Polish-Georgian
Historians’ Commission

Collected Works

Volume I

Edited by
David Kolbaia

in cooperation with:
Wojciech Materski, Grzegorz Mazur, Rev. Henryk Paprocki,Paweł Olszewski, Paweł Libera, Otar Janelidze, Mikheil Bakhtadze, Georges Mamoulia, Beka Kobakhidze, Dimitri Silakadze, Giorgi Astamadze, Shorena Murusidze

Reviewers
Prof. Marek Kornat (IH PAN)
Dr hab. Mirosław Szumiło (UMCS/IPN)

Cover
Sylwia Szafrańska

Proofreading
David Kolbaia, Piotr Chojnacki

Index
David Kolbaia, Piotr Chojnacki

Typesetting
Marcin Koc

On the Cover: Memorial celebration for the 750th anniversary of the birth of Shota Rustaveli. Warsaw, 11 December 1937. Photograph from the National Digital Archives

On the Back Cover: Archimandrite Grigol Peradze, From a homily delivered on the occasion of the death of the First Marshal of Poland, Józef Piłsudski, 15 May 1935. Central Military Archives, Warsaw

Copyright © Polish-Georgian Historians’ Commision & Institute of National Remembrance Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation, 2019

ISBN 978-83-8229-967-0 (epub)
978-83-8229-968-7 (mobi)

In Memory of
Saint Archimandrite Grigol Peradze (1899–1942)
Professor of the University of Warsaw
(1933–1942)
Martyred at Auschwitz concentration camp

Preface

Georgia, a country which twice regained its independence in the 20th century. The first period of independence was difficult and short-lived, but nonetheless a significant achievement. It lasted a mere three years, extinguished and struck down by the army of its powerful neighbour to the north. Suddenly, Georgia’s independence laid in tatters, just three months after the signing, in May 1920, of a treaty by which Soviet Russia recognized the independence and sovereignty of Georgia, pledging not to meddle in the country’s internal affairs. Today, Georgia’s second period of independence is still in its early stages, and the difficulties and problems affecting its path to independent statehood are no less significant than they were one hundred years ago.

After the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Georgia regained its independence, initially within the framework of the short-lived Transcaucasian Federation, and later as the Democratic Republic of Georgia in 1918–1921. Ninety-eight years ago, on 26 May 1918, the National Council of Georgia announced the Act of Independence of Georgia in Tbilisi, which stated that from then on: “The Georgian nation is the only source of legal authority in Georgia, and Georgia is an independent and sovereign nation.” The Georgian government carried out many far-reaching reforms. All class privileges were abolished, land reform was carried out and local governments were reorganized in the spirit of self-government. The educational system and its corresponding institutions were nationalised and developed along modern guidelines. The first Georgian institutions of higher education were created and a national Georgian Army was formed. In spring 1917, the Georgian Church regained its autocephaly, becoming independent of the Russian Holy Synod and, for the first time in over a century, a Catholicos-Patriarch, Kyrion II (1917–1918), was elected.

Georgian independence was recognized, de facto and de jure, by nearly every nation, including Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Turkey and even Soviet Russia, as well as, of course, Poland. Georgia had already established diplomatic relations with Poland through the Regency Council, and a diplomatic Representative Office of Poland in the Caucasus was formed in the autumn of 1918, in Tbilisi. In 1919, also in Tbilisi, the Polish-Georgian Association for Industry and Trade was formed.

In 28 January 1921, the Polish government recognized the Georgian Republic de jure. This occurred just a short time before the Soviet Red Army entered Georgia and independence was lost once more. Following a month of heavy defensive fighting, the Georgian government was forced to leave the country and go into exile. A significant number of Georgian émigrés, among them Georgian Army officers and officer-cadets, found their way to Poland, which became their second home. They served in the Polish Army as contracted officers, ran businesses, medical practices, traded in goods, and studied and lectured at universities. Many of them knotted their future even more tightly to Poland, marrying Polish wives and starting families. Nonetheless, each one of them remained loyal to their lost homeland and was active in Georgian and Polish-Georgian organizations and associations for the independence of Georgia, such as the Georgian Committee in Poland (Komitet Gruziński w Polsce), the Polish-Georgian Club (Klub Gruzińsko-Polski), and the Association of Georgian Students in Poland (Koło Studentów Gruzińskich w Polsce). These activities were supported both institutionally, as well as by many well-known political and cultural figures, including Tadeusz Hołówka, Stefan Żeromski, Wacław Sierakowski and others.

Georgian independence was a prevalent topic in inter-war Poland; much discussed and much written about. Many popular science-type works dedicated to Georgia, as well as anniversary Sunday papers (Amirani, Pro Patria, Pro Georgia), were published at the time. While the weekly, Voice of the East (Głos Wschodu), edited by Sergo Kuruliszwili, was primarily dedicated to Georgian matters, other publications such as Alliance (Przymierze) or East-Orient (Wschód-Orient) also devoted them much attention. The issue of Georgia, especially current events, were discussed on the pages of the majority of the most popular press publications, particularly in the 1920s.

The period of 1918–1939 proved to be an especially significant period in the history of relations between the two countries, quite different from previous periods and rich in critical events for both Poland and Georgia. In 1918, after more than one hundred years of slavery, both countries regained their independence. Georgia would shortly go on to lose its freshly regained independence in 1921, when the Soviet Army entered Tbilisi, practically closing the way east – to the Caucasus and Georgia – for Poles. At the same time, the road opened westwards as a wave of Georgian émigrés fled to Poland. Traditional feelings of friendship, which many Poles felt towards Georgia at the time, found a basis in the federative concept of Eastern policy pushed by Marshal Piłsudski. In fact, after the signing of the Riga Treaty, the concept had lost all practical viability, but in an ideological sense, it continued to exist, finding its continuation in Prometheism. The movement’s aim was to support those nations of the USSR, which had attempted to develop their own states during and immediately following World War I, such as the Ukrainians, Armenians, Tatars, Caucasian Highlanders and Georgians. Thus, although Prometheism primarily possessed a political dimension, it also created an atmosphere conducive to wide-scale cultural and social activity of numerous émigré organizations and associations, including for Georgians and the Poles supporting tchem.

Already in fall 1919, there existed the Polish-Georgian Club, possessing a wide programme of cultural and economic activity. Among others, the Georgians received support on the pages of the weekly publication Przymierze from the Association for Closer Cooperation between Reborn Nations (Związek Zbliżenia Narodów Odrodzonych), established in January 1921 and chaired by Ludwik Krzywicki. The Association’s aim was, “closer mutual cultural and economic relations between the Baltic and Pontic nations and countries.” In the early 1920s, after the fall of the Georgian Republic, the Georgian Committee (Komitet Gruziński) was created in Poland, remaining active throughout the entire inter-war period. The Committee was especially active in publishing, educating Polish society on Georgian history and culture, as well as keeping the issue of Georgian independence alive.

In 1921, Sergo Kuruliszwili, head of the Georgian Committee in Warsaw, turned to Gen. Kazimierz Sosnkowski, Minister for Military Affairs, with a proposal to admit Georgians to Polish military schools and academies, free of charge. That same year, Konstantin Gvarjaladze, representative of the Georgian government in Constantinople, addressed Władysław Baranowski, delegate of the Polish government in Turkey, with an identical proposal. Before presenting his initial decision on the matter, Deputy Baranowski proceeded to gather information concerning the Tbilisi Military Academy for Officer-Cadets and its graduates. Information gathered from Poles returning from the Caucasus was very complimentary. Gen. Giorgi Kvinitadze, the commandant of the academy, was especially highly regarded and having spent his Russian military service in Warsaw, was something of a Polonophile. The Georgians were also able to gain support for their projects from the military attaché of the Polish Embassy, Col. Leon Bobicki. In telegrams to Warsaw, the embassy passed on Gvarjaladze’s proposals and presented the advantages that Poland might gain from accepting the Georgian propositions. According to Baranowski, all aid accorded to the Georgian émigrés would be a unique opportunity to strengthen Polish influence in the Caucasus. Col. Bobicki, on the other hand, pointed out the fact that training a certain number of Georgian officers would lessen the influence of graduates of Russian military schools in any future Georgian army, and thus, by default, also lessen the influence of the Russian army. Telegrams containing information pertaining to this activity (sent from Constantinople in 1921) were received by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Military Affairs. The final decision, naturally, was undertaken at a higher than ministerial level, with the deciding voice most likely that of the Chief of State, Marshal Józef Piłsudski. Since the idea of aiding Georgian émigrés certainly suited Piłsudski’s conception of Eastern policy, his decision was practically a foregone conclusion; the proposals should be taken advantage of. The final decision was undertaken in Warsaw, and in 1921, General of Division (Maj. Gen.) Władysław Sikorski, Chief of the General Staff – after receiving the agreement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and following a positive opinion from the General Staff – agreed to accept Georgians to the Infantry Officer-Cadet School in Warsaw. Besides political and military reasons, also taken under consideration was the fact that in 1917 and 1918 the then Georgian government took a positive stance towards Polish units then forming in the Caucasus, despite the fact that a Polish independent government did not yet exist. These units also gained considerable aid from the Georgian government and its people. As Deputy Tytus Filipowicz pointed out, the subsidies totalled well over ten million French francs and he further added: “It should be underlined, that the Georgian government did not present Poland with any financial bill due to the friendly relations between the two countries. Thus, the intended act of aiding Georgia in such difficult émigré circumstances was also an expression of gratitude and a kind of settling of accounts on the part of Poland.”

It is the intention of this volume to take the reader back in time to a bygone era. It contains a vital anthology the history of the Georgian émigré community during the inter-war years in Poland, its relations with Marshal Józef Piłsudski and the Promethean Movement. The Polish-Georgian Historians’ Commission Collected Works also raises the issue of Polish-Georgian contacts, both cultural and historical.

This publication would not have come into existence without the sincere help and support of the Centre for East European Studies at the University of Warsaw, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Institute of National Remembrance, various museums, libraries, archives and many other institutions in Poland, Georgia and abroad. They have our heartfelt gratitude and thanks.

David Kolbaia

Saint Archimandrite Grigol Peradze (1899–1942). Life and Works
by Rev. Henryk Paprocki

In the world of science he was known as “Archimandrite Peradze.” He was born on 13 September (31 August according to the Old Style calendar), in 1899 in the village of Bakurtsikhe (Kakheti province) in Georgia. After the death of his father Romanos, the Orthodox pastor of Grigol’ s hometown in 1905, the upbringing of the children was taken care by Grigol’ s mother and Romanos’ s brother, who was also a priest and pastor of the parish in Qvareli. One of Grigol’ s ancestors had entered the priesthood and this tradition had been passed down the generations, and Grigol was no exception. Subsequently, Grigol enrolled in the Theological School in Tbilisi, before continuing his studies at the Seminary. He graduated with distinction in 1918. In pre-revolutionary Russia, a diploma with honours gave him the right to enter any theological academy. However, the revolution and creation of the Democratic Republic of Georgia changed his plans. Instead of exploring theology, he undertook studies in the Faculty of Philology at the Tbilisi State University. Between 1919 and 1921, he completed military service and later taught at the school in the village of Manavi. He then returned to Tbilisi State University and with the help of Father Professor Korneli Kekelidze, an eminent specialist in the field of literature and Old Georgian liturgy, Grigol was allowed to pursue his studies further, abroad.

Visit to Germany

At the end of October 1921, The Catholicosat Council of Georgia, chaired by Catholicos-Patriarch Ambrosi I, sent Grigol to Berlin where he was to receive a comprehensive theological education. In his efforts to continue his studies in Germany, he received great support from Dr Johannes Lepsius, a German orientalist and scholar. Grigol later became a close family friend of Lepsius and many of his relatives.

Whilst in Berlin, his German gradually improved, and after passing the relevant entry examinations, he was registered on 12 May, 1922 at the Theological Faculty of the University of Berlin. There, under the guidance of Professors Adolf von Harnack, Adolf Deissmann, Karl Holl and Bruno Meissner, Grigol concentrated on studying theology and oriental languages, such as Hebrew, Syrian, Arabic, Coptic, Armenian, and Greek. At the same time, he also mastered Latin, German, English, French and Danish. Besides, he knew the following languages: Russian, Georgian and Old Church Slavonic, and after 1933, he quickly learnt Polish. His studies at the University of Berlin were completed with the title of Candidate of Theology. At the end of 1924 at the instigation of Richard Meckelein, Georgian language lecturer at the University of Berlin, Peradze turned to Professor Heinrich Goussen of Bonn, a great German Orientalist, for assistance in arranging for further studies. In addition, during the Christmas holidays of the same year, he spent two busy weeks in the private library of the same professor. When Grigol Peradze returned to Berlin, his friend and patron, Doctor Johannes Lepsius, advised him to transfer to the University of Bonn. Grigol arrived on 29 April 1925. At the Faculty of Philosophy, under the directions of Professor Doctor Paul Kahle, Anton Baumstark and foremost Professor Goussen, Grigol studied the history of religions and improved his knowledge of oriental languages. At that time, he translated his own work on the biography of George the Hagiorite, a Georgian monk of Mount Athos, who lived in the eleventh century, into German. Having written the critical introduction and footnotes, Grigol entitled this biography “The Life and Work of St. George the Hagiorite.” Later, persuaded by Dr Lepsius, he extended this study (originally a Bachelor’ s thesis) and ultimately presented it as a topic of his doctorate thesis entitled: “Geschichte des georgischen Mönchtums von ihren Anfängen bis zum Jahre 1064. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der orientalischen Mönchtums.” He received his PhD on 26 February 1926.

Analysis of the lives of the canonised Georgian monks in the doctorate thesis enabled Grigol to draw a number of conclusions that would lead to a greater understanding of the history of the Georgian monasticism. For example, Grigol believed that the Georgian monasticism in its eremitical form was founded by the native people soon after the adoption of Christianity by Georgia in the fourth century. Grigol recognised that the foundation of community life came later, around the year 550, with the arrival of the “Thirteen Syrian Fathers” in Georgia. When the Syrians fled to Georgia, because of persecution in their homeland, they began to construct new monasteries and the development of monastic life. The asceticism of the immigrants from Syria was characterised by their hostility towards the body: they paid no attention to food (bread and vegetables they ate, water they drank), clothing (they walked barefoot), and shelter (they lived in caves). They reinforced the Georgian orthodoxy and organised the system of monasteries thus: John of Zadazenia founded a monastery in Mtskheta, David, the Monastery of Gareja, and Szio, the Monastery of Szio-Mgwime, Abibos became Bishop of Nekresi, and Ize became Bishop of Cirkania.

Further research work

After receiving his doctorate degree, Grigol Peradze studied in Brussels until April 1927 at the Bollandists and at the Catholic University of Louvain in Belgium. Later he worked for two months at the libraries of the British Museum and at the Bodleian, the main library of the University of Oxford. He was then employed by the University of Bonn, first as a teacher of Armenian and Georgian languages, and after the death of Professor Goussen in 1927, as an associate professor. From then on, the name Grigol began to appear more frequently in various scientific journals. However, Grigol continued to research Georgian monasticism, inter alia, the role of monasteries in the life of the Georgian Church and Eastern Christianity. He also repeatedly championed the hitherto unexplored area of the Coptic influence on the tradition of Christianity in Georgia. His superior knowledge presented in these articles instantly made him one of the most prominent experts on early Christianity in the Middle East. Professor Julius Assfalg characterised the activities of Grigol in Bonn in an article devoted to Kartvelian studies in Germany:

“Georgian studies gained a new momentum when the Georgian G. Peradze published his findings in his PhD thesis in Bonn on the origins of Georgian monasticism; findings which were mainly edited by A. Baumstark in the journal Oriens christianus. Oriens christianus regularly deals with issues related to Georgia, and thus follows in a long tradition that dates back to A. Baumstark, T. Kluge, H. Goussen, G. Peradze and M. Tarkhnishvili (…). Today, after the deaths of Goussen, Peradze, Baumstark and Deeters and after the transition of J. Molitor and K. Schmidt to other universities, the Georgian language in principle is no longer taught at the University of Bonn.”

A similar opinion was expressed by Professor Hubert Kaufhold in the preface to the publication of Grigol Peradze’ s article in Oriens christianus about the fate of Georgian culture. Grigol actively participated in the scientific life of Germany. Amongst other things, he gave the speech “Zur vorbyzantinischen Liturgie Georgiens” at the Fifth German Oriental Conference in Bonn in 1928, as well as “Die Probleme der georgischen Evengelium übersetzung” at the Sixth German Oriental Conference in Vienna two years later. During that time Grigol focused his attention on pre-Byzantine Georgian liturgy, which resulted in several classical works on this subject, such as the translation into French of the Georgian version of the Liturgy of Apostle Peter. The Georgian Church was initially dependent on Antioch, which caused the transfer of the Antiochian and Jerusalem traditions. Adoption of the Byzantine Rite came as a result of close relations with Byzantium and this took place in the late tenth century, mainly due to translations made by Euthymius and George the Hagiorites at Athos. However, traces of the pre-Byzantine tradition have been preserved until the present day in Georgia. For example, the liturgical monuments show that originally the Liturgy of Saint James the Apostle was celebrated. Likewise, the Liturgy of the Apostle Peter was celebrated at a later date. Troparions and the Georgian idiomele do not correspond to any known Greek text, which indicates that they are of Jerusalem origin. A large number of canons matins have a second song, which disappeared in the Byzantine tradition.

Ordination and arrival in Poland

In 1931, Grigol Peradze vowed monastic vows in the Greek Cathedral in Paris and was ordained as a priest. This came about as the result of a spiritual experience during a severe illness, which he described in the poem “Cherubim Hymn”:

“Today we understand the past, I felt that I meet, Judgement was announced, I became a slave to death (…). Stay with her people; become a bridge to heaven (…). The seal of silence, you should remove the paragraph, I become the patron saint of children Kartlos (…). Are you ready to die, to destroy, is the burning of thy fate.”

In Paris Peradze made contacts with the Georgian community and settled there permanently. He participated in the organisation of the parish, and was later appointed as its first pastor. It was at that time that he began to issue an academic annual called Jvari vazisa, which literally means “Cross made of the vine sprig.” As the editor of this journal, most of the published work was his own writings. However, with an increasing workload in his own parish, he resigned from teaching at the University of Bonn in 1932.

Grigol also harboured ambitions of becoming a lecturer at the theological school. The desire materialised in 1933 when the Metropolitan Dionysius (Waledyński) invited him to Warsaw, and offered him the position of assistant professor and deputy director of the Patrology Seminary at the School of Orthodox Theology at the University of Warsaw.

On 7 December 1933 he gave a lecture on “The concept, objectives and methods of Patrology in Orthodox theology.” He highlighted its special place in the practice of theology, postulated that in addition to the Greek and Latin patrology, other Eastern-Christian literature was taught, and that research was conducted in accordance with the methodology of scientific work. In January 1934, in the Greek Cathedral of St. Sophia in London, Priest Grigol received the dignity of archimandrite. In the academic year 1934/1935, he delivered a series of lectures called “Introduction to theological science” to all students of Orthodox Theology in Warsaw. Metropolitan Dionysius, who was the director of the study, filed a proposal to grant the title of associate professor to Grigol, and this idea was also supported by the rector of the university. However, the authorities were simply not interested in the development of Orthodox theology. Furthermore, Grigol Peradze did not have Polish citizenship. But despite these setbacks, Grigol continued to work with full devotion to the good of the Polish Orthodox Church. He had a modest apartment at ul. Brukowa 22 m. 11 (currently Okrzei) in Warsaw. He also took time out to help the less advantaged, in particular poor students.

Research in other countries

During this period, Peradze completed a series of scientific journeys between 14 July and 22 September 1935. He stayed in Romania, Greece (Thessalonica and Mount Athos) and Bulgaria. At Athos he managed to retrieve 50 Georgian books and 13 manuscripts, such as the “Apophtegmata Patrum”, the works of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and apocryphal lives of the saints. In addition, he found the Greek versions of the martyrdom of the martyrs of Vilnius: Anthony, John and Eustace. In the National Library in Sofia, he came across the Georgian text of Typikon by the great Western domesticus, George Bakuriani. Bakuriani, who lived in the eleventh century, founded the monastery of Petriconi only for the Georgians, and the Typikon was written in Georgian, Greek and Armenian. The text of the Typikon that Peradze discovered was a copy of the original, drawn up in 1702.

Between July and September 1936, Peradze travelled to the Holy Land and Syria. He brought back with him Georgian palimpsests from between the sixth–seventh century, as well as an impressive collection of photographs and documents. He published his memories of the trip in the journal Słowo in 1938 and in the Wiadomości Metropolii Prawosławnej w Polsce in 1939.

During late 1937 and early 1938, Peradze studied the works of Dionysius the Areopagite in Italy (Florence, Naples, Venice and Rome). Later, in the National Library in Paris, he worked on the “Apology” of Tatian. Whilst there and subsequently in another Austrian library, he came across the Georgian version of the hearing of St. George the Theologian “A Dialogue with St. Basil.” It should be noted that his first scientific discovery was that of the Georgian apocryfic text, in the Bodleian Library in Oxford, “Letter from Dionysius the Areopagite Timothy to the Bishop of Ephesus on the Martyrdom of the Apostles Peter and Paul.” Further, he also found the Georgian translation of the “Didache” in Paris, and the text dates back to the eight–tenth century.

Further activities in Poland

In 1937, with Professor Giorgi Nakashidze, Fr. Peradze actively participated in the preparations for the jubilee celebrations of Shota Rustaveli, the twelfth-century Georgian poet and author of the Georgian national epic “Vepkhistkaosani” (“The Knight in a Panther’ s Skin”). Fr. Grigol not only delivered lectures in Warsaw, Kraków and Lvov; but, according to unconfirmed information, also helped to translate this text together this time with Józef Łobodowski and Professor Nakashidze.

On the occasion of the jubilee Fr. Peradze published the article “Religion of Shota Rustaveli,” in which he wrote: “There is an opinion that at the end of his life Rustaveli was a monk. Personally, I think that if he indeed became a monk, it was before writing this piece. A man, who wrote this poem, would suffer martyrdom in defence of his beliefs, rather than locking himself up in the walls of the monastery.” Meanwhile, it was widely believed that Shota Rustaveli joined the monastery at the end of his life. This was supported by the discovery in 1960 in the Jvari monastery in Jerusalem of a portrait of the poet, which depicts an aged Rustaveli, dressed in typical court costumes of the first half of the thirteenth century. This alone would confirm Fr. Peradze’ s hypothesis that a youthful Rustaveli was probably a pupil at the monastery school where he gained his extensive knowledge of the Bible, the Koran, as well as of philosophy and literature, as reflected in the poem “Vepkhistkaosani.”

Scientific achievements

An area that deserves special attention is the scientific work of Fr. Peradze and his interest in the publication (for example, chronicles of the monastery of St. John the Baptist), or translations of sources (for example, the apocryphal Georgian monophysitist Gospel), as Peradze believed that these texts enable a better understanding of the history of early Christianity. Fr. Peradze was also interested in publishing directories of Georgian manuscripts in England (this, in turn, enables us to understand the history of translations of works of the Fathers of the Church), and the reports of pilgrims on Georgian monasticism in the Holy Land but also, crucially, a directory of the translations of early Christian literature into Georgian. This directory was a German adaptation of the work of Prof. Korneli Kekelidze, and was published in Georgian and entitled “Foreign authors in the ancient Georgian literature.”

The scientific achievements of Fr. Peradze are therefore very impressive and every item is of value to the community at large. Numerous published reviews, in which Peradze often contributed to the contents of the reviewed books or engaged in polemics with the authors, are further evidence of his extraordinary erudition. Also, works that can be defined as dissemination also contain much valuable data, hypotheses and formulations on various aspects of both the Church’ s life, the history of Georgia and Georgian paganism. For example, when examining the cult of St. George in Georgia and its links with paganism, Fr. Peradze disputes Ivane Javakhishvili’ s (1876–1940) argument that the cult of the saint in Georgia is a continuation of the cult of the moon. Instead, Fr. Peradze considers that the main deity of Georgia was a pagan sun.

The outbreak of World War II

At the outbreak of the war, Fr. Grigol led a variety of scientific activities, belonged to numerous national and international organisations, he served many functions:

– Assistant Professor and Deputy Head of a Seminar in Patrology at the School of Orthodox Theology at the University of Warsaw,

– Member of the Oriental Studies Commission at Warsaw Scientific Society,

– Member of the Commission on “Faith and Order” (Geneva),

– Member of the Polish team at the World Association of Friendly Co-operation of the Churches,

– Member of the Polish branch of Practical Christianity (“The Stockholm Movement”),

– Member of the “Anglican and Eastern Church Association” (London),

– Parson of a Georgian parish in Paris,

– Editor of the scientific yearbook Jvari vazisa (Paris),

– Chaplain to the Georgian immigration in Poland,

– Member of the committee on translation of liturgical books into Polish,

– Honorary member of the Orthodox Brotherhood of Theologians in Poland,

– Chairman of the Circle of Students of Orthodox Theology, Warsaw University and head of the scientific section,

– Member of the Polish Society of Oriental Studies.

After September 1939 Fr. Peradze remained in Warsaw. He provided shelter for one of the Georgian contract officers, Captain Kavtaradze in his apartment. Fearful of a detention, Fr. Peradze asked a friend to obtain the necessary documents for the captain.

Arrest

Fr. Grigol Peradze was arrested by the Gestapo in his apartment, probably on 5 May 1942.

The immediate reason for the arrest was provocation and denunciation. Further details came to light during an interview with Giorgi Nakashidze:

”Someone denounced him… I know that his diary was delivered daily to the Gestapo, I know their names. This is our shame… But now you do not need this…

Several officers who served in the Polish Army, some of whom Georgians by birth, were summoned. And the three officers whom I personally knew, said that everything was so badly-scribbled that much cannot be read, and refused, but after all there will always be enemies and there have been enemies of the unfortunate…“

This is also confirmed by Sewdia Daredshan (Aka)-Ugrekhelidze Lukac: “I find it difficult (…) to add something to what has already been stated several times, and I always heard from my father, who is still in Warsaw, namely, that A. and K. who lay in wait for Peradze and were guilty of causing imprisonment and death. My father was sure that it was not just about personal animosities, as A. went over to the enemy or that Peradze was with us, but that (he) had his eye on Peradze’ s precious books and incunabula. Perhaps he also wanted to have all that was kept for those who were on the run or imprisoned, for example, Jews and others persecuted in mortal danger by the occupation forces, which he clearly (…) knew about.”

A similar description can also be found in the ‘indictment’ drawn up after World War II by the Georgian contract officers:

”If A. could easily trade the heads of unarmed prisoners of war and Jews, it was not so easy to accuse and arrest Archimandrite Peradze on the basis of mere denunciation. It was necessary to justify the charges against him, and here is how he deceived Archimandrite Peradze. They photograph documents, sent from the Gestapo, and using Peradze’ s servant, a man named BM, they hide those photos in a hole made at the back of an icon in Peradze’ s room. A. then denounces Peradze as an English spy, who photographed the secret documents for the British, and informs the Gestapo of the storage site.

The Gestapo conducts a search in the apartment and finds the photographs. Peradze is then imprisoned in the camp, where he died after 18 days of brutal treatment. BM receives good pay from A. and currently lives in Argentina. All this was written based on the testimony of the Georgian soldiers serving in the Polish army who are now staying in London.”

After the arrest, Fr. Peradze was imprisoned at the Pawiak Prison in Warsaw. His fate in the Pawiak is revealed in memoirs of those who were also at the prison. Prison clerk Leon Wanat noted down personal details, and sent the prisoner to the cell at the transition ward VII, located in the basement. Peradze stayed at ward VII for about 14 days, after that he was transferred to ward V, which is called the transport ward, located on the second floor. He was used as a translator. At the beginning of October 1942 Peradze was transferred to the working division of No. 186 (called “arbeitzela”) where he was also a translator. Some of these accounts were discovered in 1986 at the Archives of the Orthodox Metropolitan of Warsaw, and these helped to retrace some of the events, which occurred during Peradze’ s incarceration. In addition, a few years ago the archives unveiled an envelope with documents belonging to the Father, amongst which was the original death certificate (Sterbeurkunde) in German, issued by Standestamt Auschwitz.

These documents enable us to reconstruct some details from the last days of Fr. Peradze’ s life. First of all, it is revealed that he was arrested during early May 1942, most likely on the 5th. Following his imprisonment, the dean of the Warsaw district, Fr. Protopriest Jan Kowalenko, sealed Peradze’ s apartment. This took place at 4pm on 5 May. On 28 May 1942, at the request of German police, Fr. Kowalenko, assisted by Deacon George Berkman-Karenin, removed the seals from the apartment. The police seized some money (in both American and British currencies), which was hidden in a secret closet. This would indirectly confirm the supposition that Fr. Peradze kept the money of the Jewish people in his apartment for safekeeping.

Whilst still in Pawiak, Peradze authorised his friend, Deacon George Berkman-Karenin, to go to his apartment in Brukowa Street on 10 June 1942. At his request, some underwear and a summer coat were retrieved from the apartment with the intention of sending them to the imprisoned priest.

Another well-preserved document is a copy of the letter Fr. Peradze sent on 20 June 1942 to the deacon Berkman-Karenin. This letter is actually his last will, and Peradze delivered a number of instructions regarding his personal property. It says, inter alia: “…to please provide the furnished apartment to someone from the Consistory. (…) If I am not set free, please give my library to the Metropolia, things should be sold and the proceeds devoted to our parish orphanage in Wola. (…) My Georgian books and documents (including images) after the war, should be sent by the Metropolia to the Georgian Church…”

Auschwitz

Despite the very difficult situation, the Orthodox Church made numerous efforts to secure the release of Fr. Grigol Peradze. It provided him with specific food and material aid, as seen from a letter to the deacon, Berkman-Karenin. Professor Giorgi Nakashidze, at the request of the Metropolitan Dionysius, also intervened with the German authorities in the case of Fr. Peradze but to no avail.

It is likely that Grigol was transported to the concentration camp of Auschwitz on 18 November 1942. Further attempts to release the prisoner proved fruitless. On 11 December 1942, the commandant of Auschwitz, Rudolf Höss, sent a telegram message to Deacon Berkman-Karenin with the news that Father Grigol Peradze had died in the camp on 6 December at 16.45.

At the request of the church authorities, the Camp Registry Office sent out an official death certificate. This was confirmed in the acts of the Government Delegation for Poland: “Auschwitz Camp. Fr. Professor Grigol Peradze was arrested and died shortly after a few weeks’ imprisonment. UJP Faculty. Theologian. Law, Georgian, an eminent specialist.“

In 1945, two former concentration camp inmates, whose identities have not been established, presented an oral statement to the Orthodox Metropolitan in Warsaw that Father Grigol Peradze volunteered to admit to have stolen some bread for his inmates, thus saving the whole detachment. Unfortunately, this statement was either not recorded or has been lost, or maybe it has yet to be discovered.

In a letter to Patriarch Alexius I of 1 February 1946, Metropolitan Dionysius wrote: “…Professor of Theology of our Section, Ph.D., Archimandrite Grigol Peradze, Georgian, a graduate of the seminary in Tbilisi, followed by the universities of Bonn and Oxford, a multi-linguist expert in Russian, Georgian, French, German and English, was arrested and deported to Auschwitz and was executed there.” This is likely to be attributed to information provided by these two former prisoners of Auschwitz.

Grigol Peradze’ s death certificate in German

The death of Father Grigol continues to elude hagiographers and historians alike. Did he sacrifice his life for another man, admitting to the uncommitted theft of bread, and was then shot, or sent to the gas chamber?

As Bishop Anthony Bloom wrote: “No one has greater love than he who lays down his life for his friend”; these words characterised the ideal of the Gospel and were shown as the only true Gospel way of life. Too often are the words of the Saviour retold as to how a Christian should die. But in this case, it refers to life itself: “to lay down one’ s life,” to donate, devote to the neighbour. Above all, it means to live for Him, to live a decent day-to-day life, to live with persistence, to shoulder the burden of life, the whole life, and not just your own but strangers’ too (if that word can ever be used because, after all, we can never be “strangers” in relation to others, as we, without exception, are all “kindred”). And when one’ s love ends in death by sacrificing one’ s life, then that is a triumph and victory of life.”

Canonisation

Shortly after World War II, the Georgian Orthodox Church began the process of canonising Fr. Grigol Peradze. Much later, preparations began for the first scientific session dedicated to the memory of Fr. Peradze, on the 45th anniversary of his death on 6 December 1987. Work on the life and legacy of Grigol Peradze began to gather momentum. The documentary director Rezo Tabukashvili also came to Warsaw to make a documentary about the Archimandrite, having collected a wealth of material on the life and activities of Father Grigol, inter alia, statements from people who knew him. It was due to Tabukashvili that the story of the arrest was largely explained. Professor Giorgi Nakashidze, who was a lecturer at the Warsaw University in the interwar period and a friend of Grigol’ s father, gave Tabukashvili some important documents from the Second World War and the immediate period that followed. It was through this collection of materials and testimony of witnesses which enabled the canonisation of Grigol Peradze to proceed. The event took place on 19 September 1995 under the auspices of the local council of the Georgian Church when Fr. Peradze was declared a “holy martyr.” The Act of the canonisation was proclaimed by Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II in the cathedral of Svetitskhoveli, in Mtskheta: “In the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, and the holy council of the Autocephalous Georgian Orthodox Church I announce that Father Archimandrite Grigol Peradze is canonised as a saint and henceforth he will be called and addressed as saint priest martyr. Amen.”

The service and the life of St. Grigol were depicted by Fr. Henryk Paprocki, and the basic iconographic type has been developed by Michał Pieczonko, other icons were made by: Ludmila Lubach, Michał Bogucki, and Irakli Tsintsadze. The memorial day of Saint Grigol is 6 December.

In memory of St. Priest Martyr Archimandrite Grigol

The University of Warsaw has organised annual caucasology sessions of the in name of St. Grigol Peradze since 2002.

In Warsaw, the Brotherhood of the Orthodox Church was founded in his honour in 1998 (it organises pilgrimages to holy places in Georgia). A similar fraternity was established in 2002 in Georgia (it recently published a life of St. Grigol Peradze in the Georgian and Polish languages).

In 1999, the Polish Medical Association was founded in Georgia in tribute to Grigol Peradze. Eight years earlier, the St. Grigol Peradze University was opened in Tbilisi (on 4 Jiqia Street), and one of the streets nearby was renamed in his honour in 2008, and the site was designated for the construction of churches, which were to be dedicated to him. In 2005, the International Commission for the Heritage of St. Grigol Peradze (Polish-Georgian) was founded, and began to issue the Archimandrite’ s works in Polish, Georgian, German and English.

In Poland in 2007, a chapel was founded in honour of martyr Grigol archimandrite (Warsaw, ul. Lelechowska 5), and in 2009, construction began on a church, which would be dedicated to him in Bialystok.

Martyr Peradze played an important role not only in the history of Polish science, but also contributed to the world’ s theological science. This can be confirmed by the numerous references to Peradze’ s works by scholars from various fields, such as Andre Tarby, Julius Assfalg, Paul Kruger and the Clavis Patrum Graecorum. Peradze’ s academic work has also received high scores in studies on the status of Kartvelian Studies in Germany.

Literature:

Artanuji, 10 (2003), No. 11 (passim).

Assfalg, Julius, “Über die georgischen Studien in Deutschland (Kurze Übersicht)”, Bedi Kartlisa, 19–20 (1965), pp. 206–209.

Fischer, Luise, “Grigol Peradze (1899–1942)”, Mitteilungsblatt, 5 (1999), pp. 1–3.

Gruzińscy święci, ed. J. Charkiewicz, Warszawa 2005, pp. 166–178.

Kaufhold, Hubert, “Gregor Peradze (1899–1942)”, Oriens Christianus, 83 (1999), pp. 193–199.

Kolbaia, David, Under Polish wings. The Georgian emigration in Poland 1921–1939, Warsaw 2016.

Lenczewski, Mikołaj, “Ksiądz prof. dr archimandryta Grzegorz Peradze”, Wiadomości Polskiego Autokefalicznego Kościoła Prawosławnego, 4 (1974), No. 2, pp. 61–67.

Lepsius, Johannes, “Ein neues Band mit Georgien”, Der Orient, 4 (1922), pp. 1–5.

Lubach, Jerzy, “Wojenne losy ks. Grzegorza Peradze”, Karta, 18 (1996), pp. 147–149.

Machitadze, Zakaria, Lives of the Georgian Saints, transl. D. & L.E. Ninoshvili, Platina (California) 2006, pp. 423–426.

Męczennicy XX wieku. Martyrologia prawosławia w Polsce w biografiach świętych, ed. J. Charkiewicz, Warszawa 2004, pp. 83–101.

Nicoladzé, F. & R., Les Géorgiens pour la France. Itinéraires de résistance 1939–1945, Paris 2007, pp. 69–74.

Paprocki, Henryk, “Analiza dokumentów odnoszących się do sprawy aresztowania w 1939 roku w Warszawie trzech Gruzinów”, Pro Georgia, 4 (1994), pp. 64–77.

Paprocki, Henryk, “Bibliografia prac o. Grzegorza Peradze”, Pro Georgia, 13 (2006), pp. 199–210.

Paprocki, Henryk, “Historia przygotowań do kanonizacji ojca Grzegorza Peradze”, Pro Georgia, 15 (2007), pp. 139–143.

Paprocki, Henryk, “Ojciec Grzegorz świętym Kościoła gruzińskiego”, Pro Georgia, 5 (1996), pp. 87–88.

Paprocki, Henryk, “L’Archimandrite Grigol Peradze (1899–1942)”, Revue des Études Géorgienes et Caucasienes, 4 (1988), pp. 199–221.

Paprocki, Henryk, “Kanonizacja ojca archimandryty Grzegorza Peradze”, Przegląd Prawosławny, 10 (1995), No. 11 (125).

Paprocki, Henryk, “Święty Grzegorz Peradze (1899–1942)”, Arche. Wiadomości Bractwa, 8 (1998), No. 1, pp. 4–5.

Paprocki, Henryk, “Życie i dzieło św. Grzegorza Peradze”, Pro Georgia, 9 (2002–2003), pp. 7–17.

Paprocki, Henryk, “Żywot świętego męczennika Grzegorza Archimandryty i nabożeństwa do niego”, Pro Georgia, 14 (2006), pp. 5–51.

Reissner, Ilma, “Kirche unter dem Weinrebenkreuz”, Der Christliche Osten, 51 (1996), pp. 77–97.

Reissner, Ilma, “Ein neukanonisierter Heiliger der Georgischen Orthodoxen Kirche: Archimandrit Grigol Peradze”, Hermeneia (1996), pp. 135–143.

Zhitia gruzinskikh sviatikh, eds Z. Machitadze, M. Bukia, M. Bulia, Tbilisi 2002, pp. 195–196.

Tchumburidze, Tamar, Das Erloschung der georgischen Handschriften im Ausland – Grigol Peradses archeographische Forschungen, Tbilisi 2006.

Niviere, Antoine, Pravoslavnye sviashchennosluzhiteli, bogoslovy i tserkovnie deiateli russkoi emigratsii v Zapadnoi i Tsentralnoi Evrope (1920–1995), Moscou–Paris 2007, pp. 167–168.

Weise, Charles, Peradze Grigol/Gregor, [In:] Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon, Herzberg 2000, p. XVII. The Georgian Diaspora led by Joseph Salakaia and Kote Imnadze, the former adjutant to Prime Minister Noe Zhordania, had only one cleric, Grigol Peradze.

Saint Grigol Peradze’ s Theological Writings on Monasticism
by David Kolbaia

Grigol Peradze, who is known in the academic world as Archimandrite Peradze, started his studies at the Philological Department of Tbilisi University. Professor Korneli Kekelidze, an outstanding specialist in Old Georgian literature and liturgy, helped him in obtaining consent to study abroad. The Board of the Catholicosate of Georgia, which was chaired by Patriarch Ambrose I, in 1921 sent Peradze to study in Berlin, where he was expected to receive a broad theological education. At the beginning, Peradze was polishing his German in Berlin to become a student at the Theology Department of the University of Berlin in May 1922. He studied theology and Oriental languages (Hebrew, Syrian, Arabic, Coptic, Armenian, and Greek). He also learnt Latin, German, English and French at that time. Additionally, he obviously was a fluent user of Russian, Old Church Slavonic and Georgian. He quickly mastered Polish after 1933. The degree of Doctor of Theology was conferred on Peradze to crown his studies at the University of Berlin. Doctor Johannes Lepsius recommended him to move to the University of Bonn, which Peradze did in April 1925. In Bonn, he studied the history of religion and improved his knowledge of Eastern languages with the assistance from Paul Kahle, Anton Baumstark, and especially Prof. Goussen, a brilliant German orientalist. At that time he translated the biography of George the Hagiorite into German, which he had compiled (as The Activity of George the Hagiorite), and added a critical introduction and footnotes to the work. He was awarded the distinction of Ph.D. in 1926 on the basis of his work Geschichte des georgischen Mönchtums von ihren Anfängen bis zum Jahre 1064. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der orientalischen Mönchtums, which was reviewed by Prof. Dr. Paul Kahle of the University of Bonn and Prof. Dr. Karl Holl of the University of Berlin. In that work the author analysed the lives of canonised Georgian monks, which led him to a number of conclusions essential for understanding the history of Georgian monasticism. Primarily, he believed that Georgians developed the eremitic form of their monasticism shortly after the conversion of Georgia to Christianity in the 4th century. Later, ca 550 AD, the country was visited by the “Thirteen Syrian Fathers,” who Peradze believed to have been the founders of monastic life. Their arrival stimulated the building of new monasteries and the development of monastic life. The Syrians came to Georgia due to persecutions in their own homeland and brought some elements of asceticism typical of Monophysitism. Their asceticism was characterised by a clear hostility towards their own bodies; they did not care for their food (they ate bread and vegetables and drank water), clothes (for example, they went barefoot) or homes (they lived in caves). They came to Georgia at a very important historical moment. In the 5th century, the Georgian Church became united with the Armenian Church against the supporters of the Council of Chalcedon and to withdraw from Monophysitism one century later, the leader of that move was Patriarch Kirion. When the Syrian monks came to Georgia, it was religiously neutral and did not take any stance on the Council of Chalcedon. The newcomers from Syria reinforced the Georgian Orthodoxy and organised a system of monasteries. Peradze made a number of comments on the impact the monasteries had made on the Georgian Church and Eastern Christianity as a whole. Georgian monasticism is not based on rules and statutes. The main factor was the personality of the father superior, who became a model to others. Each father superior had his own rule, which was later followed by his disciples. This gained a double meaning in Georgia, both negative and positive. As a consequence of the lack of ideas and statutory rules adequate internal relations between the Church and individual monasteries did not develop there. Unlike Oriental monasticism, Georgian monasticism did not serve the Church guided by its intrinsic need. Great saint monks accepted church positions and fulfilled tasks assigned to them only when they had been forced to, which was probably an effect of influence from Syrian and Coptic monasticisms. Peradze indicated the unexplored field, which was the influence of Coptic traditions on Christianity in Georgia. However, on the other hand, the spiritual nature and enthusiasm of monasticism were preserved in Georgia, owing to which monasteries could perform their religious and ecclesiastic tasks without the risk of excess of form and rules. Georgian monasticism brought the spirit of independence and restlessness to the Church. Peradze focused his attention on the pre-Byzantine Georgian liturgy and wrote several classical works on this subject. Traditions of Antioch and Jerusalem were adopted by the Church of Georgia because it had initially been dependent on Antioch. Jerusalem influenced the Georgian liturgy especially via the Georgian monasteries (including of the Holy Cross and the Saviour) and Georgian people living in Palestine. Georgian pre-Byzantine liturgical monuments prove that the Liturgy of James the Apostle (initially) and the Liturgy of Peter the Apostle (some time later) were celebrated in Georgia. The ordination prayers, which have been preserved until now, show some dependence on the traditions of Constitutiones Apostolorum and Testamentum Domini Nostri Jesu Christi. The canonical hours also prove a strong dependence on the Jerusalem tradition. Georgian troparia and idiomelons do not correspond to any known Greek text, which proves that they originate from Jerusalem. A large number of Matins canons include a second song, which is no longer practiced in the Byzantine tradition.

The tradition of celebrating some parts of services in front of a richly adorned cross standing in the middle of the church has been preserved in Georgia, which is a trace of the procession ad crucem at the Golgotha rock, described by Egeria. Some liturgical texts, the Greek originals of which had been lost, such as the stichera to be sung on 24 December and 5 January, and the Matins canon sung on Sunday before the Epiphany, written by Saint John of Damascus, have been preserved. The presence of the 24 troparia for Kyrie ekekraksa in the vespers is still an insoluble puzzle. The Byzantine Rite was adopted as a consequence of close relations with Byzantium at the turn of the 10th century mainly owing to the translation activity of Euthymius and George the Hagiorites on Mount Athos. However, traces of the pre-Byzantine tradition have been preserved in Georgia until the present day. Interesting data regarding this subject may be found in the German translation of the letter of St. Euthymius Mtatsmindeli answering the questions asked by Tevdore Sabatsmindeli, which was published by Peradze. The letter provides a description of relations inside the Church of Georgia in the 11th century. One of the questions concerns the Liturgy of James the Apostle and the Liturgy of Peter the Apostle. Euthymius believed that the Liturgies could be celebrated but the time of the union with Armenia had come to an end and thus all customs originating from the Armenian Church were wrong. However, references to Armenian literary achievements were made even in the 11th century, which is evident in the writings of George the Hagiorite. Euthymius was one of the first representatives of the Byzantine trend in the Georgian Church. The trend led to the liquidation of the Antioch and Jerusalem traditions in Georgia. Peradze also shed more light on aspects of the Georgian liturgy by publishing his French translation of the Georgian version of the Liturgy of Peter the Apostle.

Peradze published catalogues, for example of Georgian manuscripts in England, pilgrims’ reports on Georgian monasticism in the Holy Land (so-called notes on the book margins in the libraries of Palestine concerning Georgia), and first of all the catalogue of translations of Old Christian literary works into Georgian. Analysing the cult of St. George in Georgia and his links with paganism, Peradze argued with the thesis that the cult of St. George in Georgia was a continuation of the lunar cult, proved that the sun had been worshiped as the main deity in pagan Georgia.

Christianity was introduced in Georgia circa 325 in effect of missions from Cappadocia and Byzantium (Rufinus of Aquileia, Historia Ecclesiastica, Socrates, Gelasius of Cyzicus, and Theodoret of Cyrus). A great role was also played by St. Nino, whose life is one of the oldest monuments of Georgian literature. Christianity was developing very slowly at the beginning, and it was the establishment of monasteries and their pastoral service that accelerated the process. Monasteries, especially their scriptoria, played a great role. Georgian monks were theologians, philosophers and historians. Georgian monasteries fulfilled a very important function beyond their motherland, especially in Palestine as well as in and around Jerusalem (St. Sabbas Monastery near Jerusalem), where the Georgian Lectionary of Jerusalem among other works and liturgical books was written between the 5th and the 8th centuries, which along with the Armenian Lectionary is of key significance to the history of liturgy.

The Lectionary of Jerusalem was discovered by Prof. Kekelidze in two manuscripts in Svaneti. The liturgical ceremonies, pericopes, the calendar of saints and other data comply with the report given by Egeria in Peregrinatio ad loca sancta and with the Palestinian tradition. This document is a pre-Byzantine Georgian liturgical monument. Another important centre was Iviron, a Georgian monastery on Mount Athos, where a school for translators was operating. They translated works not only from Greek into Georgian but also Georgian into Greek. Saint Giorgi even composed poetry in Greek.

The establishment of the monastery of Iviron caused a new orientation in Georgian culture; Byzantium supplanted the influence of Jerusalem, Antioch and the Coptic Church. The Georgian version of the Book of Job, which was copied by Grigol Peradze on Mount Athos from a manuscript written in 978, is very similar to the Coptic version. The Bible, the liturgy, the ecclesiastic law and all other branches of theological knowledge in Georgia from the pre-Iviron epoch were revised. That reform, carried out by Georgians, fathers from the monastery of Iviron, had a major impact on Georgian culture.

Georgian monasteries existed in Constantinople and on the Black Mountain (Kastane monastery) near Antioch. Other important Georgian centres included Olympus in Bithynia, St. Catherine’ s Monastery on the Sinai Peninsula, and later Bachkovo in Bulgaria.

Initially, the Georgian Church was administered from Syria (Georgia was dependent on Antioch until 545) and from neighbouring Armenia. However, when Armenia had adopted Monophysitism, twelve (or, according to some sources, thirteen) new missionaries were sent from Syria to Georgia; their lives, recorded by various authors, were compiled and edited by Catholicos Arsen II (in the 9th century).

The newcomers from Syria reinforced the Georgian Orthodoxy and organised a system of monasteries: John of Zedazeni established the monastery in Mtskheta, David, the monastery in Gareja, Shio, the monastery Shio-Mgvime, Abibos became Bishop of Nekresi, and Ise, Bishop of Tsilkani. However, our knowledge of their lives is very limited. Their lives, written very early by their disciples, unfortunately were lost. Almost all of those, which have been preserved until now originate from the 12th century and are mostly legendary works written by monks on the basis of various sources. Finally, Catholicos Arsen II was recognised as their author because at that time he was the main opponent of the Armenians who held anti-Chalcedon views.

The founders of monastic life in Georgia are referred to in Georgian sources as “The Thirteen Syrian Fathers,” who came from Antioch to Georgia in the second half of the 5th century. Works describing the lives of some of them, albeit in the legendary form and of late origin (written in the 12th century), have been preserved. We have only reports on the lives of John (in the Chronicle by Sabinin), Ise the Bishop of Tsilkani, martyr Saint Abibos of Nekresi, Joseph the Bishop of Alaverdi, Shio of Mgvime, David of Gareja and Anton of Martqopi.

The number “thirteen” raises doubts from the very beginning. “John as the central figure and his twelve disciples are a clear reference to Christ and the twelve apostles. In fact, when one considers the names mentioned in the lives, the number of the fathers increases. The fact that the number of the names grows from thirteen to at least seventeen leads one to a presumption that in this case one deals with two separate lists of Georgian and Syrian fathers. It is quite probable that the Georgians were disciples of the Syrian fathers, and that tradition made them Syrians later.”

According to the Chronicle by Tedo Zhordania, the fathers came to Georgia between 541 and 557, when Armenian Monophysites were raging in Georgia, and the Georgian Church was severely endangered and needed help (the Chronicle by Tedo Zhordania described the situation until 550). Let us now leave aside this chronological aspect and return to the question whether the fathers were Monophysites. After all, the Georgian Church was officially Monophysite in the 6th century. At the end of the 5th century the Georgian Church joined the Armenian Church and condemned the Chalcedonian Church to reject Monophysitsim one hundred years later under the leadership of Patriarch Kirion. When the Syrian monks came to Georgia, the Georgian Church was neutral in the dogmatic disputes, and its attitude towards Chalcedon was neither hostile nor friendly.

Regarding the question why the Syrian fathers had come to Georgia, Kekelidze believed that they had been persecuted as Monophysites and sought shelter in Georgia because Monophysitism was flourishing there at that time. Moreover, they also wanted to reinforce the Georgian Monophysites.

We have just assumed that the fathers came to Georgia not in the 6th, but in the 5th century. However, Monophysites were not persecuted in Syria at that time, and the Georgian Church was not officially Monophysite yet. For this reason, the motive emphasised by Kekelidze must be disregarded. In the texts of the lives various motives for their arrival to Georgia are indicated: for example, by chance (which was the case of David of Gareja), moral motivation such as escape from worldly fame (John) and, finally, religious vocation in two forms, modest to accomplish a mission in the country (Joseph) and in another case elaborate and imaginatively presented (Shio). The case with the reception of the fathers was similar; according to all the lives, the fathers were received with great respect. However, according to the lives of David and John, their arrival in Georgia was unnoticed, and they were even unknown in Mtskheta. Different reasons could be given in their case: a desire to carry out a mission in a country, which has not been converted, and a desire to live in solitude and stay away from people. The two motivations make a good combination when one assumes that those deserted areas chosen by the monks were believed to be the most dangerous to the human soul because many demons lived there. The demons could be expelled through fast and prayer. Holy places, free from the devil and unclean spirit, were to be created in solitude and in the desert.

Our author also raised another problem to be solved: what was the nationality of the fathers? Were they Georgians or Syrians? I have already mentioned that Syrians were the leaders but their disciples could be Georgian. However, due to the lack of sources, such facts should be considered separately.

Kekelidze called into question the Syrian origin of the fathers and presented arguments to support his doubts. Then the fathers became Georgians. They lived in various Syrian monasteries. However, when the Monophysites started persecuting them, they escaped going home, to Georgia. Only David escaped to Jerusalem first. The author backed his theses with the following arguments: Why did the fathers go to Georgia if they were not Georgian? How could John all of a sudden speak Georgian if he was not Georgian? After their arrival in Georgia, they were familiar with Georgian customs and traditions, which would have been absolutely impossible in the case of a stranger. However, these arguments do not provide strong evidence because they fail, to a certain extent, to consider the hagiographic nature of the lives. The works were written by Georgians who lived at least seven centuries later than the fathers. Therefore, quite obviously, the authors automatically attributed contemporary Georgian characteristics to the fathers. The monastic life, as shown in the lives, did not differ much from the life in other Eastern monasteries.

Therefore, the author argues that it would not be an overstatement to assume that all the lives might also refer to, for example, Ethiopian or Coptic hermits, if one simply changed the names of the protagonists or the places. The following quotation from The life of St. Shio also fails to provide strong evidence. “When he visited John, he learnt Georgian in four years, however, he used Greek and Syrian for praying and singing the psalms, because he had learnt those languages also.” If Shio was Syrian, why would the author emphasise so strongly that he “learnt” his own native language? This convinced Kekelidze that Shio was a Georgian. In fact, this is very strange because the author used the word “learnt” in both cases, a word that would not have been used to refer to a native language. However, the same text provides good grounds for asking a counter question: If he was Georgian, why would he have to “learn” that language? The reference to the fact that he used Syrian and Greek for praying and singing the psalms proves that he was not Georgian. Why would he have to use a foreign language in Georgia?

Both languages (Greek and Syrian) were used in monasteries in Syria, and it is not so certain whether the “Syrian Fathers” learnt them after their arrival in Georgia, especially as they were unable in four years to master the difficult Georgian language to be able to preach freely using Georgian liturgical and other prayer books. It is also unclear whether at that time (mid 5th century) all religious texts were already written in Georgian.

Georgian monasticism in its hermitic form could not have been founded by the Syrian fathers because it had already existed in Georgia long before their arrival; the Syrian fathers were rather the founders of the cenobitic life, which is their great and enduring merit.

They were Syrian ascetics and came on a mission in the middle of the 5th century (the authors of the lives of the saints deemed that probable) to Georgia, which was a usual practice in monastic life at that time.

It is impossible to determine their exact number. The lives were probably written by their disciples on the basis of their own experiences. However, unfortunately, they were lost in that early form.

The lives, which we have today, all come from the 12th century. Most of them were written by monks on the basis of various sources to ensure general respect to their monasteries and local saints.

With time, the fathers were chronologically moved from the mid 5th century to the mid 6th century, and the credit for writing down their lives was given to Catholicos Arsen (855–882) because he had the reputation of being the main opponent of the anti-Chalcedon Armenians.

Peradze writes that Eastern monasticism is not generally based on rules and statutory regulations. The most important factor is the personality of the father superior, who becomes a model and whose example is followed as long as he lives. If he is a significant figure, the monastery flourishes and after his death everything either comes to a standstill or lingers on like a boundless plain without peaks. Each great father superior had his own rule (the rule of Saint Basil the Great and referring to Eastern orders as “Basilian” as opposed to Western orders is rather inaccurate). “This had a dual impact on Georgian monasticism; both positive and negative. As a consequence of its lack of understanding of social life and statutory forms (rules); monasticism, quite naturally, had little in common with the Church, whose activity was intrinsically linked with social issues. Unlike Western orders, Georgian monasticism never served the Church voluntarily. We often hear that the great saint monks were forced to accept church duties and perform specific tasks for the Church.” On the other hand, “monasticism preserved its pneumatic-enthusiastic character and thus indirectly contributed to the religious and ecclesiastic life, especially when there was risk of its disintegration as a result of adopting stricter forms. This way monasticism brought dynamism and restlessness to the areas where it had impact.”

The topic of Syrian, Palestinian and Byzantine influences constantly re-emerges in academic discussions. As Peradze marked, Syrian influence originated from Antioch, which was referred to in the language of the Georgian Church as a divine and holy city. St. Simeon the Younger (died in 596) played a great part. Georgians had monasteries on the Black Mountain, in Kalliopios and in Antioch itself. Eastern Georgia was clearly under their influence. Thus the influence on Samtskhe was exerted through St. Simeon. It is difficult to tell anything about St. Simeon as a person. Reports on this saint’ s life appeared as late as the turn of the second period in Georgian monasticism and had little in common with the original (for example, the lives of the thirteen Syrian fathers and of St. Seraphim). A more visible and stronger influence came from Palestine. Again, we have no information about its beginnings; we can only address this epoch when it was flourishing, through its representative St. Grigol of Khandzta (who died in 861). He did not submit totally to the Palestinian influence. Instead he was in the middle of a movement, which attempted to make a synthesis of influence from both Jerusalem and Byzantium. Similarly to St. Simeon in the Syrian period, in this epoch another great anchorite, St. Sabbas, played a prominent role in this epoch. Georgians lived in his monastery. The rule of his monastery was brought to Georgia, where monasteries and temples were built in his honour. The third influence came from Byzantium, which in the Georgian ecclesiastic language is referred to as a second Jerusalem. The best representatives of that period are St. Euphimios and Giorgi the Hagiorite. However, they were not uncritical and they did not take everything from Georgian monasticism; they chose what suited them and what seemed necessary to them. They were guided by their own choice in their activity.

At that time Georgian monasticism became universal. Georgian monasteries were located in all paces of influence (Syria, Palestine, Mount Athos and Constantinople); the monks replaced one another and tried to preserve their national character for the benefit of their common task. Despite those strong influences, Georgian monasticism was not enslaved; it maintained control of the situation and preserved its national character. This was very beneficial to the Georgian monasticism because this reflected the essence of the Georgian Church, and to other nations as well. Moreover, no one could take full power and control over people who simultaneously dealt with influences from three different sources. An additional difficulty resulted from the fact that the monks often travelled and did not reveal their places of stay.

Peradze presents a number of facts showing the internal nature of Georgian monasticism. It was characterised by special preference for anchoritic life. All prominent figures were anchorites. All those who were forced to live coenobitically suffered very much and were constantly looking for an opportunity to escape from that form of life and to live in peace and solitude. I am sure that in that grey, early period in Georgia, lived anchorites who have not been mentioned in historical records because there was little or nothing to mention. Even if they had some social or religious influence within their own circles, they did not contribute anything to the general cultural progress of the country. Monasticism became a cultural and historical power only when coenobitic life prevailed and was regulated to a certain extend by adopting the rules.

However, the rules played a minor role; they were not set for a long term and people did not have to adjust their lives to comply with them because they were temporary. Each abbot could introduce new rules, and all saints took the liberty to do that. Following the presentation of such facts, Peradze attempts to indicate the proper sense of the following conclusions.

“Hermitic life was the most favoured form of monasticism in Georgia. We do not know any representatives of early Georgian monasticism because they spent their entire lives in solitude.

In historical records, the type of anchorite monk, only a little secularised, with some interest and contacts with the world, has been preserved. The monks did not forget about their monastic life and its rules, but they knew that by doing so they considered human weakness.

This unnatural double location between the world and solitude had a very detrimental effect on the development of their personalities. On the one hand, the monks could not reach the highest and the most valued degrees in monastic hierarchy and could not develop their ability to create something original, valuable or mystically speculative. They did not remind people of such saints as St. Sabbas Athanasius of Mount Athos or Simeon, the new theologian. They took rather than gave, were more passive than active.

On the other hand, their passive approach to the world prevented them from developing positive activity. Even though they were asked to do so by the kings, they remained in the purely ethical and individual areas. They were unable to reform the Church structure to consist of a central authority and branches, to convert people to their founder Christ and the Gospel, to develop the concept of national identity among the people in the best meaning of the word, to create Georgian Christianity and thus reveal its historically conditioned way to the Georgian Church.”

In 1928, Peradze made a presentation entitled Zur vorbyzantinischen Liturgie Georgiens at the 5th German Orientalist Conference in Bonn, and later, in 1930, he gave a lecture under the title Die Probleme der georgischen Evangelium Übersetzung during the 6th German Orientalist Conference in Vienna. At that time, Peradze focused his attention on Georgian pre-Byzantine liturgy, which resulted in several classical works on the subject. Traditions of Antioch and Jerusalem were adopted by the Church of Georgia because it had initially been dependent on Antioch. Jerusalem influenced the Georgian liturgy especially via the Georgian monasteries (including of the Holy Cross and the Saviour) and Georgian people living in Palestine.

In 1931, Peradze took holy orders and was ordained a priest at the Greek cathedral in Paris. He established contacts with the Georgian community in Paris, was nominated its first parish priest and was one of the founders of the parish. In the same year, he started the publication of the academic annual named Jvari vazisa, of which he was the editor, at the Georgian parish. In 1933, Metropolitan Dionysius (Waledyński) invited him to Warsaw to work as an assistant professor of patrology and deputy director of the patristic studies seminar at the Centre of Orthodox Theology of the University of Warsaw. In January 1934, Father Peradze was conferred the title of archimandrite at the Greek Orthodox Saint Sophia Cathedral in London. He undertook a number of research trips: in 1935, he was staying in Romania, Greece (Mount Athos and Thessalonica) and Bulgaria. On Mount Athos, he managed to obtain 50 Georgian books and 13 manuscripts, including Apophtegmata Patrum, the works of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and apocryphal lives of the saints. He also found Greek versions of the reports on the martyrdom of the martyr saints Anthony, John and Eustachy of Vilnius. In the National Library in Sofia he found a Georgian text of the Typicon written by Grigol Bakuriani (11th century), a Georgian magnate and founder of the Bachkovo Monastery (in Georgian Petriconi). The monastery was established for Georgians, and its founder wrote its Typicon in Georgian, Greek and Armenian.

In 1936 Peradze took a trip to the Holy Land and Syria, from where he brought, among other works, Georgian palimpsests from the 6th and 7th centuries. He published his memories of that trip in Słowo magazine in 1938. That trip also resulted in a abundant collection of photographs and documents. Peradze continued his patristic research in December 1937 and January 1938 in Italy (Florence, Naples, Venice and Rome) studying the works of Dionysius Areopagite; in the Easter period in 1938 he was working at the National Library in Paris on Apology by Tatian; and in July and August in Austrian libraries (Gratz and Vienna), where he found the Georgian version of the work by St. George the Theologian Dialogue with St. Basil.

Summing up this survey (which is far from complete), I would like to admit that my presentation may have included some gaps and some of its parts may seem insufficient. However, my intention has been to make this presentation accessible to the broadest possible public and to be helpful to teachers and students.

Literature:

Paprocki, Henryk, “L’archimandrite Grigol Peradze (1899–1942)”, Revue des études géorgiennes et caucasiennes, 4 (1988), pp. 198–230.

Peradse, Gregor, “Die Anfänge des Mönchtums in Georgien”, Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, 46 (1927), 1, pp. 34–75.

Peradse, Gregor, “L’activité littéraire des moines géorgiens au monastère d’Iviron au mont Athos”, Revue d’Histoire Ecclésiastique, 23 (1927), No. 3, pp. 530–539.

Peradse, Gregor, “Über das georgischen Mönchtum“, Internationale kirchliche Zeitschrift, 34 (1926), Neue Folge 16, 3 (135), pp. 152–168.

Peradse, Gregor, “Skizzen zur Kulturgeschichte Georgiens. 1. Der Heilige Georg im Leben und in der Frömmigkeit des georgischen Volkes (ein religionsgeschichtlicher Versuch)”, Der Orient, 12 (1930), 2, pp. 45–52; 2. “Das Mönchtum in der orientalischen Kirche”, 3, pp. 85–89; 3. “Das Mönchtum in der georgischen Kirche”, 6, pp. 178–182.

St. Grigol Peradze, Collected Works, Vol. I, History of Monasticism in Georgia, Early History of the Georgian Church, ed. David Kolbaia, Warsaw 2012; Vol. II, About the Pre-Byzantine Georgien Liturgy, Patrologia, Poetry, Sermons, Warsaw 2014.

Św. Grzegorz Peradze, Dzieła zebrane, vol. I, O monastycyzmie gruzińskim, O liturgii gruzińskiej, ed. Henryk Paprocki, Warszawa 2010; vol. II, O patrologii, O historii Kościoła, Warszawa 2012; vol. III, Dzienniki, Kazania, Warszawa 2014; vol. IV, Die alt-christliche Literatur in der georgischen Überlieferung, Warszawa 2015.

From the History of Polish-Georgian Political Relations in 1918–1921
by Marek Mądzik†

Although the Caucasus is far from Poland, ever since the dawn of independent Poland in 1918 the region attracted the attention of Polish politicians, particularly Piłsudski and his entourage. Old associations and connections, e.g. with Georgian social democrats, dating back to the pre-revolutionary period, played a certain role in this. Since the end of the nineteenth century there were also sizeable Polish communities in the Caucasus, particularly in Georgia, which joined actively in politics during World War I and the October Revolution. A significant role was played by Polish organisations which founded the Polish Regional Council in the Caucasus (Polska Rada Okręgowa na Kaukazie) in Tbilisi in mid-1917. The council was the voice of Polish interests in the region. With the Georgian political authorities favourably disposed, in late 1917 and early 1918, the Polish Regional Council also began to form Polish military units, i.e. the Autonomous Polish Caucasian Brigade (Samodzielna Polska Brygada Kaukaska). The Brigade recruitment centre was based in the Georgian capital. The Brigade existed until the summer of 1918, when the Georgian government decided to dissolve it. The Polish soldiers were given the opportunity to go to Poland and the authorities in Tbilisi allotted special funding for this purpose. In the second half of 1918, Tbilisi was the scene of another Polish military venture. In December, a branch of the Polish Military Organisation (Polska Organizacja Wojskowa) was set up there to advertise and recruit volunteers for Gen. Lucjan Żeligowski’ s Fourth Rifle Division being formed in Kuban.

The aim of this article is to present the circumstances which led to the establishment of political relations between Poland and Georgia during the latter’ s period as an independent democratic republic, i.e. in the years 1918–1921. The author has focused primarily on the initiatives of the Polish side, i.e. the activity of the Representative of the Republic of Poland to the Caucasus in Tbilisi between 1918 and 1920 and on the Special Mission of the Republic of Poland to the South Caucasus, sent in the early 1920s, whose task was to establish full political and economic relations and even a possible military alliance with the republics of Transcaucasia. This does not, of course, mean that political relations between Poland and Georgia during the period in question have been presented in an exhaustive manner; such a picture will only emerge once a thorough investigation, inter alia, of materials in the Georgian archives, has been carried out1.

The existence of unofficial relations between the reborn Polish state and independent Georgia dates back approximately to the middle of 1918. After the disintegration of the so-called Transcaucasian Parliament on 26 May 1918, the National Council of Georgia proclaimed the establishment of an independent republic. The Polish authorities, i.e. the Regency Council of the Kingdom of Poland, in existence in Warsaw since the autumn of 1917, decided to establish political contacts with the Georgian government and appointed a trustee, Wacław Ostrowski, who held that position in Tbilisi since August 1918.2 Relatively little is known about Ostrowski himself. He had spent the period from 1914 to 1918 in the Caucasus.3 How did Ostrowski get nominated? It could have been thanks to Dr Władysław Jarecki, president of the Executive Committee of the Council, who returned from Tbilisi to Warsaw in mid-1918 and could have obtained Ostrowski’ s appointment after contacting the Regency Council.4 It seems not to have been a coincidence that a representative of the Regency Council to the Georgian democratic government was appointed in the second half of 1918, as Georgia found itself in the orbit of German influence after an agreement concluded on 28 May.5 The Kingdom of Poland was in a similar situation.

On 1 October 1918, Wacław Ostrowski was appointed the head of the Polish State Representation in the Caucasus, his appointment confirmed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stanisław Głąbiński.6 Eventually the Tbilisi office used the name Representation of the Republic of Poland in the Caucasus. The Representation set up branch offices in a number of cities. Ostrowski appointed Józef Myśliński as vice-consul in Grozny, Rudolf Jurkiewicz as an agent in Batumi, and posted Tadeusz Tydelski7 to Baku. A consular office, headed by Józef Łaszkiewicz, a former sub-prosecutor of the District Court in Yelizavetpol, was also set up. Maria Konopacka,8 a teacher, was one of the officials there. The secretary of the Tbilisi office was Michał Rogóyski. The Representation was sometimes informally referred to as a consulate, although it was not included on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs list of such offices.9

Initially, the Representation’ s main task was to organise an operation to repatriate Polish soldiers who found themselves in the Caucasus during the war and were now demobilized. Ostrowski succeeded in sending several transports to Poland.10 A German mission was also used, especially in the second half of 1918, to obtain individual permission to travel to Romanian ports, including Constanţa, on German ships.11

Ostrowski’ s activity was not limited to the repatriation operation. The Representation’ s main task was to maintain regular contacts with the governments of the Caucasian republics in order to prepare ground for a political rapprochement between Poland and Georgia and Poland and Azerbaijan. Ostrowski’ s efforts met with understanding, especially from the Georgian government. In one of his reports, he wrote that the governments of the Caucasian countries “would like a closer relationship with Poland; Poland allied with Romania, on the one hand, and with Georgia and Azerbaijan on the other, would keep the influence and importance of Russia in check. It has already been a while since Georgia decided to send a representative to Warsaw, but it has been slow to do so for tactical reasons having to do with the Conseil Supreme (the Entente’ s Supreme Council). […] In recent meetings with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gegechkori, and with the Head of State, Mr Dzhordania, I have already seen a visible desire on their part to enter into a closer relationship with our country. In fact it must be said that all the countries of the Caucasus are strongly manifesting their unconditional friendship for Poland.” 12 At the end of December 1919, Ostrowski also discussed the matter with representatives of the Azerbaijani government in Baku. It was agreed that “Azerbaijan’ s relationship with Poland should be as close as possible. It is desirable for all the countries surrounding Russia to maintain contacts in order to form a kind of mutual assistance bloc should any of them be threatened. […] The Azerbaijani Government wishes to send a delegation to Poland in the near future to establish direct contacts and reach concrete mutual decisions.” 13

On his return to the Georgian capital, the head of the Representation held a meeting with Foreign Minister Evgeny Gegechkori, who allegedly stated that “it is highly desirable and even necessary for a delegation from the Georgian government to be sent along with the Azerbaijani one for the sake of the same cause.” 14

According to Ostrowski, a political rapprochement between Poland and the countries of the South Caucasus was also important for the development of mutual industrial and trade relations. In his report on the economic condition of the South Caucasus, he drew attention to the positive prospects that normal trade relations would open up. The South Caucasus was mainly supposed to supply mineral resources, i.e. manganese, copper and agricultural goods, just as it needed finished factory products and agricultural tools. Trade was to be conducted on a rather special basis. At that time, goods could only be exported from Georgia and Azerbaijan on a swap basis or in exchange for foreign currencies (pounds, francs and liras). The raw materials first had to be delivered to a location and only then one could apply for a permit to export them. As it was difficult to obtain loans from local banks, Ostrowski proposed setting up a Polish bank in Tbilisi, which would finance major commercial transactions or provide guarantees. A major banking syndicate, preferably with government guarantees, had to be set up. Perhaps the governments of the Southern Caucasus would establish business contacts with such a syndicate.15 Another aspect was pointed out by Tadeusz Tydelski, a close collaborator of Ostrowski, whom the latter sent to Warsaw in late August 1919.16 In his Note on the establishment of trade relations with the South Caucasus, he wrote, inter alia, that the economic situation was conducive to economic contacts because in terms of currency conditions the Caucasus and Poland were in a similar situation, i.e. they lacked a stable and fixed currency and the money they used had a very low exchange rate. Therefore, when entering into trade relations with Poland, the South Caucasus need not fear being exploited; the opposite is true of trade with countries that have a strong currency.17

For a while, the Representation’ s efforts to establish closer political and economic cooperation with the republics of the South Caucasus evoked little reaction from the leaders of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ostrowski even wrote that “these governments [of the Caucasian republics – M.M.] have been continually ignored by our Ministry of Foreign Affairs. […] While all the Allies contributed more or less to making it easier for the local states to achieve their desired independence, we did absolutely nothing.”18 Ostrowski also suggested that “on the Polish side, too, it is necessary to finally speak up and recognise the real independence of these states,” also because almost all the major powers had already done so. The lack of such a statement from the Polish side “makes an unpleasant impression and makes it look as though there is a different idea in our policy toward the countries that have emerged after the disintegration of Russia.”19

As Ostrowski addressed his comments and suggestions to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, certain changes occurred in Georgia’ s international situation. In September 1919, the independence of the Republic of Georgia was recognised de jure by Argentina. Even after the defeat of Denikin’ s forces, the Entente’ s Supreme Council decided on 12 January 1920 to de facto recognise the independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan, and on 21 January the independence of Armenia. On 7 February, Poland announced that it would follow the Supreme Council in de facto recognising the republics of the South Caucasus.20

However, changes in the treatment of South Caucasian issues had already manifested themselves much earlier in Polish policy, approximately in mid-1919. It is difficult to determine to what extent this was caused by Ostrowski’ s activity and his efforts in Tbilisi. It cannot be ruled out that the interest and growing political activity of the great powers in this area had a greater impact. After the Germans withdrew from Georgia, England sent its troops to the South Caucasus in February 1919. In June, a special British mission led by Olivier Wardrop left for the South Caucasus to safeguard the independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Italian Government followed suit in August by sending a special mission, headed by Colonel Gobba, to Tbilisi. In October, Gen. D.G. Charboard, personal envoy of the U.S. President Thomas W. Wilson, arrived in the capital of Georgia. The Persian government has also delegated a mission. A papal mission led by legate Antioch Delfouche also arrived in Tbilisi. There was also a French military mission in Georgia.21 Rivalry between the powers for political and economic influence in the South Caucasus is very clear.

It is not possible to determine exactly when the Polish government decided to send its own special mission. It left by October 1919 at the latest, one of its tasks being to “[…] to provide an opinion as to whether and to what extent Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have the organisation and vitality to be formally recognised as states by Poland.”22 The duration of the mission was set at six months. It was to be headed by a minister-plenipotentiary, Tytus Filipowicz, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Filipowicz was one of Józef Piłsudski’ s closest associates even before 1918. He became active in the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna) in 1896. Two years later, he left for London, where he started working as a typesetter for Przedświt magazine. During the Russo-Japanese War he accompanied Piłsudski to Japan, and when he returned from Tokyo, he negotiated with representatives of Japan in London. During the 1905–1907 revolution, he opted for the PPS Revolutionary Faction during a split within the party. After the outbreak of World War I in 1914, he joined the First Brigade of the Polish Legions, overseeing the recruitment campaign in Lesser Poland (Małopolska). From November 1918, he worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the government of Prime Minister Jędrzej Moraczewski, he became Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.23 The ministry was headed by Leon Wasilewski at that time, and many positions were filled by people close to Piłsudski. The East Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was headed by Witold Jodko-Narkiewicz and the department responsible for Russia, Finland, Latvia, Ukraine, the Caucasus and Persia within the East Section was headed by Roman Knoll. All of these people, including Filipowicz, shared a hostile attitude toward Russia.24 In December 1918, Filipowicz was dismissed, but remained in the diplomatic service and Piłsudski decided to use him in the mission to the South Caucasus.

The preparations for the Polish Special Mission to the South Caucasus (the official name of the delegation) suffered numerous delays. At the end of 1919, the Mission staff was still being selected. In November, the appointment of Prof. Zygmunt Smogorzewski as counsellor was approved.25 Other candidates being considered included: Jan Sieciński, an officer in the Polish Army, for the position of second officer; Jerzy Jarasz for the position of consul, and Ireneusz Dobrzyński, who had lived in Georgia in 1917 and served in the Georgian army.26 In the end, none of them were selected.

In mid-December 1919, the core staff of the Special Mission was set. Apart from Filipowicz and Smogorzewski, the Mission was composed of Wiktor Białobrzeski (consul) and Władysław de Bondy (secretary). At that time, Filipowicz also made efforts to assign a military staff officer to the Mission, who would act as a military attaché. Filipowicz put forward the following arguments in favour of sending a representative of the Polish Armed Forces to the Caucasus. The mission, passing through Batumi and staying in Tbilisi, Baku and Erzurum, will have dealings with both the local authorities and the military missions of the Entente powers. One of the tasks of the Mission was to draft Polish subjects living in the Caucasus into the Polish army and to regulate the status of the conscripts. It was also planned to regulate the affairs of Poles still serving in the armies of the Transcaucasian countries on the basis of agreements concluded earlier between the Polish Military Committee and the relevant governments.27 Filipowicz’ s efforts enjoyed the support of the Ministry of Military Affairs and the General Staff, and the Minister of the Treasury promised to allocate additional funding for the purpose. However, the military attaché assigned to the Mission never left Poland because the Ministry of the Treasury withdrew its obligation a few days before the planned date of departure.28 The Mission also included Dr Edmund Rappaport, an attaché for emigration matters, and MD Dr Rawicz-Kolasiński. Once the mission had started, Jerzy Kurnatowski, a delegate of the State Office for the Return of Prisoners, Refugees and Workers, was assigned to help organise repatriation from the Caucasus. He was to deliver to Filipowicz the funds allocated for the said purpose.29

The final preparations for the departure of the Mission did not begin until the end of January 1920. At that time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed its diplomatic missions that the members of the Special Mission would be travelling through Romania at the beginning of February, and therefore the mission in Bucharest was asked to notify the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Information was also requested as to which Romanian port had the best passenger ship connection to Batumi directly or via Constantinople.30 But another delay of over a month occurred due to the fact that the Ministry of the Treasury paid out the funds allotted for the Mission in instalments – in January and in the second half of February 1920.31

Finally, the Mission left at the end of February. Filipowicz, accompanied by Władysław de Bondy, Mission secretary, and Wiktor Białobrzeski, consul, left Warsaw. In Bucharest, they were supposed to be met by Prof. Zygmunt Smogorzewski, Dr Edmund Rappaport and Dr Rawicz-Kolasiński, who had left 24 hours earlier, taking with them a freight wagon full of luggage, convoyed by soldiers.32 The diplomats arrived in Bucharest on 3 March, from where after three days (6 March) they continued their journey onward through Sofia and Constantinople.33

The five-month delay in the departure of the Special Mission (originally planned for October 1919) led to a fundamental change in its main objective. The political situation in the South Caucasus had also changed because, as mentioned above, in January 1920 the Entente Supreme Council had de facto recognised the independence of the Transcaucasian republics, and Poland echoed this decision shortly afterwards. Filipowicz’ s instructions were therefore no longer to assess the stability of the political situation, but to convey to the countries of the South Caucasus their de facto recognition by the government of the Republic of Poland.34 While the members of the Special Mission were in the capital of Turkey, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stanisław Patek, confirmed Poland’ s will to recognise the government of Georgia in a special dispatch addressed to Minister Gegechkori. The message, which reached Tbilisi on 24 March 1920, was as follows: “I have the honour of informing you that the Government of Poland is prepared to de facto recognise the Government of Georgia as an independent organisation before the peace conference grants Georgia a status in accordance with the will of its people. The Government of Poland expresses its firm hope that the common interests of the peoples of both countries, as well as mutual sympathy, will be conducive to the establishment of ties of friendly cooperation between Georgia and Poland in the near future. To this end, the Polish government would welcome a representative of Georgia in Warsaw. To manifest its sympathy, the Government of Poland has appointed a special mission, led by Minister Tytus Filipowicz, which should soon leave for Tbilisi to establish direct friendly relations.”35 Even before Filipowicz arrived, to accommodate the Polish proposals, at the end of March 1920 the Georgian side raised the representation of the South Caucasus headed by Sidamon Eristawi36 and operating in Poland since 1919 to the rank of a diplomatic mission.

On 30 March, the members of the Special Mission of the Republic of Poland reached Tbilisi. The following day, a ceremony was held at the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs during which Filipowicz presented the letters of credence. The head of the Polish mission delivered a speech and conveyed greetings from the Polish government. He also stressed the similarities between Georgia’ s and Poland’ s fate and expressed his belief in their successful future as independent states.37 Information about the Mission’ s activities, especially the talks conducted by Filipowicz, is rather scarce. Polish historiography took the view that unlike the missions of other countries, geared towards achieving economic gain, the mission of Filipowicz was of a strictly political nature.38 By sending Filipowicz during the preparations for the Kiev expedition, Piłsudski wanted to establish political and military cooperation with the Caucasian republics, even pulling them into an anti-Soviet alliance.39 During the Polish-Georgian talks, launched in at the beginning of April 1920, a military alliance draft was developed and agreed. The agreement included a plan of operational cooperation and laid out the rules of assistance from Poland in supplying arms and ammunition to the Georgian army. Georgia was to extend this operation to the North Caucasus.40

All of this may even be true, but there are also some doubts. If, in fact, the talks concerned military matters, then why were there no staff officers on the Polish mission? It’ s difficult to conceive how matters such as operational cooperation or problems related to supplying the army with weaponry could have been discussed without the participation of military experts. If Piłsudski really wanted a military alliance, would he allow the Special Mission to depart without a single officer? It is possible that Filipowicz was only supposed to prepare the ground for future political and military cooperation with Georgia.41 In fact, the Head of Mission quickly realised just how much the Mission would have benefited from the presence of military staff. He wrote: “Each of the foreign missions in Tbilisi comprised a couple or even a dozen officers. The mission of the Republic of Poland had none. This not only prevented us from getting a good grasp of the military situation, but even from obtaining the information necessary to provide a minimum of security for the Mission itself.”42

This also had specific consequences for the continued presence of the Special Mission in the Caucasus. Around 10 April 1920, a general Caucasian conference began in Tbilisi with the participation of an Azerbaijani delegation, among others. At the end of the meeting, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Fatali Khan Khoyski invited Filipowicz to talks in Baku. The planned discussions were also going to focus on political and military problems. The idea was to form an alliance similar to that with Georgia. Filipowicz, assured by the Polish diplomatic representative in Baku, W. Krypski, and his future hosts that he could safely travel to Baku, decided to leave on 24 April.43 The minister took Prof. Z. Smogorzewski, secretary W. de Bondy, Dr Rawicz-Kolasiński and L. Sandurski with him. W. Białobrzeski and E. Rappaport stayed behind in Tbilisi. A few days later, the situation took a dramatic turn. On the night of 27 to 28 April, a Bolshevik coup was staged in Baku and the Red Army entered the city. On 28 April, the members of the Special Mission were imprisoned and after a few days the local authorities handed them over to the Extraordinary Commission (Cheka) of the 11th Soviet Army.44 The Georgian and Armenian missions, the French and English consuls, as well as members of the English military mission were also imprisoned at the same time.

The Georgian and Armenian diplomatic missions were released in May and June 1920, the French consul was released in July, and the English were released in October. The members of the Polish Special Mission remained in Baku until 6 August. They were subsequently sent to Moscow with the exception of Professor Smogorzewski, who was seriously ill, and the courier Sandurski. Filipowicz, Bondy and Rawicz-Kolasiński were first detained in the Cheka Central Prison, and transferred to Butyrka prison after 12 October. In December 1920, Filipowicz was released and left for Riga, while the other members of the Mission remained in prison.45

As mentioned above, the consul W. Białobrzeski and E. Rappaport had stayed behind in the Georgian capital. They were soon joined by J. Kurnatowski. In such small numbers, the Special Mission continued its operations in Tbilisi, perhaps dealing mainly with issues related to the repatriation of Poles. This went on until the beginning of December 1920. At that point, on 6 December, the funds left by Filipowicz having become exhausted and the period for which the Mission was sent having expired, the remaining members of the Mission left Tbilisi for Poland via Batumi.46

The arrest and imprisonment of the members of the Polish Special Mission under Filipowicz was a significant reason for the failure of Polish political and military operations in the South Caucasus. However, it did not mean a break in relations, especially with Georgia. On 29 January 1921, three days after the de jure recognition of the Republic of Georgia by the Entente Supreme Council,47 the Polish government recognised the country’ s independence.48 At the beginning of 1921, there were also plans to send Roman Knoll, as a Polish MP, and Maj. Wacław Jędrzejewicz, as a military attaché,49 to the Caucasus, in keeping with the provisions of the military agreement and alliance. The mission was ultimately aborted since in February 1921 Tbilisi was overrun by the Red Army, and in March the government of independent Georgia emigrated from the country.

Even then, however, Poland maintained its political and military relations with Georgia. It did not recognise the Bolshevik coup in Georgia in the Treaty of Riga concluded with Soviet Russia and maintained contacts with the Georgian government-in-exile. In the autumn of 1921, Col Bobicki, the Polish military attaché in Constantinople, established contact with the Georgians. He discussed conditions of military and political cooperation with the Minister of Internal Affairs, N. Ramishvili, and the Head of the Georgian Central Staff, General A. Zachariadze. It was agreed, among other things, that Georgian officers would be accepted into the Polish Army on the basis of individual contracts. In 1922, 42 officers and 48 cadets were accepted into the army on the basis of individual contracts.50 In March 1922, one of the representatives of the Georgian government-in-exile tried to interest the Second Division of the Polish General Staff in the design of an anti-Soviet uprising in the Caucasus and the provision of arms and ammunition by Poland. The weapons were to be delivered to one of the Romanian ports, from where the Georgians would transport the cargo to ports on the east coast of the Black Sea (Poti or Batumi). Although the Polish staff doubted the political and organizational potential of the anti-Soviet uprising, just in case the Polish institutions in Bucharest were instructed to assess the conditions of transporting arms from Poland to Romania and to sound the attitude of the Romanian authorities.51

The Second Division of the Polish Army General Staff was staunchly opposed to recognising the Soviet Union as a federal state. This matter came to the fore in the summer of 1923, when an official note regarding the establishment of the USSR52 was forwarded to Poland on 23 July, and when the Polish Foreign Minister, Marian Seyda, presented the Soviet note to the Council of Ministers on 8 August with a motion for its adoption.53 The Second Division expressed its position in a document dated 27 August 1923. It stated, among other things, that recognising the USSR, and thus extending the Treaty of Riga onto Soviet Georgia, would seriously alter the terms of Polish-Caucasian relations from the viewpoint of military interests. These consisted in creating a military-diversion and intelligence base against Soviet Russia in the Caucasus and training instructors for the future Georgian army. Military relations were important not only for Poland’ s military interests, but also for maintaining “nationwide influence in the Caucasus as a tool of Polish policy.” Hence, it was stressed that “a change of Poland’ s legal status vis-a-vis Georgia [was] therefore undesirable from the viewpoint of Poland’ s military interests. That is because, without obtaining any benefits, a pure connection to an independent Georgia is being lost […], while at the same time it is becoming more difficult to continue military work which has already produced positive results. Among the many elements that make up a country’ s foreign policy, military interests are one of the important factors.”54

Unfortunately, the opinion of politicians prevailed and Poland ultimately recognised the USSR, thus also Georgia’ s accession to it, on 13 December 1923.55 However, this caused violent protests in Polish society at large and in the Polish parliament.56

1 The author undertakes a broader discussion of the subject in Działalność społeczno-kulturalna i polityczna Polaków w Gruzji na przełomie XIX i XX wieku, Lublin 1987 (especially chapter 5).

2 Archive of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Aleksander Lednicki’ s papers, 16, Polish Regional Council in the Caucasus to A. Lednicki (undated), 1. 19–19 v.

3 The last management of the Polish Regional Council which dissolved itself at the end of January (27) 1919 after the decision to terminate its mandate (28 October 1918), consisted of: chairman – engineer Tadeusz Tydelski; deputy chairman – Edward Nahrebecki; secretary – Michał Rogóyski; and Walerian Wiłkomirski, Antoni Bełszyński, Wacław Ostrowski and Erazm Jasieński. Central Military Archive (hereinafter: CAW) testimonies, 400.2500, protocol on Polish independence, social and military efforts in the Caucasus, appendix no. 2, p. 3.

4 It does not seem possible, as S. Mikulicz claims, that Ostrowski had already been nominated in 1917, moreover already as Chairman of the Polish Regional Council in the Caucasus. At that time, i.e. in 1917, his name did not even appear among those on the Council. S. Mikulicz, Prometeizm w polityce II Rzeczypospolitej, Warszawa 1971, p. 152. This version was reiterated in the article by W. Materski, “Gruzja i wielkie mocarstwa (1919–1921)”, Studia z Dziejów ZSRR i Europy Środkowej, 25 (1990), p. 77.

5 Detailed information on the causes and benefits that Georgia achieved by associating itself with Germany in 1918 is provided by W. Materski in his article “Gruzja i mocarstwa 1917–1921. Część I: 1917–1918”, Studia z Dziejów ZSRR i Europy Środkowej, 23 (1988), pp. 81–116.

6 Współdziałanie rządu polskiego z emigracyjnymi organizacjami antyradzieckimi w latach 1918–1938, ed. S. Wroński, [In:] Z dziejów stosunków polsko-radzieckich. Studia i materiały, vol. III, Warszawa 1968, p. 266.

7 J. Reychman, Kaukaz, [In:] Polska i Polacy w cywilizacjach świata. Słownik encyklopedyczny, ed. W. Pobóg-Malinowski, vol. 1, book 4, Warszawa 1939, p. 273.

8 Archive of New Records in Warsaw (hereinafter AAN), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter MSZ), 12674, Personnel exchange between Poland and the USSR within the framework of repatriation, pp. 216, 218.

9 AAN, MSZ, 11693, List of consulates of the Republic of Poland, as of November 1920.

10 Library of the Main School of Planning and Statistics in Warsaw (hereinafter BSGPIS), Tytus Filipowicz’ s papers, box LXV, file 3, Representation of the Republic of Poland to the Caucasus to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, 22 February 1920 (copy).

11 Bor’ba, 1918, No. 83 from 2 July and No. 90 from 11 July.

12 BSGPIS, T. Filipowicz’ s papers, Box LXV, file 3, Ostrowski to MSZ, 8 December 1919.

13 Ibid., Ostrowski to MSZ, 19 January 1920.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid., Ostrowski to MSZ, 2 February 1920.

16 Ibid., Ostrowski to MSZ, 22 February 1920. After the departure of Tydelski, Ostrowski appointed Wiktor Krypski the diplomatic representative in Baku. Ibid., Box LXV, file 1 (loose handwritten page entitled Kopie listów do MSZ).

17 Ibid., Note… was drafted on 15 December 1919 in Warsaw.

18 Ibid., Box LXV, file 3, Ostrowski to MSZ, 22 February 1920.

19 Ibid.

20 W. Materski, Gruzja i wielkie mocarstwa (1919–1921), pp. 70, 73 and 76.

21 Ibid., pp. 65–70.

22 BSGPIS, T. Filipowicz’ s papers, Box LXV, file 2, T. Filipowicz’ s report for MSZ dated 27 December 1920 (copy).

23 T. Filipowicz’ s bio in: Słownik biograficzny działaczy polskiego ruchu robotniczego, vol. 2 (E–J), Warszawa 1987, pp. 101–103.

24 See A. Juzwenko, Polska a „biała” Rosja, Wrocław 1973, p. 19.

25 BSGPIS, T. Filipowicz’ s papers, Box LXV, file 4, note from 22 November 1919.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., Box LXV, file 1, T. Filipowicz’ s letter dated 17 December 1919.

28 Ibid., Box LXV, file 2, T. Filipowicz’ s report dated 27 December 1920.

29 See M. Mądzik, Działalność społeczno-kulturalna, pp. 166–167.

30 AAN, Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Bucharest, 470, MSZ to the Mission in Bucharest, 23 January 1920, l. 3.

31 BSGPIS, T. Filipowicz’ s papers, Box LXV, file 2, T. Filipowicz’ s report dated 27 December 1920. The Mission’ s budget, approved by the Ministry of the Treasury for a period of six months in the amount of over 1,793,000 tsarist roubles was only sent to Filipowicz at the end of January, ibid., MSZ to the Special Mission of the Republic of Poland in Tbilisi, 23 January 1920.

32 Ibid., Box LXV, file 4, notes on a loose, undated piece of paper, jotted by T. Filipowicz. The convoy was made up of five soldiers: Cpl Leon Idukowski and privates Władysław Bugała, Michał Jadczak, Marcin Jarkuła and Leon Sandurski. AAN, Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Bucharest, 470, List of members of the Special Mission of the Republic of Poland to the South Caucasus, l. 10–13.

33 Ibid., Mission in Bucharest to the Mission in Sofia, 3 and 6 March 1920, l. 5–6.

34 BSGPIS, T. Filipowicz’ s papers, Box LXV, file 2, T. Filipowicz’ s report from 27 December 1920.

35 Cited after: W. Materski, Gruzja i wielkie mocarstwa (1919–1921), p. 76.

36 Ibid., p. 37.

37 Bor’ba, No. 77, 4 IV 1920.

38 See: W. Materski, Gruzja i wielkie mocarstwa (1919–1921), p. 77.

39 See: J. Lewandowski, Imperializm słabości. Kształtowanie się polityki wschodniej piłsudczyków 1921–26, Warszawa 1967, p. 136; S. Mikulicz, Prometeizm w polityce II Rzeczypospolitej, Warszawa 1971, p. 152.

40 “Współdziałanie Rządu Polskiego”, p. 266.

41 It will be possible to elucidate this matter only once materials in the Georgian archives have been examined.

42 BSGPIS, T. Filipowicz’ s papers, Box LXV, file 2, T. Filipowicz’ s report from 27 December 1920.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., Memorandum drafted in Batumi, 8 December 1920.

47 W. Materski, Gruzja i wielkie mocarstwa (1919–1921), p. 89.

48 S. Mikulicz, Prometeizm, p. 153.

49 „Współdziałanie Rządu Polskiego”, p. 267.

50 Ibid., p. 271.

51 S. Mikulicz, Prometeizm, p. 155.

52 Dokumenty i materiały do historii stosunków polsko-radzieckich, vol. IV, April 1921–May 1926, Warszawa 1965, doc. 169, pp. 254–255.

53 See W. Materski, Polska a ZSRR 1923–1924. Stosunki wzajemne na tle sytuacji politycznej w Europie, Wrocław 1981, p. 83.

54 AAN, MSZ, 6743, Aide memoire and the issue of the recognition of Soviet Georgia by Poland, pp. 98–99.

55 For the text of the Polish note, see Dokumenty i materiały, vol. IV, doc. 184, pp. 273–274.

56 „Współdziałanie Rządu Polskiego”, p. 267.

Under the Menace of the “White” Russia…: The First Diplomatic Encounters between the Independent States of Georgia and Poland in 1918 and 1919
by Beka Kobakhidze

The collapse of the Tsarist Russia amidst the World War brought political havoc in the surroundings of the Empire. But it was Poland who knew well enough what was she aspiring to. Poland enjoyed greater political autonomy in the Russian Empire than any other “smaller nationality”; hence the country’ s elites met turbulent times with better preparedness. Poland was the only part of the former empire whose independence was recognised by the new provisional government of Russia in 1917.

Simultaneously Georgia together with its neighbouring peoples of Armenia and Azerbaijan was challenged by a possible Ottoman offensive and various internal problems, thus needed to remain loyal to the cause of democratic Russia.

The Bolshevik coup and death of the Russian democracy led the Caucasus to secession. First Georgia formed a Diet with its neighbours and then declared her own independence on 26 May 1918.

The First World War ended and the Victorious Powers gathered in Paris for a Conference to draft a new world map and shape a new world order. But continuous civil war in Russia between the Reds (Bolsheviks) and Whites (Tsarist generals), uncertainty in relations between the “neighbouring states” and former capital cities, boundary disputes, and the possible spread of Bolshevism prevented peace on the territories of the former Russian Empire. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George stated with regard to this: “It would be manifestly absurd for those who are responsible for bringing about the Peace Conference, to come to any agreement and leave Paris when one-half of Europe and one-half of Asia is still in flames.”1

The Allies feared the spread of Bolshevism in their own countries; they wanted Russia to pay foreign debts accumulated by the Tsarist regime and to have respect for foreign investments made in Russia by Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States. None of these terms were treated amicably by the Soviet government. The Bolsheviks outlined that the debts were accumulated by the Tsarist regime, but not by the Russian people and all the wealth in the country belonged to the people, thus the Bolsheviks nationalised all private property. But most dangerously, the Soviets in the future could have allied themselves with revanchist Germany. Henceforth the Allies gave strong support in the civil war to the Volunteer Armies of the Tsarist Generals. They sent substantial supplies of arms and munitions, troops to the White generals, and assisted them militarily and economically. In return Admiral Kolchak of the Siberian and Far East Armies and the supreme commander of all anti-Bolshevik forces, General Denikin of South Russia and General Yudenich of North-Western Russia made it clear to the Victorious Powers that their intention was to topple the Bolshevik regime, hold Constituent Assembly elections and to be loyal to the Russian national obligations towards the Allied countries. But neither Whites nor Reds would accept secession of the bordering nationalities.2

With this regard, again, Poland was an exceptional case, the Whites were unable to change the course of action taken by the provisional government and maintained recognition of Polish independence. The Allies too specifically favoured the case of Poland. At the end of 1918 the American peace delegation recommended to the US President: “1. It is recommended that encouragement be given, at opportune times, to the reunion with Russia of those border regions of the south and west, which have broken away and set up their own national governments… 2. It is recommended that there be excepted from general application of the principle the above mentioned Finland, Poland, the Armenians of Transcaucasia and probably Lithuania.”3 This position was reaffirmed by the US State Secretary Bainbridge Colby in his letter to the Italian Ambassador in August 1920.4

Georgian diplomats were dissatisfied with the Allied stance. In November 1918 Former Foreign Minister Akaki Chkhenkeli wrote to Georgian diplomatic envoy to Great Britain – David Ghambashidze: “Georgia is a notable case in the whole of Russia. She founded her statehood, prevailed over the Bolshevism, sustained gains of the revolution etc. If the same was done in Finland and Poland through the good offices of others, we did it all ourselves.”5 The Georgian delegation in Paris wrote to the British delegation: “As are Poland, Finland and Bessarabia, Georgia also is a separate case from Russia…”6 On 15 August 1920 the Georgian Foreign Minister Evgeni Gegechkori formally submitted a note of protest to the Allied Supreme Council where he inquired what was the legal basis of different attitudes of the Victorious Powers on the one hand to Georgia, and to Poland, Finland and Armenia on the other.7

Georgia as a smaller country was not important enough to have explanations from the Great Powers. In fact the Allies were seeing matters of the bordering nationalities in the light of Russian civil war. They were carefully observing whether the Volunteers would succeed. Georgia’ s existence was fully dependent on the support of the political west, because it was obvious that after the end of the civil war either the Russian Whites or the Reds would assault neighbouring states in an attempt to regain lost imperial boundaries. Poland too was dependent on the Allies but her independence was a recognised case, she just wanted to register her eastern frontier with Russia. A strong Polish state between Russia and Germany that could prevent an alliance between the two was crucial for the Allies, especially for France. For her safety and boundary settlement Poland preferred to have a weaker rather than a stronger Russia as a neighbour. Providing this Poland could have been a natural ally of Georgia from the very beginning, but the former had to keep her foreign policy in full compliance with the Allies. Georgia on the other hand was trying to upgrade her status in international relations and to push forward her case alongside with Poland, the Baltic States etc. while keeping a very limited partnership with the “internal provinces”of Russia (Kuban, Belarus etc.).

The first high level diplomatic contact between the independent states of Georgia and Poland was registered on 27 November 1918 when Akaki Chkhenkeli, then residing in Berlin, sent a diplomatic notification to the Polish Minister Plenipotentiary in Germany, Seweryn Czetwertyński. The Georgian minister described the legal rights of his country to independence, submitted a memorandum and called on Poland to recognise her independence. “Counting on the sympathies of the people and government of Poland, the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia believes that Poland will accord a formal recognition…”8 It was a turbulent time, the World War was just over and Poland herself was looking for allies among the victors, hence she was unable to give any response to Georgia. Time passed and on 17 September 1919 the Georgian delegates in Paris Karlo Chkheidze, Irakli Tsereteli and Varlam Cherkezishvili were invited on a formal dinner by the head of the Polish delegation, Roman Dmowski. The Polish host inquired of his Georgian colleagues how could his country help Georgia? He said that future of smaller nationalities would be clarified through the mandate system and Poland needed some formal ground to push forward the case of Georgia, thus hinting a possible Polish mandate. The Georgians doubted how could Poland handle the mandate, Poland was fully dependent on the Allies and her commitments towards Georgia could possibly be harmful for both countries. The argument was accepted by the Polish diplomats. Then Tsereteli stated that both countries had the same enemy and security challenges, hence it would have been understandable for everyone if the Polish diplomats did not spare their good offices to the Georgians in mediation with the Allied decision maker politicians: informational support, lobbying for the Georgian case where appropriate, reacting on diplomatic notifications etc. Dmowski committed himself to do so and asked for the copies of the Georgian Memorandum in order to present it personally to the Allied decision makers.9 The head of the Georgian delegation, Karlo Chkheidze, in his letter to the Prime-Minister Noe Zhordania quoted Dmowski as saying: “We are just witnesses at this conference, we must do what we are told to do, but with whatever power is in our hands we shall be supporting Georgian people.”10

In April and May of 1919 Admiral Kolchak commenced his main assault against the Bolsheviks. From Siberia his troops crossed the Ural Mountains and it was thought that nothing could stop them taking Moscow. The Allies did not trust him, because when he would be in Moscow he could restore the old regime, suppress democracy, disregard rights of so called bordering nationalities and be disloyal to the Russian national obligations. Hence the Allies thought it would be wiser to reaffirm Kolchak’ s commitments before he was granted the success of being a dictator in Moscow. The secretary of Lloyd George, Philip Kerr was instructed to draft a letter to Kolchak. It comprised six points. For the bordering nationalities, the fourth and fifths points were crucial:

“Fourthly, that the independence of Finland and Poland be recognized, and that in the event of the frontiers and other relations between Russia and these countries not being settled by agreement, they will be referred to the arbitration to the League of Nations.

Fifthly, that if a solution of the relations Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Caucasian and Transcaspian territories and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement the settlement will be made in consultation and cooperation with the League of Nations, and that until such settlement is made the Government of Russia agrees to recognize these territories as autonomous and to confirm the relations, which may exist between their de facto Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments.”11

On 4 June Admiral Kolchak replied to the Allied Supreme Council:

“Considering the creation of a unified Polish State to be one of the chief of the normal and just consequences of the world war, the Government thinks itself justified in confirming the independence of Poland, proclaimed by the Provisional Russian Government 1917, all the pledges and decrees of which we have accepted. The final solution of the question of delimiting the frontiers between Russia and Poland must, however, in conformity with the principles set forth above, be postponed till the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. We are disposed at once to recognize the de facto Government of Finland, but the final solution of the Finnish question must belong to the Constituent Assembly.

We are fully disposed at once to prepare for the solution of the questions concerning the fate of the national groups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and of the Caucasian and Transcaspian countries, and we have every reason to believe that a prompt settlement will be made, seeing that the government is assuring as from the present time, the autonomy of various nationalities. It goes without saying that the limits and conditions of these autonomous institutions will be settled separately as regards each of the nationalities concerned.

And even in case difficulties should arise in regard to the solution of these various questions, the Government is ready to have recourse to the collaboration and good offices of the League of Nations with a view to arriving at a satisfactory settlement.”12

Admiral Kolchak complied with all the conditions set forth by the Allies with the exception of Finnish independence. The victors were happy to see the collaborative tone of the Whites and sent a letter of support and gratitude undersigned by Lloyd George, President Woodrow Wilson, Prime-Minister Georges Clemenceau and Prime-Minister Vittorio Orlando.13

The exchange of letters and courtesy left both, partisans of “the united and indivisible Russia” and representatives of the bordering nationalities unhappy. Here their maximalist claims were not considered. Former Tsarist Foreign Minister and one of the leaders of Soveshchanie14 Sergey Sazonoff was disquieted because of the recognition of Poland and the formal intervention of the Allies in relations between Russia and the “smaller nationalities.” This feeling was further exacerbated because the Victorious Powers refused to grant even de facto recognition to Kolchak’ s government.15

The exchange of letters reaffirmed the very special status of Poland, but her eastern boundary case of the Galician region was still of great concern and in the future it could have led to tensions with Russia.

The Georgians were jolted. It was clear that only Polish and Finish independence was in the plans of the Allies. Moreover, even the autonomous status of Georgia was discouraged by placing it under the label of “Caucasian territories,” which put the country far behind the Baltic States. Kolchak refused to recognise the independence of Finland and the Allies counted this noncompliance as such a minor thing in comparison with the bigger question of Russia that in their next letter they did not even mention this country. In these circumstances what could have been the future of “the Caucasian territories”? According to Kolchak, “the limits and conditions of these autonomous institutions will be settled separately as regards each of the nationalities concerned.” Subordination of the nationalities was vividly displayed in the correspondence and it gave no hope to the Georgians. Moreover, Kolchak while being still in Omsk refused to recognise Finland and what could he have done to Georgia were it in power of centralised Russia?

The situation deteriorated further in June. At the beginning of 1919 the British put a precondition to Denikin that he was not supposed to occupy the Caucasian Republics including the Mountaineers Republic of North Caucasus, otherwise he would be deprived of the British material support. In February the Volunteers ignored the British demand and intervened not only in the western and central flanks of the North Caucasus, but also occupied the territories of Georgia from Sochi to the River Bzipi. The protest of His Majesty’ s Government and that of the Georgians were in vain. On 6 June the British sent a new ultimatum to Denikin, thus putting Dagestan, Azerbaijan and Georgia out of his area of operations. The Russian general once again ignored the ultimatum and occupied Dagestan. Great Britain had to amend the demarcation line for already the third time and “ceded” Dagestan to the Volunteers. Denikin himself was assuring the British that he would not go any further, but now the corridor was open to him to march to Transcaucasia through the lowlands of Dagestan and Azerbaijan or via the Caspian Sea. Having bitter memories of Denikin’ s “commitments”, Georgia and Azerbaijan could no longer rely on his verbal assurances.16

The increased Russian menace to Transcaucasia accompanied by the Allied correspondence with Kolchak had a panicking effect not only on the Georgians and Azerbaijanis, but on nearly all of the bordering nationalities. It triggered cohesion. They realised that the Russian success might have a domino effect, and that they could be swallowed one by one. Georgia and Azerbaijan signed a defence treaty on 16 June. Diplomatic missions of the two countries were joined by the envoys of the North Caucasus and they established in a joint council Paris. Together they were “bombarding” the Allied Supreme Council with notes of protests. On the note of 17 June the Estonian, Latvian, Belarusian and Ukrainian delegations put their signatures together with their Caucasian colleagues.17

But the culmination of solidarity came on the 26 June. Besides the delegates of Estonia, Latvia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and North Caucasus, the document was also signed by the representative of the Lithuanian Poles Bronisław Krzyżanowski. The delegation of the Polish Republic wrote a special note below the diplomatic dispatch: “The Polish signatories of this document are conscious of the fact that the independence of the Polish State, recognised by all the Powers, established in advance the severing of all the ties that bound one part of Poland to the former Russian State; they desire to manifest by their signatures that solidarity exists today as in the past among all the nations subjugated to Former Russia, in their struggle for independence.” The Polish signatories were: Former Minister of Culture and then delegate in Paris Medard Downarowicz, Former Minister of Interior and then delegate in Paris Stanisław Thugutt, member of the Polish Sejm and leader of the Polish Socialist Party Dr Herman Lieberman, member of the Polish Sejm Jerzy Kantor, former Foreign Minister and then delegate in Paris Leon Wasilewski, and Professor of University of Warsaw Antoni Sujkowski.

The document contains important messages; hence probably it should be cited in a substantial manner:

“…Now the occupation of the Ciscaucasian Republic by the troops of General Denikin and the threatening attitude of these troops towards the Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan seem on the contrary to be inspired by an avowed plan of the Russian reactionaries, who wish to bring back under their yoke the independent national states newly formed within the limits of the former Russian Empire; these reactionaries are trying to present to the Peace Conference a fait accompli by the military occupation of these states.

The inevitable consequence of such a plan would be to destroy the order in these new states…

The undersigned delegates emphasise the fact that General Denikin is accomplishing this fatal work with the military and financial assistance of the Allied Powers, who cannot nevertheless be desirous of destroying order in these states or of depriving these nations of their right to self-determination.

All the delegates of the states within the confines of Russia are unanimous in protesting against this intervention, along with the delegates of Georgia, of Azerbaijan and the Republic of North Caucasus, and with all the delegates of the states of the Caucasus. They insist on thus showing that they have a clear consciousness of the solidarity that unites all the nations within the confines of Russia, so that each one of them feels any threat directed against the independence of another as strongly as if it were directed against its own independence. They proclaim that in view of a sincere application of the right of self-determination it is necessary to maintain the territorial integrity of the states at present existing in the Caucasus, while waiting for the establishment of a definitive regime which will be instituted, not by the Russian Constituent Assembly, but by the Peace Congress, acting according to the will of the populations, expressed by the national assemblies of the new states. Consequently, the undersigned delegates bring their protests to the knowledge of the Allied and Associated Powers. They request them to put an end at once to the aggressive moves of General Denikin against the Republic of Georgia and Azerbaijan, and to make him evacuate the occupied territory of the Georgian Republic. They request them to take all necessary measures to oblige General Denikin to observe strictly all the rules of international justice.”18

On 10 July the British Peace Delegation informed their Georgian counterparts that their militaries did all in their power to deescalate relations between Georgia and Denikin in the Black Sea littoral and there was a good reason to believe that the Volunteers did not have offensive plans regarding Georgia, but rather towards the Bolsheviks.19

Forthcoming events proved that the fears were slightly exaggerated. The April–May success of Kolchak was the last for him. From the summer the Bolsheviks concentrated troops against him, thus the White admiral first had to halt, and then reverse and he finally declined and collapsed at the end of 1919. Shortly after that he was arrested and executed. When Kolchak’ s nearly half a million army was pursued by the Bolsheviks, Denikin was preparing his decisive march towards Moscow. In fact, Denikin did not have enough time and manpower to undertake offensives against the Bolsheviks and bordering states simultaneously, thus the surroundings of Russia were spared from his aggressive manoeuvres for the moment. Bordering states were fearfully awaiting the end of the Civil War, because they knew that Russia White or Red would inevitably challenge their independence using all of its military might.

Appendix I

Minutes of the Georgian Peace Delegation Meeting in Paris

9 September 1919

Present:

Karlo Chkheidze as Chairman; and Varlam Cherkezishvili, Zurab Avalishvili, Mikheil Sumbatashvili, Irakli Tsereteli, Ioseb Gobechia, and Eter Tsereteli as Secretary

(...) 6. I. Gobechia20 – Delivers the news to the delegation that a certain Polish man, who is working as an adviser for the Azerbaijani delegation, asked the Polish delegation to intervene in the relations between Azerbaijan and Denikin or, alternatively, he asked for a meeting with Dmowski. He was asked by the Poles whether Georgia was also willing to have a Polish intervention in the relations with Denikin or not? In the end, this person received a letter from Dmowski that he was ready to meet them with great pleasure. That certain Polish man does not want the Azerbaijani delegation to go to the meeting alone. He suggests having the Georgian and Azerbaijani representatives together with Dmowski.

The delegation made a decision to go for this meeting; moreover, it was discussed even before meeting the representatives of Poland.

It was decided that the Chairman and Zurab Avalishvili would go to Dmowski together with the Azerbaijani delegates. (...)

Appendix II

Minutes of the Georgian Peace Delegation Meeting in Paris

17 September 1919

Present:

Karlo Chkheidze as Chairman; Varlam Cherkezishvili, Zurab Avalishvili, Irakli Tsereteli, Ioseb Gobechia and Eter Tsereteli as Secretary

1. Irakli Tsereteli21 – The chairman, V. Cherkezishvili and I visited Dmowski for lunch. Our meeting did not have an official character, but rather was a meeting of ordinary acquaintances. After the lunch Dmowski offered a topic for discussion: how could Poland possibly use her status of a formally recognised state to be of assistance to Georgia.

He started from the following: the conference decides everything in the light of pragmatic interests, only from that angle do they approach the situation of the smaller nationalities and in the future they only expect economic profits from the independence of these smaller states. These economic profits will be legalised in the form of mandates. Every Great Power will possess several mandates and only on this basis can they support smaller states. Poland needs some formal argument to push forward the question of Georgia at the conference.

From here we concluded that Dmowski wanted the mandate over Georgia to be given to Poland, but he did not say it straightforwardly and he only proposed signing an economic convention. He said this formal excuse will enable Poland to be of use to Georgia. But we all knew and one could also conclude from his speech that Poland is unable to do much for us, because she is only a member of that group, which surrounds the four Great Powers, and [Poland] decides nothing, but only undersigns decisions made by the “Council of Four.” We told him that he himself was saying that the fate of Poland was dependent on the Great Powers and that they are assisting smaller states only if they are expecting economic profits from these smaller countries. Considering this, if Georgia signs the economic convention with you, what she will have left to offer to the Great Powers? This might harm Georgia and will also not be very advantageous to Poland. He appreciated the importance of this argument and gave his consent.

Then we gave him a proposal: let us admit the truth of what the reality is. Poland and Georgia are facing the same threat from the Russian reactionary circles, which very reluctantly accepted Polish independence and are not going to accept Georgian independence. Hence, it should be easily understandable for everyone that on this ground Poland will give support to Georgia. In practice you can express this support by telling us the details of the conference proceedings, namely the state of affairs of the Russian questions; matters related to the smaller states etc. and in your capacity support the activation of our case, support our notification and pleas.

Dmowski promised to do all these things and he asked them give him a Georgian Memorandum so that he can present it personally to the leaders of the conference.

By the way, he confirmed what we were actually thinking that the Great Powers have not come to any decision related to the aforementioned topics, the future is unclear for them and they entrust the solution of these issues to the natural flow of life. Those smaller states will survive and will be recognised if they do not die and survive this transitional phase. Concerning the Allied policy towards Russia, Dmowski thinks that it is also possible that everything will change if Denikin does not secure a victory some time shortly, the Bolsheviks might be recognised first by the British and then by the others. He also told us that he will support us, but will never take anti-Russian steps. We replied that our support is possible exactly in the same way, because we do not have an anti-Russian policy; moreover, we still have deep sympathies for the Russian people and we think that the defeat of Denikin’ s policy in every respect will be of great advantage to Russia itself. By the way, another argument why he should be defeated is that for Russia it is far easier to overcome the current crisis by the creation of the Russian state within the national22 boundaries. (...)

Appendix III

Private Letter of the Head of the Georgian Peace Delegation in Paris – Karlo Chkheidze to the Prime-Minister of Georgia – Noe Zhordania23, 20 September 1920. From Paris to Tbilisi

(...) Several days ago we met the Polish representatives and specifically Dmowski. They passed information to us that Poland is willing to give some help to Georgia. We went to the meeting with a great interest. Dmowski told us that Poland could take a mandate over Georgia. We refused it because we are still in the state of affairs that the Great Powers have not clarified our fate. But it does not prevent us from having economic ties with Poland. With regard of the political relations: we expect support from Poland, because strengthening our independence is also in the national interests of Poland. Dmowski told us: “We are just witnesses at this conference; we must do what we are told to do, but with whatever power is in our hands we shall support the Georgian people.” (...)

Appendix IV

Formal Notification of the Georgian Foreign Minister Akaki Chkhenkeli to the Polish Minister Plenipotentiary Berlin, 27 November 1918

Berlin, 27 Novembre 1918

A Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre de Pologne

Berlin

Monsieur le Ministre,

Par la proclamation de son indépendance, le voeu de la nation géorgienne a été de prendre entre ses mains sa propre destinée, d’user de droits imprescriptibles et entrer dans le concert des nations, consciente des devoirs que les nouvelles conditions lui imposent.

Constituée sur les bases démocratiques de la souveraineté nationale, la Géorgie est prête à se guider dans ses relations internationales des principes du droit public européen.

Désirant cultiver des rapports étroits avec les Puissances de la communauté internationale, le Gouvernement de la République Géorgienne, de son côté, procède auprès des Etats neutres et belligérants aux démarches pour la reconnaissance de sa personnalité juridique internationale.

Le Gouvernement de la République, se basant sur l’intérêt commun de nos nations respectives, sur leurs sympathies et l’identité de l’idéal poursuivi, est convaincu que peuples et Gouvernements, nous nous montreront solidaires, à cette heure decisive pour nous assurer la liberté et l’indépendance.

Nous avons subi ensemble pendant plus d’un siècle le poids et les avanies de l’administration étrangère. Nos droits légitimes ont été systématiquement et continuellement méconnus. Ce souvenir laisse en notre mémoire24 la trace indélébile de nos épreuves passées. Seule une indépendance entière et complète peut assurer à nos nations la prospérité et la satisfaction morale. Tel doit être notre mot d’ordre devant la conscience des nations civilisées et devant le prétoire des peuples où nos destinées doivent recevoir leur sanction.

Comptant sur ces sympathies, tant de la nation que du Gouvernement Polonais, le Gouvernement de la République Géorgienne aime à croire que la Pologne accordera la reconnaissance formelle que la Georgie a l’honneur de solliciter d’Elle.

Ci-joint j’ai l’honneur de remettre à Votre Excellence un Mémoire avec annexes et la prier de le faire parvenir à son Gouvernement.

Ces documents permettront au Gouvernement Polonais de prendre connaisance par l’acte de l’indépendance de la formation définitive de l’Etat de Georgie sur les bases de la souveraineté nationale, puis d’un court aperçu des événements politiques derniers que la nation géorgienne a dû vivre et traverser jusqu’au recouvrement de son indépendance, d’une annexe relevant les avantages économiques d’une Géorgie indépendante et son interêt politique que le mémoire ci-annexé a tout spécialement pour tâche de relever.

Je profite de l’occasion, Monsieur le Ministre, pour réitérer que le Gouvernement de la République Géorgienne compte sur l’action solidaire et amicale du Gouvernement Polonais et Vous prie d’agréer l’assurance de sa très haute considération.

Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Géorgie

Akaki Chkhenkeli

1 Papers Relating to Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Paris Peace Conference (PPC), Vol. III, p. 591.

2 See more details on the Allied policy towards Russia in: J.M. Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism and the Versailles Peace, Princeton 1966; R. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations 1917–1921, vol. I, Princeton: 1965; vol. II, Princeton 1968; vol. III, Princeton 1972; L. Kopisto, The British Intervention in South Russia 1918–1920, PhD Diss., University of Helsinki 2011; G.A. Brinkley, The Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in South Russia 1917–1921, Notre Dame 1966.

3 D.H. Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris: With Documents, vol. IV, New York 1924, pp. 219–220.

4 FRUS 1920, vol. III, pp. 463–468.

5 Georgian Central Historic Archive (GCHA) 1831/2/88/1.

6 GCHA 1864/2/111/16; FO 608/195/2; FRUS Russia 1919, pp. 47–49.

7 GCHA 1864/2/379/1-8.

8 GCHA 1864/2/45/122-123.

9 GCHA 1864/2/129/86.

10 GCHA 2115/1/60/4.

11 CAB 29/38, ff. 142–143; FRUS, PPC, vol. 6, pp. 34–36.

12 FRUS, PPC, vol. 6, pp. 321–323; CAB 29/39, ff. 43–44.

13 FRUS, PPC, vol. 6, pp. 356; CAB 29/39, f. 54.

14 Soveshchanie was a body comprising former ambassadors and ministers of the Tsarist regime and provisional government. They were acting as diplomatic representatives of Kolchak, Denikin and Yudenich in Europe.

15 J.M. Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism and the Versailles Peace, p. 304.

16 WO 32/5678, f. 154A, War Office to General Officer Commanding in Chief (GOC), Constantinople, 6 June 1919; FO 608/85 no. 12226; WO 32/5678 f. 162A, War Office to General Holman in Ekaterinodar; FO 371/3662/1015/100460/58; FO 608/88 no. 15996, War Office to GOC Constantinople, 17 July 1919; Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, Series I, vol. III, London 1949, p. 451; FO 371/3662/1015/100552/58; FO 371/3663/1015/121653/58; FO 608/88 no. 14304, Ekaterinodar to Troopers in London, 5 July 1919.

17 GCHA 1864/2/129/9; FO 608/118 nos. 13477 and 16780; FO 371/3662/1015/94192/58; FO 371/3662/1015/113022/58; Archives de Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de la France (AMAE), Europe, Russie, Caucase (Georgie) 1918–1919, vol. 833, ff. 228–231; GCHA 1864/2/114/45-49; GCHA 1864/2/79/1-9; FO 608/88 no. 13027; AMAE, Europe 1918–1940, URSS, Georgie 1918–1919, vol. 648, ff. 261–262; GCHA 1864/2/111/35-36; GCHA 1864/2/114/58; AMAE, Europe, Russie, Caucase (Georgie) 1918–1919, vol. 833, f. 205

18 FRUS, Russia 1919, pp. 766–768; AMAE, Europe, Russie, Caucase (Georgie) 1918–1919, vol. 833, f. 220; FO 371/3662/1015/104443/58; GCHA 1864/2/112/98-102.

19 FO 608/88 no. 14304; AMAE, Europe 1918–1940, URSS, Georgie 1918–1919, Vol. 648, ff. 269–270; GCHA 1864/2/111/42-43; GCHA 1864/2/119/95.

20 Nine topics were discussed at this meeting. This one was the sixth.

21 At this meeting there were five information heard and seven topics discussed. This was the first one. It is obvious that after the delegation’ s decision of 9 September some things changed: Georgians went to see the Polish counterparts alone and instead of Avalisvhili the chairman took along Irakli Tsereteli and Varlam Cherkezishvili.

22 Here probably ethnic boundaries are meant.

23 This letter comprises 8 pages, but here is given only the fourth page, because only this one is relevant to the Polish-Georgian relations.

24 This document cannot be traced in the archives, but it should be the same as the one that the Georgian diplomatic envoy Mikheil Sumbatashvili published in Berne in 1918. See: “Mémoire soumis par le Prince Soumbatoff, Délégué de Gouvernement Géorgien aux Représetants des Puissances Alliées à Berne au mois de Novembre 1918.”

Polish-Georgian Military Alliance as a Part of Józef Piłsudski’ s Security Policy
by Wojciech Materski

In the Polish historiography to date the subject of the Polish-Georgian military alliance is rarely discussed and, if so, only in the context of bilateral relations of the two countries.1 Yet its importance for the authorities in Warsaw was much more than a mere episode as in the plans of Marshal Józef Piłsudski it formed an integral part of the Polish security policy and the Eastern policy of the country in general.

The newly resurrected independent Poland was conflicted with its neighbours – first of all in the East where the borders between Poland and the lands of the former Russian Empire were yet to be charted. Since the early spring of 1919 Poland was fighting with the Bolsheviks and moreover, there was a potential threat from the “white” Russia. Aware of the drastic difference in the military potential of Poland of and the former Russian Empire, Piłsudski was anxiously looking for allies who also felt threatened by the chaos in Russia. He attempted to recreate the alliance from the days of the World War I when the nations enslaved by Russia tried to coordinate their military actions.

The most important of these attempts was the conference of representatives of the national liberation movements of Bukhara, Finland, Caucasus, Crimea, Poland, and Ukraine held in Lausanne in June 1916, which worked out a joint declaration. All these states declared their intention of the total detachment from Russia and the mutual support for one another’ s independence movements.2 Among the others, the declaration was signed by the Polish delegate Michał Łempicki (who soon after the conference became a member of the temporary Council of State3), and the Georgian delegate Irakli Cereteli, then a prominent activist of the Menshevik’ s party. With World War I still raging no military or political action followed the conference, and yet its propaganda value was undoubted.

In the spring of 1920 Marshal Józef Piłsudski referred to the declaration of Lausanne and addressed the eastern neighbors of Poland urgently asking for their military cooperation in the defensive action against Russia. His address was closely connected to the current Polish preparations of an advance attack on Ukraine. The attack required, first of all, the extinguishment of the conflict with the People’ s Republic of Ukraine. Therefore Piłsudski had to commence difficult discussions with the Ukrainian authorities about the possibility of military cooperation on a common anti-Bolshevik plane.4

Apparently, the Polish-Latvian meeting, which took place in Warsaw from 8 to 14 March 1920,5 had a greater chance of success. On its agenda was the formal recognition of the Latvian authorities by the Republic of Poland, but in fact the talks concerned mostly the hypothetical correlation of the policy of Warsaw and Riga in the case of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union. The plans for a convention concerning the cooperation of the Baltic republics with Poland, were briefly discussed. Yet, as the Latvian negotiators were reluctant to commit themselves politically, only some military issues were agreed upon.6

At the same time, from 20 to 24 March 1920, in Minsk another Polish delegation was engaged in the talks with the Central Belarusian Council of Vilnius Region and Grodno Region.7 The aim was to convince the Belarusian politicians not to cooperate with the Soviet Russia. The Russians at that time clearly tried to break up the Belarusian national revival movement, to gain his leftist part (SR, esery). A number of specific issues were agreed upon as far as the joint action against the Bolshevik threat was concerned. In the document concluding the meeting we read that the politicians of Belarus, “believe in the independence of their country which is guaranteed by its close alliance with Poland.” 8 On the eve of the Polish offensive on Kiev this was a significant statement, if when the military weakness of the People’ s Republic of Belarus is taken into consideration.

Thus, one can say that the attempts to prepare the conditions for the success of the Polish offensive were mildly successful. The use of “mildly” is deliberate here. Already at the turn of February and March 1920 when the conference of states at war with the Soviet Russia – Latvia, Finland, Romania and the People’ s Republic of Ukraine – was organized in Warsaw it was apparent that no common political line against the Bolshevik threat could be agreed upon. Similarly, the bilateral negotiations with Finland in March–April 1920 had also ended with but a mild success. The Finnish side supported the idea of the Polish-Finnish military alliance, but refused to negotiate any details9.

The bilateral negotiations with Romania in the second half of March 1920 showed that Bucharest was only interested in diplomatic alliance with Poland and the People’ s Republic of Ukraine but not in any prospective military actions. Moreover, Romania refused to enter an immediate formal military (or rather political-military) alliance with Poland, directed against Russia – both “white” and “red.” 10 Thus in spite of the friendly atmosphere of all these negotiations it became clear neither the Polish-Latvian conference nor the subsequent Polish-Romanian or military negotiations with Finland indicated that in case of failures on the front of the Bolsheviks Warsaw could count on effective assistance from Riga, Bucharest or Helsinki.

The only real success was the military alliance with the Ukrainian People’ s Republic, which at that time was virtually defeated by the Bolsheviks. Piłsudski was a realist and, despite all the misunderstandings between Poland and Ukraine, sought an agreement with Kiev. He realized that, in the long run, without an independent Ukraine the existence of Poland would be seriously threatened. This is why in January 1920, he decided to negotiate with the People’ s Republic of Ukraine. The talks ended in April 1920 by signing of a secret intergovernmental agreement known as the Piłsudski–Petliura agreement.11 Poland recognized independent Ukraine and its authorities and the border between the two countries was agreed on. This was the former border between tsarist Russia and Austro-Hungary. The Polish and Ukrainian minorities in both countries were given national and cultural rights and the plans were made to prepare a special economic-trade agreement which was to settle future disputes. Three days later a bilateral military convention was signed to guarantee close cooperation in the war with the Bolsheviks.12 It stated that the Polish army and the army of the People’ s Republic of Ukraine would be allies in the war with the Soviet Russia under the command the Polish Army. Under this convention, on 25 April 1920, a Polish Army offensive in Ukraine was launched, commonly known as the Kiev expedition. Despite the fact that Kiev was taken with comparatively little effort, it soon turned out that the Ukrainian society tired with the long-running war was not eager to support the authorities of the People’ s Republic of Ukraine. Thus, the Polish-Ukrainian military campaign, aimed at strengthening the position of both states against Bolshevik Russia, ended in a failure.

Parallel to the above-mentioned negotiations and the Polish-Ukrainian military endeavors Poland negotiated with another country, the faraway Georgian Republic which was threatened by the aggressive actions of the Bolsheviks – just like Poland. On 24 March 1920, the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a message from the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, Stanisław Patek: “I have the honor to announce that the Government of Poland is ready to recognize the Government of Georgia as an independent de facto organization before the peace conference will grant Georgia a status consistent with the will of its people. The Polish Government expresses its strong hope that the mutual interests of both states and mutual sympathy will be conducive to the establishment of friendly relations between Georgia and Poland in the near future. To this end, the Polish Government would be glad to accept a representative of Georgia in Warsaw. To document his sympathy, the Polish government has set up a special mission, chaired by Minister Tytus Filipowicz, who, in order to establish direct friendly relations, should go to Tiflis in the near future.” 13 This “special mission” was then described as “military-diplomatic” which indicated quite clearly that the Polish side was interested primarily in military cooperation with Georgia.

The offer was accepted, which resulted in the change of the official status of the representatives of the former Caucasian Federation of Democratic Republic in Poland; the office headed by Sidamon-Eristavi acquired the status of a diplomatic mission of the Republic of Georgia in Poland.14

The plans of sending a military-diplomatic missions to the formally independent (since April 1918) republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were made in Warsaw in the autumn of 1919. Yet, because the Polish diplomatic service was still poorly organized,15 and the relations with the Bolsheviks seemed to improve (and for a while the war seemed remote16) these plans did not go to fruition. Poland returned to them only in the spring of the following year, when the conflict with the Bolsheviks passed from the phase of local skirmishes to the phase of war on a large scale.

At the end of March 1920, the Polish Special Mission came to Tbilisi, led by the former head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland Tytus Filipowicz.17 It was received by the local authorities in the way dictated by the diplomatic protocol. On 31 March 1920 Filipowicz presented the Foreign Minister Gegeczkori with the official letter of accreditation during a ceremony reminiscent of the diplomatic representative’ s accreditation. Such a ceremony highlighted the positive climate of the yet non-formal relations of the two countries as well as the importance of coordinating their security policy.

In the first days of April the talks took place whose aim was to negotiate all the details. The atmosphere was friendly, the negotiations – short and fruitful. By the mid-April the draft of the Polish-Georgian military alliance was ready together with a plan of operational cooperation against the threat of the Russian Federation. Moreover, the diplomats agreed on how the Second Polish Republic was going to equip the Georgian army with arms and ammunition. The authorities of the Republic of Georgia pledged to extend their anti-Bolshevik cooperation to the North Caucasus, and to commence negotiations with the Government of The Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus.18 The procedure for the exchange of diplomatic and military representatives was also agreed upon and the full diplomatic relations were expected to start in the near future. This diplomatic procedure was to be coordinated by Wiktor Białobrzeski, who remained in the capital of the Republic. He also received a power of attorney to act as a consul and to organize the permanent office – the Polish Consulate in Tbilisi, which was opened early in 1921.

The Special Mission of the Republic of Poland went from Georgia to Baku where it was surprised by an offensive of the 11th RKKA Army (Raboche-krestianskaia Krasnaia Armia). Minister Filipowicz and his accompanying persons on 20 April 1920 went to the Soviet prison.19

Thus the alliance with the small army of the Georgian Republic20 was important for symbolic rather than practical reasons. It gave some moral support to the Polish army preparing for the struggle against the Bolsheviks. What really counted was the prospect of creating a belt of allied countries along the western and south-western borders of Russia. Later, after the fall of the independent republics of the Transcaucasus, this prospect was called the Intermarium project. The Intermarium idea was roughly akin to the concept of Prometheism whose goal was to separate from Russia the countries it enslaved. Both Poland and the émigré authorities of the Georgian Republic supported it vehemently, but this is a separate topic.

The Polish-Georgian military alliance had no chances of survival, yet though it did not become a military fact it undoubtedly was politically important. The tradition of Polish-Georgian affinity was created, which, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the recovery of real-international juridical character by Poland and Georgia, made it easy to rekindle the old friendship. In this context it should be added that the other two military alliances with the French Republic21 and the Kingdom of Romania22 made in 1920 by the Second Republic of Poland had did not survive either. The only instance of some real military collaboration was the cooperation with the Ukrainian People’ s Republic, conducted on the basis of the aforementioned secret intergovernmental agreement, commonly known as the Piłsudski-Petlura Agreement. All these agreements indicate how Marshal Józef Piłsudski perceived the problem of the security of the Polish state and what he planned to do in order to improve it.

The signed but never implemented military alliance with the Georgian Republic undoubtedly influenced the attitude of the Republic of Poland to Georgian emigration. Such were the beginnings of the contract service of Georgian officers and cadets in the Polish Army.

1 W. Materski, “Polish-Georgian relationships in the Polish historical records”, Pro Georgia. Journal of Kartvelological Studies, 22 (2012), pp. 213–222.

2 E. Charaszkiewicz, „Przebudowa wschodu Europy. Materiały do polityki wschodniej Józefa Piłsudskiego w latach 1893–1921”, Niepodległość (London), 5 (1965), pp. 140–141.

3 The Council of State was created in January 1917 under the Act of 5 November, which was a joint declaration of Austria-Hungary and Germany.

4 More about this topic in: J. Legieć, “Misja Borysa Kudrynowskiego w Warszawie (kwiecień–sierpień 1919 r.)”, Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 23 (1998); L.K., “Ekspozytura Ministerstwa Spraw Wojskowych do Spraw Ukraińskich w 1920 roku”, Niepodległość (London), 7 (1962).

5 P. Łossowski, Łotwa nasz sąsiad. Stosunki polsko-łotewskie w latach 1918–1939, Warszawa 1990, pp. 13–14.

6 A. Skrzypek, Stosunki polsko-łotewskie 1918–1939, Gdańsk 1997, p. 28–30; K. Badziak, W oczekiwaniu na przełom. Na drodze od odrodzenia do załamania państwa polskiego: listopad 1918–czerwiec 1920, Łódź 2004, p. 398–400.

7 D. Michaluk, Białoruski ruch narodowy wobec polskiej polityki wschodniej w latach 1918–1919, [In:] Stosunki polsko-białoruskie. Historia i współczesność, ed. D. Michaluk, Kraków 2013, p. 63–64.

8 K. Gomółka, “Rozmowy polsko-białoruskie (marzec 1920 r.)”, Dzieje Najnowsze, 1 (1988), p. 9.

9 R. Pullat, Stosunki polsko-fińskie w okresie międzywojennym, Warszawa 1998, p. 50; A. Skrzypek, Związek Bałtycki. Litwa, Łotwa, Estonia i Finlandia w polityce Polski i ZSRR w latach 1919–1925, Warszawa 1972, pp. 58–60.

10 Compare: H. Bułhak, Polska a Rumunia 1918–1939, [In:] Przyjaźnie i antagonizmy. Stosunki Polski z państwami sąsiednimi w latach 1918–1939, ed. J. Żarnowski, Wrocław 1977, pp. 308–309.

11 More on this topic in: Polska i Ukraina. Sojusz 1920 roku i jego następstwa, eds Z. Karpus, W. Rezmer and E. Wiszka, Toruń 1997.

12 Dokumenty i materiały do historii stosunków polsko-radzieckich, Vol. II: Listopad 1918–kwiecień 1920, eds W. Gostyńska and others, Warszawa 1961, doc. 379, p. 745–747 i doc. 381, pp. 749–753. See also: J. Legieć, Armia Ukraińskiej Republiki Ludowej w wojnie polsko-ukraińsko-bolszewickiej w 1920 r., Toruń 2002, pp. 38–40.

13 Bor’ba, No. 68, 25 March 1920.

14 Bor’ba, No. 69, 26 March 1920.

15 W. Materski, U zarania dyplomacji II RP, [In:] Wokół spraw trudnych, bolesnych i zapomnianych. Studia i szkice, eds E. Kowalczyk and others, Łódź 2014, p. 815–826.

16 Tajne rokowania polsko-radzieckie w 1919 r. Materiały archiwalne i dokumenty, ed. W. Gostyńska, Warszawa 1986.

17 W. Materski, “Misja Tytusa Filipowicza w Tbilisi (kwiecień 1920 r.)”, Pro Georgia. Prace i materiały do dziejów stosunków gruzińsko-polskich, 1 (1991), p. 26–28.

18 Współdziałanie rządu polskiego z emigracyjnymi organizacjami antyradzieckimi w latach 1918–1938, ed. S. Wroński, [In:] Z dziejów stosunków polsko-radzieckich. Studia i materiały, Vol. III, 1968, p. 266. The Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus was an independent republic in North Ossetia, Chechnya and Dagestan, also known as the Mountain Republic or the Republic of the Mountaineers (Sojuz Obiedinionnykh Gorcev Severnogo Kavkaza).

19 More: W. Materski, Georgia rediviva. Republika Gruzińska w stosunkach międzynarodowych 1918–1921, Warszawa 1994, pp. 167–170.

20 According to the military department of the Georgian Republic, the army in the second half of 1919 comprised of about 16,000 soldiers – National Republic of Georgia. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, Washington 1926, p. 69.

21 More: J. Ciałowicz, Polsko-francuski sojusz wojskowy 1921–1939, Warszawa 1970.

22 “Materiały do dziejów sojuszu polsko-rumuńskiego w latach 1921–1931”, ed. H. Bułhak, Studia Historyczne, 3 (1973).

An Attempt at Establishing Soviet Power in Georgia in 1920 and the War between Poland and Bolsheviks
by Mikheil Bakhtadze

In 1920 the Soviet Russia attempted to seize the independent republics of Poland and Georgia. From the political and military points of view, the scales were different: the armed forces of the Red Army operating against Poland were much larger and the scale of military operations in the country significantly exceeded those in the south Caucasus. The length of the war also differed: the Georgian armed forces fought with the Red Army’ s military units for three weeks, while the Polish Army resisted them for one year.

Despite these differences, the common and main issue for the both was that Poland and Georgia fought to retain their independence. At that time, both the Poles and the Georgians succeeded in maintaining their independence. Unfortunately, shortly after this, namely in February–March 1921, Georgia once again lost her independence.

How did the war between Poland and Bolsheviks influence military operations in the South Caucasus and vice versa? Accounts preserved in historical sources about Georgians who fought on the Polish side and Poles who fought on the Georgian side in the war waged by Russia are worthy of note.

In the first place I will shortly review the timeline of events in April–May 1920. This was when Soviet Russia invaded independent Azerbaijan and attempted to invade Georgia as well. Since it is not our task to overview the war between Poland and Bolsheviks in full, I will restrict myself to events that occured within the above two months.

The Bolshevik’ s desire to spread their power throughout the territory of the former empire was met by opposition from those people who had regained independence after this very empire was split. Aggressive aspirations of Soviet Russia towards the west led to reciprocal actions on the part of Poland. The Ukrainians were looking to the Poles with hope. On 5 March 1920, a Polish military division under the command of General Władysław Sikorski started the attack. The Poles took Mozyr and Kalenkowicze on 6 March. The Soviet military leadership gave orders to the divisions in the territory of Ukraine and Belarus to organise defence. Simultaneously, the Bolsheviks started to plan the counterattack. After mid-March, the intensity of military actions was reduced.1

On 22 March, S. Kamenev, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of Soviet Russia, issued a directive on launching an offensive in the direction of Baku to seize the capital of independent Azerbaijan.2

In the beginning of April, due to the deteriorating situation on the Western Front, the First Cavalry Army of S. Budionny, which fought on the Caucasus Front, was redeployed from the Caucasus to Poland to participate in military actions.

On 21 April, M. Tukhachevsky, the army group commander, issued an order to launch an offensive into the Republic of Azerbaijan on 27 April. The Soviet troops were to occupy Baku and Baku province within maximally five days.3

On 21 April, Józef Piłsudski and Symon Petliura signed an agreement on behalf of the Polish Republic and the People’ s Republic of Ukraine, which envisaged the liberation of Ukraine seized by the Bolsheviks. Three days later, the parties signed a military agreement, and two divisions of Ukraine were subordinated to the Polish military command.

On 23 April, M. Tukhachevsky issued a new order. According to it, the final objective was to fully occupy the territories of Azerbaijan.4

On April 25, the Polish army launched an assault on the Russian Red Army.

On 26 April, the Polish army seized Zhitomir.

On 27 April, four armoured trains of XI Army of the Caucasus front of Soviet Russia headed in the direction of Baku. At this time, the larger and best part of the Azerbaijan military was stationed in Karabakh, therefore the Azeris failed to stop the enemy.

On 28 April, at 04.00, the Soviet armoured trains entered Baku. Simultaneously, Polish troops continued their successful offensive on the western front. On 28 April, the front line passed through Chernobil–Kazatin–Vinitsa–Romanian border. The Soviet Russia army suffered a heavy defeat and started withdrawing its forces.

On 29 April M. Tukhachevsky was appointed army group commander of the West front. A bit later, on 15 May, the former army group commander of the front V. Gitiss was appointed group commander of the Caucasus Front.

On 1 May the first battle between military units of Georgia and regiments of the 96th Brigade of 32th Division of XI Army occurred at the border between Georgia and Soviet Azerbaijan.

On 2 and 3 May battle was under way in the environs of the Red and Foilo bridges.

On 4 May the enemy attempted to besiege the Georgian units at the Foilo railway bridge, but failed. The same day, S. Orjonikidze sent a telegram to Moscow informing that things were going well and by 12 May he intended to seize Tbilisi.5

On 5 May the Georgian party blew up the Foilo railway bridge to stop advance of Soviet military subdivisions. On the same day, a telegram was sent from Moscow to S. Orjonikidze giving him the order to withdraw from the Georgian border, because there was a chance of signing the treaty with Georgia.6

On 6 May the Red Army divisions withdrew from Kiev.

On 7 May military units of the 3rd Army under command of E. Rydz-Śmigły entered Kiev.

On 7 May an Agreement between the Republic of Georgia and Soviet Russia was signed. Russia recognised the independence of Georgia. Despite this, fighting along the southwest border of Georgia did not cease.

On 8–9 May military units of the Polish army crossed the River Dnieper and set up a military foothold on its left bank.7

On 9–10 May additional Georgian armed forces began to arrive at the area of military operations. A counterattack was launched on the same day. The enemy withdrew.

On 11–15 May Georgian military units launched an attack. The enemy withdrew from the Red Bridge and strategic high grounds. The Georgian military units pursued the enemy and advanced 15–20 versts inside the territory of Soviet Azerbaijan.

On 14 May M. Tukhachevsky gave the order for counterattack. Despite the single successes, the Red Army could not radically change the situation.

On the night of 15 to 16 May, the enemy took a piece of strategic high ground. Withdrawal of Georgian units from there caused a panic in other units and they abandoned their positions.

Lack of proper means of communication, misunderstanding and lack of coordination was the reason that the Georgian military units were steadily withdrawing all night. Only on 16 May it was possible to halt them near the Red Bridge and to activate the forces.

On 17 May, the Georgian military units took the offensive and reentered the territory of Azerbaijan. Four attacking military units had been created on the order of Giorgi Kvinitadze, the commander-in-chief. The Georgian army prepared to launch a large-scale assault against military units of Soviet Russia and Soviet Azerbaijan.

On 18 May, an order of cessation of hostilities signed by the Chairman of Government arrived from Tbilisi. Therefore, the Commander-in-Chief suspended the planned attack.

On 26 May, a temporary truce between Georgia and Soviet Azerbaijan was signed.

This was a brief overview of the sequence of events under way on the Georgian-Russian and Polish-Russian fronts. Certain coincidences can be observed, but this seems to have been accidental rather than the result of deliberate co-ordination.

It is clear that Georgia and Poland had the same enemy, Soviet Russia. Moscow, for its part, considered Poland and Georgia her enemies. Of note is a statement of M. Kakhiani, the Georgian Bolshevik, made in Baku, after a temporary truce between Georgia and Azerbaijan was arranged: “The most dangerous to Russia are Poland and Georgia. The representatives of the nobility (szlachta) and priesthood, the Georgian shop-keepers and inn-owners equally hate Russian peasants and workers.”8

There was a convergence of interests between Poland and Georgia concerning Russia. Therefore, there arises a question: did there exist a kind of agreement between the governments of Georgia and Poland about joint activities?

In late March 1920, a diplomatic mission led by Tytus Filipowicz arrived in Georgia. The issue of a Polish-Georgian military alliance was linked namely with T. Filipowicz. Of interest is the viewpoint of Prof. W. Materski on this matter. The prominent Polish scholar writes: “We know little concerning the mission to Tbilisi. Despite the fact that the newspaper Bor’ba (Борьба), published by the Mensheviks, had given a sufficient space to the news about the mission, materials about the Georgian-Polish negotiations had not been published. It seems that this process should have been very effective, since the results followed just in few days’ time, differing from analogous Polish-French and Polish-Romanian negotiations, which gave results with significant delay. By mid-April, the procedure for establishing de jure diplomatic relations was agreed; diplomatic and military representatives were exchanged. Plans for a Polish-Georgian military alliance, operative co-operation against the Russian threat and Polish aid for the Georgian military have been outlined; i.e. the Polish-Georgian military and political alliance became a fact, though the further ratification of agreed documents and more detailed discussions on various aspects of military cooperation were needed. Pleased with the above success, the parties were not aware that they did not really have time for discussion of all the details.

The next step after the successful negotiations was expansion of activities in Azerbaijan, as instructed by J. Piłsudski. Therefore, Tytus Filipowicz and persons accompanying him went to Baku.” 9 In another part of the text, W. Materski notes the following: “The statute of de facto recognition increased interest of Georgia to the countries of the world. Georgia was visited by many different missions: trade, economic and sometimes even political missions, e.g. by the special Polish mission headed by Tytus Filipowicz, the close companion-in-arms of Marshal Jósef Piłsudski. In late March, 1920, this mission started fruitful negotiations on the issue of a Polish-Georgian military and political alliance and for initialing the Treaty of Alliance.” 10

An article with content similar to that of the newspaper Bor’ba was published in the newspaper Ertoba. A letter of Stanisław Patek, the Foreign Minister of Poland, to Evgeni Geghechkori, the Foreign Minister of Georgia, was published in both newspapers: “Mr. Minister! I have the honour to inform you that the Polish government is ready to recognise de facto the government of Georgia as an independent institution until the Treaty Conference recognises the ‘statute’ of Georgia conforming to the wishes of the people. The Polish Government is deeply convinced that the joint interests of the two countries, as well as mutual sympathies, will promote the act of establishing friendly relations between Georgia and Poland in the near future. To show its sympathy, the Polish government will be pleased to receive a representative of Georgia. Just recently, the Polish government nominated a special mission led by Tytus Filipowicz, which will shortly visit Tbilisi to establish friendly relations. Please accept this mission in a friendly way. Accept, etc.”11

The Polish scholar Marek Mądzik has a different consideration: “According to the opinion established in historiography of Poland, the mission led by T. Filipowicz had strictly a political character differing from representations of other countries, which were oriented towards economic benefits. By sending Filipowicz before launching the offensive into Kiev, J. Piłsudski intended to establish military and political co-operation with the Transcaucasian republics within the anti-Soviet alliance. A project of the military alliance was worked out and agreed during Polish-Georgian negotiations, which were held from the beginning of April 1920. By the way, a plan of operational interaction and the principles of the provision of the Georgian army with arms and ammunition were accepted. Georgia had the responsibility of spreading this demarche throughout the North Caucasus. This might be true though some doubt arises. If the negotiations actually concerned military issues, why did the mission lack officers of the military headquarters of Poland? It is difficult to imagine that the issues such as operational interaction, or outfitting of the army were discussed without involvement of military experts.

Would J. Piłsudski have allowed the sending of a special mission lacking officers when he really was for a military alliance? It is not excluded that T. Filipowicz had to clear the way for political and military cooperation with Georgia. Apart from that, the head of the mission realised that the delegation lacked military experts only after he had arrived in Tbilisi. Filipowicz wrote that “each foreign mission in Tbilisi was staffed with several officers. The Polish mission had none. Due to this, we lacked the opportunity to orientate in the issues of military importance, and we did not have the necessary information to ensure the minimum security of the mission.”12

This is an important comment about the lack of staff officers in the mission.

L. Urushadze also writes about certain agreement between Georgia and Poland: “In February 1920, a high-level delegation headed by Tytus Filipowicz, the closest staff member of Jósef Piłsudski, arrived in Tbilisi. The joint work of the delegation and the Ministry of War of the Georgian Democratic Republic resulted in a conception of the project on military co-operation.” 13

The Georgian scholar based himself on a passage from R. Karabin’ s article: “Sending a mission in February 1920, headed by Tytus Filipowicz, was an action of special importance. The main task was to establish close relations in the political and military spheres with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. After the arrival of the mission in Tbilisi, in April 1920, a project of military co-operation with Georgia was developed. It envisaged assistance of the Republic with arms and ammunition, and contained a certain plan of operational co-operation. Based on the Agreement, Georgia should have attempted to promote an anti-Bolshevik movement in the territory of the North Caucasus. Signing of similar agreements with other states of the Caucasus was envisaged. But on 28 April 1920, after the Consul Filipowicz arrived in Baku for accomplishment of the objective, he was interned by the Soviet Army units, which had invaded the city. J. Piłsudski, who in early 1920 planned action against the Bolsheviks, was the initiator of T. Filipowicz’ s mission. Prior to launching military operations in Ukraine, the Polish government signed a military and political alliance with Symon Petliura. The course of events in the Caucasus had to hinder the Bolsheviks from redeploying their forces from the Caucasus to the Polish front. Due to the arrest of T. Filipowicz and the unpredictable situation on the Polish-Soviet Union front, establishing close cooperation with the Georgians was not possible, but despite this Georgia had influenced the ongoing battles: stopping the Bolshevik attack by the Georgians in June–July–August 1920, the hardest period for Poland, prevented Russia from removing large military units from the Caucasus front.”14

The prominent politician Tytus Filipowicz visited Georgia on 30 March 1920.15 By the end of April, he travelled to Baku, where he was arrested and taken to Moscow after Soviet power was established.

While in Tbilisi, Tytus Filipowicz probably had raised the question of military cooperation against Soviet Russia. Full convergence of interests on this issue was obvious. Probably the meeting was held secretly. For this reason, the Georgian sources, which I have checked, lack any information on the issue. It is unknown whether any written document was produced as a result of the discussions. It is difficult to say anything about it until corroborating information is found. It seems more realistic that the main principles were agreed orally.

It might be that discussions on military union between Poland and Georgia were continued in Baku during the visit of the Georgian military delegation led by General Giorgi Kvinitadze in late April (20–27 April). The objective of the delegation was to draw up a plan of joint operations of Georgia and Azerbaijan in case of Russian aggression in South Caucasus. During the same period, Tytus Filipowicz was also in Baku. He arrived on 24 April together with accompanying persons.16 It is of note that apart from the officials of Azerbaijan, it was Dgebuadze, the Deputy Diplomatic Representative of Georgia in Azerbaijan, who met the Delegation of Poland at the station. The situation at that time was favourable for discussion of joint operations of Poland and South Caucasian countries against Russia. At the same time, one must not forget that as early as on 16 June 1919, Georgia and Azerbaijan signed a defensive treaty.17

Despite the lack of direct accounts, it is acceptable to think that the discussion about military union of the two countries took place with the participation of representatives of Georgia and Poland, moreover if one considers that in January 1920 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Stanisław Patek, met Karlo Chkheidze: actually, at that meeting Poland had suggested an idea of the common struggle against Soviet Russia. By January 1920, Marshal Piłsudski considered the idea of a march on Moscow. Patek asked Chkheidze if Georgia was going to stretch its boundaries beyond the Greater Caucasus, onto the North Slope. The answer of the Chairman of the Georgian delegation was unambiguously negative.”18 As far as possible, Georgia assisted the North Caucasians both against “Whites” and “Reds”19, but it seems that at the beginning of 1920 such a scenario was not in the interests of Tbilisi.

One more argument for the reality of negotiations on a military alliance between Georgia and Poland is the following: in early 1920, during his visit to Baku, Ostrowski put forward an idea of setting up a “Military Bloc” with the membership of Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Azerbaijan and Georgia. It is inconceivable that Ostrowski had not discussed this matter in Tbilisi. Therefore, I consider that by the time of Ostrowski’ s arrival, the first discussions had already been held with regard of military alliance between Poland and Georgia.

I consider that Tytus Filipowicz discussed the substance of a military alliance between Poland and Georgia at the joint meetings.

Despite the existence or non-existence of a military alliance, or at least of a concept of such alliance between Poland and Georgia, the war between Poland and Bolsheviks had significantly influenced relations between Moscow and Tbilisi. In this connection, of interest is a passage from Grigol Uratadze’ s interview given to a newspaper reporter: “The Polish front caused great confusion in the work that was under way.”20 G. Uratadze implied negotiations with the leadership of Soviet Russia in Moscow.

Recognition of Georgia’ s independence by Soviet Russia was very important. Since late April, G. Uratadze, the representative of Georgia, was in Moscow and negotiated with the Russian leadership, but the Kremlin was in no hurry to sign the treaty. It was obvious that the Bolsheviks were stretching negotiations out as long as possible. In the case that events would develop in their favour, they would certainly “sovietize” Georgia, as rigorously insisted on by S. Orjonikidze. But the state of affairs did not change in favour of Moscow. Successful attacks of the Polish Army were the main reason for that. There exists a consideration that signing of the 7 May Treaty was conditioned by the defeat of the regiments of the XI army in the battles at the border with Azerbaijan. A. Chachkhiani writes the following: “The persecution operation was under way, and at this moment, due to the hopeless situation” the Bolsheviks changed their tactic and signed a treaty with Georgia.21 This consideration is erroneous, because by 7 May the Georgian military units had not yet started the persecution operation. On the contrary, at that time success was on the side of the enemy, and military operations were under way on the territory of Georgia. I share the consideration, according to which one of the main reasons for signing the treaty with Georgia was Russia’ s defeat on the western front by the Poles.22

The scale of military operations in South Caucasus was much smaller than that of the Poland-Bolsheviks Front, but it still demanded resources and attention on the part of Russia. In the beginning of May, military operations were conducted throughout the territory of Georgia, though it was obvious that the Red Army had no chance of success. Protracted and full-scale war required additional human resources. Besides, success of the Georgian army could endanger the existence of Soviet power in Azerbaijan, oil supplies from there were essential for Soviet Russia. Against the background of a critical situation on the West Front, the Bolsheviks avoided complications in the South Caucasus (In addition, the military forces of Soviet Russia had to oppose Baron Wrangel’ s army in Crimea and needed to assemble significant military forces there).

Therefore, Moscow practically ordered S. Orjonikidze to terminate hostilities with Georgia and in two days time it signed the Treaty with Tbilisi. It may be stated that it was mainly the success of the Polish army, together with other reasons, that had brought about the signing of the 7 May Treaty, according to which Russia recognised the Democratic Republic of Georgia de jure, and stated that it did not have territorial pretentions to the country.

It should be taken into consideration that following the 7 May Treaty, the Georgian government was very cautious with regard to Soviet Russia, afraid of giving any reason to Moscow for provocation. Therefore, if certain consultations on the issues of military cooperation between Poland and Georgia were indeed held prior to signing the 7 May Treaty, I consider that thereafter Georgia would have ceased any activity in this direction. Due to the 7 May Treaty, Georgia had been alienated as a potential ally of Poland.

The above concerened the influence of the war between Poland and Bolsheviks on the political processes between Tbilisi and Moscow. The military situation was also seriously influenced. Soviet Russia deployed its best military forces against Poland. History is what has already happened, but nevertheless, certain considerations may still be proposed. If it were not for an attack launched by Poland, the Soviet command would probably have left the 1st Cavalry Army where it was. In April, the latter was redeployed from the Caucasus to Poland, no longer at the disposal of the Caucasus Front.23 The 1st Cavalry Army could have invaded Georgia from the northwest, Abkhazia (this tactic was followed by XI Army units in 1921), and the Republic would have found herself in a difficult situation. If Tukhachevsky, the most qualified Soviet commander-in chief, had remained on the Caucasus Front in May, the situation would have been unpredictable.

It is obvious that the success of the Polish Army has brought about the retention of independence by Georgia in May 1920.

However, a reciprocal influence was also observed. To an extent, R. Karabin is correct when he writes that “checking of the advance of the Bolsheviks by Georgians entailed the fact that in June, July and August 1920, the most difficult times for Poland, not even a single, large military unit was redeployed from the Caucasus Front.” I will introduce a small correction to this consideration. It is correct that in the summer of 1920 additional forces from the Caucasus Front were not sent to the Polish Front (The 1st Cavalry Army was redeployed earlier). The reason for this was not so much “checking of the advance of the Bolsheviks by Georgians,” but the probability of the Georgian attack on Bolsheviks in Azerbaijan, as a result of which Baku would have been placed at risk. In the course of the three-year existence of the Georgian Republic, in summer 1920, the armed forces of Georgia were best mobilised and best prepared for war (according to data of the General Headquarters, in summer 1920 some 26,000 men served in the regular Army,24 and according to data obtained by military intelligence of Soviet Russia, the number of soldiers in the Guard and Army totalled some 36,000 men).25

It should also be considered that the Soviet military intelligence probably was aware of the insistent demand to take military action deep into the territory of Azerbaijan, which was coming from General G. Kvinitadze. As a result, the pending danger from Georgia forced the Bolsheviks to be careful and to concentrate forces on the Caucasus Front.

The involvement of Poles in the Georgian-Russian war and involvement of Georgians in the war between Poland and Bolsheviks is an issue of special interest; sources available to us comprise such information.

The fact that Poles served in the Armed Forces and Militia of Georgia is corroborated at least by the letters sent by General Aleksandre Koniashvili to Aleksandre Zakariadze. Apart from other issues, General Koniashvili mentions three Polish officers who in 1920 served in the Georgian Militia.26

Ivan Prusecki of Polish descent served in the Georgian National Guard. On 11–15 May 1920, when two columns of the Georgian Army attacked the enemy, Ivan Prusecki was the commander of the Kakheti Battalion of the National Guard, which fought as a part of the left column. Z. Datiashvili, an eye-witness of the above battle, published several articles in the newspaper Ertoba, giving a detailed description of the events. Ivan Prusecki is mentioned several times in these articles. The author emphasised that the Kakheti Battalion was commanded by an experienced officer. As were other officers of the Georgian Army, Ivan Prusecki was a World War I veteran. He had gained experience during that war. Z. Datiashvili mentions I. Prusecki as a lieutenant (Probably I. Prusecki served in the Russian Imperial Army and held the rank of lieutenant). Ivan Prusecki was not simply a talented commander of officers and private guardsmen. In case of necessity he used to visit the front-line from where he waged battle. On 15 May I. Prusecki and Kharash, a member of Guard’ s headquarters, discussed better ways for strengthening the positions of the guardsmen, when the enemy opened intensive fire at Georgian positions. At this moment Z. Datiashvili was with I. Prusecki, planning to return to his unit. This is what he writes about the incident: “Single shots were suddenly followed by a round of automatic guns and machine-guns. The enemy’ s artillery was brought in. Shells whizzed by us, falling left and right, and exploding behind us. Nobody has ceased joking and they saw us off with laughter... I. Prusecki laughed loudly. Nobody could imagine that this laughter would stop so quickly: as we learned later, several shells exploded within the trench. The shell fragments hit him in the head. Severely wounded, the commander was evacuated from the battlefield. He is still in the hospital, and I hope that he will successfully go through the major surgery.”27 The photograph of I. Prusecki was printed in the magazine Teatri da tskhovreba.28

In connection with the Georgians who fought on the side of Poland, of interest are data given by Leo Kereselidze and General Aleksandre Koniashvili.

Based on the information given by Leo Kereselidze, Doctor G. Mamoulia writes: “Prior to the offensive of spring 1920 launched by the Poles, when Warsaw planned to liberate Ukraine seized by the Bolsheviks who had defeated Denikin’ s Army, the military units of Ukraine were being formed in the territory of Poland. Jointly with the Polish army, these units had to play a decisive role in future military operations. There was a severe shortage of officers in these regiments. In contrast to this, the small Georgian army had a large number of officers, therefore it could grant assistance to Ukraine in this regard. According to the sources, the Georgian government solicited S. Petliura’ s request and with assistance of military missions of France and Poland in the Caucasus sent some three hundred Georgian officers, who became involved in military operations.”29

The scholar has cited the autobiography of Leo Kereselidze written in 1930s in which L. Kereselidze has noted the following: “In spring 1920, with the consent of the French Military Mission and our government, I was sent to Poland to provide the country with 300–400 Georgian officers. I did not accept any funding for this trip either from the French mission, or from Polish representatives, despite the fact that they would have been happy to give me the money. Białobrzeski, the representative of Poland in Tbilisi can confirm this.” 30

In the first place, I would like to make a small comment. It is difficult to say whether the Georgian army had too many officers or not. It should be taken into consideration that the former Georgian officers of the Russian Imperial Army, who at that moment served neither in the regular army, nor in the National Guard, stayed in Tbilisi. According to intelligence of Soviet Russia, a total of 1,300–1,500 officers served in the Armed Forces, Guard and Army altogether. 500 more officers were not involved in military activities.31 This reflects the situation that existed in June–August 1920. Therefore, theoretically it is quite possible that 300–400 officers could have travelled to Poland for participation in the war against Soviet Russia, but only theoretically. But what was the reality?

Each document must be cautiously and even critically studied. If one agrees with G. Mamoulia’ s consideration, the Georgian officers were to be sent to Poland before the Polish attack started, i.e. when formation of military units under the command of Petliura was still under way. This is possible, since at that time the war between Georgia and the Bolsheviks had not yet started.

The sending of Georgian officers to Poland in May, when the Georgian Army was involved in military operations against Red Army units, is excluded. “Announcement of mobilisation of infantry officers with Georgian citizenship” on 12 May by Defence Council corroborates the above consideration. The officers were to appear in the Records Department at 10 a.m. on 18 May.32

Officers were probably sent only after May, though personally I consider this option less probable, if only because of the signing a treaty with Soviet Russia. Even official rhetoric concerning the war between Poland and the Bolsheviks changed after signing the treaty; e.g. in an article published on 5 June 1920 in the newspaper Ertoba of the Social-Democratic Party “invasion of Poland and her imperialistic attitude” are mentioned.33 It is clear that such statements were intended for Moscow and in reality the opinion of the government was different. Though, the statements of the above content are of special interest. Tbilisi would have refrained from taking steps against Moscow openly (probably secretly as well) at least during a few months after signing the Treaty.

None of the sources consulted by me corroborate information about sending a large group of Georgian officers to Poland. In my opinion, neither can such a conclusion be made from Kereselidze’ s biography. Kereselidze writes in his autobiography that he himself has visited Poland. He also mentions that he has not asked for travel expenses. This should indicate that Kereselidze travelled alone or with a small group (2–3 individuals) of officers. Otherwise, personal finances would not have covered travel expenses, moreover if he travelled with a group of officers. Kereselidze writes that there only existed the intention to send the officers, but does not mention what happened later. The intention probably really existed, but I don’t think that it was realised. My opinion is that one should be cautious toward information given by Leo Kereselidze. I don’t exclude the existence of an idea for sending a large group (300–400 persons) of Georgian officers to Poland, but it seems that this idea was not actually realised.

A fragment from L. Kereselidze’ s letter mailed by him on 14 October 1920 to Geneva is of special interest to analyse the issue: “I returned from Galicia. Although they wish to have Georgian officers, the environment is so hostile that in my opinion it is difficult to advise anyone of the officers to go there. Typhus and other epidemics strike in winter and kill hundreds of officers. Add to this cold weather, lack of clothes, etc. Apart from that, in my opinion they will not succeed in keeping the conspiracy secret. The rumour will spread that Georgian officers are there and this will give a chance to our enemies to find fault with our country’ s policy. This has compelled me to think about this and to stay away... P.S. Many Georgian officers serve under Petliura’ s command.”34 Several conclusions can be made based on this fragment: “In reality, there was an intention to involve Georgian officers; Kereselidze was against sending Georgian officers. He even refused to be a part of this case. My consideration that Georgian officers might have joined Petliura’ s army from various regions of the former empire was confirmed. It is not excluded that some of them travelled from Georgia on their own initiative, as volunteers.

In August 1929, General Aleksandre Koniashvili, the Brigade’ s general for a certain time when in emigration, wrote a letter to General Aleksandre Zakariadze, who apart from being the Division’ s general, was the military representative of Georgia and instructor of Georgian officers in Poland.35 General Koniashvili recollects the following in his letter: “The late V. Jugheli and I were in command of the Guard. In 1920, during the war between Poland and Russia, by the secret resolution of our headquarters, we sent three groups of the best Georgian officers to Russia to act in the rear of Bolshevik troops. They were to set fire to and destroy any kind of provisions and ammunition stores, to blow up bridges, etc. All this was on their own, in secret, for ideological reasons, in favour of two noble peoples, Poles and Georgians. To our knowledge, only two individuals from these groups survived. One of them was exiled to Chita and another to Tomsk.”36

This letter is of special interest. Several issues arising from it should be clarified. According to Koniashvili, sending three groups of Georgian officers was the initiative of the Guard Headquarters, and the Polish party did not ask for that. This is important. When were these groups sent? Probably after the hostilities started, i.e. starting from late April 1920. But in late April and the first half of May Georgia herself was at war with the Bolsheviks. It would have been more logical to send the diversion groups of Georgian officers to the rear of XI Army, rather than to the West Front. Of course it is possible that the groups of the Georgian officers were sent in the rear of the Reds at war with Poland, after Georgia had signed a temporary treaty and hostilities were ceased. If this is the case, the groups must have been sent after May. Would the Georgian party act like that after signing the 7 May Treaty with Russia? As I have already mentioned, the Georgian government was very cautious with Russia after signing the Treaty. I doubt that Georgia would risk sending diversion groups. Koniashvili writes that the decision was taken in secret by the Headquarters. I do not think that such an important decision was taken by the Guard’ s Headquarters or at least by Valiko Jugheli independently. If not the entire government, at least the Chairman Noe Zhordania was to be informed, since sending diversion groups was also political matter. And furthermore: In 1920 Aleksandre Koniashvili really worked in the National Guard, but he was not the person to receive decisions of special importance. One should also take into consideration that in 1920 General Aleksandre Zakariadze was the Chief of Staff. How could the Chief of Staff remain unaware of the officers’ departure?

The above-mentioned casts doubt on whether the information given by Koniashvili is correct.

On the other hand, the General’ s information is detailed when he writes that only two officers from the diversion groups have survived, and that one of them was exiled to Chita and another to Tomsk. (It’ s also interesting why were the diversionists “only” exiled and not executed by the Bolsheviks when the war was raging?).

The reason for writing a letter by General Koniashvili was the fact that the military discharge of certain Georgian generals (including probably General Koniashvili as well) and officers was on the agenda. Koniashvili attempted to prove that this decision was not correct. He wrote about the merits of the Georgian officers and generals, about the role of Poland in confronting Russia, etc. He asked General Zakariadze to provide the Polish government with comprehensive information and to do his best to avoid the risk of worsening the situation of Georgian generals and officers. Taking into consideration the general emotional content of the letter, the suspicion arises that General Koniashvili attempted to exaggerate his own importance and merits before the Polish state. Maybe this was the reason for mentioning groups sent into the rearward of the Bolsheviks, and showing oneself as an initiator of this action?

It should be considered that information shared by General Koniashvili about sending three groups of Georgian officers to Poland is not supported by evidence from other sources, as is the case with the account of Leo Kereselidze. Though, it is difficult to assume that nothing like that happened and it is a figment of the imagination of Aleksandre Koniashvili. It might be that Koniashvili’ s letter to some extent reflects the reality and a group of Georgian volunteers really acted in the rear of Soviet Russia.

A very interesting photo is preserved in the Polish Military Archives. I saw and photographed it in late March, 2017, when the members of the Georgian-Polish International Commission were visiting Rembertów. The photo is dated to 1920. Two individuals of Georgian appearance are pictured in it. The photo is supplied with explanatory inscription in Polish: “A group of Georgians, which left the Bolshevik formation, are joining the Polish Army as allies in combat. 1920.” Probably we shall never know the names and surnames of these Georgians who fought in the Polish Army.

Despite the fact that at this stage one cannot state specific names and surnames, the available information provides an opportunity to discuss the Georgians’ fighting in 1920, during the war with Soviet Russia, on the side of Poland.

1 M.I. Meltyukhov, Soviet-Polish Wars: Military and Political Stand-Offs in 1918–1939, Moscow 2001, http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov2/index.html.

2 Direktivy glavnogo komandovania Krasnoi Armii (1917–1920), Moskwa 1969, p. 735.

3 Ibid., vol. III, Moskwa 1974, p. 301.

4 Ibid., p. 302.

5 Schastie na shtykakh. Sekretnaia bor’ba v bolshevistskom rukovodstvie po povodu »sovetizatsii« Zakavkazia. Istoricheskii almanakh “Labirinti vremeni”, http://www.hist.ru/kavbolsh.html.

6 Ibid.

7 M.I. Meltyukhov, Soviet-Polish Wars.

8 Ertoba [გაზეთი „ერთობა“], 30 May 1920.

9 W. Materski, “Misja Tytusa Filipowicza w Tbilisi (kwiecień 1920 r.)”, Pro Georgia. Prace i materiały do dziejów stosunków polsko-gruzińskich, 1 (1991), p. 28.

10 W. Materski, “Zagadnienie niepodległości Gruzji w stosunkach międzynarodowych 1918–1921”, Pro Georgia. Prace i materiały do dziejów stosunków polsko-gruzińskich, 2 (1992), p. 8.

11 Ertoba, 25 March 1920; Bor’ba, No. 68, 25 March 1920.

12 M. Mądzik, “Próby nawiązania stosunków politycznych między Polską a Gruzją w latach 1918–1921”, pp. 84–85.

13 L. Urushadze, “For the History of Polish-Georgian Relations (1918–1930s)”, Qartuli Universiteti (Georgian University), 63–64 (2010) [ლ. ურუშაძე, პოლონეთ-საქართველოს ურთიერთობათა ისტორიისათვის (1918–1930-იანი წლები) „ქართული უნივერსიტეტი“].

14 R. Karabin, “Prometeizm: Participation of the Caucasian People in the Struggle for Independence of Poland in 1918–1921”, New Poland, a special issue in Georgian, 2004, pp. 94–95 [რ. კარაბინი, პრომეთეიზმი: კავკასიელი ხალხის მონაწილეობა პოლონეთის 1918–1921 წლების დამოუკიდებლობისათვის ბრძოლაში. „ახალი პოლონეთი“].

15 Sakartvelos respublika, No. 74, 2 April 1920 [გაზეთი „საქართველოს რესპუბლიკა“].

16 Azerbaijanskaia demokraticheskaia respublika (1918–1920). Vneshnaia politika (Dokumenty i materialy), Baku 1998, p. 517.

17 M. Bakhtadze, Defensive Treaty of 1919 between Georgia and Azerbaijan, Proceedings of the Institute of Georgian History, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, I, Tbilisi 2011 [მ.ბახტაძე, საქართველო-აზერბაიჯანის 1919 წლის თავდაცვითი ხელშეკრულება].

18 B. Kobakhidze, An Issue of Georgia at Paris Peace Conference, Dissertation for obtaining the Degree of the Doctor of History, Tbilisi 2015, p. 219 [ბ.კობახიძე, საქართველოს საკითხი პარიზის საზავო კონფერენციაზე.]

19 M. Bakhtadze, G. Mamoulia, Materials from History of Relations between Georgia and North Caucasus, Tbilisi 2005 [მ.ბახტაძე, გ.მამულია, მასალები საქართველოსა და ჩრდილოეთ კავკასიის ურთიერთობის ისტორიიდან].

20 Ertoba, No. 123, 4 June 1920.

21 A. Chachkhiani, Military and Political Relations Between Russia and Georgia and Military Actions in Apkhazeti Region and Black Sea Shore Zone (1918–1920), Tbilisi 2014, p. 355 [ა.ჩაჩხიანი, რუსეთ-საქართველოს სამხედრო-პოლიტიკური ურთიერთობები და საბრძოლო მოქმედებები აფხაზეთის რეგიონში და შავიზღვისპირეთში (1918-1920 წწ.)].

22 Relations between Georgia and Russia in XVIII–XX Centuries, Tbilisi 2016, p. 189 [საქართველო-რუსეთის ურთიერთობები XVIII–XX საუკუნეებში].

23 The Soviet Russia fought with the Polish Army on two, West and South-West Fronts (Military Commander A. Egorov), with involvement of the First Cavalry Army.

24 The Central Historical Archives of Georgia (CHAG), fund 1969, description 2, file 146 [საქართველოს საისტორიო ცენტრალური არქივი (სსცა)].

25 CHAG, fund 1969, description 1, file 670, page 10.

26 CHAG, fund 1864, description 2, file 871, page 1.

27 Letters from the Front. Part Four, Ertoba, No. 140, 24 June 1920.

28 Teatri da tskhovreba, No. 20, 1920 [„ჟურნალი „თეატრი და ცხოვრება“].

29 G. Mamoulia, Ot Tiflisa do Kieva i Varshavy. Iz istorii kavkazsko-ukrainskogo sotrudnichestva w ramkakh dvizhenia “Prometei” (1918–1939), Nowy Prometeusz, 1 (2011), pp. 133–160.

30 G. Mamoulia, “Curriculum Vitae of Leo Kereselidze”, Tanamemamule, 3 (2007), p. 16 [ჟურნალი „თანამემამულე“].

31 CHAG, fund 1969, description 1, file 670, p. 16.

32 Sakhalkho sakme, No. 828, 18 May 1920 [გაზეთი „სახალხო საქმე“].

33 Ertoba, No. 124, 5 June 1920.

34 CHAG, fund 1864, description 2, file 398, p. 6.

35 CHAG, fund 2121, description 1, file 45, p. 14.

36 CHAG, fund 1864, description 2, file 871, p. 1.

The Democratic Republic of Georgia in the Entente Powers’ Policy after World War I
by Paweł Olszewski

The article’ s main subject is the policy of Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States towards Georgia since the declaration of independence of the Democratic Republic of Georgia on 26 May 1918 until the de jure recognition of its independence by the Supreme Council of Allied Powers on 27 January 1921. The article focuses particularly on the period after the end of military operations of the First World War, when from November 1918 on; the victorious Entente powers were given the opportunity to have a real impact on the situation in the republic and other Southern Caucasus (Transcaucasian) countries.

In order to better understand the policy of the Entente powers towards independent Georgia, one should mention its geopolitical situation and the South Caucasus (Transcaucasia) situation since late 1917. The February Revolution and, particularly, the October Revolution contributed to the abrupt changes in the political situation in Russia, including the Southern Caucasus. It was significant for geostrategic reasons being the Russian-Turkish front rear area and a location of natural resources, particularly crude oil and manganese ores.1 At the end of November 1917, the Transcaucasian Commissariat took over the administration in South Caucasus where the political leaders of the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani populations played the leading roles. The Commissariat opted for the South Caucasian region staying within Russia and did not recognise the Bolshevik government of V. Lenin. This was confirmed by the Transcaucasian Parliament, which was established as the Parliament of Transcaucasia in February 1918.2

As a result of signing the Brest Treaty on 3 March 1918, the Soviet Russian government yielded the following districts to Turkey: Kars, Ardahan and Batumi, forming parts of South Caucasus. Because the Transcaucasian Parliament did not accept the provisions of the Brest Treaty, therefore, under the military pressure of the Sultan’ s government, it needed to consent to enter diplomatic negotiations with Turkish representatives on the future of these areas.3 Also under the Turkish pressure, as Turkey was gradually taking over Transcaucasian areas militarily, it was obliged to agree on the establishment of the Transcaucasian Federal Democratic Republic, covering the territories of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, independent from Russia.4

In May 1918, the republic’ s representatives conducted peace negotiations with Turkish representatives in Batumi, which ended in a fiasco. Differences of interest between political leaders of the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani populations resulted in a decision to dissolve the Transcaucasian Republic on 26 May 1918. On the same day, however, the National Council of Georgia proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, and on 28 May, the establishment of the Democratic Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan was announced.5

Since Georgian politicians feared Georgian dependence on Turkey, even during the negotiations in Batumi, they established contacts with the German delegation, which participated in the conference as an observer. Germany did not want to excessively subordinate Transcaucasia to Turkey, which would have also prevented the Reich from using the region’ s raw materials, in particular Azerbaijani crude oil and Georgian manganese. On 28 May 1918, a Georgian-German agreement was signed in Poti. As a result, the German armed forces “occupied” the port in Poti and the Georgian railways, and German companies were given the opportunity to export raw materials and food from Georgia.6

In contact with the Entente powers’ representatives, in Georgia and in neutral countries, Georgian politicians indicated that they were treating the agreement with Germany as a means to become independent from the influence of Turkey, whose army took a considerable part of Armenian and Azerbaijani territories. However, these arguments were not accepted by the representatives of the Entente states who considered Georgia as a German ally and occasionally even as Turkey’ s zone.7 In addition, the Western powers supported the Russian anti-Bolshevik centres that opposed the independence of states emerging in the frontier areas of the former tsar’ s empire, including Transcaucasia.

One of such centres, which opted for further combat of Russia together with the Entente states against the Central States, was General Anton Denikin’ s Volunteer Army, operating in Kuban and in North Caucasus in the spring of 1918. In the summer of 1918, Georgia and the Volunteer Army were in conflict for the cities of Sochi and Tuapse in Abkhazia. In July, the Georgian army retook Sochi and Tuapse from the “volunteers.” At the beginning of September 1918, the “whites” dislodged the Georgians from Tuapse and requested the withdrawal of Georgian armed forces from Sochi. At the end of September 1918, in the course of negotiations with representatives of the Volunteer Army, the Georgians rejected this request. They indicated that Sochi and the area up to the estuary of the River Bzyb to the Black Sea were parts of Georgia. Finally, no agreement was reached. However, the “volunteers,” strengthening their military position in the North Caucasus did not begin any military action against Georgia.8

The conflict between Georgia and Volunteer Army for Sochi had a negative effect on the opinion on Georgian government of the Entente powers’ representatives. This opinion was important because on 11 November 1918 the military activities of World War I were concluded, and Georgia and South Caucasus faced new geopolitical changes. German armed forces withdrew from Georgia, and British troops entered their territory, as well as other areas of Transcaucasia. On 23 December 1918, having occupied Azerbaijan, British troops came to Batumi, and on 1 January 1919, they took over Tiflis (Tbilisi).9

On 2 December 1918, the commander of the British armed forces in Transcaucasia, Gen. William M. Thomson, announced to the Prime Minister of Georgia, Noe Zhordania, that the area of Georgia was considered to be a territory under the sovereignty of the Russian government in Ufa, which did not recognise the independence of the republic. The representative of the United Kingdom in Tbilisi, Col. Richard P. Jordan, pointed out that the political future of Georgia and the South Caucasus would be decided by the Peace Conference in Paris. He also emphasised that the presence of British troops in Georgia served only to maintain internal order. This opinion was confirmed by Gen. W.M. Thomson at the end of December 1918.10 In addition, on 31 December 1918, the Georgian representative in London, Zurab Avalov, obtained a declaration that the British Government referred to the declaration of independence of Georgia with great sympathy and was ready to support its recognition at the Peace Conference.11

However, these friendly declarations of British authorities’ representatives towards Georgia did not have, at least for the time being, any practical significance with respect to the aspirations of Georgian diplomacy to gain recognition of the independence of the Republic by the victorious Entente powers. Primarily, they served to receive Georgians acceptance of the British armed forces presence in the republic. As in the previous case of Azerbaijan, British troops occupied strategic key points in Georgia: stations, railways, ports, industrial plants and the main public buildings in Tiflis. The most complete British militarily control was exerted over the province and the city of Batumi because of its enormous economic importance for the whole of South Caucasus. Batumi port, city and district were governed by the British governor, commander of British armed forced of the region, Lt Gen. William J.N. Cooke-Collis.12 It is estimated that at the beginning of February 1918, there could have been approximately 25,000 British soldiers in Georgia, and up to 60,000 British Empire soldiers all around the Southern Caucasus.13

Despite some gestures of sympathy towards the independent Georgia that Western politicians made, at the beginning of 1919, in an official opinion, the Entente powers governments considered that Georgia, as the other South Caucasian countries, constituted part of the anti-Bolshevik democratic Russia, to be restored in the future. This was indicated during the sessions of the Peace Conference in Paris, which started on 18 January 1919, when the Georgian delegation, as well as the Armenian and Azerbaijani delegations, had not been officially invited to join the meetings.

At the beginning of the Paris Conference, an idea of organising peace talks on the Prince Islands in the Sea of Marmara was proposed. Representatives of all Russian military centres (including the Bolsheviks) and representations of non-Russian peoples living in Russia were supposed to take part there. The purpose of the meeting would have been to form a delegation representing the interests of Russia at the Peace Conference.14 The government of Georgia also received the proposal of participation in these discussions. This caused a protest of the Georgian delegation to the Peace Conference, addressed on 28 January 1919 to the representative of the government of France. It pointed out that the republic would not participate in the conference on the restoration of order in Russia, as Georgia, which considered itself to be an independent state, opposed the renewal of Russian authority over its territory.15 Finally, Western states politicians waived the project to convoke the meeting.

The problem of Georgia’ s future appeared during the Peace Conference in Paris sessions, also on the occasion of discussing the issue of assuming a mandate over Russian and Turkish Armenia by one of the victorious powers. On 30 January 1919, at a conference meeting, an idea was proposed to include the territory of Georgia in the mandate over Armenia areas that were to be taken over by the United States. This issue had been raised by the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, who pointed to the need to replace British troops in Transcaucasia by the armed forces of another power, in this case, the American ones.16

The government in London has sought to withdraw its troops from the South Caucasus, because it did not wish to become involved in territorial disputes among the various Transcaucasian republics. Their pacification required the introduction of British armed forces, which played the role of police and buffer forces between the conflicting parties. A specific example was the then Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict for Nagorno-Karabakh. British armed forces were also introduced as law enforcement forces in neutral zones between Armenian and Georgian troops in the Borchali and Akhalkalaki districts. In each of these zones, approximately 120 British soldiers were deployed under the Armenian-Georgian ceasefire signed on 25 December 1918 as a result of the mediation of British and French military missions’ heads.17

However, the British did not succeed in effectively intervening in the already mentioned territorial conflict in Abkhazia between Georgia and the Volunteer Army. When in the second half of January 1919, the Volunteer Army approached Sochi, the British forbade the “Whites” to march further in the direction of the city. Moreover, the representatives of the British command in Transcaucasia assured the Georgian government that the Volunteer Army would not take Sochi. However, the “volunteers” ignored the British position and on 6 February 1919, they occupied Sochi and pushed the Georgian forces beyond the River Bzyb.18

As a result of British-Georgian talks, it was decided that a small British force would be deployed between Georgian and Volunteer Army forces. At the same time, the British acknowledged the seizure of new areas in Abkhazia by General A. Denikin, as British troops were to be deployed in a way that recognised the February territorial achievements of the Volunteer Army at the expense of Georgia. However, finally, British forces did not enter the buffer zone and, therefore, when the “Volunteers” were involved in combat against the Bolsheviks in the Donetsk Coal Basin, in the second half of April 1919, the Georgians pushed the Volunteer Army forces back to the River Mechadyr.19

The representative of British command, Gen. William H. Beach, began to exert pressure on the government in Tiflis to make it withdraw its armed forces beyond the River Bzyb. Nevertheless, the Georgian politicians rejected this request because General Beach was not able to offer a formal guarantee on behalf of the British government that the Volunteer Army would not attack Georgian troops again.20

In February and March 1919, during the Peace Conference in Paris, also the question of Italy taking over a mandate over Georgia arose. On 8 February 1919, David Lloyd George during a conversation with the prime minister of Italy, Vittorio E. Orlando, and the Italian minister of foreign affairs, Sidney G. Sonnino, proposed that the Italian armed forces would replace the British in the Batumi–Baku zone, and then Italy would take over the mandate of Georgia and Azerbaijan. The purpose of this proposal was to persuade Italy to give up its military and political involvement in Asia Minor.

Initially, Italian politicians reacted positively to this proposal, since Italy was interested by the possibility of Georgian natural resources exploitation. This interest diverged probably due to numerous notes and brochures directed to the powers’ representatives by the Georgian delegation residing in Paris. Georgian natural resources were reported, and also the ease of their extraction and export abroad.21

The proposal that Italy would have taken over the mandate over Georgia was again undertaken in the course of the talks between D. Lloyd George and V.E. Orlando on 15 March 1919 in Paris. The prime minister of Italy continued then to sustain the interest of Italian companies in Georgian natural resources exploitation. However, he expressed concerns about the acquisition of the mandate over Georgia by Rome and about the political presence of Italy in the Transcaucasian republic. He pointed out that in the future, it could lead to conflict between Italy and Russia, which would eventually seek to rebuild its dominion over Georgia. This change of attitude of the Italian politician with respect to the Georgian mandate for Italy was due to the possibility of changes in the political situation in the south of Russia in connection with the Bolshevik offensive in Ukraine in March 1919.22

Not only Italy, France also sought to increase its economic activity in Georgia. It was indicated by the establishment of a Franco-Georgian Chamber of Commerce on 20 January 1919 in Tiflis. It associated 47 companies and 94 individuals that were interested in importing clothing, medicaments and electrical devices from France. The chamber was significantly supported financially by the representative of France in Georgia, Lt Col. Pierre-Auguste Chardigny who believed that Georgia, just as the entire Transcaucasia, could be a receptive market for French goods.23

At the same time, it should be stressed that the lack of recognition of Georgia’ s independence by Entente members in 1919 did not encourage Western companies to do business in that country. Especially that in view of the economic problems, in August 1919, the authorities of Georgia introduced the state export monopoly, among others, for food, crude oil, silkworm cocoons, and in November 1919, the monopoly on the export of manganese ore. It complicated the free economic exchange between Georgia and Western Europe.24

Despite the objections that the Italian politicians made to the mandate of Italy over Georgia, in spring 1919, it seemed that actually, the Italians would commit themselves militarily, politically and economically in that South Caucasian country. The arrival of a substantial Italian military mission on 12 May 1919 to Tiflis, commanded by Col. Melchiade Gabba, indicated this fact. Its purpose was to prepare the exchange of British troops with Italian troops in the Southern Caucasus.25

At the same time, the Entente powers still recognised Georgia and the entire South Caucasus as part of anti-Bolshevik Russia. In June 1919, the Western powers accepted the position of Admiral Alexander Kolchak, who offered national autonomy to non-Russian areas of the former empire, considering them an integral part of Russia. A. Kolchak recognised only Polish independence. The delegation of Georgia in Paris, together with representatives of Azerbaijan, Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus all objected to this position. On 17 June 1919, in an official note to the President of the Peace Conference, they argued that they represented sovereign states, which could establish relations with Russia provided that it recognises their sovereignty. However, this protest received no reaction from the victorious powers.26

In June 1919, the government in Italy changed. On 29 June 1919, the new Cabinet of Francesco S. Nitti abandoned sending Italian troops to Georgia and to Azerbaijan because of the anticipated too high costs of maintaining Italian forces in Transcaucasia, and the Italian budget, suffering from the economic crisis, was not able to support it.27

Despite the Italian decision, the British did not refrain from evacuating their troops from the South Caucasus. At the same time, they tried to maintain a strong economic influence and to establish a closer co-operation with South Caucasian governments to continue the export of crude oil and other resources of the region. Therefore, in June 1919, John O. Wardrop was appointed British Chief Commissioner in Transcaucasia. He was an outstanding expert on Georgian history and literature, particularly well disposed towards Georgia28.

British troops were evacuated from the South Caucasus by the end of October 1919. Only a 2,000-strong British garrison remained in the city and province of Batumi, placed under the authority of the British military governor. The British military presence in this city served to maintain their dominant position in Batumi. While officially, it was pointed out that the British armed forces would be evacuated from the region when the Peace Conference in Paris would have determined the political status of Batumi.29

In the autumn of 1919, Georgian representatives in Paris were still addressing official notes to delegations of the victorious powers governments, in which they protested against the assignment of the South Caucasus to Russia and demanded recognition of the independence of Georgia. It has been pointed out that Georgia had all the attributes of an independent state. Lack of diplomatic recognition by the Entente did not favour the development of democratic relations in the republic. In addition, the recognition of Georgia, like that of Azerbaijan and of Armenia, would allow them to create a barrier preventing the spread of Russian chaos into Asia Minor. Moreover, it was stressed that the recognition of the independence of Georgia would help Western countries to use its natural resources.30

Also, when the Georgian deputy minister of foreign affairs, Constantine Sabakhatarshvili, stayed in Rome in late October and November 1919, he proposed, in exchange for Georgian political recognition by Italy, that the government in Tbilisi would make numerous economic concessions for Italian companies. These included concessions for hard coal mining in Tkvarcheli and exploitation of forests in Svaneti.31

The above mentioned proved to be J.O. Wardrop, who was a great advocate of recognition of independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan by the Allies, and in particular by the United Kingdom. In the autumn of 1919, he was pointing out the efforts of the republics to establish closer economic relations with Britain and to receive British military and economic assistance.32

In October 1919, the governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan also attempted to improve their hostile relationships with the Volunteer Army assisted by Western powers.33 The discussions were held with a representative of the “volunteers,” Gen. Nikolai Baratov, in Tiflis. However, they ended in a fiasco, as Gen. A. Denikin still treated the Transcaucasian states as part of Russia.34 Such an attitude of the “volunteers” resulted also from the fact that at this time, the Volunteer Army offensive toward Moscow against the Bolsheviks was gaining success. The situation changed at the turn of 1919 and 1920, when the Volunteer Army was defeated and forced by the Red Army to retreat to southern Russia.

As the Entente military aid for “white” Russian forces brought no results, on 12 December 1919, the leaders of the victorious powers decided to support the states bordering Russia politically and militarily, to prevent them from being subordinated to the Bolsheviks. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan constituted part of the group. When, at the beginning of January 1920, the defeat of the Volunteer Army in the battle against the Red Army became even clearer, on the initiative of the head of British diplomacy, George N. Curzon, the participants of the Peace Conference recognised de facto the governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan on 10 January 1920. It was also agreed to send weapons to both those countries to enable them defend themselves against Soviet Russia.35

Despite, as it might have seemed, a positive attitude of the victorious powers towards the Transcaucasian republics during the meeting on 15 January 1920 with Georgian diplomats: Zurab Avalov and Irakli Cereteli, and Azerbaijani diplomats: Ali Madan Topchibashev and Magaramov, the representatives of Great Britain, France and Italy: Philip H. Kerr, Jules M. Cambon and Pietro P.M. Della Torretta did not reply to the question of Georgia’ s representatives whether the Entente powers would agree to temporarily separate Georgia from Russia. Furthermore, they left unmentioned the postulate of de jure recognition of Georgia and Azerbaijan by the victorious powers.36

During the subsequent meetings of the Peace Conference, Western politicians discussed the possibility of Georgia and Azerbaijan militarily coping with a possible offensive of the Red Army. The Entente military experts pointed out that in order to protect the South Caucasus against Sovietisation, the British Navy should control the Caspian Sea and that at least three Entente divisions should be sent to be deployed along the Baku–Batumi line. Nevertheless, as the Entente powers could not send these troops and Britain was unable to take control over the Caspian Sea, therefore they were against sending weapons to Georgia and Azerbaijan. They feared that the Bolsheviks would take the armament after the Sovietisation of the Transcaucasian republics. At the same time, some of the British military considered that Georgia and Azerbaijan could oppose the Red Army if they were supplied with armament from the Western countries.37

The representatives of the governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan presented a similar position; on 19 January 1920, for the first time, they were officially heard by participants of the Peace Conference. Georgian diplomats indicated that they were able to counteract the Bolsheviks because the republic’ s armed forces were of significantly higher combat value than the “volunteers” demoralised by their defeats. It was stressed that Georgia’ s military forces numbered 9,600 soldiers and 15,000 members of the National Guard. Moreover, it resulted from the previous statements of Georgian diplomats that Georgia might deploy 50,000 soldiers, if it was supplied with armament. Food supplies were necessary also, as food supply problems increased the population’ s susceptibility to Bolshevik propaganda.38 Finally, on 19 January 1920, the leaders of the Entente decided to send the armament, ammunition and food to all Southern Caucasus republics. However, they declined to send allied troops to Transcaucasia.

As there was still a threat that the Red Army would enter Transcaucasia and occupy Batumi, the British government, at the beginning of February 1920, decided to evacuate their troops from the city. However, in the second half of February 1920, it suspended the decision to withdraw while Batumi’ s political future was discussed at the allied conference in London, as it was necessary to establish the Armenia border.39 The settlement on that question needed to be included in the peace treaty of the Entente powers with Turkey. On 27 February 1920, the powers’ representatives agreed that, a “free state” supervised by the League of Nations would be created in Batumi province. It was also agreed to deploy an allied garrison of 1,800 soldiers, consisting of British, French and Italian battalions.40

In March 1920, Bolshevik Russia reinforced its position in North Caucasus and the threat of the Bolsheviks attack on Transcaucasia seemed to be increasing. Furthermore, the League of Nations supervision over the Batumi state proved to be dubious; moreover, both France and Italy did not want to send their troops to Batumi. Therefore, on 25 March 1920, the Allies decided to pass Batumi city and province to the authority of Georgia. It was also concluded that Batumi was to become a “free port” and Georgia should ensure the possibility of free use of Batumi port to Armenia and Azerbaijan.41

Once this decision was taken, Georgian-Armenian negotiations on special rights for Armenia in Batumi started. The Armenians wanted an extra-territorial railway through Georgian territory, connecting Batumi with Armenia. Nonetheless, Georgians rejected this request indicating that Armenia would have the same rights of free use of the port as other countries. The Armenians feared that should they not have special rights in Batumi, making the port available to Armenia could become an effective means of pressure on Armenia from the Georgian government. In turn, the Georgian authorities supposed that granting Armenia special rights in Batumi would significantly reduce the sovereignty of Georgia over the port. Neither of the two parties was ready for concessions, which was a result of the huge economic significance of Batumi, both for Georgia and for Armenia42.

On 27 April 1920, Azerbaijan was “sovietised,” and then the Red Army attacked the territories of Georgia and Armenia.43 Georgian troops offered such a strong resistance that Bolshevik forces withdrew from Georgia. At the same time, they continued to fight against Armenia. On 7 May 1920, a peace treaty between Georgia and Soviet Russia was signed. It was disadvantageous for Georgia, which had to accept, among others, the activity of a communist party on its territory. The representatives of the Entente powers viewed the signature of the treaty negatively, indicating that it might make Georgia dependent on Soviet Russia.44

The Azerbaijan sovietisation and, especially, the attack of the Red Army against the neighbouring republics, obliged the British government to withdraw its troops from Batumi. In order to make this decision at least look as if it was a previously planned action, on the initiative of British authorities, their representative Col. Claude B. Stokes discussed the evacuation of British troops from Batumi with the Tbilisi government. Finally, on 28 June 1920, an agreement was signed on the transfer of Batumi port, city and province from the United Kingdom to Georgia. According to previous statements, Georgia ensured free access to Batumi port for Armenia and Azerbaijan. On 7 July 1920, Georgian armed forces entered the city, and by 9 July 1920, British and French troops completed their evacuation from Batumi.45

The Georgian authorities thought that the British government recognised Georgia as a full political partner when they signed an agreement on the Batumi handover. Therefore, on 8 July 1920, the government in Tbilisi notified the Allied powers, discussing at the conference in Spa, its expectation for a de jure recognition of Georgia’ s independence. However, Western politicians rejected this request, indicating at the conference in Boulogne on 27 July 1920, that they recognised the republic only de facto.46

At the same time, on 15 July 1920, the first delivery of aid, in the form of military equipment, promised for several months by the victorious powers, entered the port of Poti. It included 25,000 rifles, 56,000,000 rounds of ammunition and 400 machine guns. Although most of the armament was sent to Armenia, Georgia received 27% of the entire delivery. To some extent, this contributed to improve the equipment of the Georgian armed forces.47

On 10 August 1920, the USA notified its allies, signatories of a peace treaty signed on the same day with Turkey in Sèvres, expressing the position of Washington towards Russia’ s future.48 The note expressed a hope that the Bolshevik government would be overthrown and Russia would introduce a democratic regime. At the same time; it emphasised that the U.S. government did not recognise the independence of, among others, Georgia, recognising it as part of Russia.49 In its reply to the government in Washington, dated on 18 August 1920, the Georgian delegation stated that Georgians had the right to independence because they enjoyed a developed national identity that enabled distinguishing them from their neighbours. In addition, the Allies, Gen. A. Denikin, and Soviet Russia, recognised Georgia’ s independence.50 However, Georgian note did not cause any reaction of the U.S. government.

Despite the absence of de jure recognition of Georgian independence by the victorious powers, the Georgian government undertook further efforts to establish economic contacts with Western Europe. Among others, this was the purpose of the mission of Georgian Minister of Finance, Constantine Kandelaki, who had been in Western Europe since May 1920. In the autumn of 1920, he was involved in discussions in France on the creation of a joint stock company, which would gain a monopoly on the silkworm rearing and on the creation of silk weaving mills in Georgia. The Georgian government as well as Georgian and French companies would have become shareholders of the planned enterprise. While in Italy, C. Kandelaki signed an agreement with Campagnie Italiana per il Caucaso for the exploitation of coal seams in Tkvarcheli.51

The Georgian Minister of Finance solicited also to obtain loans from Western European states governments to buy food, weapons and to develop Georgia’ s industrial infrastructure. However, they did not wish to grant Georgia such subventions due to the uncertain political situation in the republic. In August 1920, C. Kandelaki managed only to obtain a small loan of 358,000 francs from Crédit Commercial de France for the National Bank of Georgia, while in November 1920; he received a loan in the amount of 1,500,000 pounds from “the British Bank for Foreign Trade Limited.” 52 However, the British loan and plans to establish the co-operation of Georgian government with Italian and French companies, were not completed because of the deteriorating military situation of Armenia and thus of Georgia indirectly.

In autumn 1920, Georgian diplomats still endeavoured to obtain de jure recognition by Western powers for Georgia. This was indicated during discussions held between the Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Evgeni Gegechkori and the French Prime Minister Georges Leygues on 30 September 1920 and the British Minister of Foreign Affairs G.N. Curzon on 21 October 1920. On those occasions, Western politicians stated that both powers intended to recognise Georgia de jure. Yet they could not do so in the current political situation because they would also have to formally recognise the independence of Azerbaijan, being independent from Soviet Russia. Furthermore, it was stressed that the formal recognition of Georgia needed be done jointly by all Allied powers.53

The de jure recognition of Georgia by the Entente was complicated also by Armenia’ s situation; from the end of September 1920, it was involved in armed conflicts with Turkish nationalists.54 As a result, the Armenian army suffered a defeat. The Turkish army took a considerable part of Armenian territory according to the Turkish-Armenian treaty signed in Alexandropol on 3 December 1920. Nonetheless, the treaty did not come into force because, at the same time, Armenia was attacked by the Red Army. It helped to create a communist government of Armenia, in Erivan on 2 December 1920.55 Thus, Georgia was surrounded by states subordinated to Bolshevik Russia.

The events in Armenia took place during the period when the League of Nations, in the course of its first meeting in Geneva, discussed the Georgian application. The Georgian government was making efforts to obtain membership of the League of Nations as it hoped that this would strengthen the republic’ s international position. The Covenant of the League of Nations, analysing the candidacy of Georgia to the organisation, opted for its invitation to join the League. However, finally, on 16 December 1920, the Covenant of the League of Nations rejected Georgia’ s candidature.56 The position of France, Italy and the United Kingdom influenced this decision; they feared that Georgia might become subordinated to Bolshevik Russia and, in this situation, the League of Nations would be obliged to intervene and defend the independence of this Transcaucasian republic. This intervention would have been performed by the victorious powers, which did not want to re-engage militarily in Southern Caucasus57.

The rejection of the Georgian candidature to the League of Nations and the deteriorating international position of the republic made Georgian diplomats intensify their action for de jure recognition of its independence by the Entente. On 12 January 1921, during a conversation between E. Gegechkori and the French president, Alexandre Millerand, the latter concluded that France was determined to recognise Georgia de jure. But it had to be decided upon together with its allies. They also obtained the information that the Italian government opted for Georgia’ s de jure recognition.58

Therefore, on 21 January, E. Gegechkori sent a letter to the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, asking for Georgia’ s de jure recognition by the Supreme Council. It indicated that the recognition would strengthen the republic’ s political position and would enable it to establish economic relations with European countries. Under the influence of French politicians, on 26 January, the Supreme Council of Allied and Associated Powers decided to recognise Georgian independence de jure, should the representative of Georgia’ s government make such a request formally. The next day, such a letter was issued and on 27 January 1921, the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers recognised Georgia’ s government de jure.59

This decision was primarily a result of France’ s attitude, which after the defeat of the Volunteer Army at Crimea in November 1920, lost faith in the possibility of creating an anti-Bolshevik Russia in the near future, and then decided to strengthen states created in frontier areas of the former Romanov empire. Therefore, also upon French initiative, on 27 January 1921, Latvia and Estonia were recognised de jure by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers.60 However, the de jure recognition of Georgia’ s government by the victorious powers did not protect it against its subordination to Soviet Russia in March 1921.61

Reviewing the policy of the Entente states towards Georgia during the period from May 1918 to January 1921, it should be emphasised that it was closely dependent on the Entente powers policy, first towards Germany and Turkey, then, after the First World War, towards “white” and “red” Russia. It was also aligned with the powers’ policy towards Armenia and Azerbaijan.

After the announcement of Georgia’ s independence in May 1918, in connection with the establishment of close political, military and economic co-operation with Germany, the Georgian republic was regarded as close ally of the Reich and the Entente powers’ enemy. While at the end of the First World War, particularly in 1919, the victorious powers’ policy towards Georgia was largely formed by hostile relations between Georgia and the Volunteer Army. Its commander, Gen. A. Denikin, did not recognise Georgia’ s independence, considering the republic as part of Russian territory. Bad relations between the “volunteers” and Georgia became worse due to conflict for Abkhazia that both parties required.

The victorious powers co-operating with the Volunteer Army also did not recognise the independence of Georgia and of other Southern Caucasus republics. At the end of World War I, British forces occupied Transcaucasia and remained in the region until the end of October 1919. To enable Western European companies to export natural raw materials from the Caucasus, the representatives of the British authorities and other powers in the Southern Caucasus actually recognised the existence of Transcaucasian republics’ governments.

The issue of the future of Georgia and of other southern Caucasus republics was also discussed during the deliberations of the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919. The victorious powers refused the requests of Georgia’ s delegation in Paris to recognise the country’ s independence, considering it to be a part of Russia. In the spring of 1919, an idea was presented at the conference, to put Georgia and Azerbaijan under Italian mandate connected with its military presence. However, the Italian government gave up this idea, fearing conflict with democratic Russia that would be rebuilt in the future.

The situation of the South Caucasus changed at the turn of 1919 and 1920, when the Volunteer Army began to suffer defeats against the Bolsheviks. In January 1920, Entente powers recognized de facto the governments of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and decided to provide them with military support to reinforce their opposition against Bolshevik Russia. But with the withdrawal of British troops from the Caucasus in autumn 1919, the Western powers did not decide to re-send significant military forces to South Caucasus, leaving only a small detachment of British forces in Batumi.

The sovietisation of Azerbaijan in April 1920, further complicated the international situation of Georgia, which, threatened by Bolshevik Russia, signed an unfavourable peace treaty in May 1920. After the Azerbaijan sovietisation, the United Kingdom decided to also withdraw its troops from Batumi, which was transferred to Georgia in July 1920.

Despite the de facto recognition of Georgia’ s government by the Allied powers, their actual policy towards the republic did not change. In 1920, the Georgian policy of the powers was largely shaped by their attitude towards Soviet Russia. Lack of de jure recognition of the Georgian government by the Allies prevented the representatives of Georgia’ s government from signing favourable economic agreements with Western European companies.

The hostilities between Soviet Azerbaijan and Armenia in summer 1920, and armed conflict between Armenia and Turkey in autumn 1920, worsened the military position of the South Caucasus, including Georgia. Armenia’ s sovietisation at the beginning of December 1920 put the Georgian republic in a very poor military position. The threat of Bolshevik Russia that, moreover, blocked deliveries of Azerbaijani crude oil required for the Georgian economy, made Georgian diplomacy intensify its activities to obtain the de jure recognition of the Georgian government by the Entente powers.

The application for Georgian membership of the League of Nation was also to serve the strengthening of its international position. However, the Western powers caused the rejection of Georgia’ s candidature to the organisation, fearing that the League of Nations and actually allied powers would have to intervene militarily in defence of Georgia’ s independence against Bolshevik Russia.

Finally, as a result of Georgian diplomatic undertakings, the Allied Supreme Council recognised de jure Georgia’ s independence on 27 January 1921. However, this decision did not prevent Georgia’ s “sovietisation” in March 1921.

1 National Archives, Washington DC (College Park MD) (NA W), General Records of the Department of State. Record Group 59 (RG 59), Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Russia and the Soviet Union, 1910–1929 M316 (M316), Roll 137, doc. 861.6363/4, pp. 0031–0034; National Republic of Georgia. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, Washington 1926, pp. 145–148; V. Semdov, Neft i ekonomika Rossyi (80–90 gody XIX veka), Baku 1988, p. 17; T. Wituch, Tureckie przemiany. Dzieje Turcji 1878–1923, Warszawa 1980, pp. 226–232; P. Olszewski, Polityka państw Ententy wobec Zakaukazia w latach 1918–1921, Piotrków Trybunalski 2001, pp. 16–17.

2 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1918 Russia (FRUS 1918 Russia), vol. II, Washington 1932, p. 580, p. 582, p. 618; T. Swietochowski, The Russian Azerbaijan 1905–1920. The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community, Cambridge 1985, pp. 101–102, 107; W. Materski, Georgia Rediviva. Republika Gruzińska w stosunkach międzynarodowych 1918–1921, Warszawa 1994, pp. 27–28; A. Furier, Droga Gruzji do niepodległości, Poznań 2000, pp. 89–91; G. Gasanov, Na puti k pervoi respublike. Ocherki istorii Azerbaidjana s fevrala 1917 goda do maia 1918 goda, Baku 2010, pp. 272–282; B. Patlewicz, Azerbejdżańska droga do pierwszej niepodległości, Szczecin 2016, pp. 118–119.

3 Les Grandes Puissances, l’Empire Ottoman et les Arméniens dans les Archives Françaises (1914–1918). Recueil de Documents, ed. A. Beylerian, Paris 1983, p. 586; Z. Avalov, Niezavisimost’ Gruzii w mezhdunarodnoi politike 1918–1921, New York 1982, pp. 30–32; W. Materski, Georgia, p. 42.

4 Z. Avalov, Niezavisimost’ Gruzii, p. 38; T. Swietochowski, The Russian, pp. 119–120; A. Furier, Droga Gruzji do niepodległości, p. 93; G. Gasanov, Na puti k piervoi respublike, pp. 302–308; B. Patlewicz, Azerbejdżańska droga, pp. 133–134.

5 S. Kuruliszwili, Gruzja pod jarzmem bolszewickim, Warszawa 1922, pp. 4–6; R.G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia, vol. I: The First Year, 1918–1919, Berkeley 1971, p. 28, 33; R.G. Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, Bloomington and Indianapolis 1994, pp. 192–193; P. Olszewski, Polityka, p. 35; G. Gasanov, Na puti k pervoi respublike, pp. 318–320.

6 NAW, Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. Record Group 256 (RG 256), General Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 1918–1931 M820 (M820), Roll 223, doc. 184.01602/23, pp. 31–32; Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), Ambasada RP w Londynie (L), sign. 297, p. 22; Politika Germanii v Zakavkaze w 1918 godu. Sbornik dokumentov, red. G.W. Pipija, Tbilisi, pp. 16, 34–35, 50; G.W. Pipija, Germanskii imperializm v Zakavkaze w 1910–1918 gg., Moskwa 1978, p. 102; W. Materski, “Gruzja i mocarstwa 1917–1921. Część I: 1917–1918”, Studia z Dziejów ZSRR i Europy Środkowej, 23 (1987), pp. 98–99; M. Mądzik, Działalność społeczno-kulturalna i polityczna Polaków w Gruzji na przełomie XIX i XX wieku, Lublin 1987, p. 149; R.G. Suny, Looking toward Ararat. Armenia in modern history, Bloomington and Indianapolis 1993, p. 125; A.L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks. Power and Identity under Russian Rule, Stanford 1992, p. 91.

7 Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris (MAE P), Série: Levant 1918–1940 (Levant), Caucase-Kurdistan, vol. 2, pp. 237, 283–288; NA W, RG 59, Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations between Russia and the Soviet Union and Other States, 1910–1929 M340 (M340), Roll. 7, doc. 761.67/6, pp. 1–2; FRUS 1918 Russia, vol. II, pp. 632–633, 639–642; Z. Avalov, Niezavisimost’ Gruzii, pp. 59–60, 116–119, 139–141.

8 G.A. Brinkley, The Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in a South Russia 1917–1921. A Study in Politics and Diplomacy of the Russian Civil War, Notre Dame 1966, p. 50; W. Materski, Georgia, pp. 74–76.

9 MAE P, Série: Europe 1918–1940, URSS, vol. 832, p. 16; Ibid., vol. 833, p. 120; Documents on British Foreign Policy. 1919–1939. First Series, vol. III, London 1949, p. 482; T. Swietochowski, The Russian, pp. 141–143; idem, Azerbejdżan i Rosja. Kolonializm, islam i narodowość w podzielonym kraju, Warszawa 1998, p. 93; A.L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, pp. 93–96.

10 MAE N, Londres Ambassade 1914–1920, Série B (Londres B), vol. 44; Dni gospodstva menshevikov w Gruzii (dokumenty i materialy), ed. G. Dewdariani, Gosizdat Gruzii 1931, p. 39; A.H. Arslanian, Britain and the Transcaucasian nationalities during the Russian civil war, [in:] Transcaucasia. Nationalism and social changes. Essays in the history of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, ed. by R.G. Suny, Michigan 1983, p. 295; W. Materski, Georgia, pp. 103–104.

11 Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine, Nanterre, France, Archives de la République Indépendante de la Géorgie (AR), vol. 68; NA W, RG 256, M820, Roll 407, doc. 185.513/14, p. 8; Z. Avalov, Niezavisimost’ Gruzii, pp. 161–164; A. Furier, Droga Gruzji do niepodległości, p. 98.

12 MAE P, Levant, Caucase-Kurdistan, vol. 3, p. 164–168; A.H. Arslanian, Droga Gruzji do niepodległości, pp. 299–300; P. Olszewski, “ ‘Kwestia batumska’ w polityce Ententy po I wojnie światowej”, Dzieje Najnowsze, 31 (1999), no. 1, p. 49.

13 W.P. Churchill, The Aftermath Being a Sequel to the World Crisis, London 1941, p. 166; A.I. Czocheli, Politika Francii w otnoshenii Gruzii w 1917–1921 godach, Tbilisi 1980, p. 112.

14 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1919 Russia (FRUS 1919 Russia), Washington 1937, pp. 30–31; Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference 1919 (FRUS PPC), Washington 1943, vol. III, p. 734; K. Hovi, Cordon Sanitaire or Barrière de l’Est? The Emergency of the New French Eastern European Alliance Policy 1917–1919, Turku 1975, p. 80.

15 MAE P, Levant, Caucase–Kurdistan, vol. 4, p. 4; FRUS 1919 Russia, pp. 47–49.

16 NA W, RG 256, M820, Roll 407, doc. 185.513/22, pp. 4–5, doc. 185.513/23, p. 5; FRUS PPC, vol. III, p. 806.

17 AR, vol. 70; NA W, RG 59, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Armenia, 1910–1929 T1192 (T1192), Roll 2, doc. 860j.01/199, pp. 19–23; Ibid., RG 256, M820, Roll 223, doc. 184.01602/23, p. 4, 20, 23–24, 42, 45; R.G. Suny, The Making, p. 202; W. Materski, Georgia, pp. 88–89; P. Olszewski, Polityka, pp. 66–67.

18 AR, vol. 70; NA W, RG 256, M820, Roll 223, doc. 184.01602/1, p. 2; A.H. Arslanian, Droga Gruzji do niepodległości, p. 296; W. Materski, Gruzja, Warszawa 2010, pp. 83–84.

19 NA W, RG 256, M820; Roll 223, doc. 184.01602/23, pp. 20–22, doc. 184.01602/28, pp. 1–2, doc. 184.01602/31, p. 1; Demokraticheskoe pravitelstvo Gruzii i angliiskoe komandowanie, red. P.Je. Sef, Tiflis 1928, pp. 24–27; A.I. Denikin, Ocherki ruskoj smuty, t. IV: Vooruzhonnye Sily Juga Rosii, Berlin 1925, p. 156; W. Materski, Gruzja, p. 85. The British government believed that the Abkhazian people was linguistically distinct from Georgia – NA W, RG 256, M820, Roll 407, doc. 185.513/14, p. 8; Ibid., Roll 223, doc. 184.01602/25, p. 1.

20 NA W, RG 256, M820, Roll 223, doc. 184.01602/38, pp. 1–3, doc. 184.01602/51, p. 1, doc. 01602/68, pp. 1-2, doc. 184.01602/109, pp. 1–2; Demokraticheskoe, pp. 53–63; A.I. Denikin, Ocherki, vol. IV, pp. 161–162; W. Materski, Georgia, p. 119.

21 MAE P, Levant, Caucase-Kurdistan, vol. 4, pp. 15–23; Ibid., Europe, URSS, vol. 638, pp. 1–21; Ibid., URSS, vol. 655, pp. 1–13; FRUS PPC, vol. III, p. 190–191; I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, seste serie: 1918–1922 (DDI), vol. I, Roma 1955, pp. 435, 456; Ibid., vol. II, p. 167, pp. 190, 350, 636, 661, 687–688, 699–700; P. Olszewski, “ ‘Notiziario Commerciale’ – przyczynek do historii gruzińsko-włoskich kontaktów gospodarczych w latach 1919–1921”, Pro Georgia. Prace i Materiały do Dziejów Stosunków Polsko-Gruzińskich, 6 (1997), pp. 38–39.

22 NA W, RG 256, M820, Roll 407, doc. 185.513/22, p. 2; Ibid., M820, Roll 223, doc. 184.01602/38, p. 5; AAN, Komitet Narodowy Polski w Paryżu, sign. 2171, p. 28; FRUS PPC, vol. IV, Washington 1943, p. 379–384; DDI, vol. II, p. 636, p. 645; P. Mantoux, Les Délibérations du Conseil des Quatre (28 mars – 28 juin 1919). Notes de l’Officier Inteprète depuis la remise à la Delegation Allemande des conditions de paix jusqu’à la signature du Traité de Versailles, vol. I, Paris 1955, pp. 22–23, 52, 56–57; P. Masson, La Marine Française et la Mer Noir (1918–1919), Paris 1982, pp. 187–191, 255–256.

23 MAE P, Levant, Caucase-Kurdistan, vol. 3, p. 233; A.I. Czocheli, Politika Francii, p. 34.

24 MAE P, Europe, URSS, vol. 656, pp. 5–6, 163–164; NA W, RG 256, M820, Roll 223, doc. 184.01602/23, p. 26, pp. 82–85, doc. 184.01602/38, p. 3, doc. 184.01602/96, pp. 1–4; more information on the economic situation of the Georgian republic and the budget plan of the Georgian government, covering the period from 1 June 1919 to 1 June 1920, see: NA W, RG 256, M820, Roll 223, doc. 184.0102/88, pp. 1–4; A.I. Czocheli, Politika Francii, pp. 45–52.

25 MAE P, Levant, Caucase-Kurdistan, vol. 4, p. 131, 149; MAE N, Londres B, vol. 70; NA W, RG 256, M820, Roll 223, doc. 184.01602/68, pp. 3–4; FRUS 1919 Russia, p. 763; T. Swietochowski, The Russian, pp. 156–157.

26 MAE P, Europe, URSS, vol. 832, p. 75; Ibid., vol. 638; NA W, RG 256, M820, Roll 223, doc. 184.01602/51, pp. 1–2; FRUS 1919 Russia, pp. 381–382; P. Mantoux, Les Délibérations du Conseil, vol. II, pp. 334–335; FRUS PPC, vol. V, pp. 551–552; Ibid., vol. VI, Washington 1946, p. 322; W.P. Churchill, The Aftermath, pp. 180–183; B. Patlewicz, Azerbejdżańska droga, p. 154.

27 MAE P, Europe, Italie, vol. 78, p. 155; NA W, RG 256, M820, Roll 194, doc. 181.9402/1, p. 1; FRUS PPC, vol. V, pp. 688–689; Ibid., vol. VII, Washington 1946, p. 649; T. Wituch, Od Trypolisu do Lozanny. Polityka Włoch wobec Turcji i Bliskiego Wschodu w latach 1912–1922, Warszawa 1986, p. 142.

28 MAE P, Europe, URSS, vol. 832, p. 113; DBFP, vol. III, pp. 451–453; W. Materski, “Gruzja i Wielkie Mocarstwa (1919–1920)”, Studia z Dziejów ZSRR i Europy Środkowej, 25 (1989), p. 65.

29 NA W, RG 59, T1192, Roll 1, doc. 860j.01/32, p. 3, doc. 860j.01/37, p. 1; Ibid., RG 256, M820, Roll 194, doc. 181.9402/7, p. 1; R.G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia, vol. II: From Versailles to London, 1919–1920, Berkeley 1982, p. 109; W. Materski, Georgia, pp. 141–142; T. Świętochowski, Azerbejdżan i Rosja, p. 100; P. Olszewski, “Kwestia batumska”, p. 52.

30 AR, vol. 89; MAE P, URSS, vol. 832, pp. 95–96, 107–108; Ibid., vol. 638; AAN, L, sign. 170, pp. 112–114.

31 DBFP, vol. III, pp. 595–596; P. Olszewski, “ ‘Notiziario Commerciale’ ”, p. 40.

32 DBFP, vol. III, pp. 535–358, 575–576.

33 NA W, RG 256, M820, Roll 223, doc. 184.01602/68, pp. 2– 3; Ibid., doc. 184.01602/108, p. 1.

34 Ministère de la Defense, Service Historique de l’ Armée de Terre, Château de Vincennes (AA), Série 20N (20N), vol. 186; AAN, Instytucje Wojskowe 1918–1939, sign. 296/II-10, p. 62; DBFP, vol. III, p. 575, 584–585; Dni gospodstva, pp. 85–86; R.G. Hovannisian, The Republic, vol. II, p. 136.

35 NA W, RG 59, T1192, Roll 2, doc. 860j.01/192, pp. 1–2; Ibid., doc. 860j.01/192b, pp. 1–3; FRUS PPC, Washington 1946, vol. IX, pp. 958–959; Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1920 (FRUS 1920), Washington 1936, vol. III, pp. 774–775; T. Swietochowski, The Russian, p.159.

36 FRUS PPC, vol. IX, p. 866; DBFP, vol. III, p. 752; Z. Avalov, Niezavisimost’ Gruzii, p. 241; W. Materski, Georgia, p. 159.

37 FRUS 1919 Russia, pp. 902–904; DBFP, vol. III, pp. 751–755; A.L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, pp. 105–107.

38 FRUS PPC, vol. IX, p. 892–897.

39 MAE N, Consulate Trebizonde (Trebizonde), vol. 76; NA W, RG 256, M820, Roll 407, doc. 185.5/58, pp. 1–9; AAN, L, sign. 937, pp. 77–78; DBFP, London 1962, vol. XII, p. 558, p. 562.

40 MAE N, Londres B, vol. 331; NA W, RG 256, M820, Roll 407, doc. 185.5/58, p. 3; DBFP, London 1955, vol. VII, pp. 253–255, 647–649; P. Olszewski, “Kwestia batumska”, p. 55. At the beginning of the Paris conference, the British proposed the creation of an autonomous Muslim district, including Abkhazia and Lazystan, which will be part of Georgia. Moreover the British proposed the establishment of “free ports” in Batumi and Poti, and the creation of the freedom to transport goods to these ports using railways from one country through the other of the state (i.e. Georgia – the note from author of this article) by virtue of a special convention signed between the South Caucasian governments and participants of the Paris conference. These proposals were included in the memorandum of 7 February 1919, which was sent by the English Government to the participants of the Peace Conference – NA W, RG 256, M820, Roll 407, doc. 185.513/14, pp. 8–9.

41 MAE N, Londres B, vol. 50; DBFP, vol. VII, pp. 520–521, 640–643.

42 NA W, RG 59, T1192, Roll 2, doc. 860j.01/314, p. 5; Z. Avalov, Niezavisimost’ Gruzii, p. 262, 265, 267–276; P. Olszewski, “Kwestia batumska”, pp. 56–57.

43 NA W, RG 59, M722, Roll 8, doc. 890c.6363/4, p. 1, dok. 890c.00/3, pp. 1–7; Ibid., RG 59, T1192, Roll 1, doc. 860j.00/4, pp. 2–8; Ibid., RG 59, T1192, Roll 2, doc. 860j.01/257, p. 1; Ibid. RG 59, Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations between Armenia and Other States, 1910–1929. T1193 (T1193), Roll 1, doc. 760j.61/2, pp. 1–2; T. Swietochowski, The Russian, pp. 179–183; B. Patlewicz, Azerbejdżańska droga, pp. 178–182.

44 MAE N, Rome Quirinal Ambassade, Série A (Rome A), vol. 627; Ibid., Londres B, vol. 51; AA, 20N, vol. 186; NA W, RG 59, M722, Roll 8, doc. 890c.00/3, p. 7; Ibid., RG 59, T1192, Roll 2, doc. 860j.01/314, pp. 1–2, doc. 860j.01/314, p. 3; DBFP, vol. XII, p. 615; Okkupacya i fakticheskaia aneksia Gruzii. O politicheskoi i prawowoi ocenke naruszeniia dogowora mezhdu Gruziey i Sowietskoi Rossiyey ot 7 maja 1920 goda. Dokumenty i materialy, Tbilisi 1990, pp. 77–83; R.G. Suny, The Making, p. 206; W. Materski, Georgia, pp. 176–179; P. Olszewski, „Polityka bolszewików wobec niepodległej Gruzji w latach 1918–1921”, Dzieje Najnowsze, 29 (1997), No. 3, pp. 12–14.

45 Marine Nationale, Service Historique, Château de Vincennes (AM), Série: 1BB7, vol. 138; AA, 17N, vol. 587; MAE N, Rome A, vol. 597; NA W, RG 59, T1192, Roll 2, doc. 860j.01/314, pp. 3–4; DBFP, vol. XII, pp. 626–627, 632–633; R.G. Suny, The Making, p. 204.

46 AR, vol. 94; AAN, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych (MSZ), sign. 21, pp. 25–26; Ibid., sign. 229, pp. 8–12; AAN, L, sign. 938, pp. 32–33; DBFP, London 1947, vol. VIII, pp. 513–517; Ibid., vol. XII, pp. 630, p. 656, 659.

47 MAE P, vol. 644, p. 97; AA, 20N, vol. 186.

48 NA W, RG 256, M820, Roll 407, doc. 185.5/42, pp. 1–6.

49 NA W, RG 59, M722, Roll 8, doc. 890c.00/4, pp. 1–4.

50 MAE P, Série: Amérique 1918–1940, États-Unis, vol. 3, pp. 13–15; Ibid., vol. 77, pp. 10–11; MAE P, Levant, Arménie, vol. 11, pp. 141–143; MAE N, Rome, vol. 627; Ibid., vol. 819; AR, vol. 77; FRUS 1920, vol. III, pp. 463–468; A. Nowak, Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu. 1920 – zapomniany appeasement, Kraków 2015, pp. 103–107.

51 AR, vol. 34; Ibid., vol. 35; Ibid., vol. 36; MAE N, Londres B, vol. 319, A.I. Czocheli, Politika Francii, pp. 62–66.

52 AR, vol. 36, vol. 94; AAN, Ambasada RP w Waszyngtonie, sign. 93, p. 32; AAN, L. sign. 939, pp. 9–12; MAE P, Europe, URSS, vol. 656, p. 13; NA W, RG 59, T1192, doc. 860j.00/19, pp. 5–7.

53 AR, vol. 96; DBFP, vol. VIII, pp. 307–308; Ibid., vol. XII, pp. 639–641.

54 NA W, RG 59, T1193, Roll 1, doc. 760j.6716/23, pp. 1–2, doc. 760j.67/4, p. 1, doc. 760j.67/35, pp. 1–2; Ibid. RG 59, T1192, Roll 1, doc. 860j.00/4, p. 2, doc. 860j.00/-, p. 1; Ibid., RG 59, M340, Roll 7, doc. 761.67/11, p. 1; R.G. Suny, Looking, p. 130.

55 MAE P, Europe, URSS, vol. 644, p. 146; NA W, RG 59, T1192, Roll 1, doc. 860j.00/-, p. 1, doc. 860j.00/16, pp. 1–2; doc. 860j.00/18, p. 1–4, doc. 860j.00/19, pp. 1–2; Ibid., RG 59, T1193, Roll 1, doc. 760j.67/29, p. 1, doc. 760j.67/43, pp. 1–2; Ibid., RG 59, M340, Roll 7, doc. 761.67/13, p. 2.

56 MAE P, Levant, Arménie, vol. 13, p. 52; Documents Relatifs à la Question de la Géorgie devant la Société des Nations, Paris 1927, pp. 12–15; W. Materski, Georgia, pp. 211–212; P. Olszewski, “Kwestia zakaukaska na forum Ligi Narodów w 1920 r.”, Piotrkowskie Zeszyty Historyczne, 1 (1999), pp. 108–109.

57 DBFP, vol. VIII, pp. 841–842; Ibid., London 1963, vol. XIII, p. 198, p. 657; A. Furier, Droga Gruzji do niepodległości, p. 100.

58 MAE P, Europe, URSS, vol. 653, p. 231; Ibid., vol. 655, pp. 33–34.

59 AR, vol. 96; MAE N, Berlin Ambassade, Série: B, vol. 566; Ibid., Rome A, vol. 620, MAE P, Série: Y Internationale 1918–1940, vol. 430, p. 173; National Republic, s. 208; Z. Avalov, Niezavisimost’ Gruzii, pp. 309–310; W. Materski, Georgia, p. 212.

60 K. Hovi, Alliance de Revers. Stabilization of France’ s Alliance Policies in East Central Europe 1919–1924, Turku 1984, pp. 116–118.

61 W. Materski, Georgia, pp. 214–225; A. Furier, Droga Gruzji do niepodległości, pp. 106–107.

Points of Convergence of Georgian
and Polish Military Histories in 191–1921… according to previously unknown documents kept in the National Archives of Georgia
by Dimitri Silakadze

Even though Poland and Georgia did not have direct military relations in 1918–1921, both states faced somewhat similar problems, including the shared problem of having a common opponent in Bolshevik Russia. Despite non-existent direct military relations between the two countries, such relations did occur on the level of citizens, which is evident from several documents found in the Central Archive of Georgia, providing material for further research.

Five of these documents are reports sent in the summer and autumn of 1920 by Sergo Kuruliszwili, Chairman of the Georgian Committee in Poland, to Mikheil Sumbatashvili, a representative of Georgia in Bern, Switzerland, and to the Georgian diplomatic delegation in Paris. Of interest in these reports is the fate of 300 Georgian soldiers who were enlisted by force into the White Army of General Anton Denikin and served in the unit commanded by the White Guard General Nikolai Bredov, who fled with his unit to Poland in early 1920. After entering Polish territory, they were placed in internment camps. Archival documents reveal that the Polish government supported the Georgian Committee’ s request to repatriate them, however, some of them remained in Poland and then served in the Polish army. The reports by Sergo Kuruliszwili also reveal the attitude and expectations of the Georgian Committee and other Georgian regulars who found themselves in the frontline city of Warsaw in July and August of 1920.

Also interesting is a letter sent on 14 September 1920 by General Leo Kereselidze, head of the Georgian military legion of volunteers, to Mikheil Sumbatashvili, a diplomatic representative of Georgia in Bern. Leo Kereselidze, who went to Poland with the consent of the Georgian government, was tasked with advising the government about whether to send Georgian officers to the Polish army. Kereselidze advised the government against doing this due to typhoid and other epidemics, and severe weather conditions.

Archival documents contain an emotional letter by Polish citizens, husband and wife Konstantine and Varvara Nikolaevs residing in the city of Dubno, requesting the Georgian diplomatic mission in Poland to enlist them in the Georgian army as volunteers in the Russian-Georgian war in 1921.

An important document is a report by Aleksandre Koniashvili, a Georgian general serving in the Polish army after the loss of Georgia’ s independence, to Aleksandre Zakariadze, another Georgian general serving in the Polish army. This report of 1929 starts with a review of Georgian-Polish military relations in 1918–1921. The document reveals that Polish officers were the only nationality allowed to serve in the Georgian army despite their lack of knowledge of the Georgian language.

Finally, according to one archival document, during the Russian-Polish War of 1920, the headquarters of the Georgian People’ s Guard made a secret decision to send three groups of officers to sabotage the backline of the Russian army. The only two officers that survived were serving sentences in Russian prisons as of 1929.

Georgian Committee in Poland
Excerpt from a letter by Sergo Kuruliszwili1 sent to Mikheil Sumbatashvili, a representative of Georgia in Bern2

Warsaw, 12 June 1920

We would also like to let you know that Polish prison camps hold 300 Georgian citizens; we believe that a description of their situation is unnecessary. Their delegates arrived in Warsaw yesterday and requested their prompt release and repatriation. These are soldiers in the army of General Bredov, who fled to Poland and surrendered there. Personal files of the three hundred Georgian citizens who served in this army are kept in the Committee office and prove that they are Georgians and residents of Georgia. They were mobilised by force, since Denikin did not recognise Georgia.3 Negotiations with the Polish Foreign Ministry revealed that the prisoners will be released from these camps at our first request. Therefore, the Committee is sending its delegates to free them; however, we do not know where to accommodate them or how to repatriate them, since the Committee does not have any funds at present.

S. Kuruliszwili

I. Antadze4

Georgian Committee in Poland
Extract from a letter by Sergo Kuruliszwili sent to the representative of Georgia in Rome

Warsaw, 26 July 1920

The Committee has liberated one hundred Georgian prisoners who are currently in Warsaw. We are trying to repatriate them. These are officers and soldiers serving in the Bredov army. As you know, General Bredov’ s army fled to Poland and surrendered here. Currently, we can send only 30 people. The Serbian embassy refused to transport Georgians through its territory, since Serbia has not yet recognised the independence of Georgia and they have not been able to come to terms with the dissolution of enormous Russia. Because of this, with a great deal of effort, we have identified new routes and persuaded Czechoslovakia and Austria to transport the Georgian echelon through their territory, and provide it with a railway carriage and food. As for the Ottoman embassy, it demands three hundred marks for each person, so after passing through Austria the Georgian echelon will be delivered into your care in Italy. Therefore, once we send you a telegram with the date of departure of the echelon from Warsaw, we ask you to send your representative to the Austrian and Italian borders, so that the echelon is provided with appropriate assistance and food on their way from Trieste to Istanbul.

Chairman of the Committee, S. Kuruliszwili

I. Guramishvili5

Georgian Committee in Poland
Excerpt from a letter by Sergo Kuruliszwili sent to Mikheil Sumbatashvili, a representative of Georgia in Bern

Warsaw, 15 September 1920

We sent one echelon to Georgia. I received permission from the Romanian government to allow us to send two hundred Georgians through the territory of Romania, which will also provide us with a railway carriage and food free of charge. At the same time, I persuaded the Polish government to transport them to its border and provide us with a railway carriage. Only a small number of Georgians remain in Poland; we sent some of them, while some joined the Polish army due to lack of funds.

With respect, Chairman of the Georgian Committee, S. Kuruliszwili6

Georgian Committee in Poland
Letter by Sergo Kuruliszwili to the Georgian Delegation in Paris

Warsaw, 30 July 1920

I would like to inform you that the Bolsheviks are near Warsaw and may take the city soon. Today, Warsaw received a tide of Georgian citizens fleeing from cities captured by the Bolsheviks. We are at a loss as to what to do. If the Committee remains in Warsaw to protect the interests of Georgia’ s subjects, will it be safe due to the treaty signed by Georgia with Bolshevik Russia, or who knows what trouble awaits us? The Committee is doing all it can to help the fleeing Georgians by providing them with food, clothes and so forth. We are planning to send these to the captives as well.

Please send a telegram advising us what to do. I ask you to promptly send a telegram decreeing that I am obligated to protect the interests of Georgia’ s subjects in Poland. This will ensure that their lives and property are saved. I hope the Georgian Delegation will see the need for this, for in the extreme case the situation of Georgians in Poland will become catastrophic.

Chairman, S. Kuruliszwili7

Georgian Committee in Poland
Letter by Sergo Kuruliszwili to the Georgian Delegation in Paris

Warsaw, 9 August 1920

Please send a telegram with your instructions…

The Bolsheviks are near Warsaw and may take it either today or tomorrow. The Georgian echelon of 25 people has already left for Georgia. Many Georgians remain in Warsaw and in Poland, so I have decided to stay and protect their interests, their lives and property until my last breath. The Committee has no funds and no food. Please, entrust the protection of Georgians in Poland to me with an official telegram, for in doing so you will save the subjects of Georgia that are currently in Poland. I await your telegram.

With respect, S. Kuruliszwili8

Excerpt from a letter by Leo Kereselidze9 sent to Mikheil Sumbatashvili, a representative of Georgia in Bern

Geneva, 14 October 1920

Honorable compatriot,

It has been a few days since I returned from Galicia and Warsaw. Even though they greatly wish to have Georgian officers there, the conditions are so bad that I cannot advise any officer to go there. In winter, typhus and other epidemics kill hundreds of officers, add to this the cold, lack of clothes and so forth. In addition, they will not be able to sustain a conspiracy, rumours will spread that Georgian officers are there and this will give our enemies reason to accuse our country.10 All this has made me think a great deal, and I decided to step aside.

With great respect, Leo Kereselidze11

General Aleksandre Koniashvili12 to General Zakariadze, military representative of Georgia to Poland13

Warsaw, 24 August 1929

I. Independent Poland and Georgia

With the destruction of the Russian monarchy, two states with an ancient culture: Poland and Georgia, were resurrected.

All Georgians residing in Poland at the time, be it a soldier or common citizen, headed back to Georgia. Many Poles serving in the Russian military, who were stationed in Georgia at the time, headed back to liberated Poland together with their other compatriots.

At the time, an organized brigade of independent Poland was stationed in Georgia headed by, as I recall, Colonel Makarevich, who currently resides in Wesoła, near Rembertov.

The Government of Georgia and I personally, as the commander of armed forces, passionately took part in organizing the Polish Brigade, so that it would have everything necessary to function, including arms. At this time, all correspondence between institutions was carried out in Georgian due to the ongoing nationalisation process. Being the head of the People’ s Guard at the time, I received letters from three former Polish officers who had served with me stating that they are forced to abandon their service due to not knowing Georgian. I replied to them: “you can continue to serve in Georgia without a problem, since the decree on nationalization will not affect Poles.”

The People’ s Guard was headed by the late V. Jugheli14 and me. Through a secret resolution, we sent three groups of best Georgian officers to Russia during the Polish-Russian war in 1920 to work against the Bolshevik forces from inside their back line, burn and destroy all military food stores and ammunition warehouses, blow up bridges and more. All this was done independently, in secret, for the benefit of two noble peoples: Poland and Georgia. According to our information, only two officers survived from these groups, one exiled to the city of Chita, and the other to Tomsk.

General Aleksandre Koniashvili15

1 March 1921

City of Dubno, Wołyń Province

To the Georgian Diplomatic Mission in Warsaw

Nowy Świat 17

Konstantine (son of Aleksandre) and Varvara (daughter of Giorgi) Nikolaevs

City of residence: Dubno, Wołyń Province, Kaznacheiskaya Street, House No. 101

A Request

We would like to volunteer into the Georgian army to fight against the Bolsheviks. We ask the Diplomatic Mission of Georgia to include us in the list of volunteers to be sent to the Caucasus, if such a decision is made; include me as a former senior warrant officer of engineering forces, and my wife as a nurse of the St. Nino Georgian infirmary. Let us know how and when we can go. Before the European war, I lived in the Caucasus for about 15 years and served in the Caucasus Railway until 1919. My wife is Georgian, a resident of Tbilisi.

Konstantine Nikolaev

Varvara Nikolaev (Kvachakidze)16

1 Sergo Kuruliszwili (1894–1925) – Georgian diplomat, journalist and poet. Lived in Poland since 1918. During the Red Army attack on Warsaw, he led the Georgian Committee that he established in Poland, which cared for Georgians in Poland and represented a kind of unofficial diplomatic mission.

2 Mikheil Sumbatashvili – Georgian diplomat. Diplomatic representative of Georgia in Switzerland in 1918–1920.

3 These were the soldiers of the Russian army that were captured during the First World War, and were later handed over to General Denikin instead of Georgia by the British as former Russian army soldiers. However, this problem was solved soon after Georgia’ s protest, and all subsequent captives were returned to Georgia.

4 Central Historical Archive of Georgia (CHA), Fonds 1864, Inventory 2, File 324, p. 11.

5 CHA, Fonds 1864, Inventory 2, File 324, p. 19.

6 CHA, Fonds 1864, Inventory 2, File 398, p. 3.

7 CHA, Fonds 1864, Inventory 2, File 323, p. 21.

8 CHA, Fonds 1864, Inventory 2, File 323, p. 22.

9 Leo Kereselidze (1885–1943) – Georgian political and soldier. Headed the Legion of Volunteers during the period of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. Performed special tasks under government orders. For example, in 1919, his Legion fought in the North Caucasus in favor of the Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus against Denikin.

10 In this case, Kereselidze meant Soviet Russia, with which Georgia signed a peace treaty on 7 May 1920, according to which, Russia recognized the independence of Georgia and its territory, but both sides agreed that they would not assist each other’ s opponents.

11 CHA, Fonds 1864, Inventory 2, File 398, p. 6.

12 Aleksandre Koniashvili (1873–1951) – General of the Georgian and later Polish Armies. Served in the Georgian Army in 1918-1921, mainly commanded the People’ s Guard units. Emigrated after Russia conquered Georgia in 1921. Served in the Polish Army, where he received the rank of a Brigade General.

13 Aleksandre Zakariadze (1884–1957) – General of the Georgian and later Polish Armies. In 1919–1921, he was the Chief of General Staff of the Regional Army of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. Emigrated after Russia conquered Georgia in 1921. Served in the Polish Army, where he received the rank of a Division General.

14 Valiko Jugheli (1887–1924) – Georgian politician and soldier. Member of the Constituent Assembly of Georgia. One of the founders and heads of the People’ s Guard of Georgia.

15 CHA, Fonds 1864, Inventory 2, File 871, p.1.

16 CHA, Fonds 1864, Inventory 2, File 405, p. 3.

From the History of the Polish Diplomatic Mission in the Caucasus
by Georges Mamoulia

The revolution of 1917 which ended autocracy in Russia took the long held connections between Poland and the Caucasus to an entirely new stage. Hoping to use the Poles that lived on the territory of Russia in their own interests, the provisional government of A. Kerensky issued a declaration that it will assist with the creation of a Polish state on all of the lands that are primarily settled by Poles under the condition of them entering into a “Free Military Union” with Russia. On the other hand, the situation that arose in the Caucasus, where the region had obtained de facto autonomy in the form of the Special Transcaucasian Committee and then the Transcaucasian Commissariat and Sejm that had set off along the road to independence as a result of the Bolshevik coup in October allowed local Caucasian politicians to start providing practical assistance to Poland. According to the source materials, polish representative W. Ostrowski, who had been sent by the pro-German Polish Regency Council before the declaration of Polish independence in November 2018, was active in setting up Polish-Caucasian relations at the time.

This assistance was primarily military. In the immediate aftermath of the February revolution, national military formations started to be formed in the Caucasus–the Georgian, Armenian and Tartar (Azerbaijani) Corps as well as a Greek division. The purpose of these units was the gradual replacement of Russian soldiers, who were increasingly taken in by Bolshevik ideology, on the Russian-Turkish front. This context allowed the Social Democrats who were in power in Tiflis to facilitate the de facto illegal formation of a Polish military brigade which consisted of both Polish former servicemen of the Russian army and volunteers that lived in the Caucasus. According to General A. Koniashvili, who had later served in the Polish army in the 20’ s and 30’ s, “many Poles that were in the Russian military service that had been in Georgia at that time left for newly independent Poland together with other Poles. An organisationally formed and independent Polish brigade headed by Colonel Makareticz was stationed in Poland at that time.”1 After this, the brigade which had been named “Caucasian” was moved to Poland, where it became part of the Polish national army. A similar situation arose in Azerbaijan. According to A.M. Topchibashi, Chairman of the Azerbaijani delegation at the Paris peace conference who was later a member of the Promethean movement, the Transcaucasian Muslim Central Committee in was formed in Baku and headed by him from June 1917. “This committee kept in contact with the Baku military-national organization of the Polish colony and recognised the legality of its existence, and by doing so, giving it the opportunity to protect the interests of the colony and the opportunity for those who desired it, primarily from the ranks of the military, to return to their homeland.”2

This shows that there is no doubt that the situation of the Poles in Tiflis and Baku, the two of the main centres of South Caucasus, was more or less the same. The main issue that a significant number of the Polish population in the Caucasus faced was their return to their homeland, which became irreversible after the creation of an independent Polish state. Unlike Georgia, where the government managed to maintain stability well up to the Bolshevik occupation of the country in February 1921, the position of Poles in Azerbaijan and its capital Baku was far less trouble-free, particularly over the period from March to September 1918, when the city was under the control of the Bolshevik Council of People’ s Commissars headed by S. Shaumyan and then the Social Revolutionary government of the Centro-Caspian Dictatorship.

It seems that both the Bolsheviks and the Social Revolutionaries tried to forcibly drag the local Poles into the civil war which had engulfed Russia. They wanted to force them to join the local Red Army, in order to ensure the defence of the city from the Caucasian Islamic Army and Azerbaijani units. There is no doubt that this was the reason that the Poles that lived in Baku and its environs had gathered in the building of the Polish school on 21 July of that year and issued a resolution that as citizens of the Polish state they refused to join any kind of Russian army without a direct order from the Polish government. Copies of the resolution were given to the representatives of all of the powers present in Baku and Tiflis.3

According to information from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the aforementioned Ostrowski engaged in energetic activities for the establishment of Polish-Caucasian connections. For instance, on 22 November 1919 he appealed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Georgia together with the representatives of the USA, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Finland, Norway and Persia with a note which appealed to the Georgian social democrats, who were sometimes inclined towards excessive socialism, to respect the private property rights of foreigners. It particularly called for appropriate compensation to be paid in the case of the nationalization of the land that belonged to them. The same applied to the apartments that were requisitioned by the government for its own needs. At the end of the document, it was stated that “Taking the fact that the conditions of import and export as well as the market economy have taken on a very abnormal character into account, the undersigned are prepared to assist the Georgian government with help and advice.”4 It seems that the initiative for the composition of this document came from Ostrowski, as the document was signed by Rogojski, the Secretary of the Polish government in the Caucasus5.

The recognition of the independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan by the Supreme Council of the Entente took Polish-Georgian relations to a new stage. The government of Poland decided to send a special diplomatic mission to the Caucasus headed by Piłsudski’ s old associate Tytus Filipowicz. Detailed information regarding the staff, structure and aims of the mission remain in the document compiled about it by French Consul in the Caucasus L. Netman and provided for the attention of the readers. As the country that stood closest to Poland in that era, France and its representatives strove to provide Polish diplomats in the Caucasus the greatest assistance possible. It was their channels that were also used for encrypted telegraph communication between Polish representatives in the Caucasus and Warsaw. It is the encrypted telegram from Ostrowski that was sent using the telegraph of the French Military Mission in Tiflis to the Polish embassy in Paris to be forwarded to Warsaw which shows the complexity of the situation that Polish citizens faced in the Caucasus in March 1920.

At that time, the Red Army had defeated General A. Denikin’ s Volunteer Army, occupied Northern Caucasus and directly threatened Azerbaijan after occupying Dagestan, with its invasion now only a question of time. Because they did not want to be under the rule of the Bolsheviks, the Polish population of Northern Caucasus set off for Georgia en masse in the hope of reaching their homeland from there. “The Special Mission which you reported about has not yet arrived and a great number of the Polish citizens […]6 are demanding immediate repatriation. The majority of them are refugees from the Bolsheviks that do not have any means for their own existence. The situation is very critical. The representative office does not have the means for repatriation. The Allied missions state that they do not have permission to provide assistance. The report regarding this has been sent with two couriers,”Ostrowski reported to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 15 March7.

· · ·

Message from Netman, Consul of the Republic of France in the Caucasus, to A. Millerand, President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, “Polish Mission in the Caucasus”

14 May 1920

Tiflis

The Polish Political and Economic Mission has recently arrived in Tiflis. The members of the mission are Mr. Filipowicz, Minister Plenipotentiary, Mr. Smogorzewski, Advisor, Mr. De Bondy, Secretary and Mr. Białobrzeski, Consul. In addition, the staff includes a doctor, Mr. Gołaczeski and an official of the immigration service, Mr. Rappoport.

According to the information supplied to me by my Polish colleague, the Government of Warsaw intends to initiate a movement among the many Poles resident in the territory of former Russia for their return to their land of origin. In the Caucasus in particular, the Polish colonies in the main cities of the region and especially in Tiflis are significant in terms of their numbers and mainly consist of people of little wealth. Closely grouped around the Catholic church, which is called the Polish church by everyone here, these colonies have preserved the national language, mentality and traditions. It seems that it would be quite easy to create a movement for the return to their motherland among them under these conditions.

The unrest and the increasing difficulties in their lives that cause the growing dissatisfaction of the local population can only facilitate this movement. Mr. Rappoport has been especially instructed to prepare the practical details of the intended repatriation. There is no doubt that the Mission also has the aim of studying the possibility of establishing direct links between Polish industrialists and Caucasian trade. Before the war, Russia was the main market for these industrialists, whose products were distributed to every part of the empire. The market is closed to them in Bolshevik territory at the moment. Their greatest interest is to re-establish their connections with their old clients in the regions that have yet avoided the rule of the Soviets.

The Poles have made several attempts at the production of silk and leather processing. These enterprises, which have not had broad distribution, can be encouraged and developed.

Polish capital has been invested in the oil industry of Baku, which employs a rather great number of Polish staff: directors and specialist engineers that acquired their technical experience in the extraction of oil in Boryslav, Galicia. The island of Chekelen has also been granted to a society that has its central office in Warsaw. The exploitation of the grant is of particular interest due to the significant value of the product extracted from mineral wax, the reserves of which are little known.

The three main members of the Mission set off for Baku 15 days ago with the aim of investigating the local situation and were there at the time of the revolution that took place in Azerbaijan on 27 April and put the country into the hands of the Bolsheviks. Since then, we have heard nothing about them. By the way, after this date, all communications between Georgia and Azerbaijan have been completely severed. The forces of both sides are face-to-face at the border. According to one Persian who managed to cross the border, the Polish Mission was arrested in Baku at the same time as the British Military Mission.

Signature: Louis Netman

Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères. Correspondance politique et commerciale. 1914–1940. Série Z (Europe). Dossier n° 629 Russie (Caucase). Fol. 189–190.

1 A. Koniashvili, Independent Poland and Georgia. A report for the military representative of Georgia in Poland, General A. Zakhariadze, Warsaw, 24 October 1929. Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine (Nanterre) (further referred to as BDIC). Microfilms des archives du gouvernement géorgien. Mfm 881. Bobine133.

2 Letter from A.M. Topchibashi to T. Golovko, Polish politician and close associate of J. Piłsudski, expressing gratitude for the personal subsidy issued to him by the Polish government, as well as a short account of the relations between Poland and Azerbaijan. Saint-Cloud, 23/25 October 1926. In the book: A.M. Topchibashi, Paris Archive 1919–1940. In four tomes. Book three 1924–1930, Compilers, foreword, translation and notes G. Mamulia and R. Abutabylov, Moscow 2017, p.311.

3 Resolution of the general assembly (wiecze) of Poles resident in Baku and its district that took place on the 21st of July 1918 in the new style in the building of the Polish school. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 6/1. Le Centre d’etudes des mondes russe, caucasien et centre-europeen (CERCEC), l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS).

4 G. Mofakher (Persia and France), H.A. Doolittle (US), J. Franzoni (Italy), H. Berlement (Switzerland), A. Perseghian (Spain and Turkey), H. Bjorkvist (Finland), W. Ostrowski (Poland), K. Sundlo (Norway). A Son Excellence monsieur le ministre des affaires étrangères de la Republique Democratique Géorgienne. Tiflis, 23 November 1919. Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères (further referred to as the AMAE). Correspondance politique et commerciale (further referred to as the CPC). 1914–1940. Série Z (Europe). Dossier n° 628 Russie (Caucase). Fol. 33.

5 Ibid.

6 Some words could not be deciphered.

7 Commandant de Nonancourt à Guerre, Paris. Pour légation polonaise, Paris. Tiflis, 15 March 1920. AMAE. CPC. 1914–1940. Série Z (Europe). Dossier n° 629 Russie (Caucase). Fol. 30.

Tygodnik Polski: An Unknown Chapter in the History of the Tbilisi Polish Community
by Andrzej Woźniak†

On the eve of World War I the Polish colony in Tbilisi numbered some 8,000–9,000 people (7,367 Poles lived there in 1910). Compared to Saint Petersburg (circa 70,000) or even Odessa (25,000), the Tbilisi Polish community was not of the largest, yet it was the largest Polish group in the Caucasus (the second largest Polish community in the region – in Baku – only comprised 3,000 people).1

Tbilisi was home to over a half of all the Poles living in Georgia at the time. According to data from the 1897 census, most of the Poles living in the Georgian capital came from Congress Poland. Among those who were professionally active, the largest group were military men (over 50%), domestics, those employed in the administrative and court system, police officers, railwaymen, and a substantial number of teachers and doctors. The age composition of the Poles was quite typical: over half were young people (between 20 and 29 years of age), most of them soldiers in the Tbilisi garrison. There were very few women in this age bracket. With regard to education, the Polish community in Georgia was characterised by a very high percentage (around 50%) of illiterates (most of these were probably soldiers) and by the existence (particularly in Tbilisi) of an intelligentsia with middle and higher education. The Polish colony in Tbilisi was also very homogeneous in terms of religion, with Catholics accounting for around 98%.2

The Poles in Tbilisi concentrated around the new Catholic St Peter and Paul Church, raised in the 1870s (the “old” Catholic church was used by Georgians and Armenians). In the 1890s, a Roman Catholic Charitable Society was founded at the new church which engaged in social and cultural work over the course of the following years, although the statutory gamut of these activities, particularly in the cultural realm, was limited. It was only in 1907 that a society could be founded whose statute made provision for more ways of satisfying the cultural and educational needs of the Polish community. This was the Dom Polski Association.

The association’s plans included publishing books and brochures as well as newspapers and periodicals, but they never came to fruition.3 Similarly, the cultural-literary magazine which the poet Tadeusz Łada Zabłocki wanted to publish in Tbilisi in the 1840s, never materialised.4

After the February Revolution of 1917 Polish life in Tbilisi became more animated, with many new Polish organisations springing up and a growing need for a periodical in Polish. Although the Polish Executive Committee of the Council of Polish Organisations decided to publish a Polish newspaper as early as May 1917, it seems that the plan was never put into action. The only Polish periodical published in Georgia that scholars have been able to trace is Tygodnik Polski, which came out in Tbilisi starting in June 1918.

The first issue of Tygodnik Polski Polityczno-Ekonomiczny i Literacki (Politico-economic and Literary Polish Weekly) came out in Tbilisi on Sunday, 2 June 1918. It was edited by W. Jordański and published by the Musiał brothers and J. Blichiewicz. Tygodnik consisted of four small-format (32 x 21 cm) pages. The text was printed in two columns. The second issue came out on 9 June and, like those that followed, no longer included the long title. M. Musiał signed “on behalf of the editor” in issue 3, consisting of six pages, with M. Musiał and J. Blichiewicz given as the publishers. In issue 5, M. Musiał appeared as editor along with J. Blichiewicz as publisher.

There are four issues of Tygodnik (1918, numbers 1–3 and 5) in the holdings of the Warsaw University Library; no other issues are known. There is no such title in the other Warsaw libraries, and searches in a number of other cities have yielded no results. No issues of Tygodnik have been found in the academic libraries of Tbilisi, nor is the title mentioned in the extremely competent work by M. Mądzik (cited above), containing a wealth of detailed information about the Tbilisi Polish community during World War I.

We don’t know at whose initiative Tygodnik was founded, how long it came out, what its circulation was or where it was printed. We know either little or nothing about its editors and publishers. Wincenty Jordański, the editor, was a deputy member of the Polish Executive Committee of the Council of Polish Organisations.5 In June 1918, he went to Poti as a Tygodnik correspondent to collect information on conditions of travel to Poland via the Black Sea. On 13 June he sent the following dispatch to Tygodnik from Poti: ‘Stop all departures. Jordański will bring details’.6 Even if he returned to Tbilisi, it was only briefly to conclude any business. We find out about his departure for Poland from the fifth issue of Tygodnik. Even less is known about Lt Col Jan Blichiewicz, co-publisher of the weekly. The only mention about him comes from the second half of 1918, when he enlisted in Gen. Żeligowski’s Fourth Division.7

Nothing is known about the brothers W. and M. Musiał. Both were co-publishers of the first two issues of Tygodnik; afterwards only M. Musiał and J. Blichiewicz signed as publishers. M. Musiał was also editor at the time. The Musiał brothers also published, along with A. Gorbaczuk, the “artistic-literary and satirical” Igła weekly, edited by J. Degen, probably in Russian. They both wrote, though rarely, for Tygodnik Polski.

We don’t know who wrote the article Czy wolno spać? (Are we allowed to sleep?) printed on the title page of the first issue of Tygodnik, where one would expect a programme piece. The article called on the Georgian Polish diaspora to be hard-working, disciplined and well-organised in the face of competition from economically and organisationally stronger nations, above all the Germans, who were becoming increasingly politically and economically active in Transcaucasia. It also advocated establishing “a living connection to the Motherland.”

It is likely, however, that the editors were admonished for failing to publish a programme statement because issue 2 features the piece Why we didn’t publish our credo. The author states that it isn’t necessary because “the point is not phraseology but action, worthwhile and healthy action. Any manifestos and declarations are to be summed up as follows: Remember the old land. That, dear countrymen, is our credo, if you really want one.”

To what extent was this very general programme implemented? Tygodnik did feature some news from the home country, mostly from Congress Poland, but this was scarce and was largely reprinted from other Polish periodicals published in Russia and sporadically reaching Tbilisi. However, all of the issues feature all kinds of pieces on returning to Poland. Poland’s economic affairs were also touched on, as were the economic circumstances of the Polish diaspora in Georgia, but little was written about other aspects of local Polish life.

We find quite a lot of interesting information about Polish cultural events, a variety of Polish vocational courses and other educational ventures in the classified ads section.

Rarely did Tygodnik feature information about current events in Tbilisi and Georgia. News of Georgia’s independence, proclaimed on 26 May 1918, only appeared in the second issue (dated 9 June) in the form of a short note preceding news from Poland.

In the final of the surviving issues of Tygodnik (no. 5) we clearly see that the periodical is suffering from a lack of collaborators and interesting material. Most of the issue is filled with articles and notes by Ludwik Piekarski, who was a frequent contributor. And yet it seems that this issue was not the last. Let’s hope that we will succeed in finding the next ones, perhaps along with other periodicals published by Poles in Tbilisi.

1 Z. Łukawski, Ludność polska w Rosji 1863–1914, Wrocław 1978, p. 91.

2 M. Mądzik, Działalność społeczno-kulturalna i polityczna Polaków w Gruzji na przełomie XIX i XX wieku, Lublin 1987, p. 28 et seq.

3 Ibid., pp. 73–80.

4 B. Baranowski, K. Baranowski, Historia Gruzji, Wrocław 1987, p. 161.

5 M. Mądzik, Działalność społeczno-kulturalna, p. 127.

6 Tygodnik Polski, 1918, issue 2, p. 4.

7 M. Mądzik, Działalność społeczno-kulturalna, pp. 150–151.

Diplomatic Representation of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Poland
by Otar Janelidze

The results of World War I changed and refreshed the world significantly. Geopolitical transformation over a century also affected the South Caucasus incorporated into the Russian Empire. In May 1918, three new states emerged here, one of which appeared on world political map named the Democratic Republic of Georgia.

Historically, Georgia had a long tradition of statehood, but in the new reality it took special efforts for a restored Georgian State to be self-sustaining internationally space. The difficulty was due to several factors. Among them: 1. Georgia gained and maintained its status of an independent country with the help of Germany. After its defeat in the war, Germany could no longer protect and support Georgia. The victorious allies did not demonstrate any trust in pro-German Georgia; 2. The Entente powers still considered Georgia and the Caucasus as parts of Russia and in case of the victory of the White Guard of Russia, preferred to see this region within the borders of Russia; 3. In the plans of the Powers an alternative existed, which considered the Caucasus not three or four disorganised political units, but as an integral space; 4. Of no less importance was the circumstance that the Democratic Republic of Georgia was led by an anti-imperialist political power of socialist aspiration, in the form of social democracy, which, as a government, was unique.

In the document of the establishment of the new state of Georgia, the Act of Independence, it was stated that “the Democratic Republic of Georgia wishes to establish good neighbourly relations with every member of the international community.” As a precondition for that by the same Act; Georgia declared itself to be a “permanently neutral state in international wars.” The unilateral readiness for a peaceful relationship with the outside world was not enough to ensure security for Georgia or its integration into the international family of nations. It was necessary for the newly created republic to show its own vitality, and in parallel to prove the necessity of its independent existence before the leaders of the winner states.

The diplomatic activity of the Democratic Republic of Georgia was conducted in accordance with these objectives. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was created in the country within the first coalition government.1 A famous social-democrat, member of the fourth Russian State Duma and the Chairman of the Government of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic in April–May 1918, Akaki Chkhenkeli was appointed the head of the Ministry. Chkhenkeli remained as a minister until November 1918. The defeat of Germany in the World War, the evacuation of German military units from Georgia and the change of official political orientation in foreign affairs of official Tbilisi, made it necessary to replace A. Chkhenkeli, who had a reputation as a pro-German politician, with a more moderate politician – Evgeni Gegechkori.2

A staff of the State Department of Foreign Affairs was established, a budget was confirmed and in a short period of time the Office of the Ministry was formed. In May 1919, in the Constitutional Assembly of Georgia a Foreign Relations Commission (chairman, Simon Mdivani, a federalist) was formed, which was granted the status of a permanent commission from 11 July of the same year.3

A considerable part of the Georgian political elite thought then that “the subject of foreign policy was … to protect and save the newly restored independent state, to enrich, redevelop and support the thriving of its national life and structure, its material and spiritual treasures.”4 With this general objective, recognition of the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Georgia was the first priority. For the young state of Georgia, the recognition of its independence, obtaining international political and economic support were vital. The founding council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and its diplomatic missions worked intensively to complete the task.

The first state that recognised the independence of the Democratic Republic of Georgia was Germany (the Treaty of Poti, 28 May 1918). On 4 June 1918, the Ottoman Empire also signed a “Treaty of Truce and Friendship” with Georgia in Batumi. This treaty was compulsory and harmful to Georgia, but at the same time it meant the recognition of the newly-born Georgian State. Grigol Rtskhiladze was sent to Constantinople as a representative of Georgia. In 1918 a Georgian diplomatic mission was also opened in Ukraine.

At the same time the state independence of Georgia was accepted by the neighbouring newly born states in the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan and Armenia.5 First, Georgia and Azerbaijan recognised the sovereignty of each other de jure. The Government of Georgia appointed Nikoloz Kartsivadze in Azerbaijan as its official representative (he was replaced in the position of the Plenipotentiary Ambassador, first by Gerasime Makharadze first and subsequently by Grigol Alshibaia). Diplomatic representation of Azerbaijan in Tbilisi was entrusted to M. Jafarov.6 In March 1919, Georgia legally recognised Armenia and Armenia recognised the state independence of Georgia. Simon Mdivani served as Georgia’ s plenipotentiary representative in Armenia. Armenia’ s diplomatic mission in Georgia was led by A. Jamalian.

As for the more distant external world, in September 1919, Georgia was recognised as an independent state by Argentina. All this was important, but the decisive word belonged to the winners of the First World War, the leaders of which were gathered at the Paris Peace Conference.

The Georgian Democratic Republic sent an official delegation to Paris. The head of the delegation Nikoloz Chkheidze presented the memorandum with a brief description of the past and modern reality of Georgia. In the document was argued the necessity of state independence of Georgia. In addition, the Georgian authorities requested the allies to support the choice of the Georgian people, to recognise the Georgian nation among other nations and its sovereignty.

The answer was belated. From the perspective of the allies, the solution of the Georgian issue was related to the future of Russia, but Russia was embroiled in the civil war that had no end.

In the process of waiting for the response from the Peace Conference, the government of Georgia tried to work with governmental circles of individual states; however, they had to face considerable specificity: arising from the practice of international relations and diplomatic etiquette, while an emerging political entity was not recognised by foreign countries, its representative could not receive accreditation. Official representations could not be opened,7 but there was another experience: it is known that for the sake of trade and economic cooperation, states are linked to each other without recognition of their independence. History knows cases when the consular post accredited by the old government continued functioning on the territory of a newly established state, if this was a requirement and in the interest of the country of origin of the consulate and its citizens etc.

Poland regained state independence after the February revolution of 1917 (11 November 1918), before that it had no consulate either in the Russian Empire, or on the territory of Georgia. The first contacts between Poland and the Democratic Republic of Georgia were made mainly for economic reasons. The initiator was the Polish side.8

In August 1918, the leader of the Second Republic of Poland (II Rzeczpospolita), Józef Piłsudski, appointed his representative in Tbilisi, Wacław Ostrowski, a Pole, who from the beginning of the First World War found shelter here, who on 1 October of the same year was appointed as the head of the Polish mission in the South Caucasus.9 Primarily, Ostrowski had to manage the repatriation of the Poles who were stuck in the region as a result of the war and could not return to their homeland. He was also responsible for finding a common language with the governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan and preparing conditions for future military and political cooperation. At the same time Ostrowski contributed to opening the Polish bank in Tbilisi and establishing and industrial and commercial relations.10

Before the generally known principles of the geopolitical doctrine of Prometheism were enacted, Józef Piłsudski created an ambitious strategic plan for the integration of Central and Eastern European states. It provided for the establishment of a large federation of Polish, Finnish, Ukrainian, Baltic states, Belarus, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Serbia and the three South Caucasian republics, including Georgia. This so called “Three Seas Initiative,” responsible for the security and stability of the region, also referred to as the “potential alternative of communism,”11 was primarily directed at preventing Russian aggression and the export of the Bolshevik Revolution.12

One of the reasons for the delegation of Ostrowski to the South Caucasus was to discuss and agree about the above mentioned plan with the local leaders of the republics.13 The archival materials witness that the Polish diplomat was doing significant work in this regard. On 28 December 1919 he arrived in Baku and met the members of the government of Azerbaijan as well as the Parliamentary leadership.

In one of the reviews of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, which on 20 January 1920 was sent from Baku to Paris, the head of the delegation of Azerbaijan at the International Peace Conference, Topchibeşhev, it is noted that the arrival of Ostrowski was followed by the talks about the “bloc” of states that emerged on the ruins of the Russian Empire. According to the document, Poland, which had a developed industry and an army of half a million, could lead this “bloc.”14

It seems that the Georgian newspaper Nationalist also had information on the above-mentioned idea of Piłsudski. On 12 October 1920, the newspaper chronicles “The Latest News” noted: “negotiations are underway between Finland, Poland, Romania and Hungary to form a union against Russia.”15

It should be noted that the Polish offer was positively received in Baku and Tbilisi. Anyway, W. Ostrowski in one of his reports said: “The governments of the Transcaucasian countries are eager to establish close relations with Poland. … Georgia has long been determined to send its representatives to Warsaw, but this is delayed due to tactical considerations … At the last meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gegechkori, and the Chairman of the Government, N. Zhordania, I felt their apparent desire to establish close relations with our country. … In general, it should be noted that the Caucasian states … treat Poland with great sympathy.”16

For the government of the Georgian Democratic Republic the proposal made to Georgia to enter a defensive union with Poland and other bordering states was not unacceptable. A little later, Georgia’ s diplomatic representative in Poland was advised to make such a statement, but the final signing of the Act of Union should be the government’ s prerogative.17

It is quite possible, to consider the information of Leo Kereselidze, who in the summer of 1920 with the consent of the Government of Georgia and with the support of the French military mission, went to Poland “in order to give this country 300–400 Georgian officers” as continuation of the activities initiated by W. Ostrowski.”18 We do not have confirming information, whether this was done or not. According to one official source, “The Georgians in Poland are planning to create legions of Georgians against the Bolsheviks.”19

According to Leo Kereselidze letter dated to 14 October 1920 (letter sent from Warsaw to Geneva), it seems that Georgian officers had not been sent to Poland. L. Kereselidze wrote: “I returned from Galicia to Warsaw. Though they want Georgian officers there, the conditions are so bad, in my opinion, that it is impossible for me to ask officers to go there. In the winter typhoid fever and other epidemics kill hundreds of officers. Add to it cold weather, the lack of clothes and other things. Besides that, I think that they will not be able to keep themselves unnoticed, and the rumour will spread that there are Georgian officers there and we will give our enemies a chance to accuse us of something or other. This made me very thoughtful and I decided to stand aside.”20 However, at the end of the letter Kereselidze wrote “Many Georgian officers are serving with Petliura,” which makes us think that a certain number of Georgian officers managed to participate as volunteers in Petliura’ s formations which fought in the alliance with J. Piłsudski.

In the Republic of Poland initially there was a positive attitude towards Georgia. “Recently the Poles show great interest in us.” There was the appointed of a special mission by M. Filipowicz. The mission, the permanent location of which will be Tbilisi, will represent the Republic of Poland in our country, Azerbaijan and Armenia. The mission will depart for the Caucasus in late January. I became acquainted with every member of the mission and informed them about Georgia and informed “the Georgian military attaché in Ukraine, Captain A. Svanidze, in 13 January 1920.”21

This information was in full accordance with the reality. In Warsaw, there was made a delegation to be sent to the South Caucasus. Its leadership was entrusted to Tytus Filipowicz.22

Józef Piłsudski’ s closest companion, Tytus Filipowicz, was an experienced diplomat and former deputy foreign minister of Poland.23 As a member of the Socialist Party of Poland, he had relations with the Georgian Social-Democrats, the representatives of the political force, who now led the Democratic Republic of Georgia.

Before T. Filipowicz’ s mission started out for Tbilisi,24 on 11 January 1920, the Supreme Council of the Allied States decided to adopt de facto recognition of the independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan. This made it easier for the Polish authorities to define their own attitude towards the two republics of the South Caucasus. Poland’ s desire to cooperate with them did not contradict the leaders of Entente. On 18 January 1920, the Polish Foreign Minister Stanisław Patek met the leaders of the Georgian and Azeri delegations Nikoloz (Karlo) Chkheidze and Ali Mardan Bek Topchibashev at the Peace Conference in Paris.25 The conversation touched the future cooperation issues of their countries.

In a note dated 24 March 1920, the Polish Foreign Minister, Stanisław Patek, wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, Evgeni Gegechkori “I have the honour to inform you that the Government of Poland is willing to recognise the Government of Georgia as an independent organisation de facto before the Peace Conference concedes to Georgia the status, which is consistent with the will of her nation.”

In the note it was also mentioned that, the Government of Poland expresses its firm belief that the common interests of both states, as well as mutual friendly relations will be conducive in establishing bonds of friendly cooperation between Georgia and Poland in the nearest future. To that effect, the Government of Poland would be willing to receive in Warsaw a representative of Georgia, proving its sympathies. The Government of Poland has convened a special mission led by Mr. Tytus Filipowicz, which shall go to Tiflis shortly to establish direct friendly relations. We ask you to accept the abovementioned mission cordially.”26

The head of the Polish diplomatic mission arrived in Tbilisi, had a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Evgeni Gegechkori27 and presented his credentials.28 The mission visited the Supreme Legislative Body of the state, the Constitutional Assembly where the Polish delegates were cordially welcomed by the deputy chairperson Ekvtime Takaishvili.29 T. Filipowicz actively began to fulfil his duties. According to Polish sources, in the Polish-Georgian negotiations at the beginning of April 1920, the sides worked and agreed on the project of a military union of the two countries. In particular, there were plans were made for supplies of armament and combat equipment for the Georgian Army by the Polish side.30

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia found it necessary to send a diplomatic mission to the Republic of Poland. At this time in Warsaw, at the address Nowy Świat 17, the Georgian Committee already existed in Poland, led by its founder, engineer, journalist and poet Sergo Kuruliszwili.31 The Committee assisted Georgians in Poland to return to their homeland, through cultural and educational activities promoted Georgia and tried to promote trade and political relations between the two countries.32

Diplomatic representation could be vested in S. Kuruliszwili, but as it is clear from one of the later archive documents, the head of the government Noe Zhordania was against it. In his letter to Akaki Chkhenkeli he wrote: “Kuruliszwili should be used only as a propagandist, as he can write and speak Polish.”33

The choice was made of another person. By the summer of 1920, the candidate for the head and advisor of the mission was approved. “We are sending a representative to Warsaw, Poland, who shall also maintain diplomatic relations with Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Finland. We have appointed Giorgi Sidamon-Eristavi as a Plenipotentiary representative, and Vladimer Bakradze as a counsellor; Constantine Sabakhatarshvili, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the diplomatic representative in Bern, Mikheil Sumbatashvili on 31 July 1920.34

Giorgi Sidamon-Eristavi (1865–1953) lived long after the completion of the Law Faculty of St. Petersburg and worked as a lawyer in St. Petersburg. This liberal Georgian prince was also known for his charity and as a lawyer. Of the high profile cases of the Empire, he was involved in the trial of the Potemkin sailors.35

After the February Revolution of 1917, G. Sidamon-Eristavi led the provisional Department of Public Security and Citizens’ Personal and Property Security office, at the same time he was the Deputy Chairperson of the Russian Bar Association. After the Bolshevik coup in Russia he returned to Georgia and was appointed the chairman of Sokhumi Regional Court.

The party affiliation of Giorgi Sidamon-Eristavi after arriving to Georgia is not known,36 though it is not of special significance. It is known that the diplomatic missions of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, embassies and representations in foreign countries, included members of the ruling Social-Democratic Party, and also representatives of the opposition spectrum.37

By the resolution of the Government of Georgia it was decided that one million rubles should be allocated for the diplomatic missions to Poland. In accordance with the resolution, the Founding Council was presented a relevant decree and requested its approval.38

Members of the delegation going to Warsaw, together with the delegation of the Second International visiting Georgia, departed from Tbilisi on 28 September 1920 to Batumi by train,39 from where they sailed to Europe, on 29 September.40 The mission arrived just two weeks later, on 14 October 1920.41

A day before leaving for Warsaw, on 27 September 1920, Noe Zhordania, Chairman of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia received Giorgi Sidamon-Eristavi, appointed as Georgia’ s representative in Poland, and Vladimer Bakradze, the first advisor to the mission.42 Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that the foreign minister of the country, Evgeni Gegechkori, was in Europe and the newly appointed envoy could not receive the instructions directly from him. Presumably, meetings were held with other responsible persons of the Foreign Ministry, but it seems that the Chairman of the Government found it necessary to meet Georgian diplomats leaving for central Europe and gave them specific instructions.

In Poland the Georgian delegation was guided by Sergo Kuruliszwili and the Georgian committee. “We gladly welcome the arrival of the delegation, since it was necessary and there was a need to resolve a number of difficult vital political issues, which the Committee could not deal because it was not so authorised by the government. We hope that the committee will be useful for the delegation and we will work in contact with them,” wrote S. Kuruliszwili to the diplomatic mission, which arrived in Rome, on its way to Warsaw.43

The diplomatic representation, which was composed of only four people, settled in the apartment, in the committee building. These were: Giorgi Sidamon-Eristavi, Plenipotentiary representative; Vladimer Bakradze, Advisor; Nikoloz Pernadze, Attaché; and Sergo Kuruliszwili, appointed as the Secretary of the Embassy.44

The members of the representation (apart from S. Kuruliszwili) lived in the hotel “De Saxe” in Warsaw. This well-known chain of hotels existed in Poland from 1847 and was located at ul. Kozia 3, 5, 8 and 12, also Krakowskie Przedmieście 37 and 39.

The objective of the mission was: establishing friendly political relations, strengthening of political and economic ties between Poland and Georgia, and also efforts to convince Poland to recognise the Democratic Republic of Georgia de jure.45

The diplomatic mission was given a special instruction,46 in addition to issues related to the relations with the Republic of Poland; the position of the representation to the Soviet Russia was particularly outlined. The mission should be guided by the statute: the interests of Georgia and Poland are mutual in the protection of the sovereignties of both of them. In the event of threat Georgia will act in coordination with Poland.

The instruction advised the mission to be cautious with Soviet Russia. It was emphasised that neither the activities of the representation, nor any statements by the media or notes, should contain a hostile attitude to Soviet Russia, whom Georgia considered as a state recognised by treaty and with which it is in agreement. The Representation should not interfere in Polish-Russian relations.

The mission was also given a specific task; namely, it should work to achieve the de jure recognition of Georgia. The instruction explained: Poland is interested in the legalisation of Georgia’ s independence and should help us in this case. It can make an emergency clause in a treaty with Russia,47 which will not be difficult to prove. Poland had not yet recognised Georgia and by signing the agreement with the Soviet Russia, it could recognise Georgia’ s independence.48

G. Sidamon-Eristavi began to work on the task immediately after receiving the accreditation. He met senior officials of the Poland Foreign Office several times, spoke directly to Eustachy Sapieha,49 but the Polish-Russian ceasefire agreement was signed in Riga before (12 October 1920) the Georgian mission arrived in Warsaw. As for the Russian-Polish ceasefire agreement, it was signed at the time (18 March 1921) when the Red Army had already occupied Georgia and including the issue about Georgia in the agreement was excluded.

It is known that in December 1920, the Polish representative, Ignacy Jan Paderewski, refrained from voting on the issue of adoption of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in the League of Nations.50 Because of this issue G. Sidamon-Eristavi had a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Sapieha, who gave the Georgian diplomat such clarification: “Our representative was acting according to circumstances. He did so after the preliminary meeting with the representatives of England and France and could not resist their opinions, as the solution to Poland’ s many important problems depended on the will of the allies.”51

The revelation by the Minister should undoubtedly be appreciated for its sincerity, but for Georgia, when at the given moment the issue of its existence as a state was very much related to the decision of the League of Nations, it was of no relief.

“Sapieha is supportive of our recognition, he thinks it would be better if this recognition will be realised collectively and promised me that he will try to focus on Georgia during his visit to Paris and London. Thus Sidamon-Eristavi informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs Gegechkori.”52

Indeed, as soon as the Supreme Council of Allies adopted the Declaration of the legal recognition of the Democratic Republic of Georgia on 27 January 1921, the Polish Republic also joined it the next day. The official letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Sapieha, regarding the legal recognition of Georgia to Sidamon-Eristavi is dated 28 January 1921. The letter reads: “It is my honour to inform you that the head of the Polish state, after consultation with the Council of Ministers, has decided to finally recognise the Republic of Georgia as an independent and sovereign state. I am convinced that with this act sincere friendship and mutual understanding between the Georgian and the Polish republics will become stronger and firm.“

On 31 January of the same year G. Sidamon-Eristavi sent a letter of gratitude to Minister Sapieha, as follows: “I am happy that on the behalf of my government and people I have the opportunity to express my gratitude to the Polish government and personally to Your Excellency for the sincere attitude and moral support given to my country. We always expected to see such feelings from Poland, which were revealed in the decision of the head of state.

I, in turn, am convinced that as a result of this legitimate and just act, ties between the Republic of Poland and Georgia will become even more generous and warm.”53

With the mandate of the Polish representation in Georgia W. Ostrowski addressed the Chairperson of the Government of Georgia, N. Zhordania, with the following congratulation: “I was happy with all of my heart to hear about the recognition of the legitimacy of the independence of your state by the whole country. Please accept my sincere greeting on behalf of the Polish people on this great event. I wish you and all the Georgian people under their remarkable leadership to enrich the glorious history of Georgia with the records about this wonderful event for the sake of the wellbeing of humanity.”54

Georgia’ s diplomatic representation has been absent from Poland for a long time. On 23 September 1920, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia decided to close its missions in Bern, London, Rome and Warsaw.55 About the matter Evgeni Gegechkori reported Sidamon-Eristavi first on 14 December, and then on 11 January 1921.56 In addition he advised him to stay intact, or to find a suitable candidate, even among the Polish people who would be appointed, without payment for this position, and would be able to defend Georgia’ s interests in Poland.

The decision to close the representations was due to two main factors. 1. Economic considerations and 2. After the recognition of the independence achieved at international level, the nature of agitation-propaganda work abroad could be changed, and the staff of Representation was to be decreased in number.

The government’ s decision was fully shared by the diplomatic delegation of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, which was upheld on 27 September 1920 in Paris by the head of the Georgian delegation at Paris Peace Conference, N. Chkheidze.57 The Bolshevik occupation of Georgia and the emigration of the Democratic Republic of Government made this issue even more topical.

G. Sidamon-Eristavi offered E. Gegechkori, to name someone as “Charge d’Affaires” with the responsibility of a consul,58 but apparently the minister did not agree. Thus, on 12 February 1921, he offered the position of honorary consul in Warsaw to the Polish citizen Edmund Fricke, who kindly accepted it.

By a special order of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, E. Fricke was appointed as a temporary performer of the role of honorary consul without remuneration. The consent of the Polish side was also necessary to approve the consul. In event of approval E. Fricke become a legitimate representative of the Democratic Republic of Georgia and had the right to protect the interests of Georgian citizens in Poland.59

It is not yet known what authority was granted to E. Fricke by émigré government of Georgia or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There is no official document confirming that the Polish government recognised him as a consul of Georgia. But there exists a letter from Fricke himself. It is said there, that he received the offer from G. Sidamon-Eristavi with pleasure.60

Before leaving Warsaw, G. Sidamon-Eristavi chose another consul. He appointed G. Machutadze to this position in Riga, and left for France himself,61 where the government of Georgia and the political elite of the Democratic Republic of Georgia had already emigrated to. By the decision of the émigré government of 21 June 1921, G. Sidamon-Eristavi was given an allowance for two months with total amount 6,000 francs.62

It is important to discover the diplomatic rank of Giorgi Sidamon-Eristavi, head of the Georgian representation in Poland. This necessity is due to the fact that in some publications he is addressed, in some cases, as a diplomatic representative of the Government of Georgia in Poland or “the representative of Georgia in Poland.” At the same time there is an inscription on the seal that Sidamon-Eristavi used in Poland on behalf of the Democratic Republic of Georgia: “Diplomatic embassy of the Georgian Dem. Republic in Poland.” 63 As for the official state blank it reads: “Embassy of Georgia in Poland.” 64 Often G. Sidamon-Eristavi signed Georgian official letters as the “Ambassador,” while in French – “Ministre Plenipotentaire et Envoye Extraordinaire de la Republique Georgie en Pologne.”65

Did Giorgi Sidamon-Eristavi hold the highest diplomatic rank, such as that of the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary?

In the Democratic Republic of Georgia there was still no law on “diplomatic services,” which could easily elucidate the issue of our interest. The newly created republic had neither experienced diplomats nor any means for their special training. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs granted the person selected for the diplomatic service in accordance with their rank or replaced it. For example, it is known that Giorgi Machabeli, at the beginning of 1921, was sent to Italy by the diplomatic mission as “the first secretary of the representation,” but soon his status changed into an “advisor to the legation.”66

Giorgi Sidamon-Eristavi is mentioned in the list of the diplomatic corps operating in the Republic of Poland as “Representat de la Georgie en Pologne. Ministre Plenipotentaire”67, which means ”the representative of Georgia in Poland, the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Envoy.” If he had such a status they would write Ambassador … or Envoye Extraordinaire et Ministre Plenipotentaire, as in the same document are called the heads of diplomatic representations of the US, Belgium, Romania, France, Norway, Finland and others.

In 1922 in the “Memorandum about the diplomatic work of the authorised ambassador in 1921–1922” Akaki Chkhenkeli described the Georgian diplomatic mission in Poland as “a representative mission.” In his words, “Georgia’ s diplomatic mission in Poland was in 1920. It is true that it [Poland – O.J.] recognised Georgia legally but there was no embassy opened there afterwards.”68 It is obvious that Chkhenkeli knew best of all, what status the institution had in reality. Presumably, it was thought to be an embassy, for which an appropriate stamp and blank were designed, but due to the lack of time, the embassy could not be formed and the mission remained at the level of representation.

From 1922, Ioseb Salakaia69 served as a representative of the Georgian émigré government in the Republic of Poland. His office was located at Warsaw, ul. Emilii Plater 8 ap. 8.70

Finally, about some of the inaccuracies that appear in the publications and official information dedicated to this topic.

1. It is stated that, from 1919, the representatives of the Caucasian countries functioned in Warsaw under the guidance of Valerian Sidamon-Eristavi, who was granted the status of Georgia’ s Diplomatic Mission in Poland by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in the spring of 1920.71

The Caucasian republics did not have any representatives in any countries, including Poland. Even more so they could not have them in 1919 as the republics were not recognised by the West. The Diplomatic Mission of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Poland was approved in the summer of 1920 and its head was not Valerian Sidamon-Eristavi but Giorgi Sidamon-Eristavi.

2. As if the Georgian diplomatic representative in Warsaw has been Giorgi Sidamon-Eristavi since 1919. During the Polish-Bolshevik War, the Georgian embassy and diplomatic personnel were evacuated in Poznan.

As learned above, Georgia’ s diplomatic representation in Poland (and not the embassy) worked under the management of G. Sidamon-Eristavi not from 1919 but from the autumn of 1920. Due to the Polish war with the Bolsheviks, the Georgian representation has not been evacuated to Poznań because it began functioning in Warsaw from 14 October 1920 – after 12 October 1920 when the ceasefire agreement was signed between Poland and Soviet Russia and the threat of invasion of the Red Army in Warsaw was eliminated.

3. It is considered that the Republic of Poland recognised the independence of the Democratic Republic of Georgia on 29 January 1919, 2 years before the Supreme Council of the Entente recognised it de jure. This is not true. As is mentioned above, the document was substantiated and the date of the de facto recognition of Georgia by Poland was on 24 March 1920, and it was legally recognised on 28 January 1921.

As a conclusion one can say the following: despite the fact that the representative office of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Poland operated for a short while, Poland had no representation in Georgia for a long time,72 there was exchange of diplomatic missions and their activities on an equal level to lay the foundation for cooperation between the two countries and partnership relations. After a long period of coercive interruption, this relationship was renewed in 1992 and is still in successful progress today.

Documents

1. Greetings from the Government of Poland Filipowicz

The authorised representative of the Polish delegation, the minister addressed the Minister of Foreign Affairs Petre Gegechkori with the following words:

Your Excellency! My government has authorised me to fulfil two honourable missions: to greet Georgia and develop a friendly attitude that will connect both of our peoples. As the first official representative of Poland in Georgia, I am happy to express a sincere sense of responsibility on behalf of the Government. Georgia with its old culture and origins is part of European civilization; It was separated from the latter and surrounded by other peoples. In the endless struggle against many enemies, Georgia has managed to retain its national identity. Dear Minister, still in the time of Tamar the Great, Georgia reached the highest level of national development. After this brilliant period, the situation outside Georgia changed, its progress was stopped and the existence of the Georgian nation was endangered. At the end of the eighteenth century, Poland fell to its three neighbouring imperialist countries; Georgia also trusted the Russian emperors and endorsed the fate of Poland. Both of our countries suffered more than a century in the same regime, we lived with the same aspirations and hopes. The best sons of Poland and Georgia shared the same fate in cold swamps of Siberia. The World War and the brilliant victory of the New Democracy over the monarchy gave our peoples the opportunity to restore the statehoods. The joy that we feel in Poland, would not be complete if we did not have the opportunity to appeal to independent Georgia and other nations that were liberated from the slavery of Russia and Germany. Your excellence, for the benefit of the both nations, I will do my utmost to fulfill my mission, in which I am deeply convinced that the Government of Georgia will support me.

გაზ. ,,საქართველოს რესპუბლიკა“, 1920 წ., 4 აპრილი

Republic of Georgia, 4 April 1920.

2. Greetings of the deputy Chairperson of the Constituent Assembly,
Ekvtime Takaishvili, to the Polish Diplomatic Mission in the Founding Council of 2 April 1920.

Gentlemen, here are the representatives of Poland. You know that Polish history is a repetition of our history. We lost and regained freedom together. The territory of Poland was divided among three imperialist states, and our territory was split between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The Poles returned their territories from all three countries, but indisputably part of our territory is a matter of arguments. There was always a friendly relationship between us and Poland and now, moreover, it will be further strengthened; Let me wish Poland success on your behalf and send my greetings (MPs stood up and greeted by applause the Polish representatives).

საქართველოს დამფუძნებელი კრება, 1920 წლის 2 აპრილის სხდომის სტენოგრაფიული ანგარიში, გვ. 9;

The Founding Council of Georgia, stenographic report of 2 April 1920, p. 9;

გაზ. ,,საქართველო“, 1920 წ., 4 აპრილი.

Georgia, 4 April 1920.

3. A letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Sapieha, to the diplomatic representative of Georgia in Poland, G. Sidamon-Eristavi, 28 January 1921.

To the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Georgia in Poland, G. Sidamon-Eristavi

Your Excellency, I am honoured to inform you that after consulting the Council of Ministers, the head of the Polish State has decided to finally recognise the Republic of Georgia as an independent and sovereign state. I am firmly convinced that with this act the sincere friendship and mutual understanding between the Republic of Georgia and the Republic of Poland will become more solid and stronger.

Please, Your Excellency, accept my deep respect.

Sapieha, Minister of Foreign Affairs

4. Letter of gratitude from Sidamon-Eristavi, representative of the Georgian diplomatic mission in Poland, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland Sapieha, 31 January 1921.

To his Excellency Prince Sapieha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs

I am honoured to confirm that I have received the message of your Excellency, dated 28 January, which refers to the decision of the Polish Government to legally recognise the independence of Georgia. I am happy that on behalf of my government and the Georgian nation that I may express my deep gratitude to the government of Poland and to your Excellency personally for your sincere attitude and moral support for my homeland.

We always expected a demonstration of the emotions from Poland that were revealed in the decision of the head of state. In my turn, I am firmly convinced that the ties between the Republic of Poland and Georgia will become even more generous and warm as a result of this legitimate and just act.

Your Excellency, I would like to use the chance and confirm my deep respect to you.

Representative of Georgia in Poland

Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador G. Sidamon-Eristavi

Central Archives of Modern Records (AAN) in Warsaw, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 6676, pp. 296–297.

1 This government before 24 June 1918 was headed by Noe Ramishvili and afterwards by Noe Zhordania.

2 Also a known Social-Democrat, Member of Russia’ s Third State Duma, Chairman of Transcaucasian Commissariat from 15 November 1917 to 22 April 1918.

3 საქართველოს დამფუძნებელი კრება. 1919 წლის 11 ივლისის სხდომის სტენოგრაფიული ანგარიში (The founding council of Georgia. The stenographic report of the 11 July 1919 meeting, p. 304).

4 სარჯველაძე პ., სიმართლით აწონილი სიტყვა (P. Sarjveladze, Word of Justice, Paris 1975, p. 63).

5 The fact that the Republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia were established in Tbilisi and that the governments of both of them were in agreement with the Georgian authorities, for a certain period of time worked here actually meant the recognition of Georgia and mutual recognition of these States. O. Janelidze, “Three States in One City”, Pro Georgia, 27 (2017), p. 240–241.

6 Dokumenty i materialy po vneshnei politike Zakavkazia i Gruzii, Тiflis 1919, p. 96.

7 Before the actual recognition of the South Caucasus republics their contacts were weak with the outside world, or as A. Topcibaşev stated during the meeting with the Allied Supreme Council members there was no communication with other countries at all. See: A.M. Topchubashov, Parizhskii arkhiv. 1919–1940. Kniga pervaia. 1919–1921, eds G. Mamoulia and R. Abutalybov, 2016, p. 323).

8 M. Mądzik, “Z historii politycznych stosunków polsko-gruzińskich w latach 1918–1921”, Pro Georgia, 1 (1991), p. 17.

9 M. Mądzik, “Próby nawiązania stosunków politycznych między Polską a Gruzją w latach 1918–1921”, Rocznik Lubelski, 29–30 (1987–1988), p. 78.

10 In 1919, such a union was established in Tbilisi.

11 J.H. Levy, Madison, Wilson, and East Central European Federalism, Dissertation of the degree of Ph.D., 2006, https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=ucin1147397806&disposition=inline.

12 On 5 July 1920, in the order given to the Polish Army Piłsudski emphasized: „Whether we are fighting for our or freedom of others, we are not fighting against the people of Russia, but the order that legalized terror, abolished freedom and led the country to hunger and destruction”, http://historylib.org/historybooks/Boris--Sokolov_100-velikikh-voyn/83.

13 In the book Istoria Polshi, 2004, South Caucasus countries, including Georgia, are not mentioned in the list of states that have established a federal bloc under the hegemony of Poland. See: M. Tymovsky, J. Kenevich, E. Holzer, Istoria Polshi, 2004, p. 401.

14 Azerbaijanskaia demokraticheskaia respublika (1918–1920). Vneshnaia politika (Dokumenty i materialy), Baku 1998, p. 441.

15 გაზ. ,,ნაციონალისტი”, 1920 წ., 12 ოქტომბერი (Nationalist, 12 October 1920).

16 M. Mądzik M., “Próby nawiązania stosunków”, p. 79); გრიშიკაშვილი ა. ქართველები პოლონეთში (A. Grishikashvili, Georgians in Poland, Tbilisi 2008, p. 31).

17 National Archives of Georgia, Central History Archive, Found 1864, rec. 2 case 404, p. 6.

18 ლეო კერესელიძის Curriculum Vitae, გ. მამულიას პუბლიკაცია, ჟურნ. ,,თანამემამულე“, ლონდონი, 2007 (L. Kereselidze, Curriculum Vitae, C. Mamulia Publication, Compatriot, 3 (24), London 2007, p. 16).

19 National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, Found 1864, rec. 2, case 393, p. 93.

20 National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, Found 1864, rec. 2, case 398, p. 6.

21 G. Mamoulia, Iz istorii kavkazsko-ukrainskogo sotrudnichestva w ramkakh dvizhenia „Prometei” (1918–1926), http://nowyprometeusz.pl/от-тифлиса-до-киева-и-варшавы-из-исто/.

22 W. Materski, “Misja Tytusa Filipowicza w Tbilisi (kwiecien 1920 r.)”, Pro Georgia 2 (1992), pp. 26–29.

23 T. Filipowicz later was a Polish diplomatic representative in Soviet Russia (1921), ambassador to Finland, USA; Later, he established the Polish Radical Party, and the Polish Democratic Party, he was a member of the Polish National Council, in 1949–1951 acting Polish President. Died in 1953 in London. http://nowyprometeusz.pl/tag/tytus-filipowicz/.

24 Initially there was planned to send the mission by October 1919, but it was delayed and became possible only by the end of February 1920.

25 კობახიძე ბ., საქართველოს საკითხი პარიზის სამშვიდობო კონფერენციაზე, დისერტაცია ისტორიის დოქტორის აკადემიური ხარისხის მოსაპოვებლად (B. Kobakhidze, Issue of Georgia at Peace Conference in Paris, Ph.D Thesis, Tbilisi 2015, p. 202, with the right of manuscript).

26 Bor’ba, 25 March 1920; გაზ. ,,საქართველოს რესპუბლიკა“, 1920 წ. (Republic of Georgia, 25 March 1920); გაზ. ,,საქართველო“, 1920 წ. (Georgia, 25 March 1920); W. Materski, Gruzja i wielkie mocarstwa (1919–1921), Warszawa 1990, p. 76).

27 Bor’ba, 4 April 1920.

28 A. Furier, Polacy w Gruzji, Warszawa 2010, p. 369.

29 საქართველოს დამფუძნებელი კრება (The Founding Council of Georgia, 1920 Stenographic report of the 2 April session, p. 9).

30 M. Mądzik, “Próby nawiązania stosunków”, p. 84); კარაბინი რ., პრომეთეიზმი. 1918–1921 წლების პოლონეთის დამოუკიდებლობისათვის ბრძოლაში კავკასიელი ხალხების მონაწილეობა, ჟურნ. „ახალი პოლონეთი“ (R. Karabin, “Prometheism. Participation of Caucasian Peoples in the Fight for Independence of Poland in 1918–1921”, New Poland (Special Number in Georgian), Tbilisi 2001, p. 94).

31 National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, Found 1864, rec. 2, case 398, p. 3; S. Kuruliszwili (młodszy), “Z rodzinnych wspomnień o Sergo Kuruliszwili”, Pro Georgia, 1 (1991), pp. 45–51.

32 ვოჟნიაკი ა., ვარშავის ქართული ემიგრაცია, ჟურნ. ,,ქართული ემიგრაცია“ (A. Woźniak, “Warsaw’ s Georgian Emigration”, Georgian Emigration, 2 (2014), p. 39); გაზ. ,,საქართველოს რესპუბლიკა“, 1920 წ. (Republic of Georgia, 16 May 1920).

33 ჭუმბურიძე დ. ზოგიერთი დეტალი საზღვარგარეთ 1924 წლის აჯანყების გამოძახილისა და ქართული ემიგრაციის თვალსაზრისის შესახებ, ახალი და უახლესი ისტორიის საკითხები, (D. Chumburidze, “Some of the Details the Recall from Abroad and the Viewpoint of Imigration on the Uprising in 1924”, Studies in Modern and Contemporary History, 1 (16), Tbilisi 2015, pp. 111–112).

34 National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, Found 1864, rec. 2, case 393, p. 85, 90.

35 Deiateli Rossii, ed. A.M. Shampan’er, St. Petersburg 1906, p. 242.

36 In Russia he was included in the constitutional-democratic party, see: https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q4418706.

37 From the rightist opposition were Mikheil Tsereteli (representative in Scandinavian countries), Mikheil Sumbatashvili (representative in Switzerland), Grigol Alshibabia (ambassador in Azerbaidjan), Giorgi Machabeli (representative in Italy), diplomats: Zurab Avalishvili, David Gambashidze and others. To the left opposition belonged the Federalists Simon Mdivani (ambassador in Armenia first, after in Turkey), Grigol Rtskhiladze (representative in Constantinopole), Aristo Chumbadze (representative in Sweden and Norway after M. Tsereteli), Andria Dekanozishvili (representative in Argentina) and others.

38 გაზ. ,,საქართველოს რესპუბლიკა“, 1920 წ. (Republic of Georgia, 1 August 1920).

39 National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, Found 1864, rec. 2, case 393, p. 98.

40 გაზ. ,,საქართველოს რესპუბლიკა“, 1920 წ. (Republic of Georgia, 30 September 1920).

41 National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, Found 1864, rec. 2, case 424, p. 35.

42 გაზ. „საქართველოს რესპუბლიკა“, 1920 წ. (Republic of Georgia, 29 September 1920).

43 National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, Found 1864, rec. 2, case 424, p. 33.

44 Ivane Kuruliszwili, resident of Warsaw, was also invited to the mission as a civil servant. See National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, Found 1864, rec. 2, case 424, p. 35.

45 Ibid., p. 353.

46 National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, Found 1864, rec. 2, case 404, p. 5–6.

47 Perhaps on 27 August 1918, analogous to amendment of the Brest treaty between Berlin, Russia and Germany, when Soviet Russia agreed that Germany recognized Georgia as an independent state. See ავალიშვილი ზ., საქართველოს დამოუკიდებლობა 1918–1921 წლების საერთაშორისო პოლიტიკაში (Z. Avalishvili, Independence of Georgia in the 1918–1921 International Politics, Tbilisi 1925, p. 146).

48 National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, Found 1864, rec. 2, case 404, p. 6.

49 Ibid., case 447, p. 14.

50 Ignacy Paderewski – a famous Polish pianist, composer and political figure. In 1919 he was Polish Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. 1920–1921 Polish representative in the League of Nations.

51 National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, Found 1864, rec. 2, case 447, p. 14.

52 Ibid., p. 15.

53 Central Archives of Modern Records (AAN) in Warsaw, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 6676, pp. 296–297.

54 გაზ. ,,ერთობა“, 1921 წ. (Unity, 1 February 1921); გაზ. ,,საქართველოს რესპუბლიკა“, 1921 წ. (Republic of Georgia, 1 February 1921).

55 National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, Found 1864, rec. 2, case 424, p. 27.

56 Ibid., case 446, pp. 7–8, 11.

57 Ibid., case 424, pp. 11–25. The draft law made by the Government was passed by the Presidency Council of Foreign Affairs and Budgetary Finance Commissions. Georgian state control also appreciated reduction of the stuff members. The Budget Commission reviewed this document and prepared the draft law for the plenary session of the founding council. See: Ibid., case 55, pp. 1–10.

58 Ibid., case 447, pp. 34.

59 Ibid., case 447, pp. 24–25.

60 National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, Found 1864, rec. 2, case 447, p. 23. E. Fricke lived at the address: Warszawa, ul. Stużewska 3, log. 3.

61 G. Sidamon-Eristavi remained immigrant, lived in France, died in Grenoble in 1953.

62 National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, Found 1864, rec. 2, case 447, p. 38.

63 Central Archives of Modern Records (AAN) in Warsaw, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 6676, p. 297.

64 National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, Found 1864, rec. 2, case 424, p. 35.

65 Ibid., case 447, pp. 4, 16, 20.

66 ჯანელიძე ო., გიორგი მაჩაბელი დიპლომატიურ ასპარეზზე, ჟურნ. „ქართული ემიგრაცია“ (O. Janelidze, “Giorgi Machabeli on diplomatic arena”, Georgian Emigration, 1 (2013), p. 99–100).

67 National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, Found 1864, rec. 2, case 404, pp. 2–5.

68 ქართული დიპლომატია, წელიწდეული, ტ. 2 (Georgian diplomacy. Yearbook, vol. 2, Tbilisi 1995, p. 34).

69 Ioseb Salakaia – former member of the Georgian National Council, Parliament and Founding Council, Chairman of the Board of Senaki District Community Issues during the years of Independence. Since 1921 he lived in emigration. He died in 1940.

70 National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archive, Found 1864, rec. 2, case 446, p. 25.

71 ვოჟნიაკი ა. ქართული ემიგრაციის საზოგადოებები და ორგანიზაციები პოლონეთში, ჟურნ. ,,ახალი პოლონეთი“ (A. Woźniak, “Georgian Emigration Communities and Organisations in Poland”, New Poland (special number in Georgian), Tbilisi 2001, p. 87); M. Mądzik, “Próby nawiązania stosunków politycznych między Polską a Gruzją w latach 1918–1921”, Rocznik Lubelski, 29–30 (1987–1988), p. 83.

72 The occupation of Georgia by Soviet Russia did not allow Poland to turn its diplomatic mission into the embassy and sent Roman Nol as Ambassador to Tbilisi and Major Wacław Zedzewicz as military attaché.

Facts from the History of Polish-Georgian Relations During World War II
by Grzegorz Mazur

During the Second Polish Republic in the ranks of the Polish Army, some Georgian officers served as contract officers. Due to the efforts so-far of historians, their names and military ranks were revealed. The 1939 “Officer’ s Yearbook” as at 23 March 1939, i.e. just a few months before the outbreak of the World War II, lists the names of foreign contracted officers in the Polish Army, including the Mjr. Gen. (Aleksander Zakariadze), about a dozen infantry officers, a few cavalry and artillery officers, and single officers representing other services: aviation, armoured personnel, 1 sapper, 3 communications officers, 6 commissariat officers, 1 officer representing geographic corps and 2 naval officers.1

The outbreak of WW II brought about the fall of the existing structures of Georgian society in Poland, and Georgian officers dispersed. Many of them are remembered in campaign histories in the ranks of the Polish Army, taking part in numerous battles with the Germans.2 However much less is known about the relations of Poles and Georgians in the secret services domain. The available information is incomplete and fragmentary and requires further research. Through scrupulous gathering and confrontation of information, many of the so-far unknown details concerning various issues can be revealed, disputes and unexplained issues resolved, and, last but not least, Polish activities during the war can be seen from a completely different perspective. It is worth comparing them with the actions of other political forces, looking at our own opportunities and possibilities of action. Some of the seemingly obvious decisions of the Polish secret services were doomed to fail, the fact which can be seen only now, after evaluating many documents over many years.

Among others, little is known about the relations between Poles and the double agent Shalva Berishvili, a Georgian emigration activist and a leading Georgian social-democratic (Menshevik) and at the same time a close accomplice of Lavrentiy Beria (in some publications found under the name of Shaliko).3

Shalva Berishvili was born on 12 November 1899, in Kutaisi, Georgia. In the opinion of Georgian historian, he demonstrated significant personal courage. A nephew of the founder of the first Georgian government Noe Ramishvili, in 1922 he was arrested by Soviet authorities and imprisoned for about a year. The investigation was conducted by Lavrentiy Beria himself, at that time the head of the Georgian GPU (Glavnoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie – The Main Political Directorate, the predecessor of NKVD). After his release from prison, Berishvili took part in the Georgian anti–Bolshevik uprising in August–September 1924, after the fall of the uprising he managed to escape and reached France. There he joined the underground structures of Menshevics and became a member of their Foreign Office. From June to September 1930, accompanied with another Menshevic activist, David Erkomaishvili, he stayed with a mission in Georgia where he organised two subsequent underground conferences of the Georgian Mensheviks and the underground Central Committee, which was supposed to continue the works in case the first one is arrested.4 What is interesting, is that his journey to Georgia was financed by the Polish Branch of the Second General Staff and the intelligence information he provided captured the interest of Marshal Józef Piłsudski who met Ramishvili after his return.5

The Polish intelligence services, running Promethean activities, were the first to interest themselves in the emigrants from the Caucasus, during the inter-war period. One of the leading Georgian social-democratic activists, Evgeni Gegechkori, a former member of the III and IV Duma and the ex-foreign minister of the independent Georgia, in 1926 signed a deal with the Poles, which assured Georgian Menshevics financing from Warsaw. Form 1928 he was one of the most effective negotiators of the Caucasus Confederation Treaty, finally implemented on 14 July 1934, in Warsaw (officially in Brussels).6 He felt excellent in Paris conducting various businesses and acting as a solicitor, and he also had very good contacts in the French political circles and the II Socialist International. He was befriended by Adrien Marquet, the mayor of Bordeaux and the future labour minister in the government of Gaston Doumergue (9 February – 8 November 1934) and the minister of the interior and minister of state in the governments of Pierre Laval and Philipe Petain (1940–1942)7.

The enormous role played here by Maj. Edmund Charaszkiewicz and the Department in the Second Division of the General Staff that he directed; some of the documents illustrating this have been published by researchers.8 Berishvili thus became the channel connecting Lavrentiy Beria with leading Western politicians; as he testified during the investigation in 1953, he convinced them that Beria was ready to take Stalin’ s place in the Kremlin.9 At the same time, he became a representative of the Menshevik government and the Georgian National Centre at the headquarters of the Levant Army of Gen. Maxime Weygand, where the Caucasian section was created. Through the general, he met, among others, the Chief of Staff of the Turkish Army, Marsh. Fevzi Çakmak. At the beginning of 1940, Berishvili started cooperation with the Turkish intelligence services, through the dispatch of emissaries to Georgia, in the event of the outbreak of an uprising in the Caucasus10. He conducted a vast activity, going beyond ordinary espionage missions. We have to believe that he was a kind of personal envoy of Beria in Turkey and the Middle East. His brother, Tite Berishvili, lived in Warsaw during the interwar period and from 1931 to 1936 studied at the Warsaw University of Technology, obtaining a degree in chemistry. As one of the Georgian representatives of Promethean emigrants, Tite was a Promethean scholarship holder of the 2nd Branch Office of the 2nd Division of the High Army Command, receiving a monthly scholarship of 175 PLN from the MFA funds. He was also very active in the Georgian emigration circles in Poland. After the outbreak of World War II, he was shot in Warsaw by the Germans, who suspected him of being a Soviet spy. The murder of a brother was one of the reasons for the hatred of Shalva Brishvili toward the Germans. When, at the end of December 1940, Shalve Berishvili met a British officer interested in working with the Georgians, he told his compatriots that he was interested in working with British Special Forces and hated the Germans who had murdered his brother.11

In the Georgian Social Democrats Foreign Office Berishvili belonged to the left wing, he fiercely opposed a group of more right-wing activists, and for him the only authority was Noe Jordania, the leader of the Social Democrats and the Prime Minister of independent Georgia, and then, the leader of the Georgian Mensheviks in the emigration whom he defined in his letters as “our beloved leader.” 12

It must be stressed, as stated by G. Mamoulia, the researcher of the Prometheism, that “the creation of the Promethean movement and the attempts to form a united anti-Bolshevik front of non-Russian emigration organisations have caused great concern to both the Soviet special services and the higher Kremlin leaders. A decision was made to prevent by all means the emigrants using the international context that favoured activities of anti-Bolshevik organisations.” 13 The GPU has been successful in taking over a large number of emigrant documents and using them in increasing the number of dissidents in their ranks.14 Finally, it must be remembered that the assumptions of the Promethean movement stroke, as was aptly observed by Pawel Libera, at the heart of the Soviet state. In this situation, it led to a considerable proportion of the units composed of former Russian captives and representatives of other nationalities in the combat against the USSR on the side of the Third Reich.15

Lavrentiy Beria in the second half of the 1930s discreetly pursued a policy of cooperation with Georgian exiles. To achieve this, one had to make the Georgian border porous. On 29 November 1938, a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR was issued appointing the Senior Major of the State Security Avksenti Rapava as National Security Commissioner for Interior Affairs (NKVD) of Georgia. Beria entrusted him with the organisation of the transfer channels on the Turkish-Georgian border. Almost simultaneously, Noah Jordania, on 12 July 1939, asked Polish officers involved in the Promethean movement to issue to Shalva Berishvili who was also one of the heads of the Georgian social democracies in exile, a passport to the name of “Karol Berik.” He decided to send him to the Caucasus “to establish a close relationship with Georgia.”16 This request was fulfilled and, among other things, he also used this name in contacts with the Polish post in Istanbul in 1940 and 1941. On the eve of his departure for Georgia, N. Jordania said that the Allies “think seriously about counting on Beria,”in the event of a coup in the USSR and the seizing power there the by people oriented to the Allies.”17 It must be remembered that from the end of 1938 the Georgian emigration was very concerned about the possibility of the concluding of a German-Turkish agreement. According to circulating rumours, Turkey, in exchange for the support for the Third Reich, would receive a protectorate over the post-Soviet Georgia and Armenia, and at the same time, the only Christian countries in the Caucasus.18 Possible contact would be facilitated by family ties: the nephew of Noe Jordania, Gigo Jordania, was the brother of Rapava’ s wife, while Berishvili himself had known Rapava for a long time since they studied together in Kutaisi.19

The Soviet-German agreement of August and September 1939 made the Soviet Union, in the eyes of the leaders of France and the United Kingdom, a sort of German ally. However, one should remember, that the governments of both countries, with absolute consistency, were of the opinion that they were at war only with Germany, while the USSR was neutral. It also meant that, as British politicians communicated it bluntly to their Polish counterparts, Great Britain would under no circumstances fight for the eastern Polish borders.20 Nevertheless, this situation caused the USSR to be treated as a potential adversary, as it might be an increasing threat to them, especially in the Near and Middle East due to its good relations with the Third Reich. This was most apparent through trade and especially by the supply of strategic raw materials to Germany from the Soviet Union. In 1940, one-third of German oil imports came from the USSR. The threat of the German-Turkish alliance resulted in the Georgian emigrants being very favourably referred to in the Franco-British plans of an expedition to Transcaucasus, discussed in Paris at the beginning of September 1939. Representatives of the Foreign Office of the Georgian Mensheviks were present, and the French were represented by Adrien Marquet, Gen. Bricaud and Col. Lochard, the British by Col. Scott and Capt. Williams, and the Poles by Col. Stefan Nowaczek. So it was decided to send S. Berishvili to Gen. Maxime Weygand, who at that time commanded the Army of the Levant in Syria, to organise smuggling channels to the USSR. The candidature was well-supported as Berishvili knew Gen. Maxime Weygand in 1932, to whom he was introduced in Paris by Gen. Kazimierz Sosnkowski, at that time serving as the Inspector of the Army in Poznań.21 It should be noted that these plans by the British and the French concerning joint operations in Transcaucasus together with the Turks quickly became known to the Soviet intelligence, as evidenced by the information of Lavrentiy Beria for the NKVD of the Azerbaijani SRR of 23 September 1939.22

Berishvili left Paris on 10 September 1939, and arrived in Istanbul on 16 September. From there he went to Aleppo in Syria, where he met Gen. Maxime Weygand, commander of the French Army of the Levant (it included French forces stationed in Syria and Lebanon). Weygand promised him that he would talk to the Chief of Staff of the Turkish Army, Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, so that the Turks would not interfere with the Georgians in creating their intelligence organisation in Turkey. At the same time, Weygand expressed doubts about the possibility of liberating the Caucasus by the armies of the Western allies. To achieve this, it was necessary to have accurate intelligence on the situation in Georgia and the whole region. Already in the first days of October 1939, Berishvili illegally crossed the Turkish-Georgian border with the help of Azerbaijani guides, reached Tbilisi where he allegedly contacted representatives of illegal Georgian organisations, successfully returned to Turkey and then arrived in Ankara on October 19. There was Gen. Weygand, who signed the Anglo-French-Turkish agreement on that day. Berishwili delivered a lecture on his travel to the USSR for representatives of French, English and Turkish intelligence.23

Starting from February 1940, a secret agreement was made between the intelligence services of France, England and Turkey to establish intelligence organisations for the Caucasus in Turkey. Specific forms of their cooperation with allies and Turks were worked out. Georgian intelligence organisations in Turkey and Iran were under the control of Shalva Berishvili. Financing and procurement of weapons, radios and other technical equipment were to be provided by the French side, in the person of the deputy military attaché of France in Ankara, Maj. R. Leleu. The post of the Turkish intelligence services located on the Turkish-Soviet border was obliged to provide the Georgians with all the help required. Berishvili was allowed to stay in the border area, where access was restricted even to members of the Allied war missions. The information he had received was supposed to reach both him and the Turkish intelligence. Representatives of the Turkish General Staff, in his words, fully supported the idea of the Caucasian Confederacy. In February 1940, the British General Staff began to consider plans for joint operations with Turkey in the Caucasus, which targeted, among other things, the capture of Batumi and the landing in the Crimea. This operation would, in turn, be directed at interrupting the transit of Soviet oil to Germany. In this regard, support was considered for the uprising in Ukraine and the “Ukrainian provinces” of pre-war Poland. The British even started to enlist the Ukrainian expatriates living in France, intending to create a Ukrainian Legion to participate in these operations. Together with the French, they decided to form it in the Transcarpathian Ukraine, which was at that time part of Hungary. The last event is interesting because the formation of such a Legion would be sharply opposed by the Polish side; these ideas are the best proof that the opinion of the Polish government on individual issues had increasingly ceased to count.24 On the other hand, it also shows that the Allies were losing contact with the political realities of Central and Eastern Europe, and their plans became out of touch with reality. The Ukrainian nationalists at that time bet on the Third Reich as the only force capable of fighting the Soviet Union and correctly predicted that the clash between the two states was inevitable. In this case, the only way out for the Ukrainians was to stand on the side of the Third Reich, as a country that defeated Poland, which was hostile to them and would fight the main opponent of the future Ukrainian state, and namely the Soviet Union. Allies had nothing to offer them. In the first half of 1941, Soviet intelligence stated that Germany was preparing for aggression against the USSR, although at the same time it was accompanied by the growing activity of intelligence services of other states, including the British, which focused their attention on the development of the Soviet armed forces.25

The reasons for and circumstances of Berishvili’ s cooperation with the NKWD are described in detail by F. Thom. Namely, the Caucasian emigrants have enthusiastically welcomed the plans of France and Great Britain to attack the USSR during the “Winter War” with Finland. However, the enthusiasm quickly cooled, especially when they realised that the bombing of Caucasian oilfields, as well as Batumi, Baku and Grozny, were considered as an aid to Turkey in case of an attack on it by Germany and the USSR. Also, they began to suspect that the French and the British have promised Georgia and Armenia to Turkey as a sort of “payment” for cooperation with the West, and soon afterwards they learned that Georgia was promised to the Turks. In this situation, Noe Jordania and his associates have recommended that Berishvili thwart the realisation of these intentions by all means. Weygand called Berishvili to Beirut to calm him down and convince the Allies to give up the bombing of Batumi. However, the latter in March 1940 learned that Turkey would take part in the attack on the USSR and that the decision was made to bomb Baku and Batumi. He decided to warn the Soviet government and went to Georgia under the pretext of preparing secret organisations to host Allied troops. On 9 May 1940, he sent the first message to Beria that they planned to attack Baku in June. He asked in his letter for confirmation of receipt of the message by placing an agreed message in the magazine Kommunist.26 He did not receive the reply, and he returned to Turkey around 20 May. In September 1940 he again went to Georgia with David Erkomaishvili and Shalva Kalandadze. After the fall of France, the Germans revealed French-British war plans against the USSR in the Caucasus and the Turks, fearing a Soviet response, panicked. At that time, Berishvili sent a second letter to Lavrentyi Beria (dated 6 September 1940), in which he offered his services. He also warned against the threat to Georgia in case of a Turkish attack. Beria showed interest, and since then things have gone very quickly. Berishvili in his letter recalled his past, wrote about his excellent relations with Gen. Weygand and the confidence he enjoyed among the Turkish authorities. He wrote about the need to avoid all adventures at that time: “Our nation must avoid the fate of the Armenians during the Great War. Georgians should serve [in the Red Army], we must avoid any provocation and all opposition to the Soviet rule.“27 A few words of comment should be added to this “Armenian fate” that was mentioned in the document. It was about the genocide of the Armenians in Turkey during the World War I when about 1,500,000 people were killed. It is natural that the Georgians were afraid of a repeat of these tragic events, and that this time they would fall victim to them. These concerns were so strong that, in talks with representatives of the French Command in the Middle East, Berishvili strongly insisted that if the allies and the Turks were to attack the Soviet Union, the French troops would involve the Georgian army if possible and not the Turks. At the same time, it should be added that the pretext for the Armenian massacre was that they supposedly favoured the Russian army during the World War I.28

On 21 September in Batumi, Berishwili met the head of the 2nd Department of the Directorate of State Security of the Georgian SSR NKVD, Capt. of State Security Irakli Nibladze (later acting as deputy of Rapava), who sent him to Tbilisi; whereas his two companions remained in the area of Batumi. From there, Rapava himself and Senior Lieutenant of State Security Viktor N. Iljin, who at that time led operations against the Mensheviks (formally head of the department at the 2nd Directorate of State Security of the USSR NKVD), accompanied him on a trip to Moscow. In Moscow, Berishvili met Beria several times and received his instructions for further activities in Turkey. The most important issues included: staying in touch with the Turkish, French and British services in Istanbul, passing on information of his stay in the USSR, and above all to pass on information about the existence of an anti-Bolshevik underground. Also, he was to track the activities of the Caucasian emigration in Turkey systematically, maintain contacts with the Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijani and North Caucasus emigrations and also try to gain control over the activities of the Caucasus Confederation. He was instructed to track the activities of the Promethean movement and introduce his people to it. He had to initiate contacts with Polish and Ukrainian institutions, as well as with the German intelligence services. He received the pseudonym “Omeri” and returned to Turkey on 13 November 1940.29

His contacts with Germany were as follows. They were established as a result of Beria’ s instructions; Moscow’ s headquarters wanted to have as much information concerning the Germans in the Middle East as possible. In August 1941, the Abwehr agent Paul Leverkuehn arrived in Istanbul to establish a spy network in the Middle East. However, after the defeat of France, Berishvili’ s Georgian Menshevik network lost its partners with whom it had worked so far. Berishvili on the order of Beria offered his services to the Japanese and the Germans, who thus wished to make the Mensheviks talk to Berlin and learn about the German intentions for the Caucasus. Through the Japanese, he contacted Gen. Hans Rohde, German military attaché in Turkey. He even wished to go to Berlin to obtain information about the German plans for the Caucasus, but eventually, it did not happen.30 When Berishvili left Turkey in October 1942, going to Georgia for the last time, he had prior to that met the Abwehr resident in Istanbul, Paul Leverkuehn, an Assistant to the German Naval Attaché Zaeringer (he contacted him through the activist of the Azeri emigration Khosrov-Bek Sultanov) and the German military attaché Gen. Hans Rohde. From all of them, he received the task of organising sabotage and diversion in the USSR.31

On 16 July 1953, in the minutes of the interrogation of L. Beria, he testified that in 1939 the emissary of the Mensheviks was arrested in Berlin. Beria characterised him as follows: “Through and through burned-out Menshevik, certainly an agent of foreign intelligence, primarily Turkish.” 32 We received from him detailed information on Menshevik emigration, Turkish intelligence and emigrants from other nationalities. Beria during the interrogation rejected the suggestion that he only he talked to him personally or that only personal contact was maintained. It was decided to transfer him back to Turkey as their agent. For communication and further cooperation with this emissary, it was decided to send additional people to Turkey, including an executive secretary of the Secretariat of the USSR NKVD, and since 1940 the Deputy Head of Division I (1st Chief Directorate), Major Wardo M. Maksimieliszvili and her husband David A. Mataradze. Earlier, they both graduated from intelligence school. Wardo Maksimieliszvili was previously for 15 years a mistress of Beria with whom she had a baby. She was a distant relative of Berishvili and was raised in his family. It may be added here that, several years later, after the arrest of L. Beria, Soviet General Prosecutor Roman Rudenko while interrogating him in one of his questions, accused him of initiating through Berishvili, Maksimielishvili and her husband Mataradze “criminal anti-Soviet contacts with the leaders of the Georgian Mensheviks.” These allegations were firmly rejected by Beria. W. Maksimieshvili received instructions for Berishvili in sealed envelopes, handwritten by Beria, and her task in Istanbul was to pass the instructions to Berishvili.33

The case of the recruitment of Shalva Berishvili by the NKVD remains unexplained until now. Françoise Thom, who has studied Russian and Georgian archives from the perspective of Lavrentyi Beria’ s work, including the case S. Berishvili, writes about this: “The case of Berishvili’ s recruitment by Beria remains mysterious despite the data from the archives of the Georgian NKVD. Was Berishvili unknowingly manipulated by Beria’ s men during his travels to Georgia in 1930 and 1939? Did he offer his service to Beria in the spring of 1940? Was he acting on his own account, or on the orders of Jordania and Gegechkori? Alternatively, did Beria need to ‘legalise’ a personal agent to be able to use the information he received from him in his report for Stalin and facilitate his movement? At the present state of our knowledge, these questions cannot be answered. Anyway, emigrants [Georgian ones – G.M.] had a good insight, trying to recruit Beria for their cause.” 34 In the extensive report of Lavrentyi Beria of 5 November 1940, the following information is given: “In September this year ‘Omeri’ who arrived illegally from Turkey entered secret co-operation with the NKVD USSR.” 35 It seems that the very asking of these questions demonstrates that the subject matter requires continuous research, although it is possible that the backgrounds of these events shall remain unknown to us.

Shalva Berishvili arrived from Turkey in the USSR with another mission in September 1940. It was confirmed by the report of Lavrentyi Beria of 5 November 1940, which referred to the situation of the Georgian emigration, as well as the situation in Turkey. He received the pseudonym “Omeri”and the number “59” (with the latter he signed a letter to Beria).36 He returned to Turkey on 13 November 1940, and, as Françoise Thom writes, “after the journey, he was full of euphoria and a sense of self-importance. He did not conceal his stay in Moscow, even boasting that he went there by plane, which seemed suspicious to emigrants. It was obvious that he did not consider himself as a pawn in the game moved by some one else. At the end of the note made by the NKVD after the Soviet troops entered Iran, he wrote: ‘Tell me, what is the situation in Iran, who do have you in your hands and who slipped away?’ It is rather the tone of a partner than an agent.” 37

All that was linkeded by the contacts of Shalva Berishvili with the Poles. Their details are known from Polish sources. In the Institute of the Polish Underground in London were found documents concerning the offer made by Shalva Brishvili to the Polish post operating in Istanbul of the international communications of the military underground, and so Związek Walki Zbrojnej – Armia Krajowa [Union of Armed Struggle – Home Army] (ZWZ-AK), codenamed “Bey,” headquartered in London. On 6 December 1940, Berishvili presented in an extremely flattering way an anti-Soviet Georgian organisation that would cover the entire Caucasus and wrote, among other messages:

“In winter, once a month, I will receive and send post by a special courier. In the summertime, at marked points, the border will be crossed, and in the spring, if I have the opportunity, I wish to cross the border and work there all summer. I was sent there for the first time in 1930, I crossed the border the second time in August and spent two and a half months in the Soviet Union, I was in Moscow and Baku, but although I wished it very strongly I did not have time to go to Lvov; with the right resources, the Promethean movement could be very well organised there and connect through us with all the nations of Russia.” 38

In this text, our attention is drawn to the fact that the author of this document knew well what were the main assumptions of the Promethean movement and, also considering, as I write below, that he was an agent of the NKVD, this meant that the Soviet special services had knowledge of the assumptions and objectives of the Promethean movement. There is an important question here, to what extent the Promethean movement has been identified by the opponent, what conclusions were reached in Moscow and what countermeasures were applied. Their knowledge means that we will be able to determine how far the promoters of the Promethean movement have managed to achieve their objectives, and how successful counter-measures have been initiated.

At that time, in the camp in Kirkaldy, Scotland was Col. Dipl. Roman Gvalesiani, before the outbreak of war, deputy commander of the divisional infantry of the 6th Infantry Division in Cracow. He gave a good opinion about S. Berishvili, as a prominent Georgian emigrant. Between 15 April and 20 April 1941, in agreement with Berishvili, he was dispatched from Istanbul via the Caucasus courier of the “Bey” post, a Georgian. On 20 May, the station informed Headquarters that on that day, Lt. Col. Emil Macieliński, wired to the ZWZ-1 in Lvov, that the courier had arrived in Istanbul and that he considers the route as safe. On 17 May, the courier arrived in Lvov without any obstruction and delivered to the receiver’ s mail ($1,000 and 4 quartz pieces for the radio station).39

Both in Istanbul and in the Polish military authorities in London it was realised that this route of communication with Lvov would be used in principle only for sending money. On 3 June 1941, another courier was dispatched (the post contained among the other contents about 3,000 dollars), but he did not arrive in Lvov due to German aggression against the USSR.40

The situation was complicated, however, when, on 1 July 1941, one of the “Bey” base employees, Capt. Wacław Zalewski (Wiktor Zaleski), who was also the head of the Polish intelligence service post in Istanbul, informed the commanding officer of the base, Col. Dipl. Alfred Krajewski that his contact, Shalva Berishvili was an agent of the NKVD, and that he started his collaboration with the NKVD, which was established in the autumn of 1940. It is known that at the end of June 1941, Simon (Szymon) Gogiberidze accused Berishvili in the presence of Cpt. Zalewski of being an agent of the NKVD. Zalewski ordered Berishvili to leave Turkey, threatening that if he failed to do so, he would take back his Polish passport (in the name of “Karol Berik”). Berishvili who was so enraged by such a turn of events that he turned to the NKVD, demanded appropriate steps against Zalewski and to begin operations with the Turkish authorities to get rid of the overly inquisitive and talkative Gogiberidze. To calm the situation, the Turks set up a commission, which in December 1941 cleared Berishvili of all allegations of co-operation with the NKVD and forbade Gogiberidze spreading rumours on the subject.41 Gogiberidze himself emigrated from Georgia in 1924, and then secretly visited the USSR several times and went on various missions to Tbilisi and Moscow. In May 1939 he came with a Polish passport to Tehran as an emissary and then in October 1939 he was handed over to the French at their disposal. In November, at the order of the Foreign Office of the Mensheviks, accompanied by two other emissaries, Leon Pataridze and David Erkomaishvili he went to Georgia. This time he was to use the Turkish smuggling channel, but eventually, he used Rapava’ s network for that purpose. The French were keen to sabotage the Baku–Batumi oil pipeline, but in fact, he followed the instructions of the Jordanians that he should advise the Georgians not to start an uprising until the Soviet troops were in Georgia.42 Very soon the representatives of the Georgian emigrants realised that the British and the French treated Georgia exceptionally instrumentally and that initiating any action would have resulted in the Georgians themselves being the most affected.43

In reply to the information on Berishvili received by Zalewski sent from the “Bey” base in London, on 16 July 1941, the Chief Commander in Chiefs’ Staff sent an order to break off all contact with him and his men, and on 18 July Col. Krajewski sent a warning, in this case to Lt. Col. Macieliński to Lvov. It was a bit late since from the end of June Lvov was occupied by the Germans.44

However, there was one more aspect of the case. Namely the chief commander of ZWZ, Lt. Gen. Kazimierz Sosnkowski on 15 May 1940, appointed Lt. Col. Emil Macieliński to the position of commanding officer of Area 3 (Lvov) of ZWZ. He soon began to be suspected of collaborating with the NKVD.45 Probably from the spring of 1940 (April–May), the suspicions became more and more intense, in March 1941 Mjr George Fryzendorf, an intelligence officer from the post in Cairo came to the conclusion that the Lvov conspiracy was controlled by the NKWD. Therefore, on 30 May 1941, the head of the VI Division (National) in the Commander in Chief’ s Staff, Col. Jerzy Smoleński, sent a wire to the post in Istanbul that “NKWD is sitting on Pomian’ s organisation” [Lt. Col. Emil Macieliński – G.M.]. Finally, after the investigation and the trial before the underground court, it ended with the execution of Lt. Col. Macieliński for co-operation with the NKVD in Warsaw on 7 December 1941, following the sentence of the court.46

F. Thom, in an impressive biography of Lavrentyi Beria, has devoted only a few sentences to the cooperation in Turkey, but states the case: “Berishvili also offered to the Polish secret services that he would hand over to his agents in Georgia instructions for Polish agents in Western Ukraine. Rapava has fulfilled this task in record time.”47 This means that the Minister of the Interior of Georgia, the head of the Georgian NKVD of and the Minister of State Security of Georgia, the Commissioner of State Security, 3rd rank A. Rapava, completed the task of delivering the courier mail to the ZWZ in Lvov. This is best demonstrated by how far under the NKVD control were not only to the structures of the Polish conspiracy in Lvov, but also to the channels of communication with them, and under the surveillance of Soviet intelligence but also employees of Polish institutions as well as intelligence posts of other countries. The wire of Macieliński confirming the receipt of mail is a clear proof of how much of the Polish conspiracy was under that control. Polish underground organisations were completely controlled here by the Soviet secret services; encouragingly one can only say that fortunately, this situation did not last long.

The future fate of S. Berishvili was tragic. On 23 October 1942, he crossed the border from Turkey to Georgia and, at the order of the Georgian interior minister, A. Rapava; he was placed in Tbilisi in an apartment, at that time 13 Derzhynski Street, where he stayed 55 days. A special employee of the NKVD Jojua (Georgyi) Shukri was posted to it. In the same year, he was arrested and sentenced to 25 years of Gulag imprisonment for cooperation with the Polish, Turkish, English, French, German and Japanese intelligence services, as stated in the indictment. His case was led by the head of the investigative department for the most important cases of the NKGB USSR, Major of the state security service Lev Vlodhimirskyi. After the war Gen. Charles de Gaulle and the French Red Cross asked unsuccessfully for his release and permission to return to France as a French citizen. He survived everything, was released in 1961, returned to Georgia and spent the last years of his life in Tbilisi, where he died in September 1989. In 1993 his very interesting memoir (“No adornment”) was published. Unfortunately, it is only available in Georgian. The memoir was written and published by the Georgian historian Guram Sharadze. At the same time, his sister was arrested along with him and tortured, she committed suicide in prison.48 In the draft of an indictment of 16 June 1954, against one of the close associates of L. Beria, Gen. Lt. Amajak Kobulov, drafted by the Soviet Prosecutor General, Roman Rudenko, one may read about Berishvili: “Often illegally crossing the USSR border, a German intelligence agent, used by Beria for secret communications with the Georgian Mensheviks, emigrants…”49 In his memoirs there are many Polish threads, it seems that it would be appropriate to translate them and publish in Poland.

Then, following his memoirs and Françoise Thom’ s findings, we should write about the circumstances and causes of his arrest. Namely, in 1941, the first attempt by the Communist authorities of Georgia to contact Germany was made to secure her future for in exchange for cooperation with the Wehrmacht. Other attempts were made in 1942, and they were attempted by the head of Georgia NKVD, A. Rapava and Shalva Dadiani, chairman of the Georgian Defence Council. Interestingly, on 8 September 1942, the German military people managed to persuade Hitler to promise independence to the Caucasus nations. On the other hand, Noe Jordania and the emigrants have sent a recommendation to the Caucasus: do not make a revolt before the Germans are firmly there. Meanwhile, the Germans did not respond to the proposals of the Communists, and their contact with them was impossible due to the reluctance of the Germans. The latter, however, made contact with the emigrants. In the summer of 1942, the Germans formed the Sonderstab “Kaukasus,” which after October 1942 was located in Stavropol. It was to create a civilian administration in the Caucasus occupied by the Germans. At the same time, the Megrelian refugees expected that Beria would tip the balance towards Georgia’ s independence (Beria himself was a Megrel); there were numerous rumours about his conflict with Stalin. In July 1942, Sonderstab “Kaukasus” sent several people (Megrels) to Istanbul, who were tasked with preparing Stalin’ s murder. S. Berishvili joined the Megrelian group that was selected to accomplish this task. Upon arriving in Georgia, he met Rapava and then went to Moscow. There he met Beria in the presence of Kobulov, Mierkulov and another officer. However, in the talks with Kobulov, which he held at the turn of 1942 and 1943, he firmly refused to participate in Stalin’ s assassination and replace “one Georgian with another,” believing it would be badly accepted by Russian society. In this situation, he was imprisoned and for the whole 1943 Kobulov still regularly called him, asking if he changed his mind. However, he firmly refused to take part in this venture.50

It is also worth mentioning, briefly, that it is not known what the mission was, which was not approved by Berishvili. Françoise Thom supposes that Beria wanted him to become a mediator in talks with Germany and the Western countries. Recalling Berishvili’ s memoirs and the testimony of Grigori Tokayev, who fled to the West in October 1947, he writes that Beria was considering Stalin’ s murder and perhaps needed a trusted emissary to the Abwehr people in Germany who planned to stand out against Hitler. Berishvili, who had good contacts in the German circles in Istanbul, would be perfect for this role, but he did not agree to take part in this operation. At present, it is only possible to state that the deliberations on these possible intentions of Beria and his companions will be a rewarding task to historians for many years, especially when such sensational threads appear.51

It is hoped that further research of these issues will enable us to discover some important details, also important for knowledge of Polish history. It turns out that by confronting archival material and documents concerning the fate of Poles and Georgians, we can establish many important facts from the history of both nations, and not only about their mutual relationships. We have a chance to learn more about the history of the Polish underground in the Eastern Borderlands in the years 1939–1941, the problems of its communication with the posts in Romania and Turkey and the activities of the Polish authorities in exile. In this case, we were dealing with large-scale Soviet intelligence operations, which were aimed not only at gathering intelligence about the enemy, but also influencing developments in neighbouring countries and paralysing the functioning of entire structures. Evaluating, based on these sources and documents that we have access to, its activities, it must be emphasised that due to them we could recognise the tasks, and thus the intentions of the German intelligence in the Middle East and Caucasus. The same was true of Turkish, British and French plans. Important information was received from the Japanese, and finally, the Polish underground activity was paralysed. It is astonishing that such a fruitful activity has never been broadly described.

Now there is no doubt, in the light of known sources, that both the signatories of August and September 1939, the Third Reich and the Soviet Union treated the situation as transient and their leaders realised that conflict between them was only a matter of time. The Soviet leaders finally realised this in the summer of 1940, after the defeat of France, Belgium and the Netherlands. The attempts that were undertaken by Soviet aggression on 17 September 1939, to gain Ukrainian society did not produce results. On the contrary, it became clear that the Ukrainians would favour the Germans, in their attempt to build an independent state. Thus, since the summer of 1940, the policy towards the Polish community has changed, with the first significant signal being the telegram of J. Stalin to the secretary of the Lvov Oblast Leonid Hryshchuk, in which the dictator criticised “overdoing in dealings with the Polish population.”52 Then there was the celebration of the 85th anniversary of the death of Adam Mickiewicz in Lvov, which was a clear tribute to the Polish people. On the other hand, at the arrest of activists of the Polish underground in Lvov during the interrogations and conversations with high-level NKVD officials, proposals were made to continue their activities against the Germans and Ukrainians in cooperation with the NKVD (both in the case of Dipl. Col. Leopold Okulicki and, for example, Włodzimierz Młotkowski). Hence, it fully justified the conclusion that Lt. Col. Emil Macieliński, Commander of the Lvov Region ZWZ-1 from 15 May 1940 to September 1941, also decided to take part in a similar game. This may be supported by the fact, that the document, dated before 15 May 1940, which was found and published after many years, most probably was written by him.53 The document contains a proposal for far-reaching Polish-Soviet cooperation and proposals for activities aimed at ensuring the loyal attitude of the Polish community towards Soviet rule. Unfortunately, in the source publication, where it was published, no author’ s signature was placed, so that only by its content, researchers may find that the author was Lt. Col. E. Macieliński.54 In this situation, the findings of F. Thom have a fundamental, decisive significance as to the role and significance played by Lt. Col. Macieliński and it is shown that they are yet another argument for the fact of his cooperation with the Soviet intelligence services. They fully confirm the findings of Rafał Wnuk, who concluded his reflections on the Polish underground in the Eastern Borderlands from 1939 to 1941 in such way: “(…) In the spring of 1941, in Lvov (…) there were only the few dozen people groups [which – G.M.] remained completely transparent to the NKVD.”55

Let me reiterate here once more the words of reflection that I wrote down at the end of my article in Zeszyty Historyczne: “(…) Due to such precise operation, the NKVD gained full control of the communication route from Istanbul to Lvov, which enabled reading the post for the Lvov ZWZ, and would then enable reading the replies sent in response. (…) Later on, with this route under its control, it was possible to work out in detail Polish posts in Turkey, and in the case of cooperation between Poles with Turkish, English or any other intelligence in the region, Soviet intelligence had the opportunity to counteract this.”56 It should be noted that the contacts of Shalva Berishvili in Turkey and the Middle East have provided the Soviet side with a chance to conduct many operational activities. At the same time, the reason for the Georgian emigrants’ engagement with the Soviet authorities, as a result of the threat of Turkish and Anglo-French aggression, was a completely understandable and explicable move. After the passage of time it may be thought that this was not a good solution, but it seems that there was no good solution.

1 About the Georgians – contract officers in the Polish Army see among the other: R. Karabin, “Gruzińscy podchorążowie i oficerowie kontraktowi w Wojsku Polskim 1921–1939”, Pro Georgia, 4 (1994), pp. 23–34; No. 6, pp. 24–37; A.Cz. Żak, “Gruzińscy sojusznicy Polaków. Kilka uwag o oficerach kontraktowych w służbie Rzeczypospolitej”, Niepodległość, 47 (1995), pp. 164–184; Z.G. Kowalski, Najliczniejsza mniejszość. Gruzini, Azerowie i inni przedstawiciele narodów Kaukazu w Wojsku Polskim w okresie międzywojennym, [In:] Mniejszości narodowe i wyznaniowe w siłach zbrojnych Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 1918–1939, eds Z. Karpus, W. Rezmer, Toruń 2001, pp. 177–200; W. Materski, Polsko-gruziński sojusz wojskowy 1920, [In:] Wojna polsko-sowiecka 1920 roku: przebieg walk i tło międzynarodowe: materiały sesji naukowej w Instytucie Historii PAN, 1–2 października 1990, ed. A. Koryn, Warszawa 1991, pp. 203–209; R. Rybka, K. Stepan, Rocznik oficerski 1939, Kraków 2006, pp. 952–954.

2 R. Rybka, K. Stepan, Rocznik oficerski 1939, p. 532, 954.

3 Here, I would like to thank Mr. Professor Georges Mamoulia from Paris, to whom I owe a lot of valuable guidance and invaluable information for writing this text, who also gave me copies of the documents relating to Shalva Berishvili from the Archives of the Ministry of Security of Georgia (AMBG) and the Archives of the Paris Police Prefecture (APP), that were in his possession.

4 Berishvili Dossier, copies from APP from the collection of G. Mamoulia; Dossier “Omeri”, copies from AMBG from the collection of G.Mamoulii (further cit.: Dossier “Omeri”); F. Thom, Beria – oprawca bez skazy, Warszawa 2016, p. 101; H. Kuromiya, G. Mamoulia, The Eurasian Triangle: Russia, The Caucasus and Japan, 1904–1945, Warszawa–Berlin 2016, p. 177.

5 F. Thom, Beria, p. 101; G.G. Mamoulia, Bor’ba za svobodu i nezavisimost’ Kavkaza (1921–1945), Tbilisi–Paris 2012, pp. 335–336; D. Rayfield, Edge of Empires. A history of Georgia, London 2012, pp. 356–357.

6 F. Thom, Beria, pp. 91, 93; II Rzeczpospolita wobec ruchu prometejskiego, edition, introduction, selection and elaboration P. Libera, Warszawa 2013, pp. 54–55. The negotiations on the text of the Caucasus Confederation and the text of the agreement see: R. Witak, Tajne wojny służb specjalnych II RP. Działalność Ekspozytury nr 2 Oddziału II Sztabu Głównego WP w latach 30. XX w., Łódź 2014, pp. 164–171; G.G. Mamoulia, Kavkazskaia konfederacia v oficyalnikh deklaracyakh, tainoi perepiske i sekretnikh dokumentakh dvizhenia „Prometei”. Sbornik dokumentov, Моskvа 2012, pp. 95–96.

7 F. Thom, Beria, p. 93.

8 See among the others: Zbiór dokumentów ppłk. Edmunda Charaszkiewicza, editorial, introduction and footnotes A. Grzywacz, M. Kwiecień, G. Mazur, Kraków 2000, pp. 56–87; P. Libera, “Pierwsza notatka o ‘zagadnieniu prometejskim’ mjr. Edmund Charaszkiewicza z 15 listopada 1939”, Nowy Prometeusz, 8 (2015), pp. 137–150; A. Grzywacz, G. Mazur, “Ruch prometejski w Polsce”, Zeszyty Historyczne (Paris), 110 (1994), pp. 74–85; M. Kwiecień, G. Mazur, “Przyczynek do dziejów ruchu prometejskiego w Polsce”, Zeszyty Historyczne (Paris), 136 (2001), pp. 87–109. Many valuable information can be found in: I.P. Maj, Działalność Instytutu Wschodniego w Warszawie 1926–1939, Warszawa 2007.

9 F. Thom, Beria, pp. 232–233.

10 Ibid., pp. 237–238.

11 P. Libera, “Scholars of Promethean Nations in 1928–1939: Attempted Portrait”, Nowy Prometeusz, 7 (2015), pp. 154–155; Second Republic to the Promethean Movement, editorial, selection, introduction and elaboration P. Libera, Warsaw 2013, pp. 259–260; F. Thom, Beria, p. 243.

12 G.G. Mamoulia, Bor’ba za svobodu, p. 336.

13 Ibid., p. 189.

14 Ibid., pp. 189–190.

15 P. Libera, Ruch prometejski w okresie II Rzeczypospolitej – próba bilansu, [In:] Sukcesy i porażki wywiadu polskiego 1918–1945, ed. R. Majzner, Częstochowa 2014, pp. 114–115.

16 G.G. Mamoulia, Bor’ba za svobodu, pp. 335–336; F. Thom, Beria, pp. 231–232. Here the date given for Rapava’ s nomination – December 1938, while in: N.V. Petrov, K.V. Skorkin, Kto rukovodil NKVD 1934–1941. Spravochnik, Moskva 1999, pp. 354–355, they give date of the decree as 29 November. Until 12 January 1948, Rapava served as alternate minister of interior affairs of Georgia, or the Minister of State Security of Georgia.

17 F. Thom, Beria, p. 233.

18 Ibid., p. 232.

19 Ibid., p. 233.

20 E. Duraczyński, Polska 1939–1945. Dzieje polityczne, Warszawa 1999, p. 122.

21 Dossier “Omeri”; F. Thom, Beria, p. 232. There was a mistake as to the rank of the Polish officer – according to K. Rybek, K. Stepan, Rocznik oficerski 1939, pp. 301, 922, in the Polish Army at that time served Captain Stefan Wincenty Nowaczek.

22 Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR w Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voinie. Sbornik dokumentov, vol. I: Nakanunie, 1 part: Noiabr’ 1938 g. – dekabr 1940 g., Moskva 1995, pp. 94-95.

23 G.G. Mamoulia, Bor’ba za svobodu, pp. 336–338; F. Thom, Beria, pp. 232–234; J. Reychman, Historia Turcji, Wrocław 1973, p. 319.

24 G.G. Mamoulia, Bor’ba za svobodu, pp. 360–362; F. Thom, Beria, p. 238; about the British plans to attack the USSR writes with extensive details P. Osborn, Brytyjskie plany ataku na ZSRR 1939–1941, Warszawa 2007, although he omits there the problem of Georgian participation in that operation.

25 Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, vol. I, part 1, pp. 103–106.

26 F. Thom, Beria, pp. 239–242; D. Rayfield, Edge of Empires, p. 357.

27 Dossier “Omeri”; F. Thom, Beria, pp. 240–241; D. Rayfield, Edge of Empires, p. 357.

28 Dossier “Omeri.”

29 Ibid.; F. Thom, Beria, pp. 239–242; D. Rayfield, Edge of Empires, pp. 357–358, and Z. Anchabadze, European Georgia (Ethnogeopolitics in Caucasus and Ethnogenetical History of Europe), Tbilisi 2014, p. 176, wrote that Shaliko Berishvili was nicknamed “Agent Homer” and that through him the Japanese military attaché in Ankara, Horyo Tateishi, informed Beria that Japan was not going to attack the Soviet Union in 1941. At that time, this was very important information for the Soviet leadership, enabling it to move units from Siberia to repulse German aggression. Similar news came from Tokyo from the famous agent Richard Sorge. See also: H. Kuromiya, G. Mamoulia, The Eurasian Triangle, pp. 200–201.

30 F. Thom, Beria, pp. 311–314.

31 Dossier “Omeri”; F. Thom, Beria, pp. 311–312. Interestingly, one of the leading figures in the Soviet intelligence service, Gen. Pavel Sudoplatov, in his memoirs, claims that Sultanov was a Soviet agent. In this way appear further threads, as this would indicate that the penetration of emigration by Soviet intelligence and through it intelligence services of other states was quite far advanced. However, I have doubts whether all of these issues will be resolved.

32 Delo Beria. Prigovor obzhalovaniu nie podlezhit, ed. V.N. Khaustov, Моskwa 2012, p. 105.

33 Delo Beria. Prigovor obzhalovaniu nie podlezhit, pp. 105–106; F. Thom, Beria, pp. 242–244.

34 F. Thom, Beria, p. 244.

35 Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, vol. I, part 1, p. 270.

36 Dossier “Omeri”; F. Thom, Beria, p. 242; Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, vol. I, part 1, pp. 270–278.

37 F. Thom, Beria, p. 242.

38 Studium Polski Podziemnej w Londynie (SPP), 2.3.7.1.1./11; G. Mazur, “Między Stambułem a Lwowem. Z dziejów bazy łączności ‘Bey’ w Stambule 1940–1941”, Zeszyty Historyczne (Paris), 127 (1999), pp. 33–34.

39 G. Mazur, “Między Stambułem a Lwowem”, pp. 36–37; L.A.B. Kliszewicz, Placówki wojskowej łączności kraju z centralą w Londynie podczas II wojny światowej, vol. 3: Baza w Stambule, Warszawa–Londyn 1999, pp. 49–50.

40 G. Mazur, “Między Stambułem a Lwowem”, pp. 44–45.

41 F. Thom, Beria, p. 244; J.S. Ciechanowski, Turcja, [In:] Polsko-brytyjska współpraca wywiadowcza podczas II wojny światowej, vol. I, eds T. Dubicki, D. Nałęcz, T. Stirling, Warszawa 2004, p. 327.

42 F. Thom, Beria, pp. 238–239.

43 This is described in detail by F. Thom, Beria, pp. 238–244.

44 G. Mazur, “Między Stambułem a Lwowem”, p. 46; L.A.B. Kliszewicz, Placówki wojskowej łączności, pp. 50–51.

45 R. Wnuk, “Za pierwszego Sowieta”. Polska konspiracja na Kresach Wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej (wrzesień 1939 – czerwiec 1941), Warszawa 2007, p. 93.

46 Ibid., pp. 92–93, 107–108; G. Mazur, Walka NKWD ze Związkiem Walki Zbrojnej na Kresach Południowo-Wschodnich w świetle dokumentów z polskich archiwów w Londynie, [In:] Europa nieprowincjonalna. Przemiany na ziemiach wschodnich dawnej Rzeczypospolitej (Białoruś, Litwa, Łotwa, Ukraina, wschodnie pogranicze III Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej) w latach 1772–1999, ed. K. Jasiewicz, Warszawa–Londyn 1999, pp. 673–677.

47 F. Thom, Beria, p. 243.

48 Delo Beria. Prigovor obzhalovaniu nie podlezhit, pp. 271–274, 458, 594; Politbiuro i delo Beria. Sbornik dokumentov, ed. O.B. Mozokhina, Moskva 2012, pp. 292–293, 314–315; H. Kuromiya, G. Mamoulia, The Eurasian Triangle, pp. 177, 200–201; D. Rayfield, Edge of Empires, pp. 358; F. Thom, Beria, pp. 101, 333–335.

49 Delo Beria. Prigovor obzhalovaniu nie podlezhit, pp. 506. Information on Berishvili’ s cooperation with German intelligence is untrue; he had contacts with many intelligence services, but so far no documents were found to confirm his contacts with the German services.

50 F. Thom, Beria, pp. 326–335.

51 Ibid., p. 335.

52 G. Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie 1939–1944. Życie codzienne, Warszawa 2000, p. 44.

53 J. Węgierski, Lwów pod okupacją sowiecką 1939–1941, Warszawa 1991, pp. 258–260; Polskie podziemie na terenach Zachodniej Ukrainy i Zachodniej Białorusi w latach 1939–1941, Warszawa–Moskwa 2001, vol. 1, pp. 273–281.

54 Polskie podziemie na terenach Zachodniej Ukrainy i Zachodniej Białorusi, vol. 1, pp. 273–281; R. Wnuk, Za pierwszego Sowieta, pp. 112–113.

55 R. Wnuk, Za pierwszego Sowieta, p. 113.

56 G. Mazur, Między Stambułem a Lwowem, p. 47.

German Historical Sources About Polish-Georgian Relations during and in the aftermath of the great war
by Giorgi Astamadze

There are two major archives in the Federal Republic of Germany, which provide a significant amount of material about the history of the 20th century: the Federal Archive of Germany (Bundesarchiv) and the Political Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes). The Federal Archive is the bigger one and I hoped that numerous interesting sources about Polish-Georgian relations might have been protected there but unfortunately I found absolutely nothing about the period. The Archive staff did not find anything valuable for my research either. Significantly dozens of materials regarding the First World War and the years after were destroyed or taken as a war trophy by the victorious powers after the Second World War.

In the Political Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I did find some documents about Polish-Georgian relations from 1916 to 1922. They were dispersed in various files and differ in content from each other.

Some German documents about the same period are in Polish (Archiwum Akt Nowych) and Georgian (Central Historical Archive) archives.1

The Polish and Georgian Kingdoms boasted very similar fortunes at the end of the 18th century when both were conquered by the Russian Empire. During the 19th century Poles and Georgians lived under the authoritarian rule of the Tsar, but the idea of independence and self-governance never ceased to exist within the political elites of both nations. An example of the sentiment between the two peoples is the correspondence between a group of Georgians from Kutaisi and the former Polish member of the Russian Duma Aleksander Lednicki2, which dates back to August 1916. The Georgians write about the martyr fate of Poland, which found evident sympathy and deep support among the best members of Georgian society. “Every person who even superficially knows the history of both peoples, knows also how similar the fate of both peoples at the end of the 18th century was and which political and historical circumstances brought the same result, the loss of independence.”3 The Georgian nobles expressed their support for the brave fight of the chivalrous Poles during the difficult times of Great War and sent a sum of 500 Roubles to Poland collected among ordinary inhabitants of Kutaisi. Two persons signed the letter: Dr Georg Alshibaia and Prince Abashidze.4

The archive boasts also the answer of Alexander Lednicki to the Georgian nobles: “Dear Gentlemen! For us Poles, the tragedy of the remote and unknown but mentally related Georgian people is comprehensible and close, just like its struggle for national existence and freedom tends to be close to the struggle reflected in the heroic poetry.”5 Lednicki wishes fellow Georgians the positive outcome of the Great War, which could bring the long-awaited independence from the conqueror. He assumes Polish independence is not possible without the freedom of the other occupied countries of the Russian Empire and thanks fellow Georgians for their warm letter and present to the Polish people.6 Both letters are samples of the friendship and sympathy between Poles and Georgians.

After the beginning of Great War in Europe the central European powerhouses Germany and Austria-Hungary, later also the Ottoman Empire became at war with the Russian Empire. Almost simultaneously a small group of Georgian emigrants in Europe led by Giorgi Machabeli and Mikheil Tsereteli7 started their activities in favour of the German and Ottoman Empires to finally achieve the complete independence of their country from Russia. They created a Georgian Legion of former Georgian prisoners of war in Germany and Austria, who fought on the Caucasian front against the Russians. The leaders of the so-called “Georgian Independence Committee,” Machabeli and Tsereteli were in touch with anti-Russian and pro-independence Polish politicians. They were present at the International Socialist Freedom Congress in Stockholm, Sweden, May 1917. The representatives of all nationalities of the Russian Empire: Finns, Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Georgians, Tartars and Poles organised a common session where various problems were discussed. The result of the common session was that the participants took a look over the political circumstances in non-Russian countries of the Russian Empire, each nationality showed sympathy for the right of self-determination and a decision was made to establish an Informational Bureau and with its support become acquainted with a mass of information from the non-Russian regions of the Empire.8

In 1917 Mikheil Tsereteli published in Bern, Switzerland his work Liberation of Poland. National Principle by Central Powers and by Entente.9 This small book of 55 pages discusses the establishment of a new Polish Kingdom by the German Empire in terms of international law and historical righteousness. In the introduction Tsereteli brings a few quotes from the works of renowned professors of law, Liszt and Bluntschli10, in favour of small occupied countries and peoples. The author’ s intention is to make it clear that the national principle should not be dependent on victories or defeats in international wars, but on “our national principle demanding the right for every nation, which possesses the necessary elements for state building, of autonomy and independence.”11 Tsereteli considers the ideas of the American President, Woodrow Wilson, regarding the equality of nations and independent Poland to be an important but insufficient step forward, because the peoples of Ukraine and Georgia for instance must also be granted the right of self-determination. He blames the Russian provisional government as well as the Social-Democrats for continuing the policy of the Tsar regarding the subjugated peoples of the Empire.12

The text of the book is completely theoretical. Tsereteli, as a pro-German activist, criticises not only Russia, but also the two other Entente powers, England and France, for their colonial policies in various parts of the world. For him as a child of a conquered nation the fate of Georgians, Poles, Finns, Ukrainians, Tartars and other peoples who live in severe conditions under Russian rule, is very similar to those of the Irish, Indians, Algerians, and Egyptians etc.13 Tsereteli assumes that the Entente powers have no interest or desire to acknowledge the national principle and to fight for it, not only in the Central Powers but throughout the world.14

The most interesting thing about this book is the fact of its publication by a Georgian author. It shows that for a Georgian political activist the liberation of Poland is directly associated with the liberation of his own country and there is no obstacle to prevent him from protecting the rights of Poles as he does in the case of his own people in another book The Rights of Georgia, published also in 1917. Tsereteli’ s work about Poland seemed so pro-Polish and pro-independence to German officials, that the book was considered as not eligible for German propaganda purposes.15

After the declaration of independence of Georgia, Poland did not have its own official representative in the newly born republic. According to Georgian documents the functions of the official representative of Poland in Georgia were accomplished by the German consul in Tbilisi, Friedrich von der Schulenburg. He organised the re-consignment of Polish soldiers at home.16 It was obviously due to the fact that Poland was then a part of German Empire and could not send an official representative to Georgia.

From 1 October 1918 Wacław Ostrowski, a citizen of Poland in living Tbilisi was fulfilling the duties of an unofficial representative of the Polish government to Georgia.17 He did it with the collaboration of the German Military Mission to the Caucasus. The chief of the German Caucasian Expedition, Colonel Kress von Kressenstein, had correspondence with Wacław Ostrowski at his personal address on Madatovskaya Street, N1 in Tbilisi.18 It was still at the interim stage on the way to establishing direct contacts between Poland and Georgia. Ostrowski called Warsaw for official credentials as a representative in Tbilisi, which he received on 22 November 1918 from Mr. Tydelski, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland. Ostrowski was named the man of confidence (Vertrauensmann) to Georgia.19

After the collapse of the German Empire, the Weimar Republic did not have any direct diplomatic ties with the Republic of Georgia until September 1920; until then, the German diplomats of Middle-Eastern countries gathered information about Georgia. For example, the German ambassador to Persia, Rudolf Sommer, was sending information from Teheran at home on 21 February 1920 reporting that two Polish missions were supposed to visit Batumi in the coming days: the first, the political mission under the leadership of Mr. Filipowicz and the second, the economic mission under Mr. Leisner, who was to exchange goods with the locals.20

The same embassy was informing Germany from Teheran on the 5 April 1920 that Poland would be represented in the Caucasus by a diplomatic mission. According to the telegram from Warsaw a delegation would visit Tbilisi in the nearest future whose purpose would be to establish political and economic relations with the three Caucasian countries Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and also to repatriate Polish citizens. The head of the delegation would be the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tytus Filipowicz.21 He would be accompanied by a counsel and economic and military advisers.22

A short German document informs the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a certain poet Kuruliszwili23 has been named as a representative of Georgia in Warsaw.24

On the 28th of June, 1921 the German Embassy in Warsaw informs Berlin regarding some circumstances concerning Mr. Tytus Filipowicz, already the representative of Poland in Russia. He had been sent to Georgia as one of the chiefs of a Polish Red Cross mission there. On his way back he was arrested last autumn by the Soviet government and spent some months in prison in Moscow. He returned in February 1921 after he had been released and was then appointed as an advisor to the delegation in Paris. He never worked in Paris, because soon afterwards he was appointed as a representative in Moscow. When he would assume his post was still unclear. According to the document Filipowicz must be among the supporters of Piłsudski but he was not very active in politics. There were some difficulties between Poland and the Soviet Union about the appointment. Initially the government of Poland considered the candidacy of former Foreign Minister Patek, but the Soviets refused him. The second candidate was Mr. Darowski from the Ministry of Commerce, but he became a minister and thus Filipowicz became the last candidate.25

Polish society and government supported the Georgian people on the international arena since the country had been occupied by Soviet Russia on 25 February 1921. The news from the Polish newspaper Nowa Reforma reported that the socialist MPs of the Sejm made a declaration regarding the attitude of the Polish government to Georgia. The Sejm ordered the government to put emphasis on the Georgian question at the Genoa Conference and do all in its power to support the people of Georgia in the restoration of their independence.26 The Genoa economic and financial conference was held from April to May 1922. Accordingly this discussion in the Polish Seim presumably took place at the end of March or the beginning of April 1922.

The Political Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contains some information about the Georgian-Polish theologian and martyr Grigol Peradze.27 German sources clarify some details of Peradze’ s early days in Germany when he was a student at Berlin University. Before he was accepted at the university, the Georgian Ambassador to Germany, Mr. Vladimer Akhmeteli, and the former Chief of the German Caucasian Expedition, Colonel Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein, had written their supportive reports to the University staff in favour of the young student.28

In another document a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Pope writes a letter about Grigol Peradze to the Ministry of Science, Education and Arts of Prussia and notes that Mr. Peradze knows the German language well enough to follow the lectures at the university. According to the information Peradze was busy with Greek and Jewish at that time.29 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its support for the right of Peradze to study at the university.

1 Credits to Razhden Chikhoria for letting me have the materials from the Polish archive.

2 Aleksander Lednicki (1866–1934) – Polish politician and member of the Russian State Duma.

3 PA AA, R21022, Bl. 73.

4 PA AA, R21022, Bl. 74.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Giorgi Machabeli (1885–1935) – Georgian emigrant politician, later became a millionaire in the United States. Mikheil Tsereteli (1878–1965) – Georgian emigrant politician, later worked as a professor of history at various German universities.

8 PA AA, R21024, Bl. 240–241.

9 Complete survey of the book is available in Georgian: დ. პაიჭაძე, მიხაკო წერეთელის „პოლონეთის გათავისუფლება და ეროვნულობის პრინციპი ოთხთა კავშირსა და ანტანტასთან“, ჟურნალი მნათობი, 2000, N7/8, გვ. 77–92.

10 Franz von Liszt (1851–1919) – a German jurist and specialist of international law. Johann Caspar Bluntschli (1808–1881) – a Swiss jurist and politician.

11 M. Tsereteli, Die Befreiung Polens, Nationalitätenprinzip bei den Zentralmächten und bei der Entente, Bern 1917, p. III.

12 Ibid., pp. IV–VIII.

13 Ibid., p. 40.

14 Ibid., pp. 53–54.

15 L. Bakradze, Georgian-German Relations During the First World War, Tbilisi 2010, p. 88. Source: BA, 09.01.AA, Zentralstelle für Auslandsdienst 265, Bl. 2, 26 July 1917.

16 სსცსა, ფ.1861, ა.2.

17 AAN, MSZ, 6674, Ostrowski to Janusz Radziwiłł, 30 October 1918.

18 AAN, MSZ, 6674, Kress to Ostrowski, 23 October 1918.

19 AAN, MSZ, 6674, Foreign Ministry of Poland to Kress, 22 November 1918.

20 PA AA, R81976, 21 February 1920.

21 Tytus Filipowicz (1873–1953) – Polish politician and diplomat, official representative of Poland in the Republic of Georgia.

22 PA AA, R84093, 5 April 1920.

23 Sergo Kuruliszwili (1894–1925) – Georgian poet and journalist, the founder of Polish-Georgian Club in Warsaw in 1920.

24 PA AA, R84103, 25 October 1920.

25 PA AA, R81976, 25 June 1921.

26 PA AA, R84093, 3 April 1922.

27 Grigol Peradze (1899–1942) – Georgian-Polish theologian, historian, professor, Archimandrite. He was killed in German concentration camp of Auschwitz in 1942. Peradze was canonized by the Georgian Orthodox Church in 1995.

28 PA AA, R63014, 11 February 1922.

29 Ibid., 27 March 1922.

Polish Archival Materials and Documents for Researching… 1917/1918–1921 Polish-Georgian Relations
by Paweł Libera

The history of the Polish-Georgian relations on the one hand and of the Polish Diaspora in Georgia and the Georgian Diaspora in Poland on the other hand have long been an object of research carried out by historians from both those countries. The 1917–1921 period enjoyed particular interest among historians. Though very short it was key for both those states on account of the 1918 reinstatement of their independence and the animated relations during Georgia’ s 1918–1921 independence. In Polish historiography that period was researched predominantly by Bohdan and Krzysztof Baranowski,1 Marek Mądzik,2 and Wojciech Materski.3 The international relations of the Republic of Georgia during that period were also discussed by Polish historians Wojciech Materski and Paweł Olszewski.4 It must be stressed that many valuable primary and secondary sources have been published in Pro Georgia. Journal of Kartvelological Studies, a scholarly journal issued since 1991.5 But the situation has somewhat changed since the publication of the said research. One the one hand, new archival materials have been made available in Poland and elsewhere (for instance, in Russia). On the other hand, some of the materials used by scholars are no longer available.

Consequently, it should be no wonder that not all issues have been sufficiently thoroughly researched and described in detail. This is mainly because Polish archival materials produced during that period are to a large extent dispersed and damaged. Another reason is the difficulties resulting from the language barrier posed by the Georgian language. Owing to the establishment of the Polish-Georgian Commission of Historians there is a real possibility that the current state of research on the 1918–1921 period could be broadened not only by the Georgian sources used so far, but also by new Polish collections of archival materials which have recently been made available to scholars.

This text is aimed predominantly at the scholars who had never conducted search queries in Polish archives. Its main objective is to discuss the key archival sources for studying Polish-Georgian relations during the existence of the Democratic Republic of Georgia.

I. History of documents for studying Polish-Georgian relations

Even though the documents which can be used to carry our research on the history of the Caucasus6 during that period have been published since the interwar period it must be said that today this pertains to a small number of documents. First of all, there is no separate publication of primary sources devoted exclusively to this subject matter. Only individual documents were published within the framework of publishing series such as Dokumenty i materiały do stosunków polsko-radzieckich [Documents and materials for Polish-Soviet relations]7 or the Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne [Polish diplomatic documents], with the latter published after 1991. Only a handful of documents have also been published in the press and scholarly periodicals. Consequently, archival documents remain the best source for researching the mutual relations during this period.

The fact that documents connected with Polish-Georgian relations are to a large extent dispersed is definitely the main obstacle faced by scholars. Nowadays such materials can be found in numerous archives and fonds. Making matters worse, these are usually individual documents, often put in files whose name does not always suggest that they contain documents pertaining to the Caucasus.

To understand why the interwar-period Polish archival materials are so dispersed and damaged it is necessary to bear in mind what happened with them after the outbreak of World War II. Of key importance here is the history of the archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, MSW) and that of Section II and its subordinate institutions.

Germany and the Soviet Union invaded Poland on 1 September and 17 September respectively in line with the provisions of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed on 23 August 1939. Still before the outbreak of World War II, during the last days of August 1939 a part of the MSW archive was set ablaze in Warsaw. The remaining part was salvaged from Warsaw in September. A small part was transported to France via Romania and then to Great Britain. After 17 September 1939, when the Soviet troops marched into the Eastern Borderlands, a significant portion of those documents fell into Soviet hands. It was not until 1948 that the Polish authorities finally retrieved those materials by way of revindication. The documents bore clear traces of having been studied in depth as they had annotations in Russian informing about the content of each folder. It remains unknown whether all of the documents had been returned to the Polish side. During the revindication following the 1921 Treaty of Riga the Bolsheviks carefully analyzed the files and returned only those which did not attract the Bolshevik clerks’ attention.8 It is known for a fact that some of the documents are still stored in Russian archives.

The history of the military archival materials took a slightly different course. Some of them were destroyed back in Warsaw, though the largest collection of documents by far was left near Warsaw and then fell into German hands. A small number of documents was transported to Romania and then to France and Great Britain.9 The archival materials which remained in Warsaw were partly looted by the German troops and then studied in detail. In 1945 the Soviet army took them to Moscow along with German archival materials. Some of the files appropriated by the Germans and stored in Gdańsk-Oliwa were discovered by Polish communists in 1945. They were handed to military security organs and then to civilian ones. Until 1989 most of them were stored in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Centralne Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych, CA MSW), with only a handful of them transferred to state archives of the Central Military Archive (Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe, CAW). Access to them was difficult. The CA MSW let in few scholars and did not allow them to either copy the files or access the inventories. As late as in 1989 most of the pre-1939 files were transferred to state archives, mostly the Central Archives of Modern Records (Archiwum Akt Nowych, AAN) and the Central Military Archive. Among them were documents of military attachés which are key for the subject matter in question. It remains unknown why a fonds of those documents was divided. Some of the documents were transferred to the AAN and some to the CAW, where they were eventually incorporated into the Section II of the Main Staff of the Polish Armed Forces fonds. The largest volume of attachés’ documents connected with Poland’ s relations with Caucasian states remains after the activity of the military attaché to Constantinople. These documents are stored both in the AAN and the CAW. Some of them have already been published.10

In 1939 and 1945 Soviet troops obtained large amounts of archival materials. Those were archival documents of German institutions which operated before and during the Third Reich period as well as archival materials which the Germans had looted in various European countries since 1939. Among them were Polish documents. March 1946 saw the establishment of the Special Archive solely for the purpose of storage and edition of the obtained archival documents. It was first subordinated to the NKVD Archive Administration, and then, beginning with 1948, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and finally, beginning with 1960, to the USSR Council of Ministers. The archive was classified until 1991 and the documents remained unavailable to researchers. Nevertheless, the materials were subject to revindication. Consequently, in 1956 and 1963 communist Poland received a substantial number of civilian and military archival documents.11 The documents were also returned to other countries, mostly from the Eastern Bloc.12 In 1991 Russian journalists informed about the existence of the archive, which soon began to make its collection available to journalists and researchers. After further restructuring the collection of the Special Archive was eventually incorporated into that of the Russian State Military Archive in Moscow. It should be said, however, that not all captured documents were transferred to the Special Archive as some of them were given to other Soviet archives.

II. Documents for researching 1917–1921 Polish-Georgian relations stored in Polish archives

Vast majority of the documents pertaining to this subject matter are stored in Warsaw archives: the Central Archives of Modern Records13 and the Central Military Archive.14 Single documents can also be found in other archives and library collections of manuscripts.

The collection of the Central Archives of Modern Records (AAN)

There is no doubt that the most important files pertaining to the Polish-Georgian relations are stored in the MSZ fonds, with the largest of them, though incomplete, stored in the Central Archives of Modern Records. Some MSZ files are kept in the archives of the Polish Diaspora’ s institutions in Great Britain and the United States, with the documents of the MSW Treaty Section remaining in the MSZ Archive.

Of the documents stored in the AAN15 those of the MSZ Eastern Section16 are undoubtedly the most important, while those produced by the Minister’ s Office or the Consular Section are less significant. Unfortunately, the MSZ files currently stored in the AAN in Warsaw remain incomplete. Most of them pertain to the 1930s and to a lesser extent to the earlier period. Consequently, with the files missing from the MSZ fonds, Polish researchers resort to using copies which were sent to other posts for information, mostly to the Polish embassy in London.17 Single documents can also be found in the other diplomatic posts’ fonds.18 After the fall of the Berlin Wall a certain number of Polish MSZ documents was discovered in American archives. Commonly referred to as the “Qualey source,” they were returned to the Polish authorities in 1922.19 Some of them discussed Poland’ s relations with the Caucasian states during 1917–1921 and they were incorporated into the MSZ20 and the Aleksandra and Józef Piłsudski fonds.21

Another important group of files containing information regarding the Polish-Georgian relations can be found among the military attachés’ files, particularly those of the military attaché to Constantinople.22 Moreover, in the AAN single documents can also be found in the following fonds: Komitet Narodowy Polski [National Polish Committee], Delegacja RP na Konferencję Pokojową w Paryżu [Delegation of the Republic of Poland to the Paris Peace Conference], Akta instytucji wojskowych 1918–1939 [Military institutions’ 1918–1939 files], Rada Regencyjna [Regency Council], and other ones as well. Catalogues of most archival fonds can be accessed at www.szukajwarchiwach.pl.

The collection of the Central Military Archive

Nowadays, the Central Military Archive, which until recently was a part of the Military Historical Bureau (Wojskowe Biuro Historyczne), stores the largest number of archival documents for studying the interwar history of the Polish armed forces. The most important documents connected with the 1917–1921 Polish-Georgian relations are stored in the 1919–1921 Section II of the Supreme Command of the Polish Army fonds (I.301.) and in the military attachés’ files produced during that period which have been incorporated into the 1921–1939 Section II of the Main (General) Staff fonds (I.303.4). Interesting information, though pertaining predominantly to Polish formations in the Caucasus during 1917–1919, can be also found in the Collection of manuscripts (I.400), which is very incomplete though. Last but not least, interesting documents connected with Polish-Georgian relations can also be found in the files of Branch Office 2 of Section II of the Main Staff of the Polish Army. As it dealt with the Prometheism for many years the Branch Office received even earlier files. Most of them are duplicates made in the 1930s and when it is difficult to find the originals one should not ignore the possibility that the document at hand could be a duplicate. At present the files of Branch Office 2 are stored in the Central Military Archive and in the Russian State Military Archive. It should be remarked that in Poland those files were originally stored in the MSW Central Archive under file number E II/folder number. In 1989 when the files were transferred to the CAW they were reedited and their file numbers were temporarily changed. They were then incorporated into the Section II of the Main Staff fonds (I.303.4.[folder number]) and given file numbers continuous with the files produced by other cells of Section II. Consequently, in subject literature one can encounter three different file numbers referring to the same documents. It should be added that the concordance tables which enable switching from the old, outdated file numbers to the currently used ones were made at the CAW only with regard to the second and third ones.23 The above pertains also to some of the files of the military attaché to Constantinople which have been incorporated into the Section II of the Main Staff fonds.

The CAW collection lacks key documents which are stored in the 1918–1922 the General Adjutancy of the Commander-in-Chief fonds (Adiutantura Generalna Naczelnego Wodza). Those documents were salvaged from Poland in 1939 and they are now stored in the archive of the Józef Piłsudski Institute of America.

Remaining archives and collections of manuscripts

Józef Piłsudski’ s close co-worker, Tytus Filipowicz, played a special role in Polish-Georgian relations during 1918–1921 as he was sent on a special mission to the Caucasus in 1920. Filipowicz stayed in exile after 1945. With his archive dispersed, some of it is kept in the archive of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw (Polska Akademia Nauk), another part is stored in the Józef Piłsudski Institute of America, and, last but not least, the remaining documents were handed after the war to the Library of the Main School of Planning and Statistics (nowadays SGH, Warsaw School of Economics; Szkoła Główna Handlowa). The contents of each of these collections is highly diverse. From the perspective of Tytus Filipowicz’ s Caucasus mission, the most important archival materials were stored in the manuscript collection of the Library of the SGH Warsaw School of Economics. Marek Mądzik used those documents in the 1980s and now quotes them at length in his publications. Unfortunately, the search queries conducted in that fonds by the author of this text and Professor Wojciech Materski have yielded a negative result: the documents devoted to Filipowicz’ s Caucasian mission are no longer there and the library employees cannot explain when, where, or how they disappeared.

III. Documents for researching 1917–1921 Polish-Georgian relations stored in foreign archives

Documents connected with Polish-Georgian relations can obviously be found also in the archives located in the countries connected with the diplomatic relations between those two countries and in archives in the countries which were their chief enemies. One should bear in mind that a substantial percent of the documents produced by agencies of the Polish civilian and military administration during the interwar period are now stored outside Poland. These materials can be divided into those stored in archives of the Polish Diaspora’ s institutions and those kept in Russian archives into which they were included after World War II as “trophy” archival materials.

Polish Diaspora’ s archives

The archival documents of one of the key institutions during the period of the struggle for Polish borders – the General Adjutancy of the Commander-in-Chief – were transported to New York, where they have been stored in the local Józef Piłsudski Institute. Their photocopies were very quickly transferred to the Piłsudski Institute in London and later their microfilms were donated to the AAN in Warsaw.24 The entire fonds has been digitalized and its digital form can be accessed on the website of the Józef Piłsudski Institute in America.25 1990 saw the publication of a selection of documents from that fonds, but the focus was laid on the 1920 Polish-Soviet War, with only a handful of documents regarding the Caucasian affairs.26

Fragments of the 1918–1945 MSZ files are stored in the Hoover Institute27 and the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in London.28 Microfilms of the MSZ files stored in the Hoover Institute have been in the AAN for years. They have recently been digitalized and are now available in the digital form.29 Most of them regard World War II, though some of them predate it. The same pertains to other fonds of diplomatic posts of the Second Republic of Poland stored in archives of the Polish Diaspora’ s institutions.

Russian archives

The largest collection of Polish documents in Russian archives is stored in the collection of the former Special Archive, which has been donated to the Russian State Military Archive in Moscow (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi voennyi arkhiv). This archive includes parts of the archival fonds stored in the AAN and CAW in Warsaw. A list of the archival fonds stored in this archive has been published both in Polish30 and Russian.31 The most important of them are: Naczelne Dowództwo Wojska Polskiego [Supreme Command of the Polish Army] (fonds 471k), Oddział II Sztabu Głównego Wojska Polskiego [Section II of the Main Staff of the Polish Army] (fonds 308k), and the files of diplomatic and consular posts (fonds 465k). One should also pay attention to documents collected in the fonds called Polskie organizacje nacjonalistyczne i wojskowo-dywersyjne [Polish nationalist and military-sabotage organizations] (fonds 482k), which contains the remains of the archive of the Contemporary History Research Institute (Instytut Badania Historii Najnowszej), which operated before 1939 in Warsaw. Its collection included, for instance, files of Polish military formations in the Caucasus during 1917–1919.

Some Polish archival documents connected with the subject matter at hand are also stored in the collection of the State Archive of the Russian Federation in Moscow. Among them the most interesting ones are: the small fonds called Agencja Konsularna Przedstawicielstwa RP na Kaukazie [Consular Agency of the Polish Legation in the Caucasus] (fonds R-3598) and Przedstawielstwo Rady Regencyjnej Królestwa Polskiego w Rosji [Representation of the Regency Council of the Kingdom of Poland] (fonds R-9510).

There is no doubt that Polish archival documents stored in Russian archives are among the ones least researched by scholars, particularly as far as the Polish-Georgian relations are concerned.

1 B. Baranowski, K. Baranowski, Historia Gruzji, Wrocław 1987.

2 M. Mądzik, Działalność społeczno-kulturalna i polityczna Polaków w Gruzji na przełomie XIX i XX wieku, Lublin 1987; “Próby nawiązania stosunków politycznych między Polską a Gruzją w latach 1918–1921”, Rocznik Lubelski, 29–30 (1987/1988), pp. 77–87; M. Mądzik, M. Kruszyński, Polskie misje dyplomatyczne na Kaukazie w okresie międzywojennym, [In:] Kaukaz w stosunkach międzynarodowych. Przeszłość, teraźniejszość, przyszłość, eds P. Olszewski, K. Borkowski, Piotrków Trybunalski 2008.

3 Predominantly W. Materski, Gruzja, Warszawa 2010, and idem, Georgia rediviva. Gruzja w stosunkach międzynarodowych 1918–1921, Warszawa 1994. See also “Bibliografia prac Wojciecha Materskiego dotyczących historii Gruzji i stosunków polsko-gruzińskich”, Pro Georgia, 26 (2016), pp. 299–305.

4 Predominantly P. Olszewski, Polityka państw Ententy wobec Zakaukazia w latach 1918–1921, Piotrków Trybunalski 2001.

5 The periodical is issued by the Center for East European Studies of the Warsaw University. Its editor in chief is Doctor Dawid Kolbaia. 29 issues of the periodical were published between 1991 and 2019.

6 One of the first to be published was Prince Sumbatow’ s memorial: “Memoriał przedłożony przez ks. Sumbatowa, delegata rządu gruzińskiego, przedstawicielom Koalicji w Bernie, w listopadzie 1918 roku”, Przegląd dyplomatyczny, 2 (1919), pp. 90–95.

7 The 11-volume series was published during 1962–1987 and it covered the period from March 1917 to December 1960. One should bear in mind that the editorial staff’ s work was censored and pressured by the authorities in various ways. More about this see: J. Szumski, Polityka a historia: ZSRR wobec nauki historycznej w Polsce w latach 1945–1964, Warszawa 2016.

8 See P. Wojkow, Tajny raport Wojkowa, ed. J. Kumaniecki, Warszawa 1991.

9 W.K. Roman, Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe 1918–1939. Tradycje, historia, współczesność służby archiwalnej Wojska Polskiego, Toruń 2009, p. 47ff.

10 II Rzeczpospolita wobec ruchu prometejskiego, selection and ed. P. Libera, Warszawa 2013.

11 B. Woszczyński, “Materiały archiwalne przekazane Centralnemu Archiwum Wojskowemu przez Związek Radziecki”, Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny, 4 (1964), pp. 231–237; idem, “Akta wojskowe otrzymane ze Związku Radzieckiego”, Archeion, 42 (1965), pp. 217–227. General information about the revindication of Polish archival materials from the USSR see K. Wróbel-Lipowa, Rewindykacja archiwaliów polskich z ZSRR w latach 1945–1964, Lublin 1982.

12 Information about this topic can be found in Ukazatel fondov inostrannogo proiskhozhdenia i Glavnogo upravlenia po delam voennoplennykh i internirovannykh NKVD-MVD SSSR Rossiiskogo gosudarstvennogo voennogo arkhiva, Moskwa 2001, pp. 114–251 (see the electronic version of the guide: http://guides.eastview.com/browse/guidebook.html;jsessionid=abcWk9RwMp9NUhAmjbI1w?bid=123).

13 Informator o zasobie archiwalnym Archiwum Akt Nowych, ed. E. Kołodziej, in cooperation with W. Bieńkowska and B. Nowożycki, Warszawa 2009.

14 Informator o zasobie archiwalnym Centralnego Archiwum Wojskowego, ed. N. Bujniewicz, Warszawa 2008.

15 Inwentarz Akt Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych w Warszawie z lat [1915–1917] 1918–1939, ed. E. Kołodziej, Warszawa 2000.

16 AAN, MSZ, 5194-6860a.

17 AAN, Ambasada RP w Londynie [Polish Embassy in London], 171.

18 For instance, AAN, Poselstwo RP w Bukareszcie [Polish legation in Bucharest], p. XXX.

19 “Z archiwaliów Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych II RP. Po 50 latach kolekcja sovieticów wraca z Waszyngtonu”, selection and ed. J. Jaruzelski, Przegląd Wschodni, 4 (1991), 1 (1992–1993), 2 (1992–1993).

20 That was when the Central Archive of Modern Records received the largest compact collection of documents devoted to this subject matter. Their current file number of the folder where they are stored is AAN, MSZ, 6674b.

21 AAN, Akta Aleksandry i Józefa Piłsudskich [Aleksandra and Józef Piłsudski files], I/49.

22 AAN, Attachés wojskowi [military attachés], AII/31-34.

23 CAW, Inwentarz akt Oddziału II Sztabu Głównego Wojska Polskiego [catalogue of files of Section II of the Main Staff of the Polish Army] (I.303.4), pp. 718–769.

24 AAN, microfilms M-39–M-397, M-420–M-427, M-486–M-502.

25 http://archiwa.Piłsudski.org/inwentarz.php?nonav=0&nrar=701&nrzesp=2.

26 Sąsiedzi wobec wojny 1920 roku, ed. J. Cisek, London 1990.

27 Electronic version of the catalogue available at https://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/tf4v19n70w/.

28 See catalogue http://pism.co.uk/Docs/A%2011.pdf.

29 https://szukajwarchiwach.pl/800/42/0/?q=XARCHro:800+XTYPEro:zesp&order=syg_order&wynik=11&rpp=15&page=1#tabZespol.

30 Archiwalia polskiej proweniencji terytorialnej przechowywane w Państwowym Archiwum Federacji Rosyjskiej i Rosyjskim Państwowym Archiwum Wojskowym, ed. W. Stępniak, Warszawa 2000.

31 Ukazatel’ fondov inostrannogo proiskhozhdeniia i Glavnogo upravlenia po delam voennoplennikh i internirovannikh NKVD-MVD SSSR Rossiiskogo gosudarstvennogo voennogo arkhiva, Moscow 2001.

Archive Heritage of Ivane Nanuashvili and Polish Emigrants kept in K. Kekelidze Georgia National Centre of Manuscripts
by Shorena Murusidze

Korneli Kekelidze Georgia National Centre of Manuscripts is an institution, which represents the largest antiquity storage of Georgian manuscript heritage together with the library of old printed books and the manuscripts research centre. Here are preserved up to 10,000 Georgian, and 4,000 foreign (Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Mongolian, Ethiopian, Armenian, Greek, French, German, Jewish and other) manuscript books of the X–XIX centuries, palimpsest papers of the V century, 40,000 Georgian and 5,000 foreign historic documents. The centre also keeps private archives of Georgian and foreign public figures of XIX–XX centuries. The archive is constantly growing. In the last few years, the National Centre of Manuscripts was given the private archives of Georgian emigrants (Giorgi Kvinitadze, Tamar and Akaki Papava, Vakhtang Jobadze, Elise Pataridze, Karlo Inasaridze, Irakli Bagration-Mukhraneli, Viktor Nozadze, Mikhako Tsereteli, Davit and Ivane Nikuradze, and Ivane Nanuashvili). From among them we select the private archive of Ivane (Vano) Nanuashvili (1902–1975), a military figure, a captain of the Polish army being an émigré since 1921, based on his archive many new facts and aspects are revealed about works and activities of Georgian emigration.

Biographical information about Ivane Nanuashvili is kept in his archive; this is a chronological biography in the Polish and English languages. Based on this document, we discover that Nanuashvili studied at the Georgian Democratic Republic Officers’ School in 1920–1921. In February–March 1921, as a cadet of a military school he fought against the Red Army. After the occupation of the Republic of Georgia by Soviet Russia; Vano Nanuashvili, together with other military officers went into emigration. In 1921–1922 in Greece and in 1923–1925 in Poland, he studied in military academies. In 1925–1928 he was a second lieutenant of the 62nd infantry regiment of Bydgoszcz. In 1928–1930 Nanuashvili was enrolled in the Polish National Army Military College, and in 1930–1939 he served as an officer in the 24th Division in Jarosław, Poland. During the Second World War, in September 1939, Ivane Nanuashvili fought in the Polish Army against Germany. He was taken prisoner by the Germans. He was kept in captivity until 1943. He was released by Georgians, who had an influence in Germany at that time. The identity of those people and how they managed to release Nanuashvili is not known to us and we can only speculate. Nanuashvili’ s archive holds his German passport. During the occupation, in 1941–1943 he worked as a courier in Poznan City Hall, in 1943–1944 he was a driver for the German transportation company “Speer.” In September 1944 Nanuashvili managed to cross the front line in Italy, near Florence and went to the opponent’ s side. After this, he still returns to the Polish Army and is enrolled in Polish corps that fled in England until 1948.

After the Second World War Vano Nanuashvili received the permission to wear Polish military award the Cross of Valour and in 1947 to wear the Silver Cross with Swords. Its confirmation documents are kept in his private archive. We should add here too, that according to the photographic materials kept in Nanuashvili’ s archive, he had many more orders and awards hanging on the wall at his apartment, but it is not clear which rewards are shown in the pictures and whether these awards belong to him or not. The poor quality of the pictures does not enable us to research additional information.

Vano Nanuashvili finished his military career in 1948. In 1951 he moved to the United States, where he lived in New York (1951–1954), then in Boston (1954–1960) and finally in San Francisco (1960–1975). While living in the USA, he worked in a factory and finally as a guard. Despite many efforts, he was not able to start work in government service. Vano Nanuashvili tried to work as a translator at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Georgian redaction of Radio “Voice of America” and Congress library.

After the resignation from the military service, while living in the United States, Vano Nanuashvili spent all his energy and funds to fight for the restoration of the independence of Georgia, which was expressed in creating and distributing works of scientific-political-military content, in being a member of the Georgian Political Emigrants Union, also in cooperation with organisations of emigrants from the Soviet Union. He is the initiator and the implementer of the Georgian periodical entity in San Francisco, San Francisco’ s Georgian Hub. This journal was published in the Georgian and English languages. Vano Nanuashvili has written military-political works in the Georgian and Polish languages. Among them, especially noteworthy is his work published in New York (in English, about 400 pages): What Everyone in the Free World Should Know about Russia. He was a member of the Executive Committee of the Captive Nations Organisation existing in the USA. He made a great contribution in familiarising Georgia and Georgian issues to the society and government of the United States.

As mentioned above, Ivane (Vano) Nanuashvili’ s private archive is kept in the Georgian National Center of Manuscripts. One part of his archive was given to the National Center of Manuscripts by Andro and Nino Dobrovs living in the United States (Los Angeles) in 2000 and the second part was donated by the daughter of the Georgian emigrant, scientist Vakhtang Jobadze, Eter Jobadze in 2013. The chronological archival materials of Ivane Nanuashvili’ s, which were found covers the post Second World War period, from 1945 to 1975 in particular. The documents were created in the Georgian, English, Polish and Russian languages.

The private archive of Vano Nanuashvili includes:

1. Correspondence: 1) with emigrants (Aleksandre Sulkhanishvili, Tarasi [Tsuladze], Lado Arveladze, Aleksandre Manvelishvili, Viktor Nozadze, Pavle Sarjveladze, Teimuraz Bagrationi, Mikheil Dadiani and etc.); 2) with official government structures of the United States (Department of National Defense; United States Information Agency); 3) Anti-Communist and Anti-Bolshevik organisations in the USA; 4) Official figures (President of the Unites States, Senators, Congressmen and Governors); 5) Universities in the USA and Europe (Georgetown, Yale, and London University);

2. Materials about emigrant’ s unions of Eastern Europe and USSR and the participation of Georgians in them;

3. Materials about the Georgian community in the USA, San Francisco’ s Georgian Hub, Georgian political emigrant organisations existing in the United States;

4. Documentation reflecting Ivane (Vano) Nanuashvili’ s biography and works;

5. Photographic materials.

Vano Nanuashvili’ s archival documents are important sources for study of the works of Georgian political emigrants living in the USA during the Cold War. Georgian emigrants created new political organisations, presented the Georgian issue to the society and the government of the United States, cooperated with emigrant unions of the Soviet Union, government units of the USA and American organisations.

During Vano Nanuashvili’ s life in the United States, he had active communication with the Polish emigration, he especially distinguishes Stanisław Paprocki. He writes: “It is not necessary to name others [except Paprocki – Sh.M.] Poles, who will do everything to help me.”1 His articles were printed in Polish journals published in emigration. It is interesting, that he had written a book in the Polish language. Nanuashvili’ s article “About Poland’ s Liberation War and its Analogue to our Wars”which was printed in the 19th issue of the cadet’ s journal Mkhedari.

Two private letters from the archive of Vano Nanuashvili are most notable, which are about the Polish Army and the issue of Georgians being there. One of the letters is sent to Pavle Sarajishvili in 1965, where Vano Nanuashvili writes that “None of the men from the Cholokashvili’ s group have been accepted in the Polish army or any other institution.”2 Here he means the members of Kakutsa Cholokashvili’ s “Sworn Squad” who were fighting against the Soviet occupation. The second letter does not have a date and the addressee is not known. Vano Nanuashvili notifies the addressee, that he is not allowed to work at the high positions of the Polish army because of his education and training, because as he explains: “the Polish Army did not practice increasing the ‘honorary retreat’ ranks and titular degrees. On the contrary, they let them work at high positions despite the education and trainings, despite the lack of a degree.”3

As already mentioned above, Ivane Nanuashvili’ s archive, along with Georgian and English materials, keeps Polish documents. These archival units were processed in 2013, by the employee of the archival department of the National Center of Manuscripts and the students of the University of Marie Curie-Skłodowska, Poland. As a result of the united work, the Polish documents were described with an “archaeographical” description and the essence of each document. In particular, document type, short summary, date, language, number of pages, writing material, persons, toponyms and other characteristics. Such a detailed description enables an interested person to search for the desired material in short period of time.

Polish archival units, according to their essence include: 1. Correspondence with Polish military; 2. Articles of Ivane Nanuashvili; 3. Polish documents of Nanuashvili, and 4. Photo materials. The earliest document related to Poland is dated 1922, this is the pass, issued by the Italian department of liaison passport control in Istanbul for Vano Nanuashvili, to travel to Poland through Romania, the pass has Romanian, Polish and Turkish border control stamps, travel visas and Turkish and Romanian stamps. And the latest Polish document is dated 20 November 1975. It is a letter of Wacław Jędrzejewicz, officer of the Polish army, historian, and the director of the Institute of Józef Piłsudski, USA, to A.R. Dąbrowa, to whom he expresses his condolences on the death of Ivane Nanuashvili. He describes Nanuashvili as a “Great Patriot and a person with an open mind.”

From the Polish archival documents, first of all, one should outline the correspondence. The content of the letters can be grouped as follows:

– Memories on battles in September 1939;

– Remembering, specifying and studying the events of September 1939 in emigration;

– Opinions of addressees about ongoing events in the world;

– Information of private characteristics about Georgian and Pole emigrants.

The addressee of every letter is not known yet, some are only mentioned by name or military rank (Colonel). Among the known addressees are Colonel of the Polish army Adam Koc, and the recipient is Wacław Jędrzejewicz, we must find out who Balo and Genku are.

The correspondence is an important source for events of September 1939, to clarify the biographies of Georgian and Polish emigrants and also to study the Georgian-Polish relationship.

In addition to the correspondence especially notable from the archive is Vano Nanuashvili’ s autobiography of 37 pages, written in the Polish language in 1968, which is not a study and its Georgian version does not exist. Considering the biography of Vano Nanuashvili, it is likely, that this document includes interesting information about Georgian military personnel living in Poland and their participation in the Second World War. The study of this document will specify, or add new information to the biographies of Georgian and Polish emigrants. It will be important to research certain issues of the latest history of Georgia and Poland.

Vano Nanuashvilis archive contains photos, which are taken during his service in Polish army. Not all the pictures are identified and the process is ongoing.

To summarise, we would say that Vano Nanuashvili’ s Polish archival documents have not been studied and accordingly is not in scientific circulation. We hope that Vano Nanuashvili’ s archive will be the base for many more scientific researches.

1 Letter from Tarasi [Wuladze] to Ivane (Vano) Nanuashvili, 10 August 1964. Archive of Ivane (Vano) Nanuashvili, Georgian National Manuscript Centre.

2 Letter from Ivane (Vano) Nanuashvilis to Pavle Sarjveladze, 6 September 1965. Archive of Ivane (Vano) Nanuashvili, Georgian National Manuscript Centre.

3 Letter from (Ivane) Vano Niniashvili to unknown person, undated. Archive of Ivane (Vano) Nanuashvili, Georgian National Manuscript Centre.

Report from the First Seminar
of the Polish-Georgian Historians’ Commission… Tbilisi, 29 May – 1 June 2017

Monday, 29 May 2017

At the Ministry of National Education

A meeting at the Georgian Ministry of National Education – the Commission asked for help in obtaining permission for its members to make free-of-charge photocopies and scans at the State Archive in Tbilisi. The delegation was received by Mr.  Tamaz Marsagishvili, deputy minister of education, and Mr. Kakha Khandolishvili, head of international cooperation at the Ministry of Education.

At the Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University

Meeting with the rector, Giorgi Sharvashidze. The university is the Commission’s main partner on the Georgian side.

At the Georgian Parliament

Meeting with Giorgi Volski, deputy president of the Georgian Parliament and chairman of the Polish-Georgian Parliamentary Group.

At the Presidential Palace

Meeting at the Presidential Palace (Mrs. Anna Dolidze, Secretary of the President of Georgia).

Tuesday, 30 May 2017

Meeting of the Commission at the Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University

Maro Makashvili Hall (building I, 1 Chavachavadze Street, 10:00–14:00)

The meeting was opened by the chairman of the commission, Dr David Kolbaia. Dr Kolbaia began by stating that the meeting of the Polish-Georgian Historians’ Commission was a historical event because such a commission had never existed before in the history of relations between Poland and Georgia or Georgia and other countries.

He then read a document from the University of Warsaw from 1933, which mentioned the first Georgian professor at UW, Grigol Peradze. He added that it was a symbolic text illustrating the attitude of the UW academic community toward international academic cooperation in those days. The document also informs of a Georgian language course at UW.

Dr Kolbaia then gave the floor to the director of the Centre for East European Studies (SEW UW), Jan Malicki. Mr. Malicki commented on the text been read out by Dr Kolbaia, underlining that Polish-Georgian relations are very special. He also congratulated the Commission on the rich and interesting programme of the meeting. He added that the Commission would be mentioned and greeted by the President of Poland Andrzej Duda during a meeting at the National Library with the diplomatic corps and Georgian intellectuals and social activists, at which the president will officially confirm his honorary patronage for the Commission.

Director Malicki also introduced Ms. Agnieszka Góralska, academic secretary of SEW UW Caucasus Station (Delegation) at TSU and briefly described the role and tasks of the Caucasus Station in Georgia and the Delegation in Kiev (Ukraine).

The deliberations of the Polish-Georgian Historians’ Commission then begun. The working languages of the meeting were Polish and Georgian, with the assistance of interpreter Michal Mantidze.

Absent from the meeting: professors Andrzej Furier, Zaza Abashidze and Beka Kobakhidze. The other Commission members were present.

Session 1

The deliberations began with a brief discussion of plans and organisation-related business. The floor was taken by the president of the Commission, Dr David Kolbaia.

The first topic discussed was a publication planned for September (a special issue of Pro Georgia), featuring papers by members of the Polish-Georgian Historians’ Commission. According to plan, one such publication should appear annually. The special issue will only comprise papers by historians from the Commission. If an outside scholar wishes to publish his or her work, it has to be based on archival materials and approved and reviewed by members of the Commission.

The subject of the St. Grigol Peradze conference planned for 2018 (6–8 December), devoted to the centenary of Polish and Georgian independence, was then raised. The conference will enjoy the honorary patronage of the presidents of both countries. Dr Kolbaia informed the members of the Commission that he plans to invite historians specialising in the period from 1918 to 1921, perhaps until 1939 (which is to be the main subject), to the conference.

The floor was then opened to members of the Commission.

Dr Otar Janelidze thanked the chairman for his supportive words. He then discussed a research topic that he is exploring as part of his work on the Commission. Dr Janelidze’s research focuses on the diplomatic mission of the Democratic Republic of Georgia to Poland. Poland’s regaining of independence as reflected in the Georgian press of the period is a side avenue of his research.

Part of the materials have already been collected. The poet Sergo Kuruliszwili was the originator of the idea to set up a diplomatic mission of the young Georgian state in Poland. A document has been found in which the Georgian government gives him its recommendation. In October 1920, a Georgian delegation left for Poland. The address of the mission is known (a document has been found) – they lived in a hotel at 37 Krakowskie Przedmieście.

The Georgian government subsequently decided to reduce the number of its missions. The representation [in Poland] was also to cover the Baltic states and Finland. In 1921, these diplomatic efforts were dropped. The Georgian government found itself in exile, enjoying the support of Józef Piłsudski.

After his lecture, Dr Janelidze had to leave to deliver a lecture.

Dir. Malicki took the floor. He said that the issue is extremely important because it touches on a little-known chapter of history. He added that phonetic issues linked to Polish documents might pose some difficulty for Georgian scholars, while Polish members of the Commission could offer help. The Commission discussed the name of the hotel in which the Georgian diplomatic mission could have lived in Warsaw (Hotel Saski? It was precisely the phonetic spelling that raised doubts). This was recognised as a great opportunity to work together on the period from 1918 to 1921 in diplomatic relations.

After Dr Janelidze left the room, the Commission chairman, Dr Kolbaia, proposed returning to organisation-related business.

Rev. Dr Henryk Paprocki asked Dir. Malicki whether in addition to conducting research the Commission could table initiatives. After receiving an affirmative answer, he proposed that one of the new streets in Warsaw be named in honour of St. Grigol Peradze. He proposed that a suitable request be prepared to the City of Warsaw.

Dir. Malicki replied that after the decision was made to name a street in Tbilisi in honour of Marshal Józef Piłsudski, he had already started efforts to reciprocate the gesture on the Polish side. He also added that he believed it to be feasible.

Prof. Materski suggested that Ilia Chavchavadze is great figure for the Georgian people, while Peradze is more recognisable to Poles. He thus proposed that Chavchavadze’s name also be taken into account as a potential street name. Dir. Malicki agreed, arguing that Piłsudski, too, is little known to Georgians, while he is important to Poles, thus naming a street in honour of Chavchavadze would be a commensurate gesture. Rev. Paprocki added that a street was due to be named in honour of St. Grigol Peradze within the next few years in Białystok.

At that point Dir. Malicki said that it is important to gain the approval of both the Polish and Georgian members of the Commission, particularly if the Georgian side sees it as an appropriate gesture. Dr Kolbaia responded that it was Chavachavadze, an awakener and reviver of the nation, who was important to the Georgians. Rev. Paprocki proposed that efforts be made to name streets in Warsaw both in honour of Ilia Chavchavadze and of Grigol Peradze because the first is important to the Georgian people and the second lived in Warsaw. Asked about his opinion, Dr Micheil Bachtadze said that on the Georgian side it is Chavchavadze who is well-known, important and symbolic.

Dir. Malicki summed up the discussion, saying that he would use the Commission’s mandate to launch the procedure to name a street in honour of Chavchavadze immediately, and further on in honour of St. Grigol Peradze.

There was also discussion as to the potential location of the street in Warsaw. Three variants were examined: a new street in a new housing estate, renaming an old street within the framework of Warsaw’s de-communisation scheme (as suggested by Dr Libera), or naming a nameless square. The Warsaw members of the Commission took it upon themselves to look for an appropriate location.

Rev. Paprocki will develop a bio and information about St. Grigol Peradze, while Dr Kolbaia will prepare a note on Ilia Chavchadze (for the street naming application).

Session 2

Before beginning the session, Dir. Malicki proposed that a candle with the Polish eagle and a SEW ribbon be placed at the plaque with the name of Marshal Piłsudski Avenue when the street is inaugurated to commemorate this great figure. The idea was received with applause.

Next, Dr Kolbaia opened the second session, chaired by Prof. Wojciech Materski and Dr Micheil Bachtadze. Due to time constraints, the speakers were asked to be succinct.

The first to speak was Rev. Dr Henryk Paprocki, who delivered a lecture entitled The collected works of St. Grigol Peradze and possibilities of publishing their translations into foreign language.

The first problem with regard to this undertaking is to locate the said works, many of which were published in rare sources. So far, three volumes have appeared in Polish in addition to a volume of Translations of early Christian literature into Georgian. Two volumes have also been published in Georgian. Rev. Paprocki prepared the Polish edition, while the Georgian edition was prepared by Dr Kolbaia. The final volume (3) will be published in Georgian and Polish in collaboration with Dr Kolbaia. It will contain journals, interviews and poems. Peradze’s journal references historical events such as Georgia’s declaration of independence, the creation of an autocephaly, or the country’s first elections. According to Rev. Paprocki, it is an important historical source.

The idea was also put forward to develop a lesson for schools in Poland and Georgia about Georgian officers in the Polish armed forces and the life of St. Grigol Peradze, martyr of KL Auschwitz. Dr Paweł Libera proposed developing the materials within the framework of the Polish Institute of National Remembrance education dossier series.

The Commission resolved to develop one lesson, based on the premise that in addition to research, the Commission’s tasks also include education, publicity, and even political action.

Next, Dr David Kolbaia delivered a lecture entitled Georgian lecturers and students at the University of Warsaw in 1900–1939.

Dr Kolbaia began by presenting a publication of Marshal Piłsudski’s lectures on the November Uprising, due to come out in September 2017. The text was first published in Paris, translated by Lt Col Walerian Tewzadze. Dr Kolbaia has written an afterword for the publication Marszałek Józef Piłsudski i emigracja gruzińska w Polsce (Marshal Józef Piłsudski and Georgian émigrés in Poland), which will also include documents (photographs) showing how the memory of Marshal Piłsudski was celebrated in the Caucasus.

Dr Kolbaia then presented new documents which he is studying with regard to figures such as Peradze, Nakashidze, Kavtaradze and Imnadze – Georgian professors in Poland. He also made reference to the preparations to publish Grigol Peradze’s journal from 1917–21 together with Rev. Paprocki. The journal with commentary will be published by 15 September 2017.

During the session, Dr Beka Kobakhidze joined the Commission at 12:07.

Dr Micheil Bachtadze then assumed chairmanship of the session.

Prof. Wojciech Materski delivered a lecture entitled The Polish-Georgian military alliance: an element of Józef Piłsudski’s security policy.

Prof. Materski started by discussing the problem faced by the historian. New documents and sources are probably to be discovered in Georgian and French archives (emigration materials). He has been working with Polish sources since the 1980s and they are well-researched. For that reason, he proposed a new approach to the documents being examined with regard to the broader context. The sources in question are used by scholars when analysing the assumptions of Piłsudski’s security policy within the context of Poland’s alliances with France, Ukraine, and Romania (as of 1924), meanwhile the military alliance with Georgia (the document was initialled but not approved) is seldom investigated. Piłsudski’s strategy, which the planned alliance with Georgia was part of, was a Promethean policy. The paper has already gone through preliminary editing, it outlines Piłsudski’s scheme, the mission of Tytus Filipowicz, documents and organisational actions, as well as prospects for further (hypothetical) cooperation, since the Republic was in great peril. Ordzhonikidze’s Army had occupied the outskirts of Tbilisi. Cooperation could not develop under these conditions. The main claims of the paper are:

1. Piłsudski attached more value to cooperation with Georgia than one might gather from the literature on the subject.

2. The contractual service of the Georgian officers should be seen as part of the Polish-Georgian alliance.

3. The Polish-Georgian alliance, initialled in 1920, gave rise to the concept of Prometheism and the tradition of friendly relations between the two nations.

4. It is worth bringing this tradition back in education.

Chairmanship of the session was subsequently assumed by Prof. Materski, who introduced the next speaker.

Dr Micheil Bachtadze delivered a lecture entitled An attempt at the Sovietization of Georgia in 1920 and the Polish-Bolshevik war. Dr Bachtadze focused on presenting three crucial issues, namely:

1. The impact of the Polish-Soviet War on Georgia

2. Polish soldiers fighting on the Georgian side.

3. Georgian soldiers fighting the Soviets.

Micheil Bachtadze discussed his research with regard to three points. The main claim regarding the first of the above points, based on the material examined to date, is that Soviet Russia did not dispose of any additional forces to wage war in Transcaucasia due to the problems the Bolsheviks faced on the Polish front. When examining the documents, Dr Bachtadze came across an individual named Iwan Rusiecki, a colonel in the Georgian Army, who might have been a Pole, as certain data indicate. The documents describe Rusiecki’s participation in clashes with the Bolshevik forces and state that he was wounded. Pictures of Rusiecki have also been found in the press. There were also other individuals of Polish origin in the Georgian army. When working on the topic of Georgians in the Polish-Soviet war, the speaker found photographs of three Georgians who deserted from the Soviet forces and joined the Polish side. Their names probably cannot be established, but the photographs will be published.

Session 3

Chair: Prof. Grzegorz Mazur

Dr Georges Mamoulia delivered a paper entitled Polish-Georgian relations in light of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs archive.

Dr Mamoulia informed the participants of the session that the archive of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs holds two series of documents relating directly to Georgia: a Georgian series and a Caucasus series.

The documents, which have already been researched, make it possible to come to the following conclusions: the French were interested in Polish-Georgian relations because of their own policy toward the Caucasus. Until 1920, France supported the White Russian movement and did not support the idea of independence for Georgia and the other Caucasian republics. According to the documents, the first Polish actions in Georgia become noticeable in the autumn of 1919, when the head of the French military mission to the Caucasus brought attention to the activities of Ostrowski. These are described in detail. When the law on the socialisation of land was adopted, Ostrowski launched efforts to make sure that the decrees did not become radical. The most interesting document that Dr Mamoulia has found in the Caucasus series concerns Filipowicz’s mission – it contains a list of all the members of the mission and lists Poland’s political priorities, not only in Georgia but also in Azerbaijan. The document is large-format and consists of 5 pages. In the opinion of Dr Mamoulia, it is worth publishing. French archival documents are a very important source for the Commission’s further research.

Next, Dr Paweł Libera delivered a paper entitled Documents on Polish-Georgian relations during the period of the independent Republic of Georgia in 1918–1921 in Polish archives.

The aim of the paper was to present the basic groups of sources on the subject in the Polish archives. Since Polish historians are quite familiar with the subject and have used the mentioned archives, the presentation was for the benefit of the Georgian members of the Commission.

Due to a botched evacuation in 1939 and the subsequent damage to Warsaw, some documents were lost forever. Others were lost and some were transported out of Poland. What we have are primarily documents from the 1930s, with relatively few documents from the 1920s. Most of the documents returned from the USSR, but some are still in Moscow (fonds 308, branch 2 of the Military Archive in Moscow).

In the 1980s, some documents returned from the United States to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including documents related to Polish-Caucasian relations. The records of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs are kept at the Archive of New Records (Archiwum Akt Nowych) in Warsaw, at the Sikorski Institute in London, and at the Hoover Institution at Stanford. Military documents are kept at the Central Military Archive in Rembertów. Precious supplementary material is also found in private collections, for example the records of Tytus Filipowicz kept in the archive of Wyższa Szkoła Handlowa.

Dr Libera also suggested new directions with regard to document research: there are two more collections of documents of the Regency Council in Moscow (personal records) at the Russian State Archive in Moscow as well as documents concerning the consular agency of the Polish representation to the Caucasus (a small fonds). These documents have not been studied from the angle of Polish-Georgian relations yet. According to Dr Libera, their analysis will not lead to a breakthrough but may add to our knowledge.

Next, Mr. Giorgi Astamadze delivered a paper entitled Polish-Georgian Relations according to the Political Archive of the German Foreign Office 1918–1921.

In his presentation, Mr. Astamadze presented documents relating to Polish-Georgian relations during the period of 1918–1921 found in German archives. The archival materials on the 1920s are kept at the General Archive and at the German Foreign Office archive. During World War II, materials pertaining to World War I were destroyed and there is very little information about this period. Before Germany re-established political relations with Georgia after World War I, the Germans got their information about Georgia via their consulate in Iran. These documents include a letter referencing preparations for Tytus Filipowicz’s mission as well as other documents of broader scope (the entirety of the Caucasus).

Two documents regarding St. Grigol Peradze. Vladimir Akhmeteli was the Georgian ambassador to Germany and gives his recommendation for Peradze to be employed as a university lecturer. The second document is a message regarding a certificate from the theological seminary in Tbilisi.

Next, Mr. Dimitri Silakadze delivered a paper entitled The maps protected in the military archives of Warsaw in 1920–21.

According to the speaker, Polish-Georgian military relations between 1918 and 1921 are not well researched. Mr. Dmitri Silakadze presented the state of research on this subject and some found documents. In his view, a document concerning three Polish officers serving in the Georgian army during the independence period deserves special attention and should be published. In line with the nationalisation policy, they faced dismissal from the army because they did not speak Georgian. A decision was made, however, not to apply nationalisation measures to the Poles so that they could continue to serve. The document, when published along with a commentary, could facilitate a better understanding of Polish-Georgian relations.

Session 4

Chairs: Rev. Henryk Paprocki, Georges Mamoulia

The first paper during the fourth session, Polish-Georgian contacts during World War II, was presented by Prof. Grzegorz Mazur.

The speaker said that the fate of Georgian officers in Poland has been quite well reconstructed. World War II brought about a collapse of structures, the Georgian Committee ceased to function, while Georgians fought arm in arm with Poles on different fronts. Prof. Mazur’s research focuses on documents that confirm the existence of Polish-Georgian relations during the period in question.

A new intriguing aspect of Polish-Georgian relations has recently been discovered. Shalva Berishvili collaborated with Polish intelligence during the interwar period. In the 1930s, he also met with Gen. Sosnkowski. An interesting document has been found in London, dated 6 December 1940, probably authored by Berishvili, in which he approached the Polish liaison office in Istambul with a proposal to establish a secret travel route from the Caucasus to Lwów. The route began to be used, but sometime later it turned out that Berishvili was an NKVD agent and orders were given to break off all communications. In the conclusion of his talk, Prof. Mazur stated that it is worth continuing research into this topic because the Soviet services tried to influence developments in the neighbouring countries.

Chairmanship of the session was then assumed by Dr Mamoulia, who gave the floor to Dr Beka Kobakhidze, who delivered a presentation about Initial diplomatic relations between Poland and the independent Georgian Republic.

Referring to Piłsudski’s security policy, already discussed previously, Kobakhidze underlined that the activity of Roman Dmowski should also be factored into the picture. Dmowski was the first high-ranking Pole to meet with Georgian diplomats in Paris. In light of Georgian documents, the Georgian delegation to the peace conference in Paris in 1919 met with the Poles, and personally with Dmowski. Dmowski proposed that the Poles take on the mandate for Georgia. The Georgian delegation turned down the offer because Poland itself was dependent on Britain and France, while being dependent on a dependent country would not be good for Georgia. What is important, however, is that such an idea actually emerged among the Polish elite, and it is important for us to know what the aims of the proposal were. The speaker is preparing an article based on materials from Georgian, British and French sources.

The final paper in the seminar was delivered by Prof. Paweł Olszewski: The Democratic Republic of Georgia in the policies of the European Entente powers after World War I.

The purpose of the article being prepared for publication is to compare the policies of the victorious powers toward Georgia. After the end of World War I, the victors did not initially recognise Georgia as an independent state. British troops were stationed in Georgia from December 1918 until October 1919. At the same time, Western companies began to explore the country’s natural resources, including petroleum and manganese ore. It was only in 1919 that the Western powers decided to table the issue of Georgian independence at the Paris conference at all. A process began during which the Georgians were in fact in Paris although they were not officially invited as a delegation. The situation changed in late 1919/early 1920, when the Western powers adopted the cordon sanitaire. On 10 January 1920, the governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan, and later also of Armenia, were officially recognised.

The main research topic proposed for the Commission by Dr Olszewski was to compare the position of Poland and Georgia in Entente policy, and to try to find analogies. The article will be based on sources from Polish and American archives.

After all of the presentations had been heard, Dr Kolbaia summed up the seminar. First of all, he thanked those present for a very fruitful conference and reminded them that 15 September 2017 was the deadline for the submission of all articles in their final English-language version. Any photographs to be included in the articles were to be sent in a separate folder.

The Polish-Georgian Historians’ Commission at the monument to Polish president Lech Kaczyński

At 16:40, the Polish-Georgian Historians’ Commission, along with the president of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda, took part in a wreath-laying ceremony at the monument to Polish president Lech Kaczyński. The Commission lit a candle with the Polish coat-of-arms and a Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw ribbon in commemoration of the Polish president.

At the National Library of Georgia, 17:00–18:00

The presidents of Poland and Georgia, Andrzej Duda and Giorgi Margvelashvili, granted their honorary patronage to the Polish-Georgian Historians’ Commission which will jointly investigate the period of the Polish-Georgian alliance of 1917–1921.

“I’m glad to see an academic project that will allow us to draw useful conclusions from all of these general historical experiences that bind us. As the President of the Republic of Poland, it is with great satisfaction that I have granted my honorary patronage to this project. The most important element of this undertaking will be to establish a joint commission of Polish and Georgian historians whose research will focus on the years 1917–1921 which were crucial in our mutual relations. The project includes a series of academic conferences, exhibitions and publications on the Polish-Georgian alliance. I invite all of you to get to know these findings,” President Andrzej Duda said.

During a ceremony at the National Library of the Parliament of Georgia, the president of the Republic of Poland donated a Polish translation of the Canon of Repentance by King David IV Aghmashenebeli. This work of medieval Georgian literature is to be the cornerstone of a Polish library in Tblisi as part of the National Library of Georgia. The Canon of Repentence has been translated from the old Georgian by David Kolbaia, with an introduction by the translator.

Wednesday, 31 May 2017

At 11:30 a.m., the Polish-Georgian Historians’ Commission, along with Polish President Andrzej Duda, took part in the official inauguration of Marshal Józef Piłsudski Avenue in Tbilisi. The Commission lit a candle with the Polish coat-of-arms and a Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw ribbon in commemoration of the marshal.

At the National Defence Academy in Gori

During a meeting at the National Defence Academy in Gori with Rector Zaza Japaridze and Deputy Minister of Defence Nukri Gelashvili, the Commission tabled a proposal to create a hall named in honour of Gen. Aleksander Zakariadze and Marshal Piłsudski. The proposal was received positively and accepted.

Thursday, 1 May 2017

At the State Archives

During a meeting with the director, Mrs. Teona Iashvili, it was decided that the Commission would compile a Polish-language guide to Polish documents in the holdings of the State Archives in Tbilisi. The task will be coordinated by Dimitri Silakadze on the Georgian side, and by Dr Paweł Libera on the Polish side.

At the National Museum in Tbilisi

At the meeting, the parties declared that they would prepare an exhibition of works by Shota Rustaveli in Polish and of Adam Mickiewicz’s Pan Tadeusz in Georgian (September 2017).

At the National Library in Tbilisi

During the meeting, the parties nominated the Commission’s partner at the National Library in Tbilisi, who will take part in preparing an exhibition (26–31 January 2021) of original, previously unknown documents and photographs related to Polish-Georgian relations at the National Museum in Tbilisi. The partner on the Georgian side is the National Library (emigration section, Levan Taktakishvili).

At the Ministry of National Defence in Tbilisi

During the meeting at the Ministry of National Defence the commission pointed out misspelled names on one of the monuments in memory of cadets. Thanks to the engagement of the historians on the Commission the mistakes were corrected and the correct names identified. A decision was made to erect a new monument during the official meeting.

David Kolbaia

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Index

Akhmeteli, Vladimer

Alexius I, Patriarch

Alshibaia, George (Grigol)

Ambrosi I, Catholicos-Patriarch

Antadze, I.

Arslanian, Artin H.

Arveladze, Lado

Assfalg, Julius

Astamadze, Giorgi

Avalov (Avalishvili), Zurab

Bagrationi, Teimuraz

Bagration-Mukhraneli, Irakli

Bakhtadze, Mikheil

Bakradze, Lasha

Bakradze, Vladimer

Baranowski Władysław

Baranowski, Bohdan

Baranowski, Krzysztof

Baratov, Nikolai

Baumstark, Anton

Beach, William H.

Bełszyński, Antoni

Beria, Lavrentiy

Berishvili, Shalva

Berishvili, Tite

Berkman-Karenin, George

Berlement, H.

Beylerian, Arthur

Białobrzeski, Wiktor

Bjorkvist, H.

Blichiewicz, Jan

Bobicki, Leon

Bogucki, Michał

Bondy, Władysław de

Bredov, Nikolai

Brinkley, George A.

Budionny, Semen 74

Bugała, Władysław

Çakmak, Fevzi

Cambon, Jules M.

Cereteli, Irakli

Chachkhiani, A.

Charaszkiewicz, Edmund

Charboard, D.G.

Chardigny, Pierre-Auguste

Cherkezishvili, Varlam

Chkheidze, Karlo (Nikoloz)

Chkhenkeli, Akaki

Cholokashvili, Kakutsa

Colby, Bainbridge

Cooke-Collis, William J.N.

Curzon, George N

Czetwertyński, Seweryn

Dadiani, Mikheil

Dadiani, Shalva

Daredshan (Aka)-Ugrekhelidze Lukac Sewdia

Darowski

Datiashvili, Z.

Deissmann, Adolf

Delfouche, Antioch

Della Torretta, Pietro M.

Denikin, Anton

Dgebuadze

Dionysius (Waledyński)

Dmowski, Roman

Dobrov, Andro

Dobrov, Nino

Dobrzyński, Ireneusz

Doolittle, H.A.

Downarowicz, Medard

Duraczyński, Eugeniusz

Elia II, Catholicos-Patriarch

Erkomaishvili, David

Filipowicz, Tytus

Franzoni, J.

Fricke, Edmund

Fryzendorf, George

Furier, Andrzej

Gabba, Melchiade

Gasanov, G.

Gegechkori, Evgeni

Gegechkori, Petre

Ghambashidze, David

Gitss, V.

Głąbiński, Stanisław

Gobba, Colonel

Gobechia, Ioseb

Gogiberidze, Simon (Szymon)

Gołaczewski

Gorbaczuk, A.

Goussen, Heinrich

Guramishvili, I.

Gvarjaladze, Konstantin

Harnack, Adolf von

Holl, Karl

Hołówka, Tadeusz

Höss, Rudolf

Hovi, Kalervo

Hryciuk, Grzegorz

Hryshchuk, Leonid

Idukowski, Leon

Iljin, Viktor N.

Inasaridze, Karlo

Jadczak, Michał

Jafarov, M.

Jamalian, A.

Janelidze, Otar

Jarasz, Jerzy

Jarecki, Władysław

Jarkuła, Marcin

Jasieński, Erazm

Javakhishvili, Ivane

Jędrzejewicz, Wacław

Jobadze, Eter

Jobadze, Vakhtang

Jodko-Narkiewicz, Witold

Jordan, Richard P.

Jordania, Gigo

Jordania, Noe (Noah)

Jordański, Wincenty

Jugheli, Valiko

Jurkiewicz, Rudolf

Juzwenko, Adolf

Kahle, Paul

Kakhiani, M.

Kalandadze, Shalva

Kandelaki, Constantine

Kantor, Jerzy

Karabin, Robert

Kartsivadze, Nikoloz

Kaufhold, Hubert

Kavtaradze, Jan

Kekelidze, Korneli

Kerensky, Alexander

Kereselidze, Leo

Kerr, Philip H.

Kharash

Khoyski, Fatali Khan

Kluge, T.

Knoll, Roman

Kobakhidze, Beka

Kobulov, Amajak

Koc, Adam

Kolbaia, David

Kolchak, Alexander

Koniashvili, Aleksandre

Konopacka, Maria

Kopisto, Lauri

Kowalenko, Jan

Krajewski, Alfred

Kress von Kressenstein, Friedrich

Kruger, Paul

Kruszyński, Marcin

Krypski, Wiktor

Krzywicki Ludwik

Krzyżanowski, Bronisław

Kurnatowski, Jerzy

Kuromiya, Hiroaki

Kuruliszwili, Sergo

Kvinitadze, Giorgi

Laval, Pierre

Lednicki, Aleksander

Leleu, R.

Lenin, Vladimir

Lepsius, Johannes

Leverkuehn, Paul

Lewandowski, Józef

Leygues, Georges

Libera, Paweł

Lieberman, Herman

Lloyd George, David

Lubach, Ludmila

Łaszkiewicz, Józef

Łempicki, Michał

Łobodowski, Józef

Łukawski, Zygmunt

Machabeli, Giorgi

Machutadze, G.

Macieliński, Emil

Mądzik, Marek

Makharadze, Gerasime

Maksimielishvili, Wardo

Mamoulia, Georges

Manvelishvili, Aleksandre

Marquet, Adrien

Mataradze, David A.

Materski, Wojciech

Mazur, Grzegorz

Mdivani, Simon

Meckeleina, Richard

Meissner, Bruno

Mikulicz, Sergiusz

Millerand, Alexandre

Młotkowski Włodzimierz

Mofakher, G.

Molitor, J.

Moraczewski, Jędrzej

Musiał, M.

Musiał, W.

Myśliński, Józef

Nahrebecki, Edward

Nakashidze, Giorgi

Nanuashvili, Ivane (Vano)

Netman, Louis

Nikolaev (Kvachakidze), Varvara

Nikolaev, Konstantine

Nikuradze, Davit

Nikuradze, Ivane

Nitti, Francesco S.

Nowaczek, Stefan Wincenty

Nozadze, Viktor

Okulicki, Leopold

Olszewski, Paweł

Orjonikidze, Sergo

Orlando, Vittorio E.

Ostrowski, Wacław

Papava, Akaki

Papava, Tamar

Paprocki, Henryk

Paprocki, Stanisław

Pataridze, Elise

Pataridze, Leon

Patek, Stanisław

Peradze, Grigol (Grzegorz)

Pernadze, Nikoloz

Petain, Philippe

Petliura, Symon

Pieczonko, Michał

Piekarski, Ludwik

Piłsudski, Józef

Prusecki, Ivan

Ramishvili, Noe

Rapava, Avksenti

Rappaport, Edmund

Rawicz-Kolasiński

Rayfield, Donald

Reychman, Jan

Rogójski, Michał

Rohde, Hans

Roman, Wanda K.

Rtskhiladze, Grigol

Rudenko, Roman

Rustaveli, Shota

Rydz-Śmigły, Edward

Sabakhatarshvili, Constantine

Salakaia, Ioseb

Sandurski, Leon

Sapieha, Eustachy

Sarajishvili, Pavle

Sarjveladze, Pavle

Sazonoff, Sergey

Schmidt, K.

Schulenburg Friedrich von der

Seyda, Marian

Sharadze, Guram

Shaumyan, S.

Sidamon-Eristavi, Giorgi

Sidamon-Eristavi, Valerian

Sieciński, Jan

Sierakowski Wacław

Sikorski, Władysław

Silakadze, Dimitri

Skukri, Jojua (Georgyi)

Smogorzewski, Zygmunt

Smoleński, Jerzy

Sommer, Rudolf

Sonnino, Sidney G.

Sosnkowski, Kazimierz

Stalin, Josif

Stokes, Claude B.

Sujkowski, Antoni

Sulkhanishvili, Aleksandre

Sumbatashvili, Mikheil

Sundlo, K.

Svanidze, A.

Swietochowski, Tadeusz

Szumski, Jan

Tabukashvili, Rezo

Takaishvili, Ekvtime

Tarby, Andre

Thom, François

Thompson, John M.

Thugutt, Stanisław

Tokayev, Grigori

Topchibashi (Topchibeşhev), Ali Madan

Tsereteli, Eter

Tsereteli, Mikheil

Tsintsadze, Irakli

Tsuladze, Tarasi

Tukhachevsky, Mikhail

Tydelski, Tadeusz

Ullman, Richard H.

Uratadze, Grigol

Urushadze, L.

Wanat, Leon

Wardrop John O.

Wardrop, Olivier

Wasilewski, Leon

Węgierski, Jerzy

Weygand, Maxime

Wilson, Thomas Woodrow

Wiłkomirski, Walerian

Wnuk, Rafał

Wojkow, P.

Woźniak, Andrzej

Wrangel, Pyotr

Yudenich, Nikolai

Zabłocki, Tadeusz Łada

Zakariadze, Aleksander

Zalewski, Wacław (Wiktor)

Zhordania, Noe

Zhordania, Tedo

Żeligowski, Lucjan

Żeromski Stefan