with the Rector, Giorgi Sosiashvili, took place. After a ceremonial welcome by the university authorities, representatives of both sides at a round table to discuss the possibilities of cooperation. Rector Sosiashvili thanked everyone for the visit and described the cooperation with the Polish side to date (Polish language courses, the establishment of the University of Warsaw Centre at the university, the Polish-Georgian Summer School in Gori, close cooperation with the Centre for East European Studies at the University of Warsaw). He expressed interest in the achievements of the Polish-Georgian Historians’ Commission to date and declared his will of cooperation. He informed that he himself had found certain documents in the archives concerning the repatriation of Poles from Georgia. He proposed to publish a special issue of the university journal devoted to the work of the Commission. After the meeting, Rector Sosiashvili invited the members of the Commission to the University of Warsaw Centre at his university, where a meeting was held with students who attend Polish language courses and with graduates of Polish scholarship programs. Then the entire delegation went to Marshal Józef Piłsudski Square in Gori, where a candle was lit to commemorate the outstanding Pole.

The ‘4th Conference of the Polish-Georgian Historians’ Commission’ combined with the conference ‘Religious Repression in Communist Countries’ took place at the Holy Priest-Martyr Grigol Peradze House-Museum at Bakurtsikhe (Kakheti) on 23–25 November 2019. The conference was opened by His Eexcellency Mariusz Maszkiewicz, the Ambassador of the Republic of Poland in Georgia, and Archil Khandamashvili, the Mayor of Gurjaani. The Chairmen of the Polish-Georgian Historians’ Commission, Dr David Kolbaia and Prof. Włodzimierz Suleja, spoke, as did Romanos Peradze, the nephew of Saint Grigol. Dr David Kolbaia also officially opened the exhibition of St Grigol Peradze at the museum.

Organisers of the scientific events:

Centre for East European Studies at the University of Warsaw, Institute of National Remembrance in cooperation with the Embassy of Georgia in Poland, the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Tbilisi and the Polish Institute in Tbilisi.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Sources

France

Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris (MAE P).

Georgia

National Archives of Georgia

National Parliamentary Library of Georgia (NPLG)

Korneli Kekelidze Georgian National Centre of Manuscripts

Great Britain

The Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum

National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 29/2: Cabinet Office: International Conference: Minutes and Papers ‘P’ (Peace) Series)

Poland

Archiwum Akt Nowych

Archiwum Polskiej Akademii Nauk

Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych

Instytut Pamięci Narodowej

Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe

Russia

Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-istoricheskii Arkhiv

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INDEX

Achmatowicz, Mustafa

Adamczewski, P.

Allenby, Edmund Henry, Hynman

Allen, W. E. D.

Alshibaia, Grigol

Amirejibi, Shalva

Altstadt, A. L.

Anaszkiewicz, Michał

Andronikashvili, Alexandre

Antadze, A.

Antadze, Ipolite

Antoni (Bloom)

Ardishvili, Vasil

Arsenidze, Razhden

Astamadze, Giorgi

Asatiani, Alexandre

Asatiani, Sosipatre

Atabegishvili, Vasil

Avalov, Zurab see also Avalishvili

Bagrationi, Alexandre

Bagrationi, Barbare

Bakhtadze, Mikheil

Bakradze, Ivane

Bakradze, Zakaria

Bakradze, Vladimi (Lado)

Berkman-Karenin, Jerzy

Benvenuto, Tatton

Berson, Jan

Beylerian, A.

Bezruchko, K.

Bicherakhov, Lazar

Bilewicz, Juliusz

Bismarck

Błeszyński, Jerzy

Bobicki, Leon

Bogacki, Kazimierz

Bortnowski, Władysław

Bryce, Lord James

Chardigny, Pierre August

Chavchavadze, Ilia

Chavchavadze, Spiridon

Chavchavadze, Zurab

Chkheidze, Alexandre

Chkheidze, Nikoloz (Karlo)

Chkhenkeli, Akaki

Cholokashvili, Kakutsa

Chumburidze, Dodo

Ciszewski, Ludwik

Czajkowski, Paweł

Curzon, George

Crowe, Eyre

Dandelski, Lech

Dehnel, Jacenty

Denikin, Anton

Dębicki, Zdzisław – (Dęb, Jaxa, K. Zebrzydowski)

Dularidze, Tamar

Dunsterville, Lionela, C.

Dmowski, Roman

Evert, Ludwik, Józef

Filipowicz, Tytus

Frankowski, Stefan

Fromkin, D.

Furier A.

Gegechkori, Evgeni

George, Lloyd

Gintowt-Dziewałtowski, Romuald

Godzjaszwili, Alexandre

Godzjaszwili, J, I.

Gogoberidze, Levan

Grabski, Władysław, Dominik

Guramishvili, Giorgi

Guramishvili, I.

Guramishvili, V.

Gvarjaladze, Konstantine

Gvazava, Giorgi

Gvelesiani, Roman

Gummerus, Herman

Haller, Józef

Handelsman, Marceli

Henderson, Arthur

Herriot, Eduard

Hołówko, Tadeusz

Hovannisian R. G.

Hryniewiecki, Stanisław

Hubicki, Florian

Imnadze, Kote

Injia, Vasil

Jabłoński, Brunon

Jabłoński, Stanisław

Jagielski, Adam

Jagusiewicz, Zbigniew

Jacynicz, Mieczysław

Janelidze, Otar

Jankowiak, K.

Jankowski, Stanisław

Janowska, H.

Jarecki, Władysław

Javakhishvili, Ivane

Jeziorny, D.

Jędruszczak, T.

Jugeli, Valiko

Kandelaki, Konstantine

306, 307

Kandelaki, Nikoloz

Karumadze, Shalva

Kautsky, Karl

Kazemzadeh, F.

Kazemzade, P.

Kazbegi, Ivane

Kazbegi, Rostom

Kawtaradze, Jan

Kavtaradze, B.

Kavtaradze, S.

Kazum-Beg, B.

Khanoyan, Sarkis

Khavzhoko, P.

Khimshiashvili, Gogi

Kikodze, Geronti

Knoll, Roman

Kolchak, Aleksander, Admiral

Kolbaia, David

Komorska, Zofja

Kończyca, Tadeusz

Koniashvili, A.

Kosiński, Franciszek

Kotarbiński, Tadeusz

Koziołkowski, Jerzy

Krasnov, S.

Kuczkowski, Ignacy

Kutateladze, Bidzina

Kuruliszwili, Maria

Kuruliszwili, Sergo

Kuruliszwili, Jan

Kvikvidze, Konstantine

Kvinitadze, Giorgi

Kwiatkowski, Stefan

Laghidze, David

Lansing, Robert, F.

Laskhishvili, Giorgi

Law, Bonar

Lednicki, Alexander

Lenczewski, M.

Lenin, Włodzimierz, I.

Libera, Paweł

Likiernik, Stefan

Lipkowski, Wacław

Lomidze, Viktor, Vakhtang

Lortkipanidze, Ivane

Lortkipanidze, Mikheil

Lossow, Otton von

Lubach, Jerzy

Lukac-Ugrechelidze, A.

Łapiński Stanisław

Łomidze, Wiktor, Wakhtang

Łukasiewicz, Juliusz

Męczyński, Tadeusz

Majzner, Robert

Makaradze, Malkhaz

Mamulia, Giorgi

Marshall, William Raine

Marszewski Stanisław

Materski, Wojciech

Matikashvili, Nikoloz

Mazur, Grzegorz

Mądzik, Marek

Miegoń, Władysław

McMeekin, S.

Mdivani, Simon

Mieszkowski, Stanisław

Minassian, Ter, A.

Miller, Walenty

Milner, Lord

Morchadze, David

Muratoff, P.

Murusidze, Shorena

Muskhelishvili, Rostom

Nakashidze, Giorgi

Nanuashvili, Ivane (Vano)

Nawrot, Dariusz

Neuman, Jerzy

Nowinowski, S. M.

Nowak, Edmund

Okuashvili, A.

Olszewski, Paweł

Orbay, Hüseyn, Rauf

Ostapczuk, Jerzy

Ostrowski, Wacław

Paderewski, Ignacy, Jan

Paghava, Gogita

Paprocki, Henryk

Pasha, Ismail, Enver

Pasha, Nuri

Pasha, Mehmed, Vehib

Pasha, Talaat

Patlewicz, Barbara

Peplonski, Andrzej

Peradze, Grigol

Peradze, Romanos

Petliura, Symon

Piekarniak, W.

Piątkowski, Leszek

Picot, François Marie Denis Georges

Piłsudski, Józef

Pipes, R.

Potocki, Jerzy

Przewalski, Michaił, M.

Radziwiłł, Janusz

Ramishvili, Akaki

Ramishvili, Noe

Richards, Erle

Ropp, Eduard

Rushem, Hasan

Rustaveli, Shota

Sabakhtarashvili, Konstantine

Salakaia, Joseph

Sas-Hoszowski, Józef

Savery, Frank

Saitidze, G.

Serda-Teodorski, Aureli

Sharadze, Guram

Siamashvili, Vladimer

Sieroszewski, Wacław

Siedlecki, Stanisław

Sierpowski, S.

Sielanka, Józef

Silakadze, Dimitri

Sikorski, Władysław

Shalikashvili, Maro

Shalikashvili, Rostom

Skowroński, Jerzy

Skrzyński, Aleksander

Smith, Willoughby, F.

Spāde, Teodors

Strenger, Henryk

Strug, Andrzej – (Tadeusz Gałecki)

Suleja, Włodzimierz

Suny, R. G.

Sumbatashvili, Mikheil

Sykes, Mark

Swietochowski, Tadeusz

Szczepanowski, Witold

Szystowski, Edward

Szurlej, Stanisław

Świętochowski, T.

Świrski, Jerzy

Terjaszvili, Konstantine

Tevzadze, Valerian

Tomicki, J.

Tsulukidze, Varden

Tydelski, Tadeusz

Tsereteli, M.

Tsereteli, Vasil

Toptchibashi, Ali Mardan

Toynbee, Arnold, J.

Tuliszka, J.

Tumaniszwili, Jerzy

Tumanishvili, Pavle

Uratadze, G.

Vachnadze, Nikoloz

Vadachkoria, Sh.

Veshapeli, Grigol

Voitinsky, V.

Walden de, Stefan

Wasilewski, Leon

Wachtel, Konrad

Weber, Alfons

Weyher, Jan

Wieniawa-Długoszowski, Bolesław

Wierzbowski, Zbigniew

Wilson, Thomas, Woodrow

Witos, Wincenty

Wituch, T.

Woźniak, Andrzej

Wszelaki, Jan

Zajączkowski, Witold

Zakariadze, Alexander

Zavatskaia, B.

Ziółkowski, Tadeusz

Zhordania, Noe

Żeligowski, Lucjan

Żurawski, vel Grajewski R. P.

Абашидзе, Г.

Аваловъ, З.

Аветисян, Г.

Авиловъ, И.

Агаевъ, Г. б.

Агамалов, С.

Ализаде, З.

Аманспюръ, X.

Амбарцумянъ, К.

Анджапаридзе, Г. К.

Андрониковъ, К. М.

Арсенидзе, Р. М.

Арутюнянь, М.

Атабеклнъ, Л. Н.

Ахиджановъ, М.

Ахметеловъ, В. Г.

Ахундовъ, Д.

Ахундъ-Заде, Г. М.

Багирова, И.

Башировъ, А.

Бебутовъ, Л. б.

Бекзадянъ, Н.

Бернштейьъ, Э. А.

Векиловъ, И. А.

Векиловъ, Р.

Гаглоевъ, Г. А.

Галоян, А.

Гаджинский, Д. 3.

Гаджинский, М. Б.

Гаджинский, М. Г.

Газазянцъ К. А.

Гаидовъ-Миръ-Гидаявъ

Гайдаровъ И.

Ганиевъ С. М.

Гвазаеа Г. В.

Гегечкори, Е. П. 60

Георгадзе, Г. Т.

Гиижм-бабабековъ, М.

Гобечия, Г. П.

Грузинянъ-Врацянъ

Гурджуа, В. Г.

Дадешкелиани, Я.

Дзамоевъ, Г.

Джафаровъ, М. Ю.

Джибладзе, В. Г.

Джиблаазе, С. В.

Жордания, Н. Н.

Зорянъ С. Г. (Ростомъ)

Зпвриевъ Я. X.

Зурабовъ, А. Г.

Кабуловъ, И.

Кадищев, А. Б.

Кантемировъ, А.

Кара-Ага-Заде-Гамда-Эффенди

Кардатииевъ, А.

Карчикянъ, X. О.

Качазнуни, О. И.

Качарлинсксй, Ф.

Кочарянцъ, А. С.

Ласхишвили, Г. М.

Левонянъ, П.

Ломтатидзе, А. С.

Лордкипанидзе И. Н.

Лункевичъ В. В.

Магерамовъ, М.

Мамдалянъ, Г.

Мамедбековъ, Г. А.

Мамедбековъ, Э. К.

Мамулиа Г.

Махарадже, Г. Р.

Махмудбековъ, А.

Махмудовъ, М. б.

Мацаберидзе, М.

Меликъ-Еганивъ, Д.

Меликъ, Аслановъ, X.

Мехтиевъ, М. Я.

Налчаджянъ, А.

Ованесовъ, М.

Оганджанянъ, А. О.

Ониашвили, Д. Е.

Пашаева, А.

Пепиновъ, А.

Пипия, Г. В.

Пирумовъ, С. Г.

Расулъ-Заде, М. Э.

Рамишвили, И. И.

Рамишвияи, Н. С.

Ризаевъ, В.

Рустомбековъ, М.

Саакянъ, А. И.

Саакянъ, С. С.

Сафикюрдский, А.

Семеновъ Ю. Ф.

Скобелевъ, М. И.

Смирновъ, М. Н.

Султановъ, X. б.

Тевзая, В. В.

Теръ-Арутюнянъ, Г.

Теръ-Геворкянь, В.

Теръ-Газарянъ, Г. Г.

Тигранов-ь С. Р.

Топчибашевъ, А. М.

Уссубековъ, Н. б.

Хатисовъ, А. И.

Хатисовъ, С. Л.

Хачатурянъ, С. А.

Хасъ-Мамедовъ, Х.

Хойский, Ф. X.

Хомерики, Н. Г.

Церетели, И. Г.

Чилингарянг, Ар.

Чихладзе, Р. А.

Чплохянъ, Г.

Чхеидзе, Н. С.

Чхенкели, А. И.

Шахатуни, А. Т.

Шахтахтинский, Г.

Шейхъ-Уль-Исламовъ А.

Эфенди Раде, Ю. Ф.

Эрадзе, Г. П.

Яглжиянъ, Г.

Якобашвили, Ир.:

Table of Contents

Disintegration of the Russian Empire and the forms of transition -towards Nation-Satets

Establishment of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic and its international situation

Transcaucasian Seim and Georgian Political Spectrum

Saint Grigol Peradze’ s Theological Writings on Monasticismby David Kolbaia

Polish – Bolshevik War and Georgian Society. (According to the materials of the Georgian Press)

The story of the conflict between the senior Georgian officers in the Polish Army in 1929

Georgian political emigration to Poland and the issue of de-occupation of Georgia (20s – 30s of the XX century)

Wacław Ostrowski’ s mission to the Caucasus 1918–1921

Kpt. Viktor Vakhtang Lomidze (1900–1956). An archival report Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, London

Documents

Great Britain’ s attitude towards the future of Georgia and the South Caucasus in late 1918 and 1919

Sergo Kuruliszwili’ s letters from Warsaw (1920 – 1922). Materials for studying the history of Georgian emigration to Poland

Documents of the archive ‘Archiwum Akt Nowych’ about the possible -supply of weapons from Poland to Georgia (1922)

Joseph Salakaia (1881–1940) – Representative of the Georgian Emigrant Government in Poland (Letters, 1925–1931)

The story of preparations for the canonisation of Father Grigol Peradze

Report from the Seminar of the Polish-Georgian Historians’ Commission. November 22 – 26, Tbilisi 2019

Bibliography

Index